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PREFACE 
 
In the first chapter of Italo Calvino's Palomar, the story of an inquisitive mind 
experiencing the world around him, Mr. Palomar pauses to watch the sea’s gyrations. He intends 
to “see” one wave, to delineate its beginning and ending. In studying the dynamics of this one 
wave, Palomar hopes “to perceive all its simultaneous components without overlooking any of 
them.” From his “reading of a wave,” he anticipates deriving patterns that will aid his 
understanding of the universe. Palomar, however, is distracted by the splitting of a wave into 
two, by the many angles of the cresting wave, and by the movement of the water at the point 
where the wave meets sand. When his vision shifts, the waves appear to be rolling backwards 
rather than thrusting forwards.  
Concentrating the attention on one aspect makes it leap into the foreground and occupy 
the square, just as, with certain drawings, you have only to close your eyes and when you 
open them the perspective has changed. Now in the overlapping of the crests moving in 
various directions the general pattern seems broken down into sections that rise and 
vanish. In addition, the reflux of every wave also has a power of its own that hinders the 
oncoming waves. And if you concentrate your attention on these backward thrusts it 
seems that the true movement is the one the begins from the shore and goes out to sea. 
 
The narrator asks if Palomar’s underlying intention is to “overturn time”? Yet, Palomar walks 
away in frustration and disquiet.  
This story nagged me as I researched, organized pages of documents and notes, and wrote 
this dissertation. Could I follow one story? One narrative? One argument? I began to see these 
cresting and crashing waves, and was distracted by their many angles. Is this indeterminacy a 
symptom of postmodern nausea? Then, I wondered, was Palomar’s blunder that in attempting to 
see “one wave” he neglected its impact on the land beneath his feet? If one wave represented one 
 vii 
temporal trajectory, one push of time, as I saw it, was not the land subject to the effects of 
historical time? Each wave, in its multiple angles, pounded the shoreline, eroded embankments, 
and smoothened stone, churning up and depositing pieces of broken earth on other shores. In 
many ways, this dissertation is an attempt to study the multiple angles of one wave—
indistinguishable at times from preceding and following waves—as it reshapes the shoreline. 
And thus to step out of postmodernity, into the presence of history.  
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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 This dissertation studies the experiences of an Italian emigrant and colonial community in 
the shifting political regimes of the mid-twentieth century Mediterranean. It addresses the 
question of how the sense of community that emerged since the 1930s among “the Italians of 
Egypt” (gli italiani d’Egitto) positioned them within a constellation of competing geo-political 
domains. The community of over 60,000 Italian residents on the eve of the Second World War 
encompassed a wide range of national, ethnic, and religious identities that were brought closer 
together through their temporal and spatial displacement. Juxtaposing archival and oral-historical 
sources, Out of Time documents how the Italians of Egypt engaged national and imperial 
narratives by anticipating, experiencing, and remembering their departure from Egypt, processes 
which in turn constituted their sense of belonging to history.  
 The structure of this dissertation works against teleological readings of history. Chapters 
one and two address imagined futures of the Italians of Egypt in the context of the imperial 
aspirations of the Fascist regime in the early 1930s and during the Second World War. Chapters 
three and four cover the events and legal regimes in Egypt and Italy through which departing 
Italians became “repatriates” and “national refugees” after the Second World War and into the 
1960s. These historiographical chapters are interwoven with oral-historical vignettes that 
illustrate how repatriated Italians of Egypt in today’s Italy revisit their lived experiences. The 
vignettes examine the community’s origins, the consequences of political transformation in 
postwar Egypt, and the experiences of departure from Egypt and arrival in Italy.  
 xv 
 Italian communities in colonial settings in general, and those within the shifting borders 
of the Mediterranean in particular, remain marginal to scholarly work on colonial communities. 
This dissertation contributes to recent scholarship by providing a key example of the complex 
unraveling of the colonial Mediterranean. Demonstrating how departures and arrivals contoured 
the history of the Italians of Egypt, Out of Time underscores the importance of regional politics 
in shaping historical consciousness in the Mediterranean. In doing so, it challenges traditional 
periodization and studies that conceptually divide Europe from the Middle East and North 
Africa.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In March 2012, during the annual gathering of the Association of the Italians of Egypt 
(Associazione degli Italiani d’Egitto, AIDE)--an organization working to “preserve the historical 
memory” of Italians whose families left Egypt since the 1940s after several generations of 
residence--general commentary followed presentations on the influence of Italian architecture 
and engineering in Egyptian cities. A man in his late 70s walked up to the podium to address the 
room full of around 65 individuals (all but two over the age of 60). He said: “I returned from 
Alexandria three days ago... how many here are Alexandrians? [half the hands were raised]. 
Forget! Forget what once was... it’s now a skeleton... but let’s return to something more serious, 
the fact that there are no more…” He was interrupted by the voice of a woman in the audience. 
“Leave us our memories as they are!” she shouted. And then another man, “please, don’t do this 
to us!” The voices of the audience rose in a cacophony against him. The man at the podium 
fumbled to return to his train of thought, he continued:  
anyways, I always go to the Latin Cemetery [where most Italians are buried] because I 
have my relatives there [he then lists different families in the audience who are also 
there] they’re all our relatives... our cemetery, it’s painful to see. Tombstones are 
broken... and another thing... Saint Catherine’s Cathedral... on Sunday we’re merely 15 or 
16 for the Mass.1 
 
His lament slowly faded as the collective voice of the audience overcame him and he was 
ushered away for another individual to conclude the event. The woman’s cry, “leave us our 
memories!” echoed through the duration of my research as I accumulated an extensive amount of 
materials on the departure of Italians from Egypt. Both figures in this story struggled with the 
                                                            
1 AIDE meeting, Rome, 3 March 2012. 
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past, coming to terms in disparate ways with their departure from Egypt. In the case of the man’s 
observations on contemporary Alexandria, he enjoined the audience--connected to him by means 
of a kinship of deceased relatives--to reduce the distance between past and present, to unite the 
memories of the Egypt they had departed with its present state. The audience collectively 
objected to his provocation. Consistent with the outspoken women who cried out, instead, “leave 
us our memories as they are!” some best inhabited the present by relegating the past to memory. 
For the latter, the past that had shaped their community had mutated, and the thought of reuniting 
it with the present only instilled anguish. For the former, on the contrary, there was great anguish 
in the dissolution of the past in the present. Both met in their sense of belonging to a community 
of the past, at risk of vanishing from the present. The friction between these two perspectives, 
and the struggle to reconcile past and present, is the tension which propels this project.  
 
Historical absences 
This dissertation is about a community’s struggle to maintain its presence in history. It is 
a story about endings that never quite end, but are always in the process of ending. Between the 
end of the Second World War and 1961 over 40,000 Italians left Egypt. The vast majority 
“returned” to Italy as “repatriates” or “national refugees,” while others dispersed throughout the 
world. Today, the Italians of Egypt (italiani d’Egitto)--as they have come to be known--
reconstitute their community through various forms of sociality. Although the label “Italians of 
Egypt” suggests a unified group, it encompasses a range of genealogical origins and notions of 
national and regional belonging. Among them were emigrants fleeing Southern Italy after the 
1908 Messina earthquake, Sephardic Jewish protégés from Ottoman territories, political exiles 
who fled the peninsula during the Risorgimento, and merchants who crisscrossed the 
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Mediterranean since the time of the Maritime Republics. In Egypt, they lived overwhelmingly in 
the urban centers of Cairo and Alexandria, with another large population dispersed in the Canal 
Zone, the area that comprises the cities of Port Said, Ismailia, and Suez. Within each city, 
smaller zones held larger concentrations of Italians; in no area did they supersede ten percent of 
the population. They lived in neighborhoods that could be distinguished by class rather than 
national origins. Shobra (Rod al Farag) in Cairo was middle-class, Bulaq was lower or working-
class. Attarin in Alexandria was working-class, Camp Cesar and Ibrahimieh emergent middle-
class neighborhoods, whereas elite Italians lived farther east in Roushdy or Bulkeley. Italian 
schools and institutions were equally dispersed. Hospitals in Alexandria (until 1967) and Cairo 
(still to this day); schools in Alexandria (until 1945) and Cairo (until this day); clubs in Cairo, 
Alexandria and Suez (all closed); cultural centers (still today in Cairo). A vast majority--around 
seventy-five percent--were tradesmen, but members of the community cut across all social 
classes (this is equally true with populations within the community, such as with the Italian 
Jews). Despite the prevalence of narratives that connect Italians to medieval or ancient origins in 
Egypt, the Italian community underwent unprecedented expansion following the British 
occupation in 1882. Among other factors, the imperial aspirations of the National Fascist Party 
(Partito Nazionale Fascista, PNF), the imprisonment of around 5,000 Italian civilians by Anglo-
Egyptian authorities during the Second World War, and processes of decolonization all 
dismantled the conditions that had encouraged migration to Egypt. Today, fewer than 250 remain 
in Egypt. But this story is absent both from public historical consciousness in Italy and from 
historiography. 
 4 
When the Italians of Egypt appear as subjects of scholarly memory, not surprisingly it is 
in the period prior to their departure.2 They disappear from scholarly interest at the same moment 
they disappear from Egypt. Indeed, only in recent years has Italian historiography begun 
carefully to reexamine the communities of Italians that were dispersed in the colonial 
Mediterranean, most often focusing on Italy’s former possessions.3 Marta Petricioli, for example, 
writes about the community in Egypt between 1917 and 1947, detailing the role of their 
institutions, their connections to both Italian and Egyptian politics, and the connections between 
Italian businesses in Egypt to the Italian peninsula. As an institutional history, her work is deeply 
engulfed in description of the specific characteristics of small-scale organizations in Alexandria, 
Cairo, and the Canal Zone.4 Accentuating the myth of the Italian “brava gente,” other scholars 
narrate the “contributions” and “achievements” of Italians to the “modernization” of Egypt under 
and since Mehmet Ali.5 A similar body of literature was generated during the Fascist period.6 
                                                            
2 Elizabeth H. Shlala, “Mediterranean migration, cosmopolitanism, and the law: A history of the 
Italian community of nineteenth-century Alexandria, Egypt,” (Ph.D. diss., Georgetown 
University, 2009); Mercedes Volait, “La communauté italienne et ses édiles,” Revue de 
l’Occident musulman et de la Méditerranée, 46 (1987): 137-156. 
3 Mark Choate, Emigrant Nation: The Making of Italy Abroad (Cambridge, 2008); Donna 
Gabaccia Italy’s Many Diasporas (London, 2000); Anna Baldinetti, Orientalismo e 
colonialismo: La ricerca di consenso in Egitto per l’impresa di Libia (Roma, 1997), 
“Cittadinanza e comunità italiana nella Tunisia coloniale” in Federico Cresti (ed.) Minoranze, 
pluralismo, stato nell’Africa mediterranea e nel Sahel (Catania, 2015): 63-82; Daniela Melfa, 
Migrando a Sud: Coloni italiani in Tunisia, 1881-1939 (Roma, 2008); Nicola Labanca, 
Oltremare (Bologna, 2002); Claudio G. Segre, Fourth Shore: The Italian Colonization of Libya 
(Chicago, 1974); Angelo del Boca Italiani, brava gente? (Neri Pozzi, 2005), La nostra Africa: 
nel racconto di cinquanta italiani che l’hanno percorsa, esplorata e amata (Neri Pozza, 2003), 
Gli italiani in Africa orientale (Milano, 1999); Patrizia Palumbo (ed.) A place in the Sun: Africa 
in Italian Colonial Culture from Post-Unification to the Present (Berkeley, 2003); Nicholas 
Doumanis, Myth and Memory in the Mediterranean: Remembering Fascism’s Empire (London, 
1997). 
4 Marta Petricioli, Oltre il Mito: l’Egitto degli Italiani, 1917-1947 (Milano, 2007). 
5 F. Santorelli, L’Italia in Egitto: Impressioni e Note (Cairo, 1894); L.A. Balboni, Gl’Italiani 
nella Civilità Egiziana del Secolo XIX (Alessandria d’Egitto, 1906); Luigi Dori, “Italiani in 
Africa: Tipografi e giornalisti italiani in Egitto,” Africa: Rivista trimestrale di studi e 
documentazione dell’Istituto italiani per l’Africa e l’Oriente 14, 3 (1959): 146-148; Luca D. 
 5 
Some recount the exile of Italians to Egypt during the Risorgimento period.7 In the 
historiography of modern Egypt, some scholars note the competitive presence (and at times 
political agitation) of Italians on labor markets in colonial Egypt.8 Others speak briefly and 
abstractly of “foreigners” in Egypt and their particular legal circumstances vis-à-vis Egyptian 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Biolato, “Gli italiani fondatori delle moderne poste egiziane,” Oriente Moderno 88 (2008): 151-
197; Paola Viviani, “L’Egitto di naturalisti, patrioti e religiosi italiani: Figari Bey, Balboni e 
Monsignor Dalfi,” La rivista di Arablit IV, 7-8 (2014): 117-133; Some do so simply by omitting 
the political structures that made these “achievements” possible. In this regard see Mariangela 
Turchiarulo, Costruire in “Stile”: l’architettura italiana ad Alessandria d’Egitto. L’opera di Mario 
Rossi (Gangemi, 2012); eds. Ezio Godoli & Milva Giacomelli, Architetti e ingegneri italiani in 
Egitto dal diciannovessimo ventunessimo secolo/Italian Architects and Engineers in Egypt from 
the Nineteenth to the Twentieth Century (Firenze, 2008) and Cristina Pallini, “Architettura 
italiana ad Alessandria,” Controspazio 5 (2000): 22-30; For more on the myth of “brava gente,” 
see del Boca, Italiani, brava gente?; Nicolas Doumanis, Myth and Memory; and Francesca 
Locatelli, “Migrating to the Colonies and Building the Myth of ‘Italiani brava gente’: The Rise, 
Demise and Legacy of Italian Settler Colonialism,” in (eds.) Ruth Ben-Ghiat and Stephanie 
Malia Hom, Italian Mobilities (London, 2016). 
6 Angelo Sammarco, In Egitto (Roma, 1939); Angelo Sammarco and Ernesto Verrucci Bey, eds., 
Il contributo degli italiani ai progressi scientifici e pratici della medicina in Egitto sotto il regno 
di Mohammed Ali (Cairo, 1928); Angelo Sammarco, ed., Gli Italiani in Egitto: Il contribuito 
italiano nella formazione dell’Egitto moderno (Alessandria, 1937); Angelo Sammarco, Egitto 
Moderno (Roma, 1939); Le Monnier, Il contributo italiano alla formazione dell’Egitto moderno 
(Firenze, 1941). For a good summary of how this material emerged and for what reason, see 
Anthony Santilli, “Penser et analyser le cosmopolitisme. Le cas des Italiens d’Alexandrie au 
XIXe siècle,” Mélanges de l’École française de Rome- Italie et Méditerrané modernes et 
contemporaines (2013), http://mefrim.revues.org/1516 
7 Michel Ersilio, Esuli Italiani in Egitto 1815-1861 (Pisa, 1958). 
8 John T. Chalcraft, The Striking Cabbies of Cairo and Other Stories: Crafts and Guilds in 
Egypt, 1863-1914 (New York, 2012); Joel Beinin and Zachary Lockman, Workers on the Nile: 
Nationalism, Communism, Islam and the Egyptian Working Class, 1882-1954 (Princeton, 1987); 
Robert Tignor, “The Economic Activities of Foreigners in Egypt, 1920-1950: From Millet to 
Haute Bourgeoisie,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 22, 3 (1980): 416-449; Anthony 
P. Gorman, “Egypt’s Forgotten Communists: The Postwar Greek Left,” Journal of Modern 
Greek Studies, 20 1 (2002): 1-27; Anthony Gorman, Historians, State and Politics in Twentieth 
Century Egypt: Contesting the Nation (Routledge, 2003); Alexander Kitroeff, The Greeks in 
Egypt, 1919-1937 (London, 1989); Jacques Berque, Egypt: Imperialism and Revolution (New 
York, 1972), 330, 475; Most recent in this genre is Najat Abdulhaq’s Jewish and Greek 
Communities in Egypt: Entrepreneurship and Business before Nasser (London, 2016). 
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claims to national sovereignty.9 Few studies explore the departure or dispersion of non-Egyptian 
communities; these often tangentially mention the Italians in Egypt.10 
Literary allusions to the community appear in fragments.11 Maurizio Maggiani’s Il 
coraggio del pettirosso (The Robin’s Courage) narrates the story of an idealized Italian anarchist 
poet, inspired by the early life of Giuseppe Ungaretti (and perhaps by the anarchist Enrico Pea’s 
Vita in Egitto). In this genre there are also the works of Fausta Cialente, the antifascist author 
who spent around twenty years of her life in Alexandria after marrying one of the city’s most 
prestigious and wealthiest Italians, Max Terni.12 Less well known is Daniel Fishman’s Il 
chilometro d’oro (The Golden Kilometer), a novel that recounts the (fictionalized) life of an 
Italian Jewish family in Downtown Cairo.  
A number of memoirs concentrate on the “long 1950s”--from the far-reaching 
consequences of the 1948 war in Palestine to the rise of Gamal Abdel Nasser into the 1960s--as 
an isolated period of change and transformation. These include Out of Egypt, by André Aciman, 
The Man in the White Sharkskin Suit, by Lucette Lagnado, and The Sun at Midday: Tales of a 
Mediterranean Family, by Gini Alhadeff. Aciman’s work has come under harsh criticism by an 
independent scholar in Egypt, Samir Rafaat, who denounces the veracity of Aciman’s text (Out 
of Egypt was awarded the Whiting Award for non-fiction in 1995) providing evidence from his 
                                                            
9 Will Hanley, “Foreignness and localness in Alexandria, 1880-1914” (Ph.D. diss., Princeton 
University, 2007); Ziad Fahmy, “Jurisdictional Borderlands: Extraterritoriality and ‘Legal 
Chameleons’ in Precolonial Alexandria, 1840-1870,” Comparative Studies in Society and 
History 55, 2 (2013): 305-329. 
10 Joel Beinen, The Dispersion of Egyptian Jewry (Berkeley, 1998); Angelos Dalachanis, 
“Leaving Egypt: Greeks and their Strategies: 1937-1967” (Ph.D. diss., European University 
Institute, 2011) 
11 Mathias Énard’s Zone (Rochester, 2010), for example, draws attention to the changes in the 
postwar Mediterranean by denoting the departure of foreigners from Egypt, and--although its 
mention is brief--it is one of more accurate portrayals of the Italian presence in Egypt. 
12 Lucia Re, “Painting, Politics, and Eroticism in Fausta Cialente’s Egyptian Narratives,” in eds. 
Rudiger Ahrens and Klaus Stierstorfer, Symbolism: An International Annual of Critical 
Aesthetics, Volume 8 (New York, 2008): 105-140. 
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own research that the characters in Out of Egypt are not in fact Aciman’s relatives but instead are 
composites of eminent figures of mid-twentieth century colonial Egypt.13 With relative ease, a 
reader can pass from one narrative to another in this body of literature, finding little difference 
(apart from authorial styles) in the descriptive tropes used to color social life during the period. 
Almost ubiquitously, life in Egypt’s cities is described as cosmopolitan, liberal, carefree, and 
abundant in wealth and social activity.14 This literature presents the “long 1950s” as a fissure in 
historical experience triggered by anti-European Arab nationalism (or by xenophobia, depending 
on its polemical slant) and the crumbling of a prior epoch of cosmopolitan utopia. The period is 
frequently portrayed as concluding one of the “brief lives” of a cosmopolitan Mediterranean in 
which a seemingly idyllic tolerance between religious, ethnic, and national groups thrived.15 
Social harmony (among elite Europeans and Levantines) comes to an end with the “sudden” 
arrival of Egyptian nationalism, a platitude reinforced in broader works whose narratives detail a 
transition from cosmopolitanism to nationalism.16 Lagnado, for example, writes “[s]uddenly, 
                                                            
13 The lay historian Samir Refaat has written about this in 1996 and 1997: “Andre Aciman’s Out 
of Egypt” (http://www.egy.com/judaica/96-12-21.php); “Aciman Encore: Out of Egypt, Great 
Uncle Vili Mystery Resolved at Last” (http://www.egy.com/judaica/97-02-01.php). 
14 Two texts cover experiences living in Egypt before the massive departure of foreigners, but 
still dwell on the cosmopolitan aspects of Cairo and Alexandria. Enrico Pea, Vita in Egitto 
(Ponte alla Grazie, 1995[1949]) and Paolo Vittorelli, L’età della tempesta: autobiografia 
romanzata di una generazione (Milano, 1981). 
15 Henk Driessen, “Mediterranean Port Cities: Cosmopolitanism Reconsidered,” History and 
Anthropology, 16 1 (2005): 129-141, 137; Deborah A. Starr, Remembering Cosmopolitan Egypt: 
Literature, culture, and empire (London, 2009), and “Recuperating cosmopolitan Alexandria: 
Circulation of narratives and narratives of circulation,” Cities, 22, 3 (2005): 217-228. 
16 André Aciman, Out of Egypt: a memoir (New York, 2007); Lucette Lagnado, The Man in the 
White Sharkskin Suit: A Jewish Family’s Exodus from Old Cairo to the New World (New York, 
2008); Gini Alhadeff, The Sun at Midday: Tales of a Mediterranean Family (New York, 2004); 
Daniel Fishman, Il chilometro d’oro: il mondo perduto degli italiani d’Egitto (Milano, 2006); 
Carolina Delburgo, Come ladri nella notte. La cacciata dall’Egitto (Barletta, 2006); Francesco 
Guastamacchi, Il profugo italiano: la storia di un italiano d’Egitto, dalla nascita fino alla 
costituzione del comitato di quartiere (Milano, 2012); Piero Paoletti, Storia di un italiano 
d'Egitto (Pisa, 2007); Mario Rispoli and Jean-Charles Depaule, Italien du Caire: Une 
autobiographie (Marseille, 2010); For similar scholarly accounts, see the volume edited by 
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‘foreigners’ weren’t welcome in the very place where most of them had felt so profoundly at 
home.”17 Her “suddenly” refers to the early 1960s. Yet, by that time the vast majority of Italians 
had already departed, or planned to do so.  
Within these literatures, little mention is made of incidents of violent encounters between 
members of communities, such as the conflict between small gangs of Italians and Greek boys on 
Alexandria’s central Rue Safia Zaghloul, which resulted in the death of one fourteen-year-old in 
1948. An event whose implications traced from micro-events to macro-narratives of cultural and 
political belonging in postwar Egypt, it also brought to the surface debates about the relationship 
between political representation of the Italians and the populace themselves.18 Similarly, scant 
attention is given to the social inequalities revealed, for example, in Bairam al-Tunsi’s poem 
entitled “The Privileges” (Al-Imtiyazat, which refers to the Ottoman-era Capitulations, see 
Chapter One). He writes, “every affliction [is a] Sicilian / fearing the volcano / living here on the 
second floor / while we’re [living] in the lavatory.”19 Even less attention is given to the internal 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Robert Ilbert and Ilios Yannakakis, Alexandria 1860-1960: The brief life of a cosmopolitan 
community (Alexandria, 1997) and the monumental work by Robert Ilbert, Alexandrie 1830-
1930, histoire d’une communauté citadine (Cairo, 1996). One example of this narrative that 
works on a broader region is found in Philip Mansel, Levant: Splendour and Catastrophe on the 
Mediterranean (London, 2010). See also Michael Haag’s books on Cairo and Alexandria. 
17 Lagnado, The Man in the White Sharkskin Suit, 160. 
18 ACGA, “Leone Alessandro,” “Un assassin de 14 ans,” Le Journal d’Egypte, February 13, 
1948. NB: Preliminary exploration of the penal and civil consular court records from Alexandria 
and Cairo during the 1920s and 1930s has revealed that life in Egypt was rife with conflict 
between and within the Italian community. The frequency of cases that cross cultural boundaries, 
specifically Italian and Egyptian ones, and deal with insults and verbal abuse of Egyptians 
suggests that the relationship between Italians and Egyptians were not nearly as pacific as it is 
described in this genre of literature. We get a glimpse at this from earlier periods in Hanley, 
“Foreigness and Localness” and Will Hanley, “Cosmopolitan Cursing in Late-Nineteenth 
Century Alexandria,” in (eds.) Darryl N. MacLean & Sikeena Karmali Ahmed, 
Cosmopolitanisms in Muslim Contexts: Perspectives from the Past (Edinburgh, 2012): 92-104. 
19 Bairam al-tunsi, Diwan Bairam al-Tunsi (Cairo ND). It is worth noting here that one of 
Alexandria’s native scholars referred to al-Tunsi as the “real poet of Alexandria,” contrary to the 
title popularly assigned to Constantine P. Cavafis. Reem Saad, “On the life of the late Robert 
Mabro (1934-2016),” MadaMasr, 20 August 2016.  
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dynamics of national communities. The absence of these contents enables an uncomplicated 
history of cosmopolitan harmony.  
Although the “nostalgic” mourning of the worlds lost through departure that characterizes 
this genre has received considerable and due critique, scholars often frame their critiques within 
the same analytical categories employed in this body of literature--a generalized dialectic of 
cosmopolitanism and nationalism. For example, Anouchka Lazarev contends that after the 
Second World War, both Egypt and Italy “turned their backs on the Mediterranean,” abandoning 
the “ambiguity and vagueness” of Alexandria’s cosmopolitan identity.20 Lazarev ignores the 
intense relations between Egypt and Italy that characterized the postwar period and built on the 
very foundations of these “cosmopolitan” worlds. Some propose placing the two analytical 
categories in the context of colonialism to resolve this tension, arguing that cosmopolitanism was 
simply a facade behind which hierarchical colonial relations thrived.21 Naor Ben-Yehoyada 
                                                            
20 The full quote: “The war, the failure of fascism, a new partitioning of the globe, led both 
Egypt and Italy to turn their backs on the Mediterranean. After the second world war, Egypt 
embraced Arabism, and Italy looked fixedly towards Europe. Neither the one nor the other could 
integrate or absorb that intense frivolous Mediterranean ‘Italianity’ which juggled with symbols 
and wallowed in ambiguity and vagueness, that Alexandrian identity which was at one and the 
same time the origin and the guardian of a myth.” Anouchka Lazarev, “Italians, Italianity and 
fascism,” in (ed.) Robert Ilbert and Ilios Yannakakis, Alexandria 1860-1960: The brief life of a 
cosmopolitan community (Alexandria, 1997): 84. 
21 Khaled Fahmy, “The Essence of Alexandria” Manifesta Journal 14 & 16 (2012); Khaled 
Fahmy, “For Cavafy, With Love and Squalor: Some Critical Notes on the History and 
Historiography of Modern Alexandria,” in Alexandria, Real and Imagined, eds. Anthony Hirst & 
Michael Silk (London, 2004): 263-280; Will Hanley “Grieving Cosmopolitanism in Middle East 
Studies,” History Compass 6, 5 (2008): 1346-1367; Robert Mabro, “Nostalgic Literature on 
Alexandria,” in Historians in Cairo: Essays in Honor of George Scanlan, ed. Jill Edwards (Cairo 
2002): 237-265; An exception to this is the recent dissertation by Angelos Dalachanis, which 
carefully looks at the historical processes surrounding the departure of Greeks from Egypt during 
the mid-twentieth century, Dalachanis, “Leaving Egypt.” Anthony Gorman’s study of the 
identity of “Egyptian Italians,” as he translates italiani d’Egitto, captures the community’s sense 
of its own history, but almost entirely neglects the larger socio-political impact of the 1930s. 
Anthony Gorman, “The Italians of Egypt: Return to Diaspora,” in Diasporas of the Modern 
Middle East: Contextualising Community, eds. Anthony Gorman and Sossie Kasbarian  
(Edinburgh 2015): 138-172. 
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observes how cosmopolitan narratives of the Mediterranean are frequently teleological in their 
structures, written in opposition to realities confronted in the present. Narratives detailing the 
loss of the “cosmopolitan sea” emerge not merely in relation to, but as explanations of, the 
contemporary geopolitical constellations that delimit the northern and southern shores of the 
sea.22 In doing so, they widen the rift between the past experiences they seek to describe and 
their own interpretive frameworks. If that is true, then scholars who employ the same analytical 
categories in their critiques of these narratives continue to elide what was behind such narrative 
facades. As a remedy, Ben-Yehoyada suggests that we look not to epistemological interpretive 
devices but rather to processes of region formation (and perhaps de-formation).23 It is helpful to 
recall here that Manuel Borutta and Sakis Gekas have referred to the landscape of the modern 
Mediterranean as “a maritime space of colonial interactions and entanglements that transcended 
continental and national boundaries.”24 I argue that in these interactions and entanglements we 
can better understand what makes or breaks analytical categories. Another goal of this 
dissertation, therefore, is to reach beyond epistemological interpretations of the colonial 
                                                            
22 Lucette Lagnado, “Anti-Israel Jews and the Vassar Blues,” The Wall Street Journal, 23 
February 2014; “Almost the Last Jew in Egypt,” The Wall Street Journal, 17 April 2013. 
Another example is André Aciman’s response to Barak Obama’s address to the Islamic World in 
Cairo in 2013, André Aciman, “The Exodus Obama Forgot to Mention,” The New York Times, 8 
June, 2009. By the same author, see “After Egypt’s Revolution, Christians Are Living in Fear...” 
The New York Times, 19 November 2013; Paola Caridi, “Mezzanotte al Cairo,” L’Espresso, 
March 23, 2006; Paola Caridi, “La fine degli italiani in Egitto,” Dust 41, October 18/24, 2002; 
Manera Livia, “Spie, amanti, ladri: la bella Alessandria prima della fine,” Corriere della Sera, 
May 15, 2009. 
23 Naor Ben-Yehoyada, “Mediterranean Modernity” in A Companion to Mediterranean History, 
eds. Peregrine Horden and Sharon Kinoshita, (London, 2014): 107-121, 117. See also Tabak, 
who astutely notes that what makes the “cosmopolitanism” of Mediterranean cities “haunting” is 
not its exceptionality, but rather “what came in its wake.” Faruk Tabak, “Imperial rivalry and 
port-cities: a view from above,” Mediterranean Historical Review, 24 2 (2009): 79-94. 
24 Manuel Borutta and Sakis Gekas, “A Colonial Sea: the Mediterranean, 1789-1956,” European 
Review of History/Revue européenne d’histoire, 19, 1 (2012): 1-13. 
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Mediterranean and to begin to ascertain how historical processes of decolonization unfolded and 
disentangled from the interwar period into the 1960s.  
 
Community in crisis 
Within the narrative of this population’s struggle to maintain its presence in history is 
also a story about the formation of particular kind of community. Ann Laura Stoler suggests that 
colonial communities, rather than simply displaced communities of European origin, are “unique 
cultural configurations,” based on “new constructions of European-ness.”25 Within the colonial 
milieu of late-nineteenth and twentieth-century Egypt, Italians in Egypt were uniquely positioned 
within political and imperial rivalries. Often, they were used by ruling Italian regimes as pawns 
in foreign political strategy (before, during, and after fascism). At other times, they were 
assimilated by Egyptian nationalists into a broad categories of “foreigners.” Still, on other 
occasions their positioning placed them outside of these tensions. In turn, they evade facile 
dichotomies of colonizer-colonized.26 Julia Clancy-Smith notes that surprisingly little is known 
of these “colonies within colonies” despite the important link between social identity and their 
varying decrees of marginality within colonial structures.27 The key to understanding the social 
                                                            
25 Ann Laura Stoler, “Rethinking Colonial Categories: European Communities and the 
Boundaries of Rule,” Comparative Studies in Society and History, 31 1 (1989): 134-161, 136-7; 
echoes of this argument also appear in Federick Cooper, “Conflict and Connection: Rethinking 
Colonial African History,” The American Historical Review, 99, 5 (1994): 1516-1545. 
26 Albert Memmi’s classic study of the profile of the colonizer and colonized would have it that 
the Italians in Egypt--as members of the broader European community--are de facto colonizers, 
depite their arrivals as immigrants. Their eventual departure, and the early period in which 
departure becomes an essential part of the political discourse, however, raises numerous 
questions about how these categories function. Albert Memmi, The Colonizer and the Colonized 
(Boston, 1991). 
27 Julia Clancy-Smith, “Marginality and Migration: Europe’s Social Outcasts in Pre-Colonial 
Tunisia, 1830-1881,” in (ed.) Eugene Rogan, Outside In: On the Margins of the Modern Middle 
East (New York, 2002): 149-182, 152. 
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configurations of these communities lay not in their origins, but in the ways in which they 
inhabited a range of social, political, and economic margins.28  
The case of the Italians of Egypt adds several caveats to Stoler’s definition of colonial 
communities. First, the Italians of Egypt and a wide range of political actors around them 
envisioned themselves as members of a unique Italian emigrant community. During the rise of 
fascism, the image of the “historic” role played by the Italians of Egypt as a bridge connecting 
the two shores of the Mediterranean became a central trope used to represent their exceptionality. 
As Claudio Fogu argues of the various functions of “historic/historical” (storico, in Italian), the 
designation as “historic” corresponds to the representation of an event that is “incommensurable 
to all other historical events.”29 In other words, contrary to signifying simply one among many 
“historical” events of the past, the semantic employment of “historic” implies that such an event 
was a necessary impetus for change or transformation within a historical narrative. Whereas 
Fogu illustrates how material culture was made to represent and affirm the imaginary of a Fascist 
revolution, this dissertation shows that the same processes were at play in narratives that 
encapsulated the Italians of Egypt within the framework of broader Italo-Egyptian relations. The 
“local practices” of some Italians in Egypt were made to “naturally” signify the value and import 
of later generations of the Italians of Egypt--and, importantly, to legitimate the actions of Italian 
authorities.30 The practice of rendering the Italians of Egypt “historic” continued long after they 
                                                            
28 Julia Clancy-Smith, Mediterraneans: North African and Europe in the Age of Migration, 
c.1800-1900 (Berkeley, 2012) and “Marginality and Migration”; David Prochaska, Making 
Algeria French: Colonialism in Bône, 1870-1920 (Cambridge, 2004). 
29 Claudio Fogu, “Fascism and Historic Representation: The 1932 Garibaldian Celebrations,” 
Journal of Contemporary History 31 2 (1996):317-345, 335. See also his, The Historic 
Imaginary: Politics of History in Fascist Italy (Toronto, 2003). 
30 I draw this point from the Daniel Boyarin & Jonathan Boyrain, “Generation and the Ground of 
Jewish Identity,” Critical Inquiry, 19 4 (1993): 693-725, 709. 
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ceased to exist as an “ethnographic” colony.31 The community carried with them this semantic 
marking. 
The second caveat is that departure renders essential the cultural exceptionality of the 
Italians of Egypt. In similar cases scholars observe how, in experiences of departure, personal 
and collective narratives of belonging confront the political circumstances in which they were 
formed.32 In many of these cases, the individuals departing--whether pieds noirs from Algeria or 
ethnic Italians from Istria--assess their own subjectivity in relation to political regimes that no 
longer exist and, out of this friction, generate new meanings in the actual political systems. In 
this case, one of the overarching dilemmas in the study of the Italians of Egypt is that they have 
not been studied as migrant or mobile communities. Non-Egyptian minorities have frequently 
been studied under the rubric of “diaspora,” which tends to reproduce the problematic social 
categorization highlighted by Stoler. Indeed, this analytical step can be impeded when members 
of the community deny their own immigration. In the words of one Italian born in Egypt in the 
1930s, “[in this case] an immigrant is not an immigrant.”33 Nevertheless, the logics of 
immigration as a process have much to yield for our understanding of how, given the historical 
contingencies, one can claim that “an immigrant is not an immigrant.” Migrants depart with 
histories. And, as Abdelmalek Sayad notes, immigration itself folds into these histories.34 It is a 
process based on a distance measured in terms of absence (the emigration part of the history) and 
                                                            
31 Mark Choate, “From territorial to ethnographic colonies and back again: The politics of Italian 
expansion, 1890-1912,” Modern Italy, 8 1 (2003): 65-75. 
32 Andrea Smith (ed.), Europe’s Invisible Migrants: Consequences of the Colonists’ Return 
(Amsterdam, 2002); Andrea L. Smith, Colonial Memory and Postcolonial Europe: Maltese 
Settlers in Algeria and France (Bloomington, 2006); Pamela Ballinger, History in Exile: 
Memory and Identity at the Borders of the Balkans (Princeton, 2002). 
33 Interview with Silvio Calabria, June 12, 2012, Rome. 
34 Abdelmalek Sayad, La double absence: Des illusions de l’émigré aux souffrances de 
l’immigré (Seuil, 1999), 16-18. 
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presence (the immigration part of the history).35 In spatial terms, the immigrant is at once here 
and there, each identity being grounded in an iteration of spatial locality and origin. The 
progression of time within this sentimental landscape, however, begets a “double absence,” a 
sense of being neither here nor there.36 Within this temporality of double absence the immigrant 
is further articulated by employing historical argumentation--such as the idea of being a 
“historic” community. In doing so, an immigrant community decreases the distance between here 
and there.37 In departing from Egypt, the “double absence” is folded once again as the histories 
of “here” and “there” cease to conform to their prior structures.38  
Understanding these colonial communities, I contend, lay not in their origins (and not in 
the epistemological categories under which we classify them), but rather in the processes through 
which their members confront their pasts as they endeavor to come to terms with the present.39 
                                                            
35 Sayad, La double absence, 103-105. 
36 While this is coming from Sayad’s work, Andrew Shryock articulates a similar “double 
remoteness” in Andrew Shryock, “In the double remoteness of Arab Detroit: Reflections on 
Ethnography, Culture Work, and the Intimate Disciplines of Americanization,” in (ed.) Andrew 
Shryock Off Stage/On Display: Intimacy and Ethnography in the Age of Public Culture 
(Stanford, 2004): 279-314. 
37 Pierre Bourdieu makes a similar argument with regard to biography. In contrast to Bourdieu, 
however, I do not think it is fair to call this effect “illusion.” One cannot ignore the 
phenomenological realities that these constructions engender. Pierre Bourdieu, “The 
Biographical Illusion,” Working Papers and Proceedings of the Center for Psychosocial Studies, 
14 (1987); see also Gérome Truc, “Narrative Identity against Biographical Illusion: The Shift in 
Sociology from Bourdieu to Ricoeur,” Études Ricoeuriennes/Ricoeur Studies, 2 1 (2011):150-
167. 
38 Similarly, Todd Shepard describes the unintended consequences of departure: “repatriate” was 
not meant to become a category of political and social identity, but through the departure from 
Algeria of pieds noirs--among others--as a result of decolonization political projects it indeed 
surfaced as a social category that positioned its subjects between France’s colonial past and the 
present. See Todd Shepard, The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and the 
Remaking of France (Ithaca, 2008), 155, 217, 220. 
39 The need for greater focus on process in the study of “colonial history in the era of 
decolonization” is emphasized, for example, in Federick Cooper, “Decolonizing Situations: the 
Rise, Fall, and Rise of Colonial Studies, 1951-2001,” French Politics, Culture and Society, 20, 2 
(2002): 47-76. Generally, this framework contributes to broadening an understanding of 
decolonization studies by directly tackling the tendency among scholars towards teleological 
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Spatial approaches tend to emphasize a kind of locality that easily lends itself to fixed notions of 
territorial belonging and displacement. A great deal of work indeed has covered displacement 
and mobility across space. Throughout this dissertation, I ask: might something similar occur 
over time or on a temporal scale? Both are continuous: the movement in space cannot be 
conceived of without its relational distance; the movement in time, likewise. Spatial distance 
yields new kinds of relations between the “place left behind,” the new “placement” and, 
importantly, the perspectives of/from the “new place.” Being “displaced” in time also leads to a 
reconfigured relationship between the “past left behind,” the “present” and the perspectives 
of/from the “new present.” Can ideas of “here” and “there” be translated into the “now” and 
“then” of historical experience? In this dissertation, I argue that temporal processes bridge these 
gaps, and that the emegent histories used to navigate them are both subjects and objects of 
community formation.   
While conducting research between 2009 and 2015 on the departure of the Italians of 
Egypt, I frequently witnessed episodes like those with which I began. They dramatize history’s 
vulnerability. By “history’s vulnerability,” I mean that “history,” a category of knowing oneself 
and one’s community in time, is subject to time’s passing and is always capable of cutting itself 
off from its past as it projects into the future.40 Unable to integrate a narrative that follows the 
paths of time, history has the potential to unhinge an individual or community from a notion of 
who or what it is. This potential discloses the underlying structures of Sayad’s “double absence.” 
Such a dynamic is more likely when futures “close” in front of communities, calling into 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
analysis of colonial structures. In this regard, see Todd Shepard, “Making French and European 
Collide: Decolonization and the Politics of Comparative and Transnational Histories,” Ab 
Imperio, 2 (2007): 339-360. 
40 I mean the kind of time described by Dipesh Chakrabarty, “Events happen in time but time is 
not affected by them.” Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe (Princeton, 2000), 73. 
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question the very horizons that had contoured their social worlds.41 The same vulnerability is 
how the two-fold characterization of the Italians of Egypt (as carrying the myth of their 
“historic” presence in and as having departed from Egypt) sustains an important presence in the 
story they tell themselves.  
I turn to Ernesto de Martino’s conception of “crisis of presence.”42 For de Martino, 
“presence” implies, but goes beyond, an existential “self.” Presence renders “culture,” or 
community, possible. Importantly, it entails “being-there in history” (esserci nella storia).43 De 
Martino’s argument raises important considerations with regard to historical consciousness. In 
the “crisis of presence” the desire “to be present” in history confronts the “risk of not being 
present there.”44 The possibility of “dehistoricization” accompanies the irreversibility of 
historical time (the time of chronos). As described by George Saunders, “[t]he crisis of 
presence... entails the possible loss of a place in history, since history is the work of thinking, 
                                                            
41 I draw this insight on futures “closing” from Vincent Crapanzano, Waiting: The white of South 
Africa (New York, 1986), 200. 
42 Ernesto de Martino’s work as an anthropologist must be put in relation to that of his teacher, 
the historian Benedetto Croce, whose idea of historiography is founded on the notion that all 
history is “contemporary history,” a genealogy tracing to R.G. Collingwood’s philosophy of 
history. For Croce - like many of his Hegelian predecessors and contemporaries - there were 
societies whose “natural religions” precluded them from “history.” de Martino sought to restore 
historicity to the groups excluded from this narrative. He develops this theme throughout his 
oevre. See, for example, the first chapter of Ernesto de Martino, Morte e pianto rituale del 
mondo antico: Dal lamento pagano al pianto di Maria (Torino, 1958) and the second chapter of 
Il mondo magico (Torino, 2007[1956]). 
43 Ernesto de Martino, “Crisi della presenza e reintegrazione religiosa,” aut aut, 31 (1956):17-31, 
19. This has also been argued, for example, in George Saunders’s interpretation of de Martino’s 
work, which has otherwise been given little attention in anthropology. George Saunders, “The 
crisis of presence in Italian Pentecostal conversion,” American Ethnologist, 22 2 (1995): 324-40. 
More recently, see the translation of one of de Martino’s essays on the subject, Ernesto de 
Martino, “Crisis of Presence and Religious Reintegration,” trans. T. Farnetti and C. Sterwart, 
HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory, 2 2 (2012): 431-450 and Charles Stewart, “Dreaming 
and Historical Consciousness,” Historically Speaking (January 2013): 28-30. 
44 de Martino, Il mondo magico, 72. 
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acting, feeling, and, perhaps above all, ‘distinguishing’ human beings.”45 Unhinged histories, on 
the other hand, alienate their subjects. Alienation generates suffering, an “anguish over not 
being-there in a human history.”46 For de Martino, the “redemption” or “release” (riscatto) from 
this crisis comes through magic. By present-ing one’s self and community in history, this 
creative move restores time’s horizon. Throughout this dissertation, I ask: can the stories about 
the past that are shared, remembered, and forgotten provide that “redemption”? Can history-
making (or making a place in history for one’s community) represent a kind of magic, a means to 
survive as a community in the present? How do the exigencies of time shape and mold, remake 
and rearticulate community? Can a crisis of presence succumb to time, bringing a community to 
its last breaths?  
 
On microhistory and non-synchronic time 
In the summer of 2013, deep in the archive of the Italian consular offices in Cairo, I was 
searching for information on a particularly prominent antifascist (a rarity in itself). Angelo 
Tartagni had been designated as “subversive” by the regime, and his name cited in documents 
from the diplomatic archives of the Italian Foreign Ministry in Rome. Reportedly, he had 
separated from his wife, converted to Islam and acquired Egyptian nationality, by default 
renouncing his Italian citizenship. After 1943 he published a small volume of essays that he had 
written during the Second World War condemning the politics of the Fascist regime (I discuss 
this in chapter three). Few details of his life remained in Cairo. His documents were stored in the 
file belonging to his wife, Ismene Brandani (divorce was not legal at the time in the Italian 
system so their separation was one of ambiguous legal status). Contrary to Tartagni, Brandani 
                                                            
45 Saunders, “Crisis of presence,” 331. 
46 de Martino, “Crisi di presenza,” 25. 
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associated with the most well-known and active members of the PNF in Egypt. As I read through 
her file, Tartagni’s name and associated documents disappeared and I followed Brandani’s story. 
Some of the characters in Brandani’s file were relatives of people I had interviewed in Italy. She 
did not leave Egypt. Into the late 1960s, she became ill and was cared for by a friend. Letters 
exchanged between Brandani’s caretaker in Egypt and her sister in Italy concerning her well-
being passed through the consulate. In the mid-1960s, the address changed on the letters. I 
paused on its familiarity: this was the address written on a scrap of paper handed to me over two 
years earlier when I left Milan to conduct an interview in Pisa. In Pisa, I had learned that the 
family’s house served as a “stopping point” for many Italians arriving from Egypt. This 
movement through stories happened often throughout my research: characters and subjects 
passed the baton to others, often leaping from present to past and back again.  
Carlo Ginzburg and Carlo Poni define microhistory as the “science of lived experience” 
[scienza del vissuto].47 As the rapprochement of anthropology and history, its dual purpose is to 
reconstitute “lived experience” in a way inconceivable in other forms of historiography and to 
investigate the “invisible structures within which that lived experience is articulated.” While 
much of microhistory deals with historical persons or events belonging to distant pasts, its 
methodological foundations offer much in the way of our apprehension of more recent 
histories.48 It has taught us that the stories concealed in archival documents abound in their own 
                                                            
47 Carlo Ginzburg and Carlo Poni, “Il nome e il come: scambio ineguale e mercato 
storiografico,” Quaderni Storici, 40 (1979):181-90. NB: the same essay has been translated and 
included in Edward Muir and Guido Ruggiero (eds.), Microhistory and the Lost Peoples of 
Europe: selections from Quaderni Storici, (Baltimore, 1991), 8. In their text, “scienza del 
vissuto” is translated as “science of real life.” I have chosen to go with my own translation of 
“vissuto” as lived experience in attempt to capture the micro application of the term for an event 
experienced or lived by historical characters, rather than the abstracted macro-scale analysis of a 
life (a whole life, that is). 
48 A helpful model for understanding how microhistory attempts to reveal or work through 
events to acquire an understanding of certain truths, see Giovanni Levi, “On microhistory,” in 
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historical narratives, their own itineraries.49 Passing from one story to another, through a variety 
of scales, determines the cartography of lived and shared experiences.50 In doing so, microhistory 
works its magic. This dissertation is organized around the paths through which these stories leap 
across time--as in the jump from Angelo Tartagni’s resistance against the Fascist regime to his 
estranged wife, and eventually to her sister’s departure and residence with the family of one of 
my more recent interlocutors. In moving away from an approach to microhistory that emphasizes 
a synchronic imagination of culture over one that is diachronic and admits difference as relative, 
I suggest that the temporal dimensions of crossing scales of time stratifies this social 
cartography.51  
My research methods included a mix of formal interviews, informal gatherings and 
conversations, and archival research. During interviews some individuals utilized my presence--
                                                                                                                                                                                               
(ed.) Peter Burke, New Perspectives on Historical Writing (Cambridge, 1991): 93-113, 109. For 
a good example of some of the ways in which microhistory crosses into the present, see (ed.) 
Jacques Revel, Giochi di Scala: la microstoria alla prova dell’esperienza (Roma, 2006). 
49 See Natalie Zemon Davis, Fiction in the Archives: Pardon Tales and Their Tellers in 
Sixteenth-Century France (Stanford, 1987), Tricksters Travels: A Sixteenth-Century Muslim 
Between Worlds (New York, 2007). There is a certain resonance here with the idea of archival 
“itineraries” described by Ann Laura Stoler in Against the Archival Grain: Epistemic Anxieties 
and colonial Common Sense (Princeton, 2010). On a larger scale, the “revival of narrative” has 
also contributed to this body of knowledge. Paul Ricouer [trans. Kathleen McLaughlin and 
David Pellauer], Time and Narrative (Chicago, 1984-88); Lawrence Stone, “The Revival of 
Narrative: Reflections on a New Old History, Past & Present, 85 (1979): 3-24. 
50 This observation comes from Jacques Revel, “Microanalisi e costruzione del sociale,” in 
Jacques Revel (ed.), Giochi di Scala: la microstoria alla prova dell’esperienza (Roma, 2006): 
19-44. In the same volume, see Bernardino Palumbo, “Scuola, scala, appartenenza. Problemi di 
identità tea storia e antropologia,” in Jacques Revel (ed.), Giochi di Scala: la microstoria alla 
prova dell’esperienza (Roma, 2006): 251-300. With less analysis, this is what Amitav Ghosh 
does extremely well in his In an Antique Land: History in the Guise of a Traveler’s Tale (New 
York, 1992). 
51 I refer here specifically to the fact that many microhistorians drew anthropological inspiration 
from Clifford Geertz, including Ginzburg in his The Cheese and the Worms: The Cosmos of a 
Sixteenth Century Miller (Baltimore, 1980), and replicated his tendency to focus on “flat” 
cultural models as if they were texts. These are, I contend, models of symbolic structures out of 
time and, in their stasis, they are unable to account for historical time (and thus change). For 
more on this, see Giovanni Levi, “I pericoli del geertzismo,” [The Dangers of Geerztism] 
Quaderni Storici, 58 1 (1985): 269-276. 
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by means of comparison they saw in my person historical narratives juxtaposed in various ways 
to their own. Or, they saw in my historical training someone presumed to be partially informed: 
clearly, many felt, I neither knew nor understood the complexity of their histories and, as 
because of the biases inherited through my training as an historian, I would have to be retaught 
history.52 Others probed me for information regarding what I had found in the archives. The 
same lyrical complexity--the fragmented referencing of the past, juxtaposition to divergent 
presents, gazing towards future horizons--contoured archival documents as it did the narration of 
lived experiences.53 Archival collections ranged from accumulations of personal documents and 
photographs to public libraries, from collections in municipal and institutional archives to the 
diplomatic records of the Italian Foreign Ministry. Moving between the interview and the 
archive, I touched on the material remains of the moments and events drawn upon vividly during 
some interviews and in others alluded to as fragmented memories parents or friends had 
recounted. In both cases, these events constituted the “lived experience” that evidenced the 
exceptionality of their social worlds, I was told. Both oral narrative and archived document 
contained pieces of the other, each was porous and permeated by the other.54  
If microhistory is a science of “lived experience,” how can the social-scientifically 
inclined historian explore the temporal landscapes of a community whose story is founded on the 
struggle to maintain itself in history? How to study a community that is always on the verge of 
                                                            
52 These biases included the regular assumption that I positioned myself on the political left and 
therefore immediately read the act of moving to and living in Egypt as one of colonization. On a 
broader level, this also implicated the entire university system. Similar to the United States, 
many on the political right in Italy believe that the Italian university system is dominated by 
members of the left.  
53 This is especially the case in dealing with sources written at the time of events (as opposed to 
one written afterwards). Alessandro Portelli, “The Peculiarities of Oral History,” History 
Workshop, 12 (1981): 96-107, 103. 
54 Carlo Ginzburg, “Microhistory: Two or Three Things That I Know About It,” Critical Inquiry, 
20 1 (1993): 10-35. 
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its own exhaustion and whose members draw upon historical argumentation to confirm that this 
is the case? The trick, I believe, is hidden in one phrase. I owe to Alessandro Portelli the 
observation that any idea of time’s “rupture” (a platitude in postmodern articulations of memory, 
pastness, and fragmentation) means little when someone says, “l’abbiamo vissuto,” we lived it.55 
The claim, to have lived something, invites us to return to the past under question and to trace 
through the connections between seemingly disjointed stories that throw light upon the 
conditions of social worlds in which they were formed. Rather than metamorphosing 
microhistories into macro-scaled histories, this method conjoins multiple microhistories and 
seeks moments in which a variety of actors move “up” and “down” in scale.56  
From Bruno Latour’s rendering of social aggregations, we have learned to comprehend 
the social not merely as an object of analysis composed of smaller parts, but as an object always 
constituted through connections and channels.57 Like a constellation’s dimensions, social 
configurations materialize by delimiting the conditions for their existence, not in their origins or 
at individual points along the way. This does not mean, however, that they exist solely in 
continuities. Contrary to the dichotomy of “rupture” and “continuity,” throughout this 
dissertation I contend that the social fabrics of the Italians of Egypt adhere in the friction of these 
                                                            
55 Alessandro Portelli, personal communication. September 2012. 
56 I refer specifically to arguments such as that put forth in Marshall Sahlins, “Structural work: 
How microhistories become macrohistories and vice versa,” Anthropological Theory, 5 1 (2005): 
5-30. 
57 Bruno Latour, Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory (Oxford, 
2005). Latour is particularly helpful here with regard to his contrast to sociological -especially 
those inspired by Durkheim- theories of the past which place emphasis on the a priori existence 
of the social as a category which memory serves. Memory is always “for” in these 
conceptualizations of social memory. See Maurice Halbwachs, On Collective Memory (Chicago, 
1992[1952]); Paul Connerton, How societies remember (New York, 1989); Pierre Nora, 
“General Introduction: Between Memory and History,” in (ed.) Pierre Nora, Realms of Memory: 
Rethinking the French Past. Vol. 1 (New York, 1996): 1-20. 
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leaps through and connections between distinct temporal scales of lived experience, of il 
vissuto.58  
A refrain I heard throughout my research equated the lived experience of being an Italian 
of Egypt with being “out of time” or off-key (fuori tempo). As noted, the same historical events 
that textured the pages of archival documents were used as evidence of their exceptionality in 
this regard. They conceived of their lived experiences in relation to terminated political and legal 
regimes, and around these conceptions defined what it meant to be “returning” to Italy, to be 
“repatriated,” or to be “refugees.” The challenge in seeing how the community emerged within 
this conjuncture was in trying to uncover the logic of their rendering of history juxtaposed with 
the unfolding of historical time. How were these microhistories of departure related to the sense 
of being out of time? My answer to this challenge is to propose a conception of time as multiple 
and layered. 
In his now classic study of the uses and abuses of time in anthropology, Johannes Fabian 
railed against the tendency of anthropologists to place their subjects in a time distinct from their 
own. His threefold division of the “times” of anthropology--physical, mundane/typological, and 
intersubjective--is meant to characterize anthropologists’ use of “distancing devices” to separate 
themselves from their subjects. He calls this the “denial of coevalness,” which he defines as “a 
persistent and systematic tendency to place the referent(s) of anthropology in a Time other than 
the present of the producer of anthropological discourse.”59 Fabian’s approach lacks the 
acknowledgement that the same devices he sees as problematic furnishings of the 
anthropologist’s toolkit are those often used by its subjects. He privileges a temporal equivalency 
                                                            
58 The inability for certain configurations of the community to persist past the crumbling 
conditions that allowed their formation. See Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing, Friction: An Ethnography 
of Global Connection (Princeton, 2004). 
59 Johannes Fabian, Time And The Other (New York, 1983), 31. 
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whose validity can only exist in a reductive sense of time: if Fabian’s critique of other 
anthropologists is that they banish their subjects from the present, one might propose that he 
instead imposes the present upon his subjects.60 In other words, Fabian’s post-structuralist 
critique flattens time. To imply an essential presence would be to ignore the “denial of 
coevalness” that was so fundamental to elaborating the dimensions connecting porous and 
permeable stories told by my interlocutors and those that emerged from archival documents.  
Indeed, Fabian’s formulation describes broader trends in the humanities and social 
sciences following the linguistic turn.61 Historian Berber Bevernage has recently revisited 
Fabian’s argument.62 Bevernage calls for a more complex appreciation of how temporality 
factors into historical (and ethnographic) analyses. He suggests that scholars embrace non-
coevalness “as a starting point for an analysis of the politics of time,” asking how connections 
between distinct temporal periods are valued, measured, and approached.63  Relations to time, in 
this sense, are not merely epiphenomenal aspects of social life that rest on a material substrate, 
but instead they index actual temporalities, ways of being in time (a la Heidegger) that shape an 
individual’s or group’s possibilities within the world (social or otherwise).64 In this dissertation, I 
                                                            
60 A similar approach underlies Alfred Gell’s Anthropology of Time (London, 1992) wherein he 
insists on the ultimate materiality of chronological time and contemporaneity as overcoming any 
other configuration of possible temporalities. 
61 Whether it is due to Fabian’s critique is uncertain, but clearly Fabian’s work speaks to a 
broader trend that, in many ways, runs parallel to the linguistic turn in poststructuralist studies. 
For a good summary and critique of these trends as they apply to the discipline of history, see 
François Hartog, “The Present of the Historian,” History of the Present, 4 2 (2014): 203-219, and 
“Time and Heritage,” Museum International, 57 3 (2005): 7-18. 
http://collectivememory.fsv.cuni.cz/CVKP-52-version1-Hartog.pdf. 
62 Berber Bevernage, “Against Coevalness: A belated critique of Johannes Fabian’s project of 
radical contemporaneity and a plea for a new politics of time.” (forthcoming in Anthropological 
Theory). 
63 Bevernage, “Against Coevalness,” 21. 
64 In one expressive passage, Bevernage writes of Ernst Bloch’s Marxist division of temporal 
belonging: “the simplistic Marxist notion of dialectics has to be replaced by a multi-layered or 
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follow Bevernage in taking non-coevalness “as a starting point” for analysis, hoping to unsettle 
ideas about the fixity of historical time in human experience. 
Thus far we have only considered the past and the present, and how each permeates the 
other. But there is a final caveat to accepting the multiplicity of time: it incorporates a movement 
towards the future. At the root of this notion is Reinhart Koselleck’s suggestion that historical 
categories are not merely testimonial (or descriptive), but that the unfolding of historical time 
occurs in the balance between experience and expectation.65 Koselleck’s claim is that experience 
and expectation “embody past and future” and are essential concepts through which historians 
can apprehend the concrete (empirical) processes of historical time.66 As Koselleck argues, the 
future, although open and indeterminate, is not always new and surprising. Within “historical 
structures of experience,” futures are anticipated and a degree of prognosis signifies 
“metahistorical” durations.67 In the archives, repatriation and departure appeared--as early as 
1919--to many Italians of Egypt and to political actors around them as answers to the “enduring 
conditions” of a present that ceased to conform to past experiences. The disjuncture surfaced 
again in interviews, when my interlocutors emphasized the importance the future (futures now 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
polyrythmic dialectics that recognizes the fact that aspects of the past can survive into the 
present.” Bevernage, “Against Coevalness,” 15. 
65 The two works on which I draw are: Reinhart Koselleck, Futures Past: On the Semantics of 
Historical Time (New York, 2004 [1979]): 258-262 and, Reinhart Koselleck, The Practice of 
Conceptual History: Timing History, Spacing Concepts (Stanford, CA, 2002): 111. 
66 Koselleck, Futures Past, 258. For an insightful and recent engagement with Koselleck’s work 
see the American Historical Review Forum entitled “Histories of the Future” and specifically, 
David C. Engerman, “Introduction: Histories of the Future and the Futures of History,” The 
American Historical Review 117, 5 (2012): 1402-1410; Jenny Andersson, “The Great Future 
Debate and the Struggle for the World,” The American Historical Review 117, 5 (2012): 1411-
1430; Matthew Connelly et al., “‘General, I have Fought Just as Many Nuclear Wars as You 
Have’: Forecasts, Future Scenarios, and the Politics of Armageddon,” The American Historical 
Review, 117, 5 (2012): 1431-1460; Manu Goswami, “Imaginary Futures and Colonial 
Internationalisms,” The American Historical Review, 117, 5 (2012): 1461-1485. For a similar 
approach see Alexei Yurchak, Everything Was Forever, Until It Was No More (Princeton, NJ, 
2005). 
67 Koselleck, The Practice of Conceptual History, 146. 
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past) had played in the decision for their families’ departures. Or, when they reflected on the 
community’s imminent disappearance. History’s unfolding permeates each form of “evidence,” 
shaping lived experience. Neglecting the scale of the past’s propulsion into the future, historians 
risk inadvertently concealing the ways subjects anticipate “history” as well as how such 
expectations themselves determine historical events.68 This danger is inherent in Fabian’s 
flattened approach to time.  
The capacity of stories to endure, to affect change, and to permeate one another 
assembles a social cartography out of multiple, layered histories. Michel Rolph Trouillot calls 
this “the power of the story”: “[w]hat happened leaves traces, some of which are quite concrete--
buildings, dead bodies, censuses, monuments, diaries, political boundaries--that limit the range 
and significance of any historical narrative.” This is one of the many reasons, he claims, why 
“not any fiction can pass for history.”69 Trouillot’s point is that these are real processes that 
propel historical time. For example, while sorting through a box of personal artifacts that had 
been deposited in the house of an Italian in Egypt as family and friends departed, I stumbled 
upon a Mass card from the early 1940s celebrating a baptism. Upon the card was written the 
surname of a woman I had interviewed one year earlier. I wrote to her and her daughter, asking if 
by chance they knew to whom it belonged. First, the mother responded, “what an incredible 
surprise to see the card of Armando Pressel… my husband!” She confessed that it had moved her 
deeply (mi sono emozionata!) as her husband had died many years ago. And then, her daughter, 
                                                            
68 Koselleck asserts that there are “enduring conditions within which what is new appears.” 
These conditions - what he calls “structures of experience” - are what aid our “prognostic 
certainty,” or our capacity to think the future. Koselleck, The Practice of Conceptual History, 
135, 146. 
69 Michel-Rolph Trouillot, Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History (Boston, 
1995). 
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who had recorded the interview I conducted with her mother so that her own children would 
remember, responded by thanking me for helping them to keep this past “alive.” 
 
Sources of the Stories 
At its core this dissertation is about how these multiple and layered stories constitute the 
community of Italians of Egypt. As such, the dissertation attempts to illuminate the “restlessness 
of the event,” the vulnerable boundaries of historical experiences shaped between the past as 
recounted and the recounting past.70 I attempt to capture that fluidity of time both in the larger 
narrative of the organization of chapters and in the internal dynamics of each chapter. I chose to 
arrange the narrative in such a way as to capture the conversation-like nature of interviews and 
the internal complexity of the historiographical conditions to which they make reference. I do not 
include large excerpts of life histories because, in the stories of the community’s departure, their 
narratives were as fragmented as archival documents. Each person had something to show me, to 
narrate, and each had someone else in mind who could tell me more, correcting, adapting, and 
adding insight into their past: I was directed to cousins, former schoolmates, business partners, or 
to elders in distant cities. Of the Italians of Egypt I met, most were in their late 60s or 70s, many 
in their 80s, and a few in their 90s. Some were from elite families, others were the sons and 
daughters of chronically unemployed laborers. Some left Egypt immediately following the 
Second World War, others lingered, adapting their lives long after the community had all but 
                                                            
70 Robin Wagner-Pacifici, “Theorizing the Restlessness of Events,” American Journal of 
Sociology, 115 5 (2010): 1351-1386. For more reflections on the complex relations between time 
and event in historical memory, see Alessandro Portelli, “The death of Luigi Trastulli: Memory 
and the Event,” in Alessandro Portelli, The Death of Luigi Trastulli and Other Stories: Form and 
Meaning in Oral History (New York, 1991): 1-28; Biray Kolluoglu Kirli, “Forgetting the 
Smyrna Fire,” History Workshop Journal, 60 (2005): 25-44; Gary Minkley & Martin Legassick, 
“‘Not Telling’: Secrey, Lies, and History,” History & Theory, 39, 4 (2000): 1-11; Simonetta 
Falasca-Zamponi, Fascist Spectacle: the Aesthetics of Power in Mussolini’s Italy (Berkeley, 
1997).   
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ceased to exist. When possible, I also met with their children (in some cases their grandchildren) 
in order to understand how stories translated across generations, had been passed down, repeated, 
or--as was the case more often than naught--how they were relegated to some forgotten, 
mysterious, and unknown past of a father, grandfather, mother, or an aunt. In total, I conducted 
around 85 formal interviews (Appendix A).71 I have tried to capture this cumulative process 
within the narrative of the “vignettes.” Never was one whole story more illustrative of the past. 
Instead, each developed upon and permeated other stories. In this way, their stories were 
productive accounts of the past, demonstrating how history works as a social process.72  
 Rather than reduce oral and documentary sources into a moral hierarchy, I treat archival 
materials in the same manner as I do oral sources.73 I mold a narrative out of the voices written 
into the documents. Materials that fill these chapters originate in a wide variety of archives 
(Appendix B) and, even within single archives, represent a diverse array of points of view. 
Because of the central role of Italian institutions in the community, particularly from the 1930s 
onwards, I rely heavily on diplomatic and institutional archives. The narrators in the documents 
housed in the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs offer vibrant descriptions of the challenges they 
face and often struggle to deal with the circumstances enveloping the Italians of Egypt. These 
documents are short and fragmentary because they are written in the moment (in other words, 
they are not simply reducible to complete iterations of political projects). While indeed there are 
larger reflections on political environs, I deal more with the day-to-day, and in some cases 
minute-by-minute, reflections of various actors. Not all documents in the diplomatic archives 
were diplomatic in nature, although many indeed drew connections between quotidian and the 
                                                            
71 These were all recorded. They range from 45 minutes to over six hours. 
72 Trouillot, Silencing the Past, 22-23. 
73 Portelli, “The Peculiarities of Oral History,” 97. 
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state level realities.74 I was surprised by the frequency with which I found letters from members 
of all social strata of the Italian community. Some of these were addressed to specific personnel 
of the consulate or government, others were general statements and commentaries on their lives 
and circumstances in Egypt. I try to highlight these throughout, as they signify how the 
institutional and diplomatic offices functioned as nodes between a variety of political-historical 
scales.  
I was lucky to have gained access to the Italian consular archives in Alexandria and 
Cairo. I read over 300 personal files,75 which included both official documents and a wide range 
of unofficial documents (personal letters, observations on a given official’s role within the 
community, requests for assistance and intervention, and so forth). Covering the departure itself, 
particularly after the Italian government had been reestablished in Rome in the late 1940s, the 
archives of the Italian state were invaluable. One of the few benefits of the Italian bureaucracy is 
that, despite certain documents being “unavailable for consultation,” the savvy historian can 
learn to trace copies of one document to the other offices to which it was (or would have been) 
addressed and locate it indirectly. Again, the frequency of letters from Italians of Egypt followed 
the unfolding of events, and I have tried to maintain this juxtaposition in my narrative. Often, in 
the midst of diplomatic correspondence or official exchanges regarding policies of 
accommodation or pecuniary relief, I found personal accounts of departure and arrival. In other 
words, from a variety of perspectives there were examples of moving up and down in scale. 
                                                            
74 For recent commentary on the role of the state and state archives in historical research on 
decolonization, see Todd Shepard, “‘History Is Past Politics’? Archives, ‘Tainted Evidence,’ and 
the Return of the State,” American Historical Review (April 2010): 474-483. The entire AHR 
Forum, to which Shepard’s article belongs, is relevent in the broader discussion about dilemmas 
that surface in the sources and archives used to study the historical processes of decolonization.  
75 While some of these were a few sheets of papers and others were several volumes of 1.5 
inches of accumulated documentation, the vast majority were between half and one inch thick. 
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 As Carlo Ginzburg writes, “context” may be “seen as a space of historical possibilities,” 
giving “the historian the possibility to integrate the evidence, often consisting only of scattered 
fragments, about an individual's life.”76 By employing these widely divergent sources, in this 
dissertation I explore the possibility for reconstituting stories in non-synchronic or non-coeval 
contexts. Each vignette builds on the lived experiences remembered by Italians of Egypt. Each 
chapter uses these lived experiences to propel itself backwards in time and to examine iterations 
of the community’s formation through its ending. Each, in turn, makes the other possible. The 
friction between the remembering of the past and the historiographical chapters betrays the 
boundaries of what it means for an Italian of Egypt to be “out of time.” While the arch of the 
dissertation moves forward in time, iterations of the community’s ending are increasingly 
impregnated with a past that is always more past, more distant. In many ways, it could be said, 
this project itself is part of the community’s ending.  
                                                            
76 Carlo Ginzburg, “Checking the Evidence: The Judge and the Historian,” Critical Inquiry, 18 1 
(1991): 79-92, 90 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
Mediterranean Futures:  
Historical Time and the Departure of Italians from Egypt, 1919-1937 
 
 
This first chapter looks back to a period before most of the Italians of Egypt with whom I 
spoke lived. It does so with one goal: to study the tensions between experience and expectation 
that shaped the unfolding interwar worlds of the Italians of Egypt. We see these tensions surface, 
for example, with the arrival of King Vittorio Emanuele III in Alexandria for the inauguration of 
an Italian state school in 1933. The trip itself took place with great propagandistic ambition. The 
Italian King's visit to Egypt was to be the first of a foreign sovereign since Khedive Ismail hosted 
a delegation of European royalty for the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. It evoked a long 
narrative upon which the Fascist regime drew to emphasize the particularity of the relation 
between Italy and Egypt, Italians and Egyptians. The journalist Mirko Ardemagni was assigned 
by the National Fascist Party (Partito Fascista Nazionale, PNF) to follow the King during his 
visit and, preceding the trip, published a series of articles in Mussolini’s newspaper Il Popolo 
d’Italia attending to the relations between the two countries and peoples. The voyage was - wrote 
Ardemagni - “destined to exponentially strengthen the spiritual links between the two 
Mediterranean countries.” He first wrote of the struggle of Egyptian peasants for independence 
and the hardships they faced living under British occupation. He then wrote of King Fuad’s 
loyalty to Italy, noting that Fuad’s closest confidants were Italians, notably architect Ernesto 
Verrucci Bey and historian Angelo Sammarco. Ardemagni depicted the royal families of Italy 
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and Egypt as characterized by an ageless “friendship.”1 The same rhetoric was used in an article 
published by Sammarco in the widely-read Egyptian daily Al-Ahram.2 In the Italian newspaper, 
Il Giornale d’Oriente, a product of the fascistization of Italian journalism in Egypt, a special 
volume was issued to celebrate the links between the regimes and peoples.3 The visit of Vittorio 
Emanuele III, which had been organized just at the moment in which Italy’s presence as a 
reputable power in the Mediterranean was beginning to be felt, intended to cement this political 
friendship and to provide an example of its purported “politics of peace.”4 
The King’s visit served a second, related purpose. It was to represent the culmination of 
the reorganization of the Italian community in Egypt around the ideals of the PNF and, in doing 
so, to solder the binds that connected them to the political worlds of metropolitan Italy. 
Ardemagni recounted the “heroic” origins of the Italians of Egypt that this trip intended to 
reinvigorate. Eliding years of immigration history, in one rhetorical sweep the journalist 
connected the Italian community in Egypt to the drawing up of Alexandria and Cairo and the 
development of Egyptian infrastructure under Mehmet Ali (1805-1848). Describing them as 
“sentimentalists,” he attributed to the Italians of Egypt unique characteristics with respect to 
other Italian emigrants and to the other foreign communities in Egypt. The journalist detailed the 
“feverish” preparations of the Italian residents in Egypt for the King’s arrival. In Alexandria, 
around 30,000 Italians awaited the King, who planned to inaugurate a newly constructed Italian 
school designed in the Fascist aesthetic.5 The school, wrote the journalist accompanying the 
King during his visit to Egypt, extended the sanctuary of the Italian State around its young 
                                                            
1 Mirko Ardemagni, “L’evoluzione del popolo egiziano,” Il popolo d’Italia 11 February 1933; 
“Re Fuad (l’Egitto moderno)” Il popolo d’Italia 15 February 1933 
2 Angelo Sammarco, "al-tuliyyan fi misr," Al-Ahram, 19 February 1933 
3 Ladi Skakal Personal Collection, Il Giornale d'Oriente, February/March 1933. 
4 La civilta cattolica, 84 1 (1933): 608-614. 
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subjects abroad, who: “far from the Patria... confused by the melting pot of humanity in an 
immense cosmopolitan city... meet every day beneath the ceiling of the Italian school with the 
same joy with which emigrants place their feet upon native soil after a long exile.”6  The school 
represented the beginning of a new Italy, at home and abroad.  
Aside from the grandeur of propagandistic rhetoric, the King’s visit betrayed an 
underlying instability in the future of the Italians of Egypt. During his visit, he donated 100,000 
Italian Lire to Italian youth collectives, schools, and welfare organizations in Egypt. This gesture 
was met by a surge of requests from community members. Letters from Italy’s emigrants poured 
into the consulates, expressing their need for assistance.7 One was from sixteen-year-old 
Antoinette Paonessa. Both she and her younger brother attended Italian schools. Their father, an 
unemployed carpenter, had emigrated from Calabria sometime between 1905 and 1912 and 
settled in the working-class district of Bacos, where European and Egyptian tradesmen, builders, 
and artisans intermingled. In the letter, Antoinette described her family’s poverty and the 
struggles her father met trying to procure employment. She complained of “despair [and] great 
misery,” and described her father as a “faithful” Italian and former combatant in the First World 
War. Her brother, she continued, was “an ambitious avanguardista,” a member of the Fascist 
youth organization for 14 to 18 year-old boys. He was among the 3,000 Italian youth who 
gathered to salute the monarch in what was an unprecedented rally of Italians in Egypt.8 Despite 
their loyalty to the Patria, recounted Antoinette, her family lacked adequate support from the 
Italian state, “neither for work, nor for the things we need [at home].” She closed the letter 
declaring; “I don’t say this out of pleasure, but hoping to relieve some of this misery... I’m a 
                                                            
6 Mirko Ardemagni, “I sovrani d'Italia pongono termine al soggiorno ufficiale nella capitale 
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young girl and I turn to His Majesty as a daughter [so that] you might help us.”9 Her letter never 
reached the King, but it did arrive to the office of the Italian Consul, where its mélange of 
anguish and hope echoed trepidations about the future increasingly voiced among Italian 
residents.  
The goal of this chapter is to demonstrate how various historical actors articulated the 
tensions between experience and expectation and thereby perceived the horizon of possible 
futures long before the de facto departure of the Italians of Egypt. Whereas both propagandistic 
narratives of the community’s history and literary and personal reflections on the community’s 
past in the aftermath of departure give much attention to its origins, both narrations elide years in 
which the present “community” (the repatriates) took shape. These forms of remembering offer 
little insight into the conflicting conditions of nationalist hope and emigrant anguish that marked 
the interwar period, such as the trepidations of Italian emigrants like the young Paonessa. The 
generation prior to those with whom I spoke often struggled through a different set of 
uncertainties and from these circumstances derived a variety of ideas about the future, one of 
which included the increasingly real possibility of departure from Egypt precisely because the 
experience of living in Egypt was undergoing great transformation. The argument of this chapter 
is that the likelihood of the “departure” depended on the particular arrangement (or 
misalignment) between experience as Italian emigrants in Egypt and expectation within the 
context of Egypt’s changing political sphere.   
The balance between experience and expectation, between anguish and hope, articulated 
in these futures past illustrates, to employ Reinhart Koselleck’s terminology, the “formal 
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determinants that disclose [the concrete process of history].”10 Faruk Tabak calls the period from 
1870 to the 1920s a “fleeting conjuncture” during which legal and political regimes favored the 
realization of distinct groups within late-Ottoman cities. As he shows, in this conjuncture the 
experiential categories of cosmopolitanism and nationalism were not mutually exclusive, but 
were instead co-dependent processes.11 The extraterritorial legality preserved under the Ottoman-
era Capitulations, which granted jurisdictional and economic privileges to some foreign nationals 
in Egypt later than anywhere else in the Mediterranean, conditioned what were and were not 
possible outcomes of the present. While it allowed Italian subjects to reside in Egypt without the 
burden of taxation and with relative impunity, it more importantly permitted the Italian State to 
act upon its own subjects without Egyptian (or British) interference. 
The materials upon which this chapter draws illustrate how the aspirations of the Fascist 
regime transformed conditions of possibility into conditions of impossibility for the Italians of 
Egypt. The imbalance activated by these aspirations linked the past to the future, and yet it 
remains neglected in much historical analysis because of an overemphasis on later historical 
periods. Between 1919 and 1937, many individuals perceived interwar tensions between Italy, 
England and Egypt as responsible for ending the “fleeting conjuncture” described by Tabak.12 A 
variety of historical actors realized, however, that the future would be distinct from the past; a 
realization that itself embodied the concrete processes of historical time. By the mid-1930s, the 
termination of extraterritoriality was imminent and with a majority of Italians living in 
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circumstances similar to those of the Paonessa family, Italian diplomats feared that “the 
conditions of [Italian] communities in Egypt will only continue to decline.”13 Important political 
actors expected that all Italians would be obliged to repatriate, regardless of their class or social 
status.14 Indeed, from this point forward, repatriation will inform a variety of discussions 
throughout the dissertation. Although “repatriation” is a legal and political process often 
associated with postwar narratives, it became a remedy to the discord between past and future. 
Repatriation was, consequently, neither an inevitable outcome to colonialism’s end nor a modest 
reaction to the antagonisms of cosmopolitanism and nationalism, as it is frequently portrayed. In 
the case of the Italians of Egypt, repatriation entered into historical process as a vital conduit 
through which futures could be envisioned. The fact that it only surfaces in scholarly analysis as 
distinctive of later periods, I argue, is indicative of the shaky foundations upon which rest the 
analytical categories that mark the colonial Mediterranean.15  
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I. Arrivals 
In understanding the scale of Italian immigration to Egypt, one cannot underestimate the role 
played by the legal structures of the Capitulations in creating the conditions of possibility in 
which historical events unfolded. The Capitulations (from capitula in Latin) were a series of 
treaties between early Ottoman rulers and European city-states that granted commercial 
privileges to merchants. In 1154 a commercial treaty was signed between Pisa and Egypt 
granting special privileges to Pisan merchants.16 Terms of one treaty signed in 1290 between the 
city of Genoa and the Sultan Malak el 'Adel in Alexandria read: “[a]ll of the Genovese will be 
under the jurisdiction of their consul in Alexandria, who will (recognize) civil and penal affairs 
among Genovesi, and among Genovesi and Christians of other nations.”17 While such legal 
privileges originate around the 12th century, the treaties increased in number and complexity 
over the centuries. In 1534, French subjects were given commercial and residential rights under 
French jurisdiction in all Ottoman territories. With the consolidation of European nation-states 
into the nineteenth century, the 1534 treaty became the prototype for later ones between Western 
powers and the Sublime Porte. These later Capitulations extended extraterritorial rights to 
Europeans, who fell under the jurisdiction and protection of their respective consuls.18 
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Various attempts were made throughout the nineteenth century to modify the terms of the 
capitulations and to develop from them mixed venues of litigation.19 Egyptian nationalists 
perceived them as a hindrance to their own economic sovereignty, as foreign venture in Egyptian 
territory were subject only to the laws of the country from which they came. Under Egypt's semi-
autonomy from the Porte, attempts at their modification culminated in 1876 with the 
establishment of the Mixed Courts, in the vision of Nubar Pasha, then Minister of Foreign 
Affairs. To Nubar the capitulations no longer existed de jure but had instead metamorphosed into 
anachronistic privileges:  
 They have been replaced by an arbitrary law of custom, varying with the character of 
each new diplomatic chief - a law based upon precedents frequently abusive, which has 
been permitted to take root in Egypt through force of circumstances and constant pressure 
and a desire to make easy the lot of the foreigner. It leaves the Government powerless in 
its relation to such foreigners and the people without any security that evenhanded justice 
will be done. Such a state of affairs ...impedes the country in the development of its 
resources; it prevents it from putting its true riches at the service of European enterprise 
and capital; it destroys its progress and brings moral and material ruin in its train.20 
 
Jasper Yeates Brinton, a former president of the Court of Appeals from 1943-48, in his historical 
study of the mixed courts, claims that Nubar's framing of the courts as "mixed" and not 
"international" was a designation intended to ensure that the courts represented a form of 
national sovereignty.21 Although their aim was to limit foreign domination in Egypt, in many 
instances - especially in their requirement of the Egyptian Government to enforce cases against 
itself if it lost a suit - the courts were used as arbiters in legal battles between foreign companies 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
The Mixed Courts, 3. For historical analysis of the evolution of the Capitulations and their 
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and citizens and the Egyptian Government itself.22 Nubar made concessions to ensure foreign 
commercial investments - a vital part of the Egyptian economy - and European powers 
compromised some of their capitulatory powers to protect their own interests in Egypt. Still, the 
treaties remained. 
Whereas many scholars have concentrated on the Capitulations’ role in engendering a 
kind of cultural hybridity and conditioning “legal chameleons,” I will illustrate some of their 
other effects, such as how they facilitated immigration and assisted in creating internally 
coherent communities.23 Italians arrived to Egypt in various waves, some long before national 
unification in 1861. Pisan and Genovese merchants had established a presence there as early as 
the thirteenth century.24 But most arrived much later. Starting in the early nineteenth century, 
Mehmed Ali and his successors recruited European technicians to develop Egypt’s infrastructure 
and to assist in the centralization of state bureaucracy.25 Although numbers from this period are 
unclear, an estimate from 1840 puts the “Italians” at around 2,000.26 Over subsequent years, 
many Italians fled the political turmoil of the Risorgimento (the process that culminated in 
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national unification) and departed for Egypt, where they were attracted both by the prospect of 
work and by the protection of the capitulatory regime.27  
With the British occupation and designation of Egypt as a protectorate in 1882, however, 
Italian influence sharply declined.28 Paradoxically, however, the population of Italians and other 
Europeans exploded under colonial rule. The immigration of working-class Italian migrants, 
seeking temporary or seasonal employment, increased from 18,665 in 1882 to 24,454 in 1897.29 
Egyptian nationalists attempted to modify the terms of the Capitulations and did in fact succeed 
in developing from them mixed venues of litigation during the late nineteenth century, but 
national debts and pressure from European Consuls helped to preserve privileges well into the 
twentieth century.30  The mixed court system dealt mainly with multinational commercial 
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transactions. Nationalists failed to insert non-Egyptians into Egyptian jurisdiction and the 
consular courts remained the site of most litigation for members of the Italian community. 
Indeed, some Egyptian nationalists feared that abolishing the Capitulations altogether would 
transfer far too much power over Egypt’s economy to the British (it was mostly in the hands of 
non-Egyptians). The case of Tunisia, where the French abolished the Capitulations to consolidate 
their colonial presence, seemed to prove them right.  
In the framework of Italian foreign policy, the Capitulations also constituted one of the 
“citizenship tools” used by Italian governments between 1870 and 1914, aiming both to unite its 
national communities under the new Italian State and to “penetrate” Mediterranean port cities 
through its cultural and commercial presence. The liberal Italian government conferred what 
historian Sabina Donati calls “thin citizenship” (nationality, but not the full rights of citizenship) 
to many Sephardic Jewish subjects who had moved to the region during and after the time of the 
Italian maritime republics. By creating protected groups (protégés) whose commercial activities 
and mobility were secured by Italian authorities, the Italian state hoped to gain access to 
merchant networks that transcended both national and imperial boundaries.31 With the outbreak 
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of the Italo-Turkish war in 1911 and subsequent Greek-Turkish tensions, many of Italy’s 
protégés fled to safer harbors in Alexandria, where they continued to live under the protection of 
the Italian state.32 The Italian protégés’ financial donations to the construction of key institutions 
linked to the Italian state demonstrate the relative success of this project, at least into the late 
1930s. The institutions that received exceptional support from Italian protégés during their 
incipient years included the consular courts, the Italian Chambers of Commerce, the Italian 
Hospital in Alexandria, and the Dante Alighieri Society, and several charity organizations (such 
as the Società Italiana di Beneficienza). The importance of these institutions as a structural 
safety-netting for much of the working-class Italian population in Egypt grew from the late-
nineteenth century onwards.  
Contrary to narratives that stress social harmony under the Capitulations, this influx of 
immigrants was not without its problems.33 Almost immediately following British occupation in 
1882, Anglo-Egyptian authorities attempted to limit immigration due to growing tensions 
between ethnic and national groups.34 They particularly feared the consequences of the growth of 
an Italian “proletarian immigration” because it constituted a significant source of competition for 
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Egyptian workers.35 As early as 1899 the Emigration Office in Italy (a division of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs) took measures to slow the pace of immigration by publicizing the destitute 
conditions encountered by Italian workers upon their arrival in Egypt.36 British authorities 
cautioned the Italian police to enforce stricter controls on Italian ports of emigration. Despite 
this, by 1907, the population of Italian subjects had grown to 34,926. In accord with British 
efforts, the following year an Italian decree was passed to limit un-contracted labor migration to 
Egypt. It stated that for blacksmiths, carpenters, and street-pavers the release of visas for 
individuals intending to travel to Egypt was “suspended for reasons of public order” and would 
only be released if prospective emigrants were able to exhibit proof of contracted work or the 
presence of relatives able to financially support them; both needed to be certified by an Italian 
office in Egypt. Moreover, the decree stipulated that, if emigrants did indeed have employers or 
family members able to support them, they should also have means available to pay for their 
eventual “repatriation” (rimpatrio). While this use of repatriation sets the stage for what occurred 
much later, it also implies that the within these colonial entanglements, the terms of nationality 
importantly affected how migration, residency, and community-formation were mapped onto one 
another.   
The Emigration Office in Rome sent a copy of the decree to the Police Headquarters in 
Naples. In a handwritten note accompanying the decree, someone had written: “the excessive 
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crowding in Egypt of temporary Italian workers unable to find work becomes disruptive to 
public order.”37 A similar statement circulated in 1913, during the peak year of Italian 
emigration, reiterating the Foreign Minister’s request that the Emigration Office not release 
passports to men without contracts intending to travel to Egypt. It added that with the 
proliferation of unregulated prostitution, under no circumstances should passports be issued to 
women traveling alone.38 In a series of telegrams from 1915, the British tried to overtly 
discipline working-class immigration by requiring potential emigrants to consult the British 
consulate in Naples prior to their departure. By 1917, Italians numbered 40,198 persons. Still, no 
unequivocal law regulated immigration to Egypt. A British decree passed in 1920 required 
individuals disembarking in Egypt to hold a British visa, but it was dissolved in 1922 with 
England’s unilateral declaration of Egypt’s independence and the establishment of the Kingdom 
of Egypt.39  By 1927, Italian residents had grown to number 52,462. One decade later, when 
Italians constituted roughly 25 percent of the 186,515 non-Egyptians in Egypt (second only to 
Greeks), unemployment among them was widespread. A telegram from one British administrator 
in Egypt to the Prefect in Naples stated: “requests for manual workers are easily covered by the 
unemployed who are already present [here]... those intending to depart in search of work should 
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be discouraged.” Indeed, he added, there were scant opportunities for the unemployed Italians 
already in Egypt, who shared among them uncertain futures.40   
 
II. Extraterritorial Conditions of Possibility  
The conditions set by the Capitulations in Egypt marked an ambiguous temporal space. They 
were contemporaneously relics of a distant past and harbingers of change. Within the Italian 
community, fears about the future appear in archival documentation at least as early as 1919. 
After the revolts against British occupation that followed the exile of Saad Zaghloul, Egyptian 
nationalist and founder of the Wafd Party, Francesco Mazza, an Italian born in Cairo, addressed a 
letter to the Italian Consul in Alexandria from his “hometown” in Calabria.41 He was about to 
return to his wife and children in Egypt after completing military service in Italy during the First 
World War. Mazza wrote anxiously:  
I was just about to depart [for Egypt, but] I have temporarily delayed my departure 
because I read in the papers that there was a rebellion in Egypt, and that the overall 
situation is quite troubling and the indigenous nation (nazione indigena) has revolted 
causing great damage, not only in the villages but even in the cities... even more 
troubling, letters from my acquaintances [in Egypt] inform me that at any moment all of 
the Italians [will] need to be repatriated (tutti gl’Italiani devono essere rimpatriati)... I 
turn to your Excellency to know the details... and if truly all [Italians will] need to be 
repatriated or if I can return to Alexandria without obstacle and difficulty... [If not] how 
should I safeguard my family...?42  
 
Mazza’s letter suggests that Italian residents deliberated over the prospect of an ominous future 
in Egypt. While the letter signals the rich socio-political landscape of Egypt’s struggle for 
independence, Mazza explicitly draws attention to circulating rumors of an imminent 
“repatriation” of Italians. As the letter continues, Mazza does not appear surprised by this. He 
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instead anguishes about the possibility that he might need to rescue his family and belongings, 
including his mother’s heirlooms, from Egypt. The Italian Consul responded two months later, 
informing him that the situation had returned to normalcy. Mazza, however, never returned to 
Egypt. He found work in Trieste, a city freshly claimed from another empire, where he observed 
a more promising future. His wife and children joined him there one year later.  
 Mazza and his acquaintances were not the only ones who found the situation in Egypt 
unsettling. On another level of analysis, Italian futures in Egypt were questioned by one of 
Fascism’s most important historians, Gioacchino Volpe. In 1922, Volpe traveled to Egypt to 
write a series of essays for Mussolini’s newspaper Il Popolo d'Italia.43 Having recently 
reinvented himself as a contemporary historian and no longer solely an historian of the Middle 
Ages, Volpe collapsed his political commitment to the PNF into his historical work. An 
outspoken irredentist, he had an astute sense of the landscape of early twentieth-century Italian 
imperial histories. Nearly all of his works on modern Italy reflect on territories inhabited by large 
communities of Italian emigrants in and around the Mediterranean, which, following Francesco 
Crispi and Enrico Corradini, he viewed as key “assets” to Italy’s “prestige” and economic 
expansion.44 In this articulation, he drew on a rich narrative that harkened back to the 
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populations of “Italians” throughout the Mediterranean during the time of the Italian Maritime 
Republics.  
The essays on the Italians from Egypt that resulted from his trip were relegated to a small 
collection. Divergent in tone from much of his oeuvre, they are unique insofar as they represent 
the only speculation on the future of Italians in Egypt by an historian (in contrast to earlier 
publications regarding the community’s many colorful pasts).45 Although one cannot be sure 
whether his visit was before or after the declaration of Egypt's independence by the British, his 
observations detail a waning future for Italians in Egypt. Briefly summarizing the “historic” 
presence of the Italians in Egypt, he spends more time focusing on their impending decline, 
noting: “our postwar...is not without dark clouds for the Italians in Egypt.”46 We must not forget 
that what historian Erez Manela has called “the Wilsonian moment” was a moment during which 
the logic of self-determination (supported in various ways by Mussolini’s early regime while he 
concurrently occupied Libya and dreamed up a plan to render the Mediterranean an “Italian 
lake”) reconfigured what were seen as possible - and just - futures for much of the world. Volpe 
wrote that, following the 1919 uprisings, “One has the impression... looking at England in Egypt, 
of a liquidating company, or, better, a company that is changing hands, firing its old personnel 
[only] to hire anew.”47 Among the nationalist movements contributing to what he saw as 
England's demise, he cited the rise of Islamic movements (the Muslim Brotherhood would be 
founded several years later in 1928), the struggles between Zionists and Arabs in Palestine (and 
between Zionists and local Palestinian Jews), and anti-European tensions on the fringe of these 
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other movements.48 For nationalists like Volpe, the slow end of the British Empire signified the 
rise of Cairo as a potential intellectual center that could challenge British and French hegemony 
in the Mediterranean and provide an ally for Italy.49  
In contrast to the potential Volpe saw in Egypt’s political emergence, he detected great 
anxiety among the Italian residents caught in this tumultuous historical conjunction. The 
“Italians of Egypt,” he wrote, sensed a “looming threat” in a part of Africa that indirectly 
mapped onto Italian imperial ambitions in the Mediterranean. He described the Italian 
community in Egypt as constituted by “proletarian” emigrants who lacked the “imperialist 
sentiment” of French, English, and German subjects elsewhere.50 This, he calculated, would be 
one source of their eventual demise. Projecting into the future, Volpe imagined that an 
independent Egypt would no longer consent to immigration: “Numerically... the Italian colony in 
Egypt can only decline.”51 According to him, the question of Italian futures in Egypt was 
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inseparable from the jurisdictional conditions created by the capitulatory regime. Throughout the 
Mediterranean, the Capitulations had already been abolished: in Turkey, they were cancelled 
with the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, one year after Volpe’s visit to Egypt, and in Tunisia much 
earlier with the formation of the French Protectorate in 1881. He speculated that the breakdown 
of the antiquated privileges conferred by the Capitulations, which would be a probable result of 
Egyptian sovereignty, would diminish the service Italy’s protégés delivered as cultural and 
commercial intermediaries. But it would be detrimental especially because of their financial 
backing to the institutions that supported the much larger working-class Italian community.  
This concern for the internal coherence of the community that Volpe expressed was 
shared in the local Italian press. Following the declaration of Egypt’s independence in 1922 the 
widely distributed Italian newspaper in Egypt, L'Imparziale, circulated what it claimed were 
“secret instructions” behind the Anglo-Egyptian talks. Among these “instructions,” that “the 
Capitulations would be abolished and England alone would assume control over foreign interests 
in Egypt” (recalling yet again the Tunisian experience).52 Tensions rose between Italian and 
British subjects despite the lack of overt diplomatic conflict.53  
Volpe, however, suggested that the consolidation of the Egyptian Monarchy might 
provide Italy with the opportunity to negotiate a new partnership with the Egyptian government. 
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Weaving a narrative of a timeless friendship between Italian and Egyptian peoples and 
governments that took the early Capitulations as a base, and focusing on the importance of the 
Italian community in Egypt, he claimed that a continued alliance was possible because Italy had 
neither militarily occupied Egypt nor constituted a colonial presence there. With immigration at a 
point of closure and the prospect of reduced Italian influence through its protégés, Volpe 
positioned Egypt’s growing independence from the English as the de facto triumph of Egyptian 
nationalism over British hegemony. This did not, he noted, solve the problems of the Italian 
residents whose hopes remained caught between the past and the future: “...one hears frequent 
words of lament [for times past]”, he wrote, noting the decline of the community’s importance in 
Egypt and worrying that, if circumstances went unchanged, fate will leave no option for them but 
an eventual “renouncement of one’s [Italian] nationality.” In accord with Volpe’s observations, 
the Italian Government saw two possible solutions for this community “at risk”: either expand 
Italy’s reach over and around them or repatriate them.54  
 
III. Rebuilding a Future for Italians in Egypt 
Seeking to extend Italy beyond its geographical borders, in 1927 Dino Grandi, then 
Undersecretary of the Italian Ministry of Interior, announced that there would no longer be 
Italian “emigrants,” but only “Italians abroad.” This rhetorical move was intended to link Italians 
living outside of the peninsula to the nationalist and imperialist projects of the PNF. In one act 
mutually constituting nation and empire, the complex entanglements of the colonial 
Mediterranean were made into material realities.55 Emigrants were no longer seen as a loss in the 
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Italian national imaginary, but rather were portrayed by the regime as an untapped resource for 
its very regeneration. The Fasci all'estero (internationally based centers for the PNF) were 
organized by the late 1920s with three main goals: to link ideas and practices of italianità 
developed in the local histories of Italians already abroad to fascist ideals; to enact 
discriminatory policies towards Italians abroad, favoring those who were considered "true 
Italians" in their political sympathies; and to "inquadrare," or bring within a political framework, 
the masses of Italian emigrants.56   
In Egypt this move resonated profoundly. In other territories with large Italian 
communities, the Fasci (the local units of the PNF) and associated institutions were directly 
linked to the party headquarters in Rome, but Italians remained subject to local jurisdiction.57 In 
Egypt, however, extraterritorial status helped the institutional life of the community to thrive 
within this political landscape precisely because it was outside of Anglo-Egyptian authority. 
Italian subjects, schools, consular courts, and institutions were free to operate under Italian law. 
Grandi’s move, then, had greater pragmatic import in Egypt than elsewhere.58  
Major reforms were conducted in the Italian schools to ensure that they became edifices 
of Italianness (italianità) and Fascist ideology. Aided by the Capitulations, Italian state schools 
had been founded in Alexandria, Cairo, and Upper Egypt by the end of the nineteenth century, 
but the curriculum had gone unchanged since their establishment. An entirely new curriculum 
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was devised in 1931-32 in Cairo and implemented the following year in Alexandria, which, 
observed Piero Parini, the General Director of Italians Abroad, would provide young Italians 
with the tools to survive in Egypt and to reinvigorate the “prestige of Italian communities.”59 In 
the restructuring, contemporary Fascist policies renewed the post-unification ideas of Francesco 
Crispi, which envisioned communities of Italian emigrants as potential sites for nation-building 
and the expansion of Italian prestige and power abroad. The new curriculum emphasized both 
Fascism’s “revolutionary” role in the Italian peninsula and the contribution of the Italian 
community to the modernization of Egypt.60  
Fascism was framed as the new religion of the state, a revolution of modernity, and 
embassies and consulates were tasked with the perpetuation of this myth in their communities. It 
was by means of organizing youth and monitoring cultural institutions that this realization was 
imaginable.61 In February 1933, a prominent Alexandrian Italian lawyer, Stanislao Rocchi, 
cautioned the headquarters of the Dante Alighieri Society (Società Dante Alighieri, SDA) in 
Rome that their intervention was needed to link the local Dante with the Fascio - the current 
board having delayed compliance with the new Fascist ideas of organization and thus putting at 
risk the hegemony of local Italian authorities. The headquarters in Rome of the SDA, an Italian 
cultural institution whose goal was to reinforce nationalist ideals among Italians abroad (its 
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branch in Egypt established in 1896), had been integrated into the PNF in 1931 and its 
propaganda officially linked to that of the regime.62 During his 1922 visit, Gioacchino Volpe had 
observed that the SDA better engendered a sense of italianità than the Italian state schools.63 
Once the restructuring of Italian state schools was complete, the SDA leadership in Egypt finally 
gave in to the local Fascio. The institution circulated Fascist publications and regime-produced 
Luce films, found by members of its administration to be the most “effective and diffuse” means 
to reach Italian residents.64   
In 1934, the Italian Consul in Cairo observed that “a natural tendency towards sympathy 
for the Fascist movement had developed” among Italian residents.65 He attributed this to the 
efforts to homogenize the Italian institutions. During the Giornata della Fede (Day of Faith) 
campaign the following year, intended to symbolically wed Italians to the Fascist regime and to 
demonstrate popular support for the war effort in Ethiopia, the Italians of Alexandria donated an 
average of 3.5 grams of gold per person (often in the form of wedding bands), a total of 500,000 
piasters, and 200,000 Italian lire of insurance policies. This was nearly double the average 
amount sent by Italians in Italy. An immensely significant move for a population experiencing a 
steady rise in unemployment, it is perhaps also an indication that members of the Italian 
community in Egypt sought a protected future in the arms of the Italian state.66  
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The first half of this chapter has taken us back to the King’s 1933 visit. As the foreign 
policy of the PNF utilized its communities abroad for the purpose of undermining British and 
French hegemony in the Mediterranean, their actions were amplified by the extraterritorial 
conditions of the capitulary regime. The Capitulations allowed the PNF to utilize its émigrés as 
“assets” by linking them directly to the Italian peninsula in a manner that was effectively 
impossible elsewhere. This is but one example of how neither cosmopolitanism nor nationalism 
function as descriptive categories of the historical moment, but might be better understood as 
temporal processes. Institutions like the state schools and the SDA laid foundations for 
“nationalist” futures among Italians residents. Indeed, the shelter provided by the Italian state 
through its courts, schools, and cultural associations had conditioned the community’s very 
existence.67  Such was the case of the Paonessa family whose poverty could only be assuaged by 
“the Patria,” as Antoinette rooted her family in this imagined trans-Mediterranean kinship when 
she addressed the King as a “daughter.” As we saw in the case of Mazza, many had in fact 
already looked towards the Italian State aware (or suspecting) that their days in Egypt were 
numbered.  
Historian James Sheehan argues that territorial claims facilitated the consolidation of 
national identities.68 This colonial Mediterranean example provides a twist to his assertion by 
showing how the Italian state was able to extend itself over its subjects abroad through legal 
extraterritoriality, bringing them into the folds of both nationalist and imperialist projects. 
Among Italians in Egypt, this fortified the role of the nation as a source of protection, but also as 
the source of a future. The Capitulations allowed Italy to extend its nationalist project just at the 
moment Egyptian nationalists struggled to redefine the boundaries of their own sovereignty, 
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setting up an untenable tension between possible futures. These trajectories, enacted in the 
theatre of the mid-twentieth century Mediterranean, do not necessarily tell us about the nature of 
historical categories. They do, however, provide examples of how interconnected temporal 
processes propel history.  
 
IV. Fascist Imperial Futures and the Undermining of the Present 
 Notwithstanding the violent repression of the Senussi rebellion in Libya in 1930-31, the 
Italian Government had portrayed itself largely as a “peaceful” power that championed 
nationalist movements during much of the first decade of Fascist rule in Rome (1922-32).69 
Historians generally agree that this was a continuation of Liberal Italy’s foreign policy, which 
had promoted cultural and commercial “penetration” of the Mediterranean as a means to gain 
imperial power relative to the British and the French.70 Parallel to the restructuring of Italian 
institutions and the King’s 1933 visit, however, the government in Rome began an aggressive 
propaganda campaign that emphasized Italy’s drive for territorial expansion, reviving the myth 
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of the Roman Mare Nostrum. 1933 marked a "decisive shift" in Italian policy abroad.71 A policy 
of "annoyance" was pursued against the mandatory powers - France and England - as a reaction 
to unmet Italian expectations following the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire after the First 
World War. In achieving this, Italy used the framework of the League of Nations to call for 
democratic rights for the populations living under French and British rule in the Middle East.72 
By late 1934 and the beginning of the Ethiopia campaign, Italy played on the threat that it might 
follow the examples of Japan and Germany and withdraw from the League of Nations.73 Some 
have noted that the distrust shown by Italy in the ability of international pacts to influence 
regional politics without compromising Italy's prestige marked a distinct break from the foreign 
policies of Liberal Italy. This distrust became, as historian Giorgio Rochat has described, a 
"cornerstone" of Fascist foreign policy.74  When, in 1934, Mussolini declared Africa and Asia to 
be within the “historic objectives” of Italy’s “natural expansion,” Italian propaganda took on 
threatening undertones to Egyptian political figures and British officials. In doing so, Italian 
subjects in the Mediterranean became more susceptible to reactions from their “hosts” and from 
ruling colonial powers.75  
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Italian efforts to mitigate opposition to its imperialist policies took advantage of Egypt’s 
vast public sphere. The Italian Ministry of Press and Propaganda, formed with Galeazzo Ciano as 
its director in 1935 (renamed as the Ministry of Popular Culture in 1937), began a campaign of 
“Arab propaganda.”  Fascist authorities sought to convince Egyptian nationalists that Italy posed 
no territorial threat. They attempted to control information circulating on Italian colonies: Italian, 
Arabic, French, Greek, and English language journalists in Egypt were bribed directly from 
Rome and advised as to what should be published regarding Italian news.76 Radio Bari, the first 
internationally broadcast Arabic-language radio station, was one of Italy’s most powerful 
weapons in this endeavor. Its cultural programs presented Italy as a “friendly nation” to its 
Arabic-speaking audience by omitting news on the Italian colonies in Libya and Ethiopia.77 Sixty 
percent of the broadcasts by Radio Bari were “cultural programs” that covered historical 
encounters between Italians and Muslims.78 This was part of a broader project of mythologizing 
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the timeless links between Italy and the Arab or Islamic World (an articulation that might be 
interpreted as yet another manifestation of a “cosmopolitan” Mediterranean). Rather than create 
sympathy for Italian policies, however, Radio Bari was measured successful in its capacity to 
incite Egyptian and Arab nationalists against British and French hegemony in the 
Mediterranean.79 This became a recipe for later problems.  
In the mid-1930s the Italian Government also began to support several Egyptian 
nationalists, most notably leaders of Young Egypt (Misr al Fatat) and their militant youth group, 
the Green Shirts, as well as a fringe group of the leading Wafd party.80 Mussolini’s office in 
Rome furnished literature on Fascist political and social projects to these militant groups and 
closely monitored their activities. The organizations united youth through squadrons and sporting 
activities and adopted a salute similar to the one used by Italian Fascists. Italian diplomats in 
Egypt imagined that supporting these movements - which constituted a legitimate force against 
the ruling Wafd and the British - would position Italy and the Italians as a friendly nation to 
young Egyptians.81 Italian assistance was by no means covert. Indeed, after a series of anti-
Italian publications in one of the leading English-language newspapers published in Egypt, the 
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leader of one militant group publicly declared his sympathy and support for the Italian 
government and people, including the community in Egypt.82  
During anti-British demonstrations between 1934-35, Makram Ebeid, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs in the struggling Wafd government, publicly condemned the PNF for its moral and 
material support of militant groups. The English-language press - read widely among Egypt’s 
elite and foreign classes - warned that Italian support for these paramilitary movements 
obstructed a prompt resolution to the “question of the Capitulations” and, in doing so, 
exacerbated the disquiet of foreign communities in Egypt.83 Paradoxically, the primary goal that 
united the militant groups was the cancellation of capitulatory privileges. The issue was of 
exceptional concern for European residents because it touched upon the institutions that 
legitimated their presence in Egypt, and it was in drawing attention to Italian support of the 
militant opposition that the British hoped to destabilize the Italian position.  
The Wafd feared Egypt would become a theater of war for Anglo-Italian aggression. The 
1935-36 invasion of Ethiopia revealed a violently imperialistic regime, which caused many 
Egyptian intellectuals who had shown sympathy - even slight - towards the Italian government to 
back away from their positions. It also stirred some Egyptians due to the affinities between 
themselves and Ethiopians.84  Many were angered by Italy’s unilateral declaration of the 
autonomy of the Ethiopian Coptic Church, splitting the church that had united Egyptian and 
Ethiopian Christians. Among Egyptian nationalists, fears also grew that Italian hands on the 
headwaters of the Nile would have disastrous implications for the life-blood of Egypt's 
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agriculture.85 The Suez Canal was another growing factor in British anxieties. Italian ships 
constituted around fifty percent of the traffic passing through its waters in 1935 and, as Italian 
forces grew in Libya and Ethiopia, the potential for an attack from the Western Desert to protect 
its passage through the canal appeared at least a possibility.  
The director of the Banco Italo-Egiziano, the Italian bank responsible for the accounts of 
elite Italians and Italian institutions in Egypt, observed that the events in Ethiopia influenced 
how Italians were treated by Greek and Coptic communities due to their shared Orthodox 
Christianity, but also by a broader community that feared any disruption of Egypt’s status quo. 
He recognized that such growing tensions could undercut wealthy and poor Italian residents 
alike.86 The director of the bank described “tendentious voices” agitating Egyptians and other 
European residents of Alexandria and Cairo: “one [hears] talk of an Italian threat from 
Tripolitania and of bombardment [on Egyptian cities]... it could [only] end with a reaction 
against the Italians resident here, who would naturally remain without any protection.”87  Italy’s 
threat as an imperial power had out-paced its “Arab propaganda,” and fear of its consequences 
rattled the foundations of the Italian community. As the Fascists mapped the Italians of Egypt 
into their policies as “historically” important, the imperialist aspirations projected from Rome 
began to isolate the Italians of Egypt from within the very legal and political system that had 
made their community possible. 
 
V. Dismantling the Past, Dismantling the Future 
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 In 1935, Mussolini sent Pellegrino Ghigi as the Minister of Italy in Egypt to devise a 
strategy to relieve the declining economic conditions of the Italian community.88 In the 
meantime, however, the Egyptian Government had initiated negotiations for a Treaty of Alliance 
with the British, which augmented problems for Italian leadership. Signed in summer 1936, the 
Treaty acknowledged England’s special interest in the Suez Canal, granted the British troops 
authority in the case of war, and, most importantly, set a date for a conference to abolish the 
Capitulations the following spring. It represented an alliance among British authorities, the Wafd, 
and the Egyptian Monarchy after several years of violent unrest.89 Whereas rumors had spread 
that Italian politicians were on the verge of reaching a non-aggression pact with Egypt, British 
concessions, arguably made out of fear that Egypt would fall into alliance with Italy, helped to 
draw the “wind out of the Italian sails.”90 Some historians have argued that it was precisely the 
arrangement of Anglo-Italo-Egyptian relations that drove Mustafa al-Nahhas, the Egyptian Prime 
Minister, to come to terms with the British. According to one contemporary British 
commentator, the alliance was “brought about through the agency of a third party - Italy.”91 The 
Fascist Government witnessed a major setback for its imperial interests. 
In Egyptian historiography the 1936 Treaty is remembered as demarcating a new phase in 
political history.92 The desire to deal finally with the Capitulations was key to the 1936 Treaty. 
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Tax exemptions and legal privileges enjoyed by foreigners made it exceedingly difficult for an 
ascendant class of educated Egyptians (the effendiya) to participate in the country’s economy.93 
Relief from the burden of foreign privilege had been long awaited. In one report, Ghigi himself 
acknowledged: “the aspiration of Egypt to free itself from the consular privileges and to 
[integrate] the foreigners (gli stranieri) residing in [its] territory into the sphere of common law... 
[has been] long anticipated.” He claimed that since 1922 Egypt’s political parties agreed most 
coherently on one singular point: an end to the capitulatory regime was paramount to “the 
struggle for the complete independence of the country.”94 Prior to the signing of the Treaty, 
Ghigi made a last-ditch effort to defend the Capitulations. With the repercussions the Italian 
community in mind, he wrote to the Egyptian government that reform was indeed fundamental to 
the “development” of the public and private lives of the Egyptian populace. But, he argued, the 
capitulatory regime encompassed “real agreements” that needed to be dealt with between the 
Egyptian Government and the individual powers with which they were signed. They were not 
abstract “privileges,” as Ghigi asserted they were being framed in Egyptian political discourse, 
“[the Capitulations] are anything but an internal affair and their end or modification certainly 
cannot be derived by the will (volontà) of Egypt alone.”95  
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The Italian Minister had the full support of Ernesto Cucinotta, the consular judge, and an 
important figure connecting the lives of Italian residents to the conversations happening at the 
diplomatic level. Cucinotta had a first-hand sense of the extent to which jurisdictional 
extraterritoriality was integral to safeguarding Italian interests and institutions. The consular 
courts, he argued, permitted the Italian residents to maintain autonomy in the mix of nationalities 
living in Egypt. He claimed that without consular courts to oversee jurisdiction, Italian subjects 
would not be considered equal to other Europeans in the eyes of the authorities, institutions 
would collapse, and the community would lose the last vestiges of its “prestige” that had been 
carefully propped up through propaganda in recent years.  
Cucinotta thought into the future. Because Italian institutions functioned with a great deal 
of internal coherency, he feared that dismantling their jurisdictional autonomy would turn the 
entire Italian community inside out. The size of the Italian population and the large amount of 
work that would need to be transferred away from the consular courts was the only argument he 
believed could persuade the Egyptian Government to allow for greater Italian involvement. At 
the time, Italians in Egypt numbered 52,462 (18,548 in Alexandria, 17,500 in Cairo, and the 
remainder spread between the cities in the Canal Zone and in Upper Egypt). Cucinotta brought 
attention to the fact that, in the Italian consular courts, around 1,100 penal and 200 civil 
proceedings were processed each year in Egypt. He suggested that the drastic increase in the 
volume of work that would be required of a transitional court could be used as a lobbying point 
for a larger Italian presence in the courts themselves. He advised the diplomats to raise this point 
in any negotiations for post-Capitulation settlements. This, he claimed, and this alone, would 
translate into greater protection of Italian subjects and institutions.96  
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Questions surfaced once again regarding the future of the Italian community. In 1935, 
only a few years after having been linked to the PNF, the leadership of the SDA had expressed 
angst regarding the “likely” closure of non-Egyptian schools in Egypt.97 Such anxieties 
worsened. Several months after the 1936 Treaty was signed, the Italian Consul in Alexandria 
wrote that Italian communities were ultimately in a state of “continual decline.” Fearing the end 
of their support networks, many had repatriated at their own expense and an additional 183 (and 
their families) at the expense of the consulate in Alexandria, a trend expected to accelerate due to 
the increasing number of requests.98 Matched with rising unemployment, these uncertain futures 
drove Italians out of Egypt. Mario Vanni, for example, an engineer who had moved to Cairo in 
the early-1920s, sent his wife and daughter to Florence in 1935 and then, one year later, he too 
returned to Italy, selling off his belongings “because,” he wrote, “the tense relations [between 
Italy and England] portend the outbreak of war.”99  
The Italian Chamber of Commerce (ICC) in Cairo - an institution that represented smaller 
artisanal businessmen as well as major industrial interests - told a similar story by 1937. Its 
members anticipated that the hardships already confronting Italian residents would be 
exacerbated by the abolition of the Capitulations. In one report, the ICC presented a “large-scale 
repatriation” as the only viable solution to the anticipated lack of employment opportunities and 
infrastructural support.100 The institution’s leadership advised that in post-Capitulation 
negotiations, Italy should demand an explicit guarantee by the Egyptian Government that Italians 
residents would be free to depart and return. Without this assurance, which it seemed was quite 
                                                            
97 ASDA, Alessandria d'Egitto, Stanislao Rocchi to Felice Felicioni. 
98 MAE, AC, b.301/ter., Telespresso September 11, 1936. 
99 ACS, MI, Direzione Generale della Pubblica Sicurezza Divisione Affari Generali e Riservati, 
1938, b.17, Prefettura di Firenze to Ministro dell'Interno DGPS, Roma May 18, 1938. 
100 MAE, AC, b.301/ter., “prevedibili ripercussioni dell'eventuale abolizione del regime 
capitolare” (anticipated repercussions of the eventual abolition of the capitulatory regime), 
January 1937. 
 64 
unlikely, the divide between metropolitan Italy and the Italians in Egypt, caused by the latter’s 
growing impoverishment, could become dangerously intensified.  
Indeed, by the late 1930s, especially in the aftermath of the Ethiopia campaign, financial 
support provided to Italian institutions by the elite members of the community had diminished 
alongside a steep decline in investments made in Italy by Italian residents.101 Italians had lost 
ground in every category of professional life and their incomes rarely matched the rising cost-of-
living. In one report, the ICC in Alexandria noted that the vast majority of Italians lived on a 
hand-to-mouth basis.102 Throughout the 1930s, Salvatore Caccioppo, an Italian resident from 
Attarin, Alexandria, a neighborhood in which Italians numbered roughly 10 percent of the non-
Egyptian population, had requested pecuniary assistance from the consulate for his children’s 
educational expenses at the Italian state school. In considering Caccioppo’s circumstances, the 
Consul noted that “because of the work situation [confronting Italians], Mr. Caccioppo is 
absolutely unable to pay and occasionally his family lacks bread at home.”103 His circumstances, 
the Consul continued, were typical of Italian residents who would suffer the ramifications of an 
end to the Capitulations.  
The Società Italiana di Beneficenza (Italian Charity Society, SIB), which had been the 
life-blood of the community, witnessed decreasing contributions from in-country donors.104 
Italian residents, however, needed every piaster they could get to maintain their livelihoods, and 
a majority had come to rely on the heavily subsidized resources provided by Italian 
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institutions.105 Furthermore, many suspected that integration into Egyptian jurisdiction would 
entail new taxes and residency fees, increasing the cost of living.106 A note from the ICC in Cairo 
read:  
the Italian worker [l’operaio italiano], who for his survival requires moral support 
(schools, cultural and recreational associations) and material assistance (free education, 
books, refreshments, hospital services, subsidies, etc.), will not be assisted by his 
community... just at the moment in which he will most significantly be affected by the 
need for assistance; the biggest danger of the abolition of the Capitulations is to 
[workers], the most numerous of our community; without means to resist, and with moral 
and material assistance below its current level... [Italians] will be constrained to 
repatriate.107 
 
The ICC in Alexandria echoed these concerns:  
Without a doubt, one cannot ignore the rights of the natives [indigeni]... to be protected 
and even favored, and therefore any attempt to resist this natural, legitimate postulate [the 
abolition of the Capitulations] might seem useless... [but] if it is inevitable that our 
communities... resign to a gradual - and we hope as slow as possible - retreat, it would be 
[unjust] that the possibility to work be limited or impeded, at least for the families already 
settled in Egypt, and in consequence they would find themselves required by necessity to 
abandon - in short time - the territory in which they have lived and worked for decades.108 
 
With the imminent abolition of the Capitulations the anticipated end of Italian futures in Egypt 
drew nearer. 
Inadvertently highlighting the tensions between the past and the future, between 
experience and expectation, the PNF in Rome inflated the “historic” role played by the Italians of 
Egypt in constructing Egyptian modernity through a series of conferences and publications 
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orchestrated by Italian intellectuals sent to Egypt from Rome in the late 1930s.109 For them, the 
community’s significance could only be measured through retrospection. Members of the Italian 
community itself, however, interpreted events as part of an irreversible process; emerging 
changes in the social and legal milieus became agents in the unfolding of historical time. Work 
opportunities quickly disappeared for the generalized “Italian worker,” composed of a mosaic of 
families like those of Caccioppo, Mazza, and Paonessa mentioned in this article. Moreover, 
apprehensions about the weakening capacity of the consulates to provide shelter for Italian 
protégés led to the unraveling of “a patient work of education and gradual absorption [into Italian 
society]” among many of the largest donors to Italian institutions, just as the historian Volpe had 
imagined 15 years prior.110 A report written by Italian diplomats on the eve of negotiations for 
the abolition of the Capitulations despairingly concluded that the Italian communities that had 
grown “under the protection of the Capitulations" would, only after their abolition, "begin to 
truly live in Egypt."111 
Italian residents bombarded their consulates with complaints. One Italian worker 
dismissed from the Suez Canal Company in 1937 wrote, “you know, undoubtedly, that life in 
Egypt has become very difficult for our compatriots [connazionali]... when searching for 
employment, one hears nothing but ‘you are Italian, sir, we regret that we can’t employ you 
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(vous etes Italien, Monsieur, nous regrettons de ne pouvons vous engager) [sic].’”112 Italian 
foreign policy had generated an environment of hostility between different nationalities, resulting 
in discrimination against Italians because of their perceived ties to the Fascist regime.113 With the 
dwindling support of elite Italians and overall rise in unemployment, Italian institutions also 
suffered. The leadership of the SDA struggled to obtain payments from its roughly 200 
associates and rumors spread widely among those most loyal to its mission that the Society was 
bound to disappear. Smaller clubs and organizations had already closed due to lack of funds; 
among these the Italian library in the heart of Attarin, one of the few local collections of Italian 
books, newspapers, and propaganda, built up during the 1920s and early 1930s for “[Italian] 
citizens who do not have the money to buy books.”114 Attempting to breathe life into the welfare 
coffers, the Consul in Alexandria appealed to past donors. He implored, “It is futile to illustrate 
for you, who know well the assistance needs of our community, [and] the need to help - today 
more than ever - the numerous families fallen into poverty who search for work in vain and for 
whom... repatriation is not possible.”115 At the moment from which Italian residents were to be 
integrated into Egyptian jurisdiction, imagining a future in Egypt became impossible.  
 
Conclusion 
 The abolition of the capitulations signified the collapse of a structure that had made 
possible future horizons for Italian immigrants. The formation of the Italian community had been 
premised on an experience of exceptionality. Integration into Egyptian jurisdiction would 
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effectively dismantle the boundaries through which Italians maintained a degree of autonomy. 
On 12 April 1937, the conference for the abolition of the capitulations convened in Montreux, 
Switzerland. In addition to conversations among the governments of Egypt and all of the 
Capitulatory Powers to determine the duration of the transition away from the capitulatory 
regime, bilateral settlements were negotiated between Italian and Egyptian delegates. In these 
meetings, Egyptian delegates stressed their desire for “complete liberation” from the legal 
regimes created by the Capitulations, drawing upon the example of the Treaty of Lausanne. 
Pelegrino Ghigi, who headed the Italian delegation, worriedly noted that the 1923 Treaty had 
destroyed Italian institutions and communities in  Turkey, where they were much smaller than 
the communities in Egypt.116 The Italian delegation sought, instead, the protection of “current 
and future” interests of Italian residents in Egypt, emphasizing the important role state 
institutions had performed in engendering a coherent community and in “the maintenance of 
italianità (Italianness).” In initial discussions, Ghigi had been assured by Makram Ebeid, a 
member of the Egyptian delegation, that the Egyptian Government had “absolute intention” to 
secure Italian institutions.117 But such intentions extended only so far as the duration of the 12-
year transitional period away from the Capitulations, at which point any agreements between the 
two parties would have to be renegotiated. This news, feared Ghigi, would have lasting “negative 
psychological effects” on the Italians of Egypt.  
 As negotiations were underway between Italian and Egyptian diplomats, fears grew 
among Italian residents. The pages of Il Giornale d'Oriente, which reported daily on the events 
                                                            
116 MAE, AC, b.301/ter., secret report by MAE Direzione Generale Affari Generali, ufficio V, 
"L'abolizione delle Capitolazioni in Egitto (negoziati diplomatici e convenzione di Montreux)", 
telespresso 13, Italian delegation to MAE, 17.4.1937. 
117 MAE, AC, b.301/ter., Italian delegation to MAE, 17.4.1937, colloquio con Makram Ebeid 
Pascia (Ghigi), 14.4.1937, p.88, colloquio col Presidente del consiglio egiziano (Ghigi), 
15.4.1937, p.90, , Ciano to Italian delegation at Montreux, 17.4.1937, p.95. 
 69 
in Montreux, conveyed the apprehensions of the Italian community.118 Intending to quell unrest 
within the Italian communities, editors of the newspaper released the following statement 
making explicit that the future would be distinct from the past for the Italians in Egypt:  
 
Foreigners in general and thus the Italians surely cannot think that all will continue as 
before. There will be various important things that will change; but any pessimism is 
futile and illegitimate. To live and work in Egypt for foreigners will no longer be easy 
and, if you will, as pleasant as today, but one will be able to live and work and even 
prosper well and in the best ways... An epoch finishes and another one begins in Egypt: 
and it certainly will not be the Italian, who are active, intelligent and adaptable by 
temperament, that will not know how to glean, even from the new situation, all the 
possible advantages... It's a gross error to want to believe in the fixity and immovability 
of certain situations of peoples and countries. The world goes on and woe unto those who 
regrets that it doesn’t stand still. One wastes time... We open thus our hands to our 
Egyptian friends and we'll see to make the long and joyous new road together from peace 
and progress.119 
 
 
Notwithstanding the newspaper’s cautionary tone, letters from Italians residents flooded the 
diplomatic, administrative, and institutional offices in Egypt, just as they had on the occasion of 
the King’s visit to Egypt in 1933.120 The transformation set into motion by the abolition of the 
Capitulations, if not one of immediately significant transformation in the structures of everyday 
life, vastly reconfigured the capacity to imagine Italian futures in Egypt. Ironically, from the 
                                                            
118 CAI, Giornale d’Oriente 14 April 1937. 
119 “Gli stranieri in genere e così gli italiani non possono certo pensare che tutto continuerà come 
prima. Vi saranno varie importanti cose che cambieranno; ma ogni pessimismo è inutile e non è 
neppure legittimo. Vivere e lavorare in Egitto per gli stranieri non sarà più cosa agevole e, se 
potete, così piacevole come oggi, ma si potrà vivere e lavorare ed anche prosperare benissimo e 
nel migliore dei modi.... Un'epoca finisce ed un'altra incomincia in Egitto: e non saranno certo gli 
italiani, che sono attivi, intelligenti ed adattabili per temperamento, che non sapranno trarre 
anche dalla nuova situazione tutti i possibili vantaggi.... E' un grossolano errore quello di voler 
credere alla fissità ed all'immovibilità di certe situazioni di popoli e di paesi. Il mondo cammina 
e guai a chi sta a rammaricarsi che non stia fermo. Si perde tempo... Apriamo dunque la mano ai 
nostri amici egiziani e vediamo di fare insieme la strada lunga ma gioiosa della pace e del 
progresso” Giornale d'Oriente, 16 April 1937. 
120 “Avviso,” Giornale d’Oriente, 23 April 1937. 
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moment that Italians would “truly live in Egypt,” it was impossible to do so. Living in Egypt 
without the protection of extraterritoriality, in this way, meant resigning the social institutions 
that had instilled amongst Italians a sense of national coherency. Moreover, these very 
institutions provided the support for a community delicately balanced on the precipice of 
poverty.  
Years after his speculations on Italian futures in Egypt, the historian Gioacchino Volpe 
wrote of the community only in the past tense.121 In following this story, this chapter has argued 
that the sense of historical time embedded in source materials from the interwar period provides 
insight on how futures affected the shape of the colonial and post-colonial Mediterranean. 
Attending to these temporal processes helps historians to better appreciate how time plays out in 
the lives of historical actors. Traditional approaches to the colonial Mediterranean continue to 
employ the analytical categories “cosmopolitanism” and “nationalism” to study shifts over time. 
As shown above, however, the characteristics of “cosmopolitan” or “nationalist” could be 
described as alternating, codependent or even indistinguishable and thus do little work for the 
historian. This is especially the case in the example of a “colonial community” like the Italians of 
Egypt. With regard to the Italians of Egypt, expectations came to embrace repatriation and the 
inevitability of departure from Egypt. These were, of course, expectations with consequences. So 
much so that when departure did indeed occur it had long been envisioned as a likely, and even 
predestined, outcome of historical experience.  
 
                                                            
121 Volpe Italia Moderna, 196. 
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VIGNETTE ONE 
 
Communities, Politics, and Origins 
 
B. Buccetti met with me outside of the hospital in San Donato, Milan.1 At a small café, he 
arrived with an envelope containing several copies of a timeline prepared by a friend on the 
history of encounters between Italy and Egypt. The same timeline had been published in one of 
the conference proceedings of the Associazione Italiani d’Egitto (AIDE).2 For Buccetti, the 
timeline, which marked events that were moments of encounter between Egypt and Italy, served 
as a map for understanding where his family’s history fit into the history of the two nations. His 
wife, of Greek origin, was also from Egypt; after an introduction, she left us and went to conduct 
some paperwork in the hospital. Both are in their early 80s; Buccetti’s health had deteriorated in 
the months preceding our meeting. Handing me the timeline, Buccetti told me that his 
grandfathers had moved to Egypt from Messina to work on the construction of a dam in Asyut in 
the late nineteenth century (he said 1870-80). At the time, he said, they would “come and go” but 
when they finished working on the project, they transferred their families to Cairo. “So they tell 
me, it was better than Europe... we were protected by laws which gave us possibility. Probably, 
many Europeans [today] don’t understand this, we didn’t have to change nationality or religion... 
we weren’t obliged to change our habits (le nostre abitudini).”  
 “We had our own world,” recalled Buccetti, “don’t forget that we spoke Italian, the 
teachers [in schools] spoke Italian... for the most part, we were Europeans... we Italians of Egypt 
                                                            
1 Interview with B. Buccetti, 23 March 2012. 
2 AIDE L’eredità culturale della presenza degli Italiani in Egitto (Roma 2010). 
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(noi italiani d’Egitto) didn’t have Egyptian nationality, no one from my family, we lived by our 
own habits, protected by the laws of our country.”3 Buccetti had initially approached me in 
Milan after the presentation of a memoir published by Carolina Delburgo, in which she details 
the experiences of a young girl arriving as a refugee in Italy during the Suez Crisis of 1956.4 
While he told me his story, he referred to her book and told me, “there were the Jews, they were 
wealthy... I won’t tell you this story because I don’t want to enter politics... but for having 
defended Italy [in the First World War], Italy gave them nationality... they became Italians 
because Italy had helped them.”5 In a later interview with Delburgo, she told me that until 
publishing her memoir, she had never known about the Italians of Egypt and in fact she had 
always wondered about her father’s connection to Italy. But for Buccetti this was beside the 
point: what he wanted to tell me was outside of what he considered “politics.” Instead, it 
regarded the specificity of a national community, formed through encounters between Italy and 
Egypt. Indeed, he said, many Italians in Italy do not understand that the Italians of Egypt were a 
key facet to these encounters, and not a community distant from the narrative of Italian history 
during their presence in Egypt. As he recounted his life story, his wife returned from the hospital. 
Almost as though she had been listening to our conversation and sought to provide an example, 
she described how the clerk at the hospital had looked at her documents and said, ‘Ah, but you’re 
an extracomunitaria?’ because her birthplace was marked as Alexandria (d’Egitto). Buccetti 
spoke up: this, he said, is what he intended when he told me that people do not understand: 
“we’ve suffered [from] this... either you interrupt [them] immediately or you get fed up with 
                                                            
3 “vivevamo con il nostro abitudine... difesi della legge del nostro paese.” 
4 Carolina Delburgo, Come ladri nella note: la cacciata dall’Egitto (Bologna 2008). 
5 “non ti racconto questa storia, non entro in politica... per poterli diferndere l’Italia li ha dati la 
nazionalità... sono diventati italiani perché l’Italia li ha aiutati.” 
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recounting the whole story.” Over the years, he had learned to become silent in these 
interactions. 
R. Berni, a 79-year-old born in Cairo and living in Milan since 1966, around the corner 
from Buccetti yet unknown to him, met with me in the lounge of a hotel on Via Buenos Aires 
while smoking an endless stream of cigarettes. A friend of his in Rome who claimed that Berni 
could recall more “facts” from the past sent me to speak with him. Berni’s friend was in a state 
of failing health and his memories escaped him. Like Buccetti, Berni described the social make 
up of early-twentieth century Egypt in terms of its national communities.6 “In Egypt, there were 
many different nationalities (nazionalità).” He listed Jews, Greeks, and Italians as the largest, 
claiming that the Italian residents peaked at around 120,000; and then there were the English, 
French, and Armenians. He seemed to search for a way to explain something to me, he paused, 
and then said, “it was a country (un paese) created by Europeans for Europeans.”7 Berni 
qualified this, saying “I’m sorry, but it’s the truth.”8 In many accounts of personal histories 
during interviews with Italians from Egypt, the “truthfulness” of one’s remembering was 
stressed, as though the substance of their memories should immediately contrast what I (was 
assumed to) know of Italian or Egyptian history.  
Each community, he continued, had their own cinemas, clubs, restaurants, hospitals, 
schools, and so forth, “[because of the Capitulations] an Italian couldn’t be arrested by the 
Egyptian police!” Berni recalled that Egyptians “didn’t come to where we lived... that is, they 
would come to work, but at sunset (maghrab) they left, not because we chased them out, but 
rather because they felt... [he hesitated] humiliated to be amongst the Europeans... it was all 
                                                            
6 Interview with R. Berni 7 October 2011. 
7 “era un paese creato dagli europei per gli europei” 
8 “scusa, ma è la verità.” 
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European for Europeans.”9 This autonomy allowed the Italians to distinguish themselves from 
other communities, he claimed, and it was not until the full termination of the Capitulations, in 
1949, that “Europeans no longer felt they had someone to defend them (non si sentivano difesi)... 
they weren’t protected (protetti) anymore.” In the same conversation, Berni described having 
stayed in Egypt without protection by the Italian state after 1949, in confrontation with his 
experiences in Italy after 1966. “You lived without protection... and then when they 
[representatives of the state/clerks at state offices] see you they say ‘ah, you’re Egyptian?’” He 
described the same confusion experienced by Bucetti’s wife. A series of expletives in Egyptian 
Arabic fell from his mouth, ending with “son of a bitch, now you tell me I’m Egyptian? I’m 
Italian!”10  
It was as though the former presence of Italians in Egypt was directly linked to the Italian 
State, which had since shed any sense of responsibility for their circumstances and, more 
importantly, for their sense of identification. Buccetti had argued that residing in Egypt, even for 
generations, did not imply a separation from Italian history. The extension of Italian protection in 
Egypt prior to the cancellation of the Capitulations was interpreted by both as having conditioned 
a sense of coterminous belonging and identification that legitimated presence in both places; to 
lose that dual presence would be to lose one’s place in this history of encounters. The long list of 
interactions between the two nations provided by Buccetti legitimated the presence of the Italians 
of Egypt as Italians of Egypt, as members of a community born into a temporal narrative of 
historical encounters.  
                                                            
9 “mortificati di stare in mezzo agli europei... eran’tutt’europei per europei” 
10 “yabn al-sharmûta ba’et t’ûli masri... ana italî!” 
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 As briefly described in the Introduction, I was introduced to one family of Italians of 
Egypt in Pisa through a mutual contact in Milan. I met with P. Paoletti11 in her house on the 
outskirts of the city, her husband, the late professor of medieval history at University of Pisa, 
Marco Tangheroni, had recently passed away. Although Paoletti was young when she left Egypt, 
she learned much of her family’s past through her husband’s interest in the family’s history. He 
would spend hours, she described, talking to her parents about their lives in Egypt. When talking 
with Paoletti about the immigration of her grandfather to Egypt, she turned to me and said,  
Your grandfather became American! We never became Egyptian, we always remained 
italiani d’Egitto... we were italiani d’Egitto, with our culture, through our friendship. 
Egypt was different from other countries of Italian immigration... Tunisia was nearly 
savage... pastoral Bedouins... Morocco and Algeria, we won’t even talk about them! (non 
ne parliamo nemmeno) Cairo was a cosmopolitan city (paese)... those who arrived 
found… an easy world.12 Yes, it’s true that the Arabs were servants (servi), but they were 
(servi) of a certain level (di un certo livello)! Surely the immigrants’ [experiences 
elsewhere] were different... there’s no immigration comparable to the Italians of Egypt 
because the hosting country was absolutely different from the rest.13  
 
To her, the legal histories that prohibited my grandfather (and other Italian emigrants) from 
maintaining Italian nationality meant that they had also lost their presence in Italian history.14 
Citizenship functioned as an umbilical cord connecting the Italians of Egypt to metropolitan 
Italy. For others, with this loss of nationality, they became of other histories, ontologically 
separated from Italy. I asked Paoletti what characterized the specificity of their circumstances in 
Egypt, what conditions had made the Italians in Egypt unique. She mentioned the Capitulations, 
                                                            
11 Interview with P. and A. Paoletti, 28 January 2012. 
12 “un mondo facile, non difficile, locale.” 
13 “non c’è un’immigrazione uguale a quella degli italiani d’Egitto perché il paese di accoglienza 
era assolutamente diverso da tutti gli altri” 
14 Lilith Mahmoud discusses her own racial status being used in ethnographic encounters as a 
means to demonstrate something about the inclusiveness of the Massoneria but also revealing the 
precarious nature of that kind of inclusion (which remainds us more of a Derridian idea of 
difference as deference). Paoletti draws my own history as a descendent of Italian emigrants into 
the encounter to illustrate that the maitenence of nationality demonstrates the ontological notion 
of nationality that is in play. See Lilith Mahmoud, The Brotherhood of Freemason Sisters 
(Chicago, 2014). 
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not calling them by name but remembering that “certain” legal regimes had consented Italian 
residents to “act liberally” in Egypt and that these constituted a “structural situation” (situazione 
strutturale): “we are who we are and they are who they are, but we’re in our country.”15 The 
question of nationality went beyond the identity politics of nationalism and was instead tied to 
the notion that the Italians of Egypt, were still legally in Italy. She then jumped forward in time 
to the Suez Crisis and said “after ’56... we had to begin paying taxes and using the same 
courts.”16 To Paoletti, 1956 marked a transformation that reconfigured the “structural situation,” 
even though these legal conditions had been slowly transitioned out over a longer period.  
 As we sat together, Paoletti’s elder sister joined us. P. had invited her because she 
“remembered more” of their childhood in Egypt (P. left Egypt when she was only 13 years old, 
whereas her sister was in her late teens). While introducing me, P. told her sister where our 
conversation had left off. A. Paoletti intervened quickly, “but of course, before the war all of 
social life was managed (gestita) by the Fasci... and the schools too, but after the war [the Italian 
schools] were dilapidated (scadenti), they were disfunctional.” Her sister described how Italian 
life in Egypt was homogenized under the fascist regime, but with the fall of the regime a divide 
remained between the Italian residents in Egypt and Italy. She recalled great tension within the 
community when the Italian state sent new diplomatic representatives after the Second World 
War. They were figures whose political affiliations were often unknown to the community. A. 
Paoletti said that Italian residents remained connected to an older system of organizing political 
and social life that had been eliminated in Italy, but remained ideologically strong among Italians 
in Egypt. “There was a lot of fear because one didn’t know if [the new representatives] were of 
                                                            
15 “noi siamo noi e loro sono loro, ma siamo nel nostro paese.” 
16 This reference to structural conditions is interesting; she seems to have a model of socio-
historical structuralism reminiscent of Marshall Sahlins’s work. 
 77 
the right or the left... and the community was a little to the right...”17 - she was interrupted by her 
sister who, laughing, said “a little!?” emphasizing the community’s notorious sympathies for the 
PNF. I asked if there was - or if they remembered - much involvement or discussion of Italians in 
Egyptian politics. “It was their country (paese)!” said A., to which P. added, “It’s difficult, I tried 
to explain to you... that with respect to work... that’s what Italians cared about, but with regard to 
Egyptian politics, it wasn’t their problem. It was a problem of another part of their country 
(paese); they, the Arabs, dealt with their politics amongst themselves.” This conception of 
presence, legal histories, and politics, interwoven with diversely signifying uses of paese, begins 
to articulate the boundaries of the world within a world described above by Buccetti. 
Importantly, this world within a world is one whose boundedness is determined in a particular 
configuration of inherited and collective historical experience (it is the non-literal lived 
experience of “l’abbiamo vissuto”). History, in this sense, is what philosopher David Carr 
describes as a “limiting concept,” it positions what lies beyond experience.18  
 
 At his home in Pordenone, G. Liciardello showed me the medal acknowledging his parents’ 
contribution to the PNF during the Ethiopia campaign in 1935. I was told to meet with him by 
another contact in Milan, A. Civiletti (see below). Liciardello said,  
one needs to recall that before 1940 there was a crisis in Italy (c’era la crisi in Italia)... 
there were the sanctions. Therefore, what did Italy do? Give gold to the Patria (date oro 
alla Patria)! All the families, especially abroad and especially in Egypt, which was quite 
strongly linked to the Patria... they gave [as gifts], they gave gold, money, to Italy to 
reconstitute the Treasury. The family was totally dry... many were... they had begun to 
sell everything. They had nothing.19 
                                                            
17 “la comunità era un po’ della destra” 
18 David Carr, Time, Narrative, and History (Bloomington, 1986): 89. 
19 “quindi tutte le famiglie, soprattutto all’estero e soprattutto in Egitto ch’era abbastanza 
[allegato alla Patria]... hanno regalato, hanno dato l’oro, i soldi, all’Italia per ricostituire l’Erario. 
La famiglia era completamente spezza... molti erano... cominciavano a vendere tutto. Non 
avevano niente.” Regarding the sanctions, Liciardello probably referred to the limited sanctions 
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This giving was a form of loyalty that tightly connected Italians subjects to the Italian State (or, 
at least, to the political regime of the PNF) which many had hoped would provide necessary 
resources or a solution to the growing problems of unemployment in Egypt, including the loss of 
autonomy as a national community. As I found in the archives of the Italian Consulates in 
Alexandria and Cairo, this feeding of state- and party-affiliated institutions was common. Just as 
Liciardello noted, Italian residents in Egypt had few resources, so it was also to the state that 
they turned looking for assistance and aid during the slow breakdown of the Italian institutions 
(see Chapter One). In 1935, hoping to profit from the prospect of new Italian endeavors in East 
Africa, Giuseppe Leone wrote to the Italian Consul requesting permission to travel to Eritrea, 
where he wanted to open a small café like the one he managed in Alexandria.20 Several years 
later, Alberto Coen turned to the consulate after learning that the coffers of the Fascio and the 
Opere Assistenziali (local Italian charities linked to the PNF) had dried up. Coen had served as a 
translator (Arabic-Italian-English) for Rodolfo Graziani between 1935-36 in Ethiopia, but 
returned to Alexandria unemployed.21 Natale Buzzanga, in 1937, pleaded with the Italian Consul 
to send recommendations on his behalf. As a lawyer, Buzzanga had suffered the consequences of 
the professional isolation of the Italian community. Unable to find a solution, he wrote directly to 
Mussolini. He addressed Mussolini both as the “personification of the greatness of Fascist Italy” 
and the “protective father of Italians,” invoking the same kind of kinship found in other examples 
of letters to Italian rulers, Buzzanga noted that the only assistance he had taken from the 
consulate was to secure his children’s education at the Istituto Don Bosco (contrary to his own 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
placed on Italy by the League of Nations during the Ethiopia Campaign that lasted from October 
1935 to May 1936, ending with the Italian occupation of Addis Ababa. Indeed the campaign to 
raise funds to support the Italian cause was concurrent with sanctions. For more on this see 
Chapter One. 
20 ACGA, “Leone Giuseppe di fu Enrico - cl.1892.” 
21 ACGA, “Coen Alberto fu Giuseppe 1907.” 
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French education), and that he separated from his Greek wife, ensuring that he acquired control 
over his children so that they were not raised “differently from the nationality and religion to 
which they belong.”22 All of these families appear alongside Liciardello’s in the issue of Il 
Giornale d’Oriente that published an entire issue dedicated to the 7,632 donors from Cairo and 
the 9,120 donors from Alexandria.23 
 
I was invited to attend the annual assembly of the Association of Italians of Egypt (Associazione 
Italiani d’Egitto, AIDE) in Rome. The organization had split from its original incarnation, the 
National Association of Refugee Italians of Egypt (Associazione Nazionale Profughi Italiani 
d’Egitto, ANPIE) in the mid 1990s due to conflicts between its members. The organization 
publishes a small bulletin which includes short “memories” of its members, obituaries, and holds 
an annual meeting. They have published several volumes based on conferences in which their 
members present family histories of their relationship to or experiences in Egypt. For many 
members of AIDE, I represented a valuable resource as an historian affiliated with a university. 
Some saw themselves as the sole possessors of their history, or better as history’s product, and 
lacking recourse or means to transmit the import of their “historic” role in Italian and Egyptian 
histories. Their histories, it seemed, had no “natural” genealogy, moving onto their children and 
grandchildren, but instead they were intricately linked to the experiences of having been born in 
Egypt. At the meeting, mundane issues of voting a new advisory board and discussing plans for 
the forthcoming year dominated the agenda; but, after this business had finished, several of the 
                                                            
22 “che personifica oggi non soltanto l’orgoglio e la grandezza dell’Italia Fascista ma bensì il 
padre degl’Italiani che ha sempre protetti!”, “diversamente della nazionalità e della religione di 
quali appartenevano.” ACGA, “Buzzanga Natale.” Date of letter is 25 August 1938. 
23 ACS, SPD-CO 578, “Albo d’oro degli Italiani d’Egitto Donatori alla Patria,” Il Giornale 
d’Oriente, 21 April 1936. 
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organization’s members presented short testimonies and enjoyed cocktails around a display of 
the publications resulting from the four small conferences they had organized in recent years.  
 After the meeting, G. de Stefano invited me to his home outside of Rome to introduce me 
to several of his schoolmates from the Istituto Don Bosco (Salesian school) in Cairo. He began to 
recount that his grandparents emigrated to Egypt, the men first, from Messina, having found 
work there as machinists. When the doorbell rang, he turned in my direction and said, “don’t feel 
embarrassed when we greet one another!”24 His friends il Dottore and M. Vitulli walked in and a 
loud “koss ommak!” (loosely translated as ‘fuck you!’ in colloquial Egyptian Arabic) emerged 
from all in unison. As de Stefano introduced me, Vitulli exclaimed, “ah, us... in Egypt... good 
times!”25 Immediately, they sat down and began to debate their pasts in Egypt amongst 
themselves. Il Dottore said that things went well for the Italian residents only because Egyptians 
held them in high esteem in relation to the occupying British. Vitulli questioned him and asserted 
that the alliances were not so determinate. Instead, he argued that any Egyptian sympathy for 
Italians was a manifestation of awareness that the Italians were a threat to the British. It was a 
case of the enemy of my enemy is my friend. A debate ensued between the two regarding the 
closure of Italian state schools on the occasion of the Italian entry into the war in June 1940. Il 
Dottore, who continues to wear a black shirt to the AIDE meetings to honor what he feels is a 
misunderstood history, claimed that it was an “act of civility”26 that the British allowed Italians 
to attend school during the war. Vitulli opined contrarily that it was inevitable, “they left the 
religious schools open because we were 4,000 Italian children, they had to!” And, he added, they 
had permitted only the religious schools to remain open because, although they were infused 
with Italian nationalist sentiment, they were religious missions. He referred specifically to the 
                                                            
24 “non vergognarti quando ci salutiamo!” 
25 “ah, noi... in Egitto... era la pacchia!” 
26 “atto di civiltà.” 
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Salesian Don Bosco and Maria Ausiliatrice schools in Cairo and Alexandria, whose intense 
nationalist-religious education was designed to remediate the fact that, until the late nineteenth 
century, many Italian families, as noted in an early account by Monsignor Nuti, were 
“constrained... to turn to foreign religious schools.” Thus, the mission opened after a request by 
the Associazione Nazionale Italiana to offer an alternative to the secular Italian state schools. 
The schools, however, remained largely ineffective within the Italian community until the 1930s, 
when growing unemployment and poverty pushed Italians out of other schools and into the 
Salesian schools. After the war, when some of the secular schools remained closed, the Salesian 
schools took on a fundamental role in the education of Italians in Egypt.27  
 Il Dottore began to tell me about the array of national communities, each with their own 
institutions, as others before him had done. In describing these, he depicted a relativist pluralism 
in which one national community barely overlapped with another and all lived their quotidian 
lives in ideal synergy. Vitulli interrupted him to clarify that opportunities were not equal for all, 
that on one occasion in the late 1940s, he applied for a job and was immediately turned down by 
a Greek shop owner because he was Italian. His point was that there was not a harmonious 
balance between communities; that they were not independent/autonomous, but rather were 
interconnected in complex hierarchies of power that changed and shifted between the pre- and 
postwar periods. Moreover, these hierarchies functioned within colonial economies under British 
influence and within a broader sphere of Mediterranean imperial politics, for him manifested in 
the alliance or association of Greek subjects with the British Authorities against Italian subjects. 
                                                            
27 See Mons. Igino Nuti, O.F.M. (ed.), Il Vicariato Apostolico d’Egitto e Le Sue Opere (Milano 
1924), 98, 192. For an excellent analysis of the role of the Istituto Don Bosco in the Italian 
community see the forthcoming work of Annalaura Turiano, “Le consul, le missionnaire et le 
migrant: Contrôler et encadrer la main œvre italienne à Alexandrie à la fin XIXe siècle.” Another 
major factor, I would argue, that drove many Italians into the Italian schools was anticipation of 
departure from Egypt. This will be dealt with in the following ethnographic section. 
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“Anyways,” he continued, “it wasn’t an act of civility (civiltà) because they [the British] turned 
the [Italian state schools] into concentration camps (campi di concentramento) for the Italian 
prisoners... my father was arrested, my mother was left alone with us... you know how much [the 
Swiss Legation] gave us [during the war]? 5 EGP per month!” The contrasting perspectives of 
Vitulli and il Dottore were important. The former worked for the Italian broadcast of Radio Cairo 
during the postwar period, witnessing firsthand the censorship enforced by emerging political 
regimes, and claimed to have understood the politics of the time as someone without political 
loyalty, whereas the latter, as noted, donned his black shirt for the AIDE meetings. Flipping 
through a stack of photographs from Egypt that il Dottore had brought to our meeting, he paused 
on a portrait of Mussolini and asked me to identify it. I began to say ‘Muss...,’ but was quickly 
cut off and corrected, “No! Il Duce!” These allegiances were not concrete boundaries. Il Dottore, 
the self-avowed loyal Fascist, was also employed by the British after the war and claimed that 
they were, in the end, bearers of civility. He remained attached to the colonial world that Egypt 
had offered during previous decades. 
 Having heard repeatedly that the Italian residents were notoriously committed to the 
Fascist regime or had strong ideological ties to the PNF, I asked, “what about the impact of 
fascism in the Italian community?” Vitulli responded first: “You see, in Egypt we had the same 
things as Italy... at school, free books, we had the great Vittorio Stadium, which they 
[undetermined] now have taken, therefore Italians were dressed as ballila, avanguardisti, 
fascisti… that’s how we were.”28 He recalled that in every neighborhood, each with its own 
character, there was a place for the Italians to gather. For example, on his street in Bulaq, Wabor 
al-Faransawi, “they built a church in the Florentine style, which had behind it a club, a theater... 
                                                            
28 “in Egitto avevamo le stesse cose come in Italia... alla scuola, i libri gratuiti, avevamo il grande 
stadio vittorio, che adesso hanno preso... quindi gli italiani, vestiti da ballila, fascisti, 
avanguardisti... eravamo così.” 
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for the Italians that lived there.”29 Indeed, the church Vitulli spoke of provided language 
instruction in Italian, French, and English and night classes for workers.30 Among the different 
neighborhoods he noted that Zamalek was “snobby,” while Bulaq/Bulacco was working-class 
(popolare). And de Stefano interrupted him saying that Shobra, where he had lived, was “more” 
working-class, and “therefore more Italian.” Il Dottore inserted his voice in the conversation. 
“When we were boys, there wasn’t an Egyptian technician... we were all Europeans... remember 
on Shawarbi [street in Downtown Cairo] there was Gila who did electrical work, and Fiat, and 
our firms... the father of [de Stefano] was an electro-technician, the father of [Vitulli] was a 
capocantiere, my father was an architect, what our parents did in Egypt was great, because Egypt 
completely lacked technicians... instead for them [the Egyptians] the [high positions] of 
aristocracy were doctors...”31 He then returned to the discourse on the Don Bosco schools, noting 
that all who had studied there had been successful. My initial question regarding the role of 
fascism in the Italian community had largely gone by the wayside; it had been subsumed instead 
in the narration of the “greatness” of the works of the Italian community (“è stato grandioso”), of 
the contribution to Egypt’s modernity by its members and by the generalized collective of an 
Italian presence. This “greatness,” however, was not a timeless one; instead it was relegated to a 
historical past that preceded the generation of Italians of Egypt with whom I met. Il Dottore 
explained that “the great work done in Egypt was done by the generations of our ancestors.” This 
work of exalting the contributions of the Italians of Egypt often harkened back to a generation 
                                                            
29 “hanno costruito una chiesa nello stile fiorentino, poi dietro c’era un circolo, un teatro per gli 
italiani che stavano vicino.” 
30 Nuti, Il Vicariato Apostolico, 39. 
31 “quando eravamo ragazzi, non c’era un tecnico egiziano... eravamo tutti europei... ricorda... 
Shawarby, c’era Gila che faceva lavoro elettrico, poi la Fiat, poi i firm nostri... il papa di P. era 
un tecnico di elettricista, il papa di M. era capocantiere, il mio era architetto, quello che han fatto 
i nostri genitori per l’Egitto è stato grandioso, perché in Egitto mancava completamente i tecnici, 
perché per loro, il top dell’aristocrazia erano i medici...” 
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prior to those with whom I spoke. Generally speaking, the “contributions” of the Italian 
community were the major infrastructural projects associated with the generation of Mehmet 
Ali’s reforms, long before the British occupation in 1882 and the large influx of Italian 
immigrants. There was considerable agreement that the “greatness” of the Italians of Egypt 
originated in this past. The publications of AIDE reflect this same temporal framework, when 
speaking of the “cultural heredity” of the Italians of Egypt they draw on the projects conducted 
by Italians in the mid-to-late nineteenth century and not to events in their own lifetimes.32 In this 
sense, even the most elderly of the Italians of Egypt considered that “historic” past central to 
apprehending the value of the Italian community.  
 
L. Diodovic met with me in a quiet office in the State Archives in Rome, where she administers 
part of the collections. I learned of Diodovic during an interview with a member of AIDE who 
left Egypt in the mid 1950s when, upon hearing that I was working in the archives, noted that she 
had a friend there that comes from a family of Italians of Egypt. Diodovic asked me about my 
research in the archives, and I recounted finding documents regarding the Italian propaganda 
during the Fascist period (see chapter one). She recalled that her uncle had been arrested around 
the time of the Italian entry into the war for distributing leaflets (volantini) against the British. 
Diodovic was a child when her family left Egypt in 1957 and had a difficult time remembering 
details. As we sat together, she called her uncle to confirm what she had told me and described 
my research to him, at which point he offered to meet personally with me to share his own 
experiences. He lived in Montesacro, a neighborhood of Rome that filled quickly with Italians 
from Africa during the postwar years. S. Calabria was born in Alexandria in 1928, where his 
                                                            
32 See for example, AIDE, L’eredità culturale della presenza degli Italiani in Egitto (Roma, 
2010). 
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father had also been born in 1891. His grandfather emigrated to Egypt from Castelnuovo, in 
northern Italy. Calabria said his grandfather left Italy:  
as an emigrant (emigrante), he was a tailor (sarto)... I was born in Alexandria, where we 
lived until 1935 when we transferred to Cairo, where my grandfather lived, on Malaka 
Nazli street...33 we lived there together [with another part of the family] until 1940, when 
the war broke out. They [undetermined] would come, enter the house, and take away 
[Italian men]... my brother was the youngest internee, 15 or 16 years old, they didn’t 
touch my father because he was elderly and ill.  
 
Calabria specifically concentrated on the shift in his schooling during the war. From 1935-40 he 
attended the ‘Garibaldi’ Italian state school, located on the same street as his home and just on 
the edge of Bulaq and Downtown Cairo, which was closed in June 1940, “[it was] placed under 
sequester (sotto sequestro) and we went to the Salesians in Rod el-Farag [Shobra, Cairo].” From 
the Italian entry into the war, Calabria recalled little. The anti-British leaflets he had distributed 
were written by hand, but he could not remember in what language they were penned. When it 
was discovered that he and his brother were responsible for distributing them, English soldiers 
arrived at their house and found the remainder of the leaflets under the boys’ mattress. They 
arrested his brother. “We were all Fascists, the Arabs too... all of the Italians [were] balilla, 
avanguardisti... it’s not that... [he hesitates] we were just that way, just like here in Italy.”34 In 
his hesitation, Calabria searched to separate “being fascist” from any political culpability. This 
was common during interviews, emphasizing fascism as a political affiliation that legitimated 
national identification among the Italians in Egypt and depreciating the history of the Fascist 
party’s violence both in Italy and abroad. The antifascists, recalled Calabria, were in exile.35 
                                                            
33 today, sharia’ gala’a. 
34 “non è che qualcuno... eravamo tutti così, come qui in Italia” 
35 “stavano in esilio” The historian Leila El Houssi has recently published on the activities of 
Italian antifascists in Tunisia between the two World Wars. Her work provides an interesting 
counter to the experiences of Italians in Egypt, where the antifascist movement was minimal. 
Indeed, during a presentation of her book, the Italian professor, Luigi Goglia, made a statement 
about how, over his years of working in Egypt and North Africa, he always remained 
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They had left Egypt, and it was not until the Italian entry into the war that Libera Italia, an 
antifascist organization modeled on Charles de Gaulle’s anti-Vichy group France Libre, emerged 
as a presence within the community. He clarified that the individuals who hoped to exit from the 
camp were the majority of signees onto the movement: “they made an organization, Libera 
Italia... if one wanted out [of the camp], one could sign with them... but they were few, one could 
count them!”36  
 Calabria claimed he did not think much about the past in Egypt. His wife passed away 
several years ago and his brother in 1980. His brother had been an active member of the 
community of Italians of Egypt living in Rome, helping to organize events and meetings of the 
precedent of AIDE, ANPIE (the emergence of this organization will be discussed in chapter 
four). As in Calabria’s previous hesitation, he drew a distinction between his past in Egypt and 
his past in Italy: “it’s a second life that we made here... I had to restart everything.”37 He paused 
for a moment, pondering the difference between the moments of the past he had just 
distinguished, and then said: “it’s not that one can complain... it was another life (un’altra vita)... 
it was like a small country/town in a big city (un paese piccolo in una città grande)! Here, 
everything’s the same. [In Egypt] there were Greeks, Armenians... the Greeks and Italians were 
the most numerous...” It was possible to have this kind of sociality, he noted, because there were 
“points of encounter” (punti d’incontro) like the schools and the churches that organized cultural 
life around national communities. Then, when he came to Italy, he witnessed the coherence that 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
dumbfounded by the political homogeneity of the Italian community in Egypt. Leila El Houssi, 
L’urlo contro il regime: Gli antifascisti italiani in Tunisia tra le due guerre (Roma 2014). 
36 “hanno fatto un’organizzazione, Libera Italia... se volevano uscire dal campo, potevano 
firmare con loro... ma c’erano pochi, si contavano proprio.” Indeed, the Italian representatives 
often did count them and, well into the 1930s, their lists contained fewer than 100 individuals 
that were considered ‘active’ antifascists. The British Authorities in Egypt compiled similarly 
scant lists. 
37 “una seconda vita abbiamo fatta qui... ho dovuto ricominciare tutto.” 
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was generated through these “points of encounter” dissolve. They had served to manage a kind 
of public plurality, at once instilling a sense of coherence within the national communities. He 
said that the past in Egypt stopped interesting him because he had to stabilize his life in Italy and, 
losing contact with the schools, churches, and clubs, he also lost contact with that sociality. 
While Calabria was making a place for himself in the present, what was difficult to come to 
terms with, he explained, was that in Italy his interlocutors failed to recognize him: “Being born 
abroad, it’s confusing for others, [they would ask] ‘but you’re Italian?’ Yes, I’m Italian, my 
grandfather is Italian, my great-grandfather is Italian, even though I’m born abroad... an 
immigrant is not an immigrant.”38 The historical conditions of colonial Egypt were perceived to 
have created the possibilities for the Italians of Egypt to exist and to act as a national 
community.39 As Calabria had it, one could not understand the past through the conceptual 
categories of the present: “an immigrant is not an immigrant.” Instead, one had to trace back 
through the past and move through historical time in order to understand what made their 
presence as Italians of Egypt possible. Without proceeding in this manner, the Italians of Egypt 
were unintelligible and would be excluded from history, and thus from the present. 
 L. Diodovic, Calabria’s niece, was born in the same building on Malaka Nazli Street in 
which he had lived. She recalled that they were the only Italian families in the building; the other 
families were also non-Egyptians (“eravamo tutti stranieri, non erano arabi”). Echoing the words 
of her uncle, she said that her family was composed of “cultivated people (gente colta)”:  
they weren’t educated, they were simple people, emigrants, tailors, shoemakers 
(emigranti, sarti, calzolai)... that is, they were workers (lavoratori), they weren’t of 
                                                            
38 “sì, sono italiano. Mio nonno è italiano, mio bisnonno è italiano, anche se nato all’estero... 
immigrato non è immigrato.” 
39 Whereas historian Will Hanley attempts to illustrate Alexandria’s “vulgar cosmopolitanism”  
(“low, unrefined, plain, ordinary (but not obscene) cosmopolitanism”) and thus display the 
“banality of the nation” and of “national citizenship”, the salient presence of nationalisms in their 
own vulgar form cannot be ignored. Will Hanley, “Foreignness and Localness,” 19-32. 
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culture... but they strived to be cultured... to maintain themselves... close to this Italian 
tradition... let’s say, to keep themselves close to their roots, because if you mix with the 
tradition of the place, you lose your roots, you forget, instead they cared [about it].40  
 
She stressed that they were not of elite origins, that they held on to their “roots” as emigrants and 
workers; their sense of being “cultured” (colti), instead came from their attachment to or 
continuation of a national tradition (one whose very genealogy may have been created during 
their presence in Egypt). That is, being “cultured” meant being educated, and being educated 
relied on a notion of tradition that had been fostered through participation with other Italian 
residents in Italian institutions in Egypt. She remembered vaguely that after they arrived in Italy 
in 1957, each Sunday after Mass, a group of families and friends from Egypt would gather in a 
park. The parents sat together while the children played elsewhere. Diodovic recalled the sound 
of the men playing backgammon, but sketchily remembered who the others were. This, she said, 
was an attempt to maintain their traditions, tracing their genealogy as a particular “national” 
community through the shared experiences of having lived together in Egypt by creating new 
“points of encounter” in Italy. In doing so, it added a fold to the story of Italians of Egypt: not 
only did it attempt to reproduce their practices in Egypt, but it also served to produce a new 
sociality in Italy, distinguishing them from other Italians.  
 Diodovic confessed that most of her memories of Egypt were filtered through her father 
and other, older family members, like Calabria. Impressions of her family’s past had 
accumulated as they sifted through her encounters with others. After learning that Diodovic had 
been politically active in the Italian Communist Party (Partito Comunista Italiano, PCI) during 
her university years in Rome and specifically with the occupation of public housing (case 
                                                            
40 “erano gente colta la mia famiglia... non erano laureati, erano gente semplice, erano emigrati 
erano sarti calzolai, erano ... cioè gente lavoratori, non erano gente di una cultura... ma cercavano 
di essere colti...  per mantenersi... stretti a questa tradizione italiana... diciamo tenersi stretti alla 
radice, perché se tu ti mischi con la tradizione del luogo tu perdi le tue radici, le dimentichi, 
invece, loro ci tenevano...” 
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popolari) in Garbatella, Rome, in 1968, I asked if the family’s experiences in Egypt had entered 
into her own politics. She replied, “with my father, yes, it’s that... he thought colonialism was a 
good idea...” She did not leave the explanation there, however, and continued, “by means of their 
[the Italians in Egypt] planning capacity, they were able to give a lot [to Egypt]... but he didn’t 
think this way with bad intentions.”41 Her father used to draw attention to the moment they 
departed Egypt and, referring to an image of the Egyptian domestic workers crying who had 
lived with the family, he would say that because of their “mentality” (mentalità) they would “go 
backwards” (torneranno indietro), “they hadn’t learned, in industry and other sectors... the 
prosperity (benessere) when there were Europeans, it’s not there... it was difficult to find a strong 
Arab business... it was the Europeans that directed (dirigevano)... [My father] would always say 
that they weren’t learning (non imparavano).” The precise wording of “tornare indietro” was 
repeated during many interviews, always in reference to the effects of departure on Egyptians 
and most often involving the presence of domestic workers or doormen.42 During the late 1960s, 
Diodovic argued with father frequently, “but it’s their land, you went for your interest, not for 
theirs...” Reflecting on her father’s perspective and the position of other Italians of Egypt, she 
added, “for me it’s always a master/ruler (un padrone).” This older generation, she noted, had a 
sense of nostalgia for “whatever I brought to Egypt,”43 which was part of what she described as 
an “exaltation” of the Patria through the repetition of stories about “their” schools, churches, and 
“their work” in Egypt.  
                                                            
41 “attraverso la loro capacità progettuale loro potevano dare molto... ma lui non pensava cosí nel 
modo cattivo.” 
42 In the interview with C. Cherini, for example, he said: “quando finalmente... quando noi 
abbiamo lasciato poi il Cairo, quelle ragazze che lavoravano per mia mamma hanno pianto 
perché si rendevano conto della situazione, intanto perdevano lavoro intanto perdevano il 
contatto con l’Europea e si rendevano conto che sarà tornato in dietro...” Interview with L. 
Morpurgo and C. Cherini, 1 December 2011. 
43 “chissà cosa ho portato in Egitto” 
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The link to colonialism was key to her observations. For Diodovic it was not that life in 
Egypt was ideally “cosmopolitan,” but rather that the various European national communities 
were working to sustain their own communities. And this, for Diodovic, made the Fascism that 
her father knew in Egypt a central cultural form that looked toward a notion of the Italian 
“homeland” (Patria) from a distance; in their conflicts in late-1960s Rome, she described, her 
father “was attached to the Fascism he had known in Egypt.”44 According to Diodovic’s 
understanding, the very ontology of the Italian presence in Egypt included its own justification, 
and fascist party propaganda reproduced this even if its politics were not seen to have direct or 
immediate consequences in Egypt. As Berni noted above, the Italians lived in and were of 
European communities, often with minimal interaction with Egyptians and saw themselves as 
outside of Egyptian politics. They brought things to Egypt. The fundamental distinction in this 
colonial logic was that for Egypt to be modern, it had to be European. And, in order for it to be 
European, the presence of Europeans was necessary. Thus, the national communities played a 
key role in this narrative, and the churches, institutions, and schools, all allowed by the legal 
conditions of the Capitulations, were seen as focal points - as “points of encounter” - around 
which a given community could gather and cultivate a collective identity.45 This is not to 
mention the economic networks that supported these institutions; that Diodovic mentioned her 
father’s explicit reference to the lack of powerful Egyptian businesses only briefly touches upon 
the vast world of European domination over the Egyptian economy during the first half of the 
twentieth century. For Diodovic, instead, the “degradation” of the European sites that her father 
anticipated was a “testimony that they [Egyptians] don’t want them and maybe didn’t want 
them!” But it was also connected, she argued, to this “strong fascist sentiment.” Despite her 
                                                            
44 “lui era allegato al fascismo che ha saputo in Egitto.” 
45 “sai che quando stai lontano dal tuo paese, tutto ciò ch’è dal tuo paese va esaltato... fare scuole 
cattoliche, scuole italiane... questa era la forza.” 
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arguments with her father and family members, she said, “when you live history it’s another 
thing... it’s a beautiful fable... they don’t want to analyze it, when the fascist archives in Rome 
were first opened, they didn’t want to do this type of analysis, because they had enjoyed its 
benefits... In my family, there was this fascist idea.”46  
 Through this recounting of boundaries of collective belonging, there was a constant 
interplay between the past in Egypt as it was or had been remembered by individuals (or their 
relatives) with encounters with Italians (from Italy who, indeed, they commonly referred to using 
the tautological categorization ‘italiani d’Italia’) in postwar Italy, or with more recent pasts. 
Often, in conversations it seemed that my interlocutors anticipated responses from me, that they 
held assumptions that I -- as an Italian-American or as an historian/anthropologist or as someone 
with experience living in today’s Italy and Egypt -- would have a different idea of what fascism 
was in Egypt, or in general, and what it meant for these communities to identify as “national 
communities” during the Fascist period. Other possible trajectories for the historical narrative 
needed to be cancelled, diverted, or at least left by the wayside.47 In other words, they seemed to 
anticipate responses based on the supposition that I was aware of another narrative arrangement 
of their history. They, instead, narrated their history playing contexts off one another; from a 
community that was a direct extension of the Italian state, to one whose “culture” was distinct 
from the State’s policy, to one less (or not at all) appreciated by the postwar state, to one 
refracted and unrecognized by others who were presumed to be members of the same “Patria” 
                                                            
46 “Però quando vivi la storia, è un’altra cosa... una favola è bella... non volevano fare 
un’analisi... quando hanno cominciato a leggere gli archivi fascisti, non volevano all’inizio. loro 
non vogliono fare questo tipo di analisi, perché loro hanno avuto i benefici. In famiglia da me... 
l’idea era quella fascista.” 
47 In some sense, one might think of these as contexts, like Johannes Fabian’s reminder that 
‘context’ is always a type of totality through which we interpret anthropology’s subject. 
Johannes Fabian, “Language, History and Anthropology,” Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 1, 
19 (1971): 19-47. 
 92 
(the italiani d’Italia).48 In doing so, the articulation of these refracted contexts amounted to a 
marked character for the collective, a series of events around which the relations between social 
actors changed, the end of the Capitulations, the Second World War, and so forth. Politics (like 
those of the PNF and its policies in Italy and abroad) were turned into culture, and culture was 
then used to read history and, more importantly, to place the community in history.49  
 
 
                                                            
48 For this reason, Anthony Gorman’s recent translation of italiani d’Egitto as Egyptian Italians 
does not quite capture the complex historical experience narrated by this community. See 
Gorman, “The Italians of Egypt.” 
49 One can think of Michael Herzfeld’s politics of significance here... this idea that the Italians 
were ‘mere’ Fascists... also, the work done by the Italians from Egypt is almost indistinguishable 
from the accusation Herzfeld holds against Huntington and his clash argument. The flattening of 
temporal/historical processes allows for the production of cultural categories. Michael Herzfeld, 
“Anthropology and the Politics of Significance,” Social Analysis 41, 3 (1997) 107-138. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
“The future does not belong to me”: Vanishing horizons and the internment of Italian 
civilians in Fayed during the Second World War 
 
 
Image 1: Easter postcard, 1941. Personal collection, Loredana Farina. 
 
 
Image 2: Passaro's sketch. Personal collection, Ladi Skakal. 
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In 1941, on the occasion of the first Easter holiday in the internment camps in Fayed, 
where around 5,000 Italian men were being held as “dangerous enemy aliens,” the internees 
designed a postcard. Postcards were one of the regulated means of communicating with family 
and friends outside of the camp, isolated in Egypt’s western desert far from Cairo and 
Alexandria, and they generally passed through the censors with greater ease than personal letters 
and packages. Under the Easter greeting on the card was the image of an egg, from which 
hatched a small chick (image 1). The egg itself was decorated with an image of several camp 
tents, the distinctive fencing that surrounded the camp, and the mountain in the background, a 
landscape that from late-1940 until 1944-45 was home to many Italian men. On 6 March 1941, 
Eugenio Farina, an Italian resident from Cairo who will follow us throughout this chapter, sent 
this postcard to his young wife, with a heart full “of [her] sincere smile [and] lightness.” As time 
in the camp accumulated, Farina lost this sense of lightness, his - and others’ - existence became 
heavy and troublesome, marred by the inability to envision a future. In a letter to his wife in 
1943, he described feeling impotent in the face of a future. Over the course of four years in 
Fayed, the innocent chick, hatched from the Eastern egg, became the maddened chicken painted 
by another internee, Salvatore Passaro (image 2), also blemished with signs of the camp. 
Passaro’s depiction, done in the final years of internment and to which we will return at the end 
of this chapter, shows a maddened chicken being strangled by the chain-link fence and crying out 
against the blond-haired, blue-eyed androgynous personifications of 1941, 1942, and 1943.  
 The goal of this chapter is to examine the rupture in the lives of the Italians in Egypt that 
followed Italy's entry into the Second World War and its ensuing implications for the Italian 
residents in Egypt. Rather than provide a political chronology of the war, in this chapter I seek to 
understand how the internment was experienced as an event, with particular emphasis on the 
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contrast it took in relation to the preceding years. With the arrest and internment of the majority 
of Italian men of working age, this chapter will demonstrate, came the dissolution of any sense of 
a future. A "horizon of expectation" itself vanished and time was confined to an uncertain and 
immediate present, both in and outside of the internment camps.1  
 The Italian communities were effectively brought to a halt during the Second World War. 
After the Italian Racial Decrees of 1938, much of the Italian Jewish community - the "Passport 
Italians" in particular - had withdrawn their support, thus striking one of the important sources of 
funding from within the community.2 A small boycott of the Italian institutions was organized by 
the Italian Jews, many of whom were previously members of the PNF, and some of whom 
claimed that the new Racial Decrees should not affect their membership in the party nor their 
                                                            
1 Camps have largely been dealt with in terms of their spatial characteristics. Most notable in this 
regard is the work of and inspired by Giorgio Agamben. The focus on space, although important 
for conceptualizing how the distance and isolation suffered by those within their boundaries (or 
within the more generalized “spaces of exception”) influenced and shaped experiences of the 
worlds around them, concurrently limits the visibility of other emergent problems associated 
with this kind of isolation. Moreover, an emphasis on the spatial-theorization of camps has the 
potential to reify and replicate the “ethnographic present” by locating experience solely in the 
exceptionality of “the camp” and, in doing so, extracting subjects from their temporal 
contexts/extensions, which, for the larger purposes of this dissertation, I argue are essential to 
articulating historical narrative. Instead, I use of “horizon of expectation,” derived from the 
temporal framework of Reinhart Koselleck, to draw attention to the temporal unfolding of 
experience, even in spaces of exceptionality. See Reinhart Koselleck, Futures Past: On the 
Semantics of Historical Time (New York, 2004). 
2 Petricioli, Oltre il Mito; with the sequester on Italian goods following the entry into the war, the 
British still worried that the Italians might use connections with the Jewish community as means 
of subverting the restriction and thus wanted, by all means, to tighten the legislation as much as 
possible, FO371/24605 minutes 5 and 17 July 1940; at the same time, in 1938 Italy had reached 
a quiet peace with England, with the latter recognizing the Italian Empire in Ethiopia, as some 
have argued, to keep Europe quiet, weaken the Italian-German connection, and delay war. See 
Alberto Sbacchi 1975 “Anglo-Italian negotiations for the recognition of the Italian Empire: And 
Haile Selassie vs. the National Bank of Egypt and the Cable & Wireless Co., 1937-1938.” 
Africa: Rivista trimestrale di studi e documentazione dell’Istituto italiano per l’Africa e 
l’Oriente, 30 4, 569, 573. 
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loyalty to the regime.3 Of course, it is unclear precisely what individuals’ intentions were in this 
regard: were they seeking protection by emphasizing their loyalty to the regime or were theirs 
genuine sentiments of affinity with the nationalist cause?4 In autumn 1939, after further steps to 
“nationalize” (or, as it is called in Italian documents, to “Egyptianize”) the Egyptian workforce, 
many Italians were laid-off from governmental/state jobs. There was a sense that, although the 
Montreux Conference set a timeline and transition period away from the Capitulations, the 
process of nationalization would occur at a quicker pace than previously anticipated.5 At the 
same time that Italians needed assistance through their consulate and the charity organizations, 
the sources of money were running dry. Many sought a way out of Egypt in the years prior to the 
Italian entry into the war, money was transferred out of the country, and property was sold.  
 When Mussolini declared the Italian entry into the war in the summer of 1940, the 
circumstances of the Italian community in Egypt were again vastly transformed. Il Giornale 
d'Oriente was briefly taken over by a small group of antifascists under the supervision (and 
                                                            
3 Joe Battino Una famiglia di vagabondi del Mediterraneo (unpublished manuscript), Istituto 
Nazionale per la Storia del Movimento di Liberazione in Italia “Ferruccio Parri” (INSMLI), 
Milano. Fondo “Joe Battino,” 23; Paolo Bagnoli Rosselli, Gobetti e la rivoluzione democratica: 
uomini e idee tra liberalismo e socialismo (Firenze: La nuova italia, 1996), 249 (accessed at 
INSMLI); One of the most vocal and prominent of the antifacists was Maurizio Boccara, who 
wrote several articles condemning the Italian Racial Decrees in 1938. L'aurore, "Italiens, Juifs et 
Chrêtiens cet article est pour vous! Analysons le Racisme Fascist" 29 September 1938, ACCC 
Boccara Maurizio; ACAE, Silvio Pinto. 
4 There is a good deal of work on this from the Italian metropole. Enzo Collotti, Il Fascismo e gli 
ebrei. Le leggi razziali in Italia (Bari, 2003), Ilaria Pavan & Guri Schwarz (eds.) Gli ebrei in 
Italia tra persecuzione fascista e reintegrazione postbellica (Firenze, 2001), Ilaria Pavan, Il 
podestà ebreo. La storia di Renzo Ravenna tra fascismo e leggi razziali (Bari, 2006). Still, much 
remains to be studied about life in the Italian “colonies.” 
5 Italians briefly protested, but to no avail. After loosing jobs at the Association Internationale 
d'Assistance Publique du Cairo, 23 Italian employees filed a complaint about their dismissal, 
attributing it to Ali Maher's "violent nationalization": "dato che essa fu fondata da italiani in 
collaborazione con membri di altre nazionalità e che conformemente al Trattato di Montreux le 
Autorità Egiziane non possono nazionalizzare quest'Associazione che alla scadenza dell'epoca 
stabilita." MAE, AC 1939, B.321 s.f.associazioni di beneficenza, Consolato Cairo to Legazione 
Italiana Cairo 20 October 1939. 
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hesitancy) of the British Authorities. An article of anonymous authorship was published entitled 
“Italy and Egypt.” The article, likely written or overseen by either Fausta Cialente or Angelo 
Tartagni, two of the few members of the antifascist movement organized only around the time 
immediately preceding the war,6 responded to two speeches given by "eminent Egyptian 
politicians," warning of the results of an Italian victory and an Italian occupation of Egypt, where 
“it would impose its regime, as it has done in other conquered countries, it would demolish the 
integrity of the people and it would deliver a fatal blow to their liberty and independence.” The 
article proceeded to dissect the myths of Fascism, deployed -as it described- to oppress “Italians” 
and “Italian subjects” alike. An English victory, argued the author/s, would mean instead the 
protection and "maintenance of the liberty of the Egyptian people."7 Although this language may 
have been commonplace in prewar Egypt, it certainly was not common within the Italian 
community itself. The attempts of the antifascists to reissue Il Giornale d'Oriente with this 
different agenda were met with hostility and enflamed members of the Italian community, many 
                                                            
6 In regard to the antifascist movements in Egypt, there is little written. Most who appeared, 
during the war, to organize publications and activities of antifascists were coming from outside 
of Egypt. For example, the leaders of Giustizia e Libertà in Egypt, Stefano Terra and Enzo 
Sereni, were brought in to found an antifascist press. For the reasons described in Chapter One, it 
was nearly impossible for a solely Italian antifascist group to be organized and the few that did 
exist were international in nature; according to Cialente, they were majority Greek, French and 
Swiss. Many who declared themselves antifascists were previously members of the Fascist Party, 
thus rousing suspicion in the eyes of the British. Both Paolo Bagnoli and Fausta Cialente, whose 
house was a known "den" of antifascism, wrote about the opposition antifascists faced with the 
British in trying to broadcast. This included Cialente's and Laura Levi's antifascist broadcasts in 
Italian on Radio Cairo. For more on this see Guido Valabrega "Note sulla partecipazione di 
italiani ai movimenti antifasciti in Egitto negli anni trenta e quaranta" Italia contemporanea 203 
(1996) 293-304 (accessed at INSMLI); Fausta Cialente "L'azione degli antifascisti italiani in 
Egitto" in Manlio Brigaglio (Ed.) (pp.85-88) Resistenza, liberazione nazionale e prospettiva 
mediterraneaL atti del seminario internazionale per il XXX anniversario della Liberazione 
(Edizione Scientifiche Italiane, 1975); Bagnoli, "Roselli," 245; Battino, Una famiglia, 53-54. 
7 "vi imporrebbe il suo regime, come ha fatto in tutti i paesi conquistati, demolirebbe l'integrità 
del popolo e porterebbe un colpo mortale alla sua libertà e alla sua indipendenza." CEA, "Italia e 
Egitto," Il Giornale d'Oriente, 18 August 1940. 
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of whom saw it as national betrayal.8 This shift in public discourse on Fascism marked a rupture 
in what had previously circulated in the Italian newspapers, enabled by the Capitulations and the 
strict control that the consulates and Fasci had enforced over the Italian press. To deepen this 
rupture, Anglo-Egyptian Authorities sequestered radios and limited movement for Italians, 
requiring them to carry a “red card” at all times; all means were taken by the British to ensure a 
divide between Rome and Egypt. That rupture - the subject of this chapter - affected every aspect 
of Italian lives in Egypt. While its attempt to dismantle the structures of feeling that Fascism 
promoted among its followers may have failed, it did stymie their ability to envision the future.   
 
I. Entering the War  
On 10 June 1940, when Mussolini announced the Italian entry into the Second World 
War against the allied forces, the Italian community in Egypt, under an Egyptian regime that had 
effectively capitulated to the British with the 1936 Treaty of Alliance, found itself on precarious 
grounds. Notwithstanding Mussolini’s assurances that Egypt would not be “drawn into the war,” 
the lives of the Italians of Egypt were vastly transformed in the coming months and years. 
Mussolini’s declaration was not an unanticipated event, and instead it confirmed rumors that had 
circulated in Egypt.9 For several months, Italians had been filtering money out of the country; the 
                                                            
8 Bagnoli, "Roselli," 246. 
9 Some observations of this can be found in the diplomatic diaries of Serafino Mazzolini and Sir 
Miles Lampson; others in the documents of the Italian consular archives in Alexandria and 
Cairo. Mazzolini’s diaries can be considered especially useful because his death occurred before 
the end of the war, before he had a chance to review or edit them. See Gianni Scipione Rossi 
Mussolini e il diplomatico: La vita e i diari di Serafino Mazzolini, un monarchico a Salò 
(Rubbettino, 2005); Miles L. Killearn The Killearn Diaries (1934-1946) (London: Sedgwick & 
Jackson, 1972) and M.E. Yapp Politics and Diplomacy in Egypt: The Diaries of Sir Miles 
Lampson, 1935-1937 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); It seems that rumors had also 
circulated that stated that Italian and American residents in Egypt would be asked to repatriate en 
masse by their respective governments, and were widespread enough to be publicly dismissed in 
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Italian consulates were “buying” Egyptian currency from the Italians in Egypt and then crediting 
their Italian accounts with Italian lire. An accelerated rate of repatriation occurred 
simultaneously. The British feared that the accumulated funds of the Italian consulates could be 
used for Fifth Column activity.10 Moreover, land registers showed “very large sales of landed 
property in Egypt by Italians” and the British suspected that the Italians who owned land were 
transferring it to friends of other nationalities so as to avoid sequestration.11 It was commonly 
known among Italian residents that, since the Ethiopia Campaign in 1935, the British had 
proposed an “internment en masse” of Italians in Egypt.12 Between the 6th and the 8th of June, 
Italian consular staff had all prepared extensive lists of the institutions under their protection and 
administration. These included schools, the Fasci, dopolavori, hospitals, charity/assistance 
associations, the Dante Alighieri Society (and its offices in different cities), veterans’ 
associations, several large companies, and the Chambers of Commerce.13 In essence, the entire 
structure of the Italian community. This was likely in preparation for the imminent declaration of 
war, knowing that in the aftermath of the 1936 treaty, the British would enforce strict measures 
over the Italian community as “enemy subjects” (as they had already done with the much smaller 
German community). 
 Although Mussolini’s speech never arrived in Egypt, the declaration set into action a 
definitive shift in the lives of Italian residents, transforming the worlds they had come to know 
since the 1920s. It was quickly followed by a diplomatic break between Rome and Cairo.14 On 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Il Giornale d’Oriente. CEA, “Gli italiani ed americani residenti in Egitto non sono stati invitati a 
rimpatriare,” Il Giornale d’Oriente, 21 May 1940. 
10 FO 371/24605, Empson to Rasmy Bey 7 June 1940. 
11 FO 371/24605, Empson to Rasmy Bey 8 June 1940. 
12 Achille Vogliano, “l’Egitto e Noi,” La lettura: rivista mensile del corriere della sera, 40 10 
(1939), 750-757. 
13 MAE, AC 1940, b.335 6-8 June 1940 
14 CEA, Giornale d’Oriente, 11 June 1940. 
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11 June, Serafino Mazzolini, then Minister of Italy in Egypt, wrote: “[o]ur situation here is one 
of the strangest. Relations are still normal but we’re isolated from the world. Deprived of 
communications, surveilled by the police. During the night, arrests of many Italian compatriots 
were carried out.”15 On the evening of the 10th, the Egyptian police, under the administration of 
the British authorities and following the state of siege enacted at the declaration of war, arrested 
at least 150 Italians in Alexandria.16 Arrests were made without distinction of race, as noted by 
Giuriati, the Italian Consul in Alexandria. Around 3am, Egyptian troops surrounded the 
consulate and occupied the Italian institutions, expelling Italian guards in the process. Telephone 
lines were cut and calls interrupted until the afternoon of the 11th. Overnight, between 550 and 
630 arrests were made in Alexandria, Cairo, and in the Canal Zone, while an additional 411 
Italians were rounded up in the provinces.17 Italian civilians rushed to the consulate to 
understand what was happening. It was rumored that the Italian schools were to be converted 
into holding camps for the prisoners; Italian bank accounts, pensions and assets were frozen and 
placed under sequester.18 Meanwhile, Mazzolini ordered the burning of the consular archives.19 
Some of the most prominent members of the Italian community were being held in the Gabbari 
prison in Alexandria and arrests, it was noted, were conducted in a “violent and unprovoked” 
                                                            
15 “La nostra situazione qui è delle più strane. I rapporti sono ancora normali ma siamo isolati dal 
mondo. Privi di comunicazioni telegrafiche e telefoniche, sorvegliati dalla Polizia. Durante la 
notte sono stati eseguiti molti arresti di connazionali.” Rossi, Mussolini e il diplomatico, 276. 
16 MAE, AC 1940, b.335 Consolato Generale Alessandria to Legazione Italiana Cairo 11 June 
1940. 
17 FO371/24605 Lampson to FO 11 June 1940. 
18 MAE, AC 1940, b.335 Consolato Generale Alexandria to Legazione Italiana Cairo 11 June 
1940, 12 June 1940. 
19 “Ho dato ordine di bruciare gli archivi riservati,” Rossi, Mussolini e il diplomatico, 276. 
Unfortunately, we do not know the extent of destruction. However, there are notations in some 
folders within the consulate archives - both in Alexandria and in Cairo - that note certain files 
were “lost” or “destroyed” in 1940. These observations were likely made in the reordering of the 
archives and reopening of the consulates following the war, when families and individuals 
needed to recommence their interactions with the Italian authorites. 
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manner: “[i]n some cases the arrest happened violently and under the threat of arms by the police 
agents, even without provocation by compatriots, who always maintained proper behavior.20” 
 The internment of Italians was the final stage of the British Tombak plan, which, since 
1935, had as its eventual outcome the disarmament, arrest, and internment of Italians. Tombak 
had been impossible until 1936 due to the restrictions under the Capitulations.21 British fears 
were centered around the large number of organized, young Italians; they noted a clear 
difference between the general attitude of a “moderate” elder generation of Italians and Italian 
Jews and the aggressive mentality of the Italians in their twenties and thirties.22 The enactment of 
the Tombak Plan consisted of three steps: 1) the registration of all Italians; 2) the internment of 
Italians; and 3) the formation of an Anglo-Egyptian committee to manage the internment. The 
British had decided that around 12,500 Italians were to be interned indefinitely. Of these, 5,800 
were members of the PNF while the remainder included males of military age (see Table 1, 
“others”) or loosely defined “suspects.”23 
Locality Numbers Place of 
internment 
Arresting 
authority 
Responsible for guard 
Cairo 2500 Fascists 
2000 others. 
Bulaq School 
and Italian 
Stadium. 
Egyptian police 
with Egyptian 
Army 
Egyptian Army. 
                                                            
20 “In alcuni casi l’arresto è avvenuto in forma violenta e con minaccia a mano armata da parte 
degli agenti della polizia, pur senza alcuna provocazione da parte dei connazionali, che hanno 
sempre mantenuto contegno corretto.” MAE, AC 1940, b.335 Consolato Generale Alexandria to 
Legazione d’Italia Cairo 12 June 1940; the names of those imprisoned - at least the more 
‘important’ within the sphere of the Italian administration and institutions - include: Turini, Fiore 
Miraglia, Rufini, Rocchi, and members of the Italian Jewish community, Ezio Pinot, Silvio 
Pinto, Aldo Ambron, Roberto Almagià, Levi Emilio, Oscar Greco, and Ugo Dessberg. For more 
on this see Petricioli, Oltre il Mito, 374-375. 
21 Petricioli, Oltre il Mito, 377. 
22 Petricilio, Oltre il Mito, 374. 
23 For studies that represent other examples of these “shifts” wherein a population is deemed an 
enemy because of its national affiliation see Regina M. Delacor, “From Potential Friends to 
Potential Enemies: The Internment of ‘Hostile Foreigners’ in France at the Beginning of the 
Second World War,” Journal of Contemporary History, 35 3 (2000). 
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assistance. 
Alexandria 2000 Fascists 
3000 others. 
Littorio School 
& tentage in 
grounds of 
same. 
Egyptian Police 
with Egyptian 
Army 
assistance. 
Egyptian Army. 
Suez Canal 
Zone (Port 
Said, Ismailia, 
Suez) 
800 Fascists 
650 others. 
Bulaq School 
and Italian 
Stadium, Cairo. 
Egyptian Police 
with British 
Army 
assistance. 
Egyptian Army 
(Cairo). 
Provinces 500 Fascists 
500 others. 
Local 
arrangements.  
Local Mudirs. Local Mudirs & 
Egyptian Army where 
necessary. 
Image 3: Administration of arrests and internment of Italians.24 
 In 1938, Serafino Mazzolini had been sent to replace Ghigi as the Italian Minister in 
Egypt. Initial discussions to place Piero Parini in the same role failed due to British protest 
because of his influence and intense involvement in Italian emigrant communities and his 
powerful role in the Fascist government, as well as the hostile position he had taken towards the 
British during the Montreux Conference.25 While Lampson had judged Ghigi pleasant and 
politically amenable, the sudden change and the rumors of his replacement with Parini led him to 
conclude that “Italian machinations in Egypt were greater than ever.”26 With the help of British 
pressure, the Egyptian government rejected the proposal for Parini’s appointment and Ciano sent 
Mazzolini instead. Top among his priorities was to study the diplomatic and civilian possibilities 
in the case of war, for nothing had been set in stone regarding Egypt and the Italians residing 
there.27  
                                                            
24 This list was circulated immediately after the declaration of entrance into the war. WO201-
2409, Wavell to Lampson, 12 June 1940. 
25 Petricioli, Oltre il Mito, 387. Specifically he occupied administrative positions of great 
authority such as the Secretario generale of the Fasci all’estero and the Direttore generale of the 
Italiani all’estero e scuole. 
26 Yapp, Politics and Diplomacy, 902. 
27 Petricioli, Oltre il Mito, 398; Rossi, Mussolini e il diplomatico, 91. See also the Ciano diaries 
which detail his reasoning for selecting Mazzolini and the duties that the latter would assume 
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 Diplomatically, Fascist leadership in Rome anticipated that Mazzolini would bring the 
anti-British opposition concretely on the side of the Italians.28 Rome sought a compromise with 
the Egyptians on Article 7 of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, which stipulated that in the case of war, 
the Egyptian Government would aid the British.29 These goals were to be met through the 
connections of the Italian community and the Egyptian Monarchy, especially at a moment when 
the delicate balance of power in Egypt may have favored an Italy that was becoming a more 
viable regional power.30 For a period following the so-called Easter Accords of 1938, in which 
the British sought to eliminate the potential of an Italian-German alliance, the aggression of the 
Fascist regime’s propaganda in Egypt diminished.31 Towards 1939, Italian attentions shifted 
towards Yemen and Iran for several months, bringing quiet on the Egyptian front. Shortly 
afterwards, however, propaganda resumed at full force. It continued to highlight the 
contradictions in Egypt’s status as an “independent and sovereign nation” and its restrictions 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
once in his role in Egypt specifically related to Italy’s possibile entry in the war. Galeazzo Ciano, 
Diario 1937-1943 (Roma, 2014). 
28 De Felice, Fascismo e l’Oriente, 79. 
29 Petricioli, Oltre il Mito, 392. 
30 For more on the historical link between the Italian Monarchy, Fascism, and the Egyptian 
Monarchy/Royal Family and its use in Italian propaganda see Anna Baldinetti Orientalismo e 
Colonialismo: la ricerca di consenso in Egitto per l’impresa di Libia (Istituto per l’Oriente C.A. 
Nallino, 1997); see also, for the politico-diplomatic intricacies of this moment, Laila Morsy, 
“The Military Clauses of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, 1936,” IJMES 
16, 1 (1984) and “Britain’s Wartime Policy in Egypt, 1940-42,” Middle Eastern Studies 25, 1 
(1989), 67. 
31 De Felice describes this as Mussolini using Italian-Arab politics as “moneta in scambio” in 
order to reach some agreement with the British, De Felice, 21, 40; De Felice tends to depict the 
situation in a more haphazard way, arguing that Italian policy shifted from “instrumentality” to a 
central role in political-military strategy only with Mussolini’s declaration of the entry in war, 
but I think Nir Arielli is closer to the point when he sees Italy’s WWII ambitions as a “logical 
outcome” of the policies of the preceding years. Nir Arielli, Fascist Italy, 163. 
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under the Anglo-Egypt Treaty.32 Above all, Italy wanted a break between the British and the 
Egyptian regimes.33 
 After Mussolini’s speech, Mazzolini’s first action was to discuss matters with Ali Maher, 
Prime Minister of Egypt, who had proven a trusted ally of the Italian minister. On the evening of 
the 10th, Mazzolini met with Maher. Presumably, Maher expressed his support for the Italian 
cause and his desire to end the British military presence in Egypt. Mazzolini wrote privately that 
Maher had assured him that were Italian forces to attack the British troops at Abukir (east of 
Alexandria), “we won’t move and we won’t be moved (emotionally)”34 A short time thereafter, 
Lampson met with Maher, who reported hesitantly that Mazzolini had inquired as to whether his 
expulsion was imminent, seemingly worried for his own well-being. Maher reiterated to both 
that Egypt would act in agreement with the 1936 treaty and proceeded with the implementation 
of the final phase of the Tombak plan. Lampson however was wary of Maher’s stance; he wrote, 
“on the whole Aly Maher was not unresponsive, but I feel one has to watch him all the time.”35 
Indeed, historians have suggested that from 1940 to 1941, at least, Maher may have had in the 
works an uprising against the British.36 
 On June 12th, Maher forewarned Mazzolini of the impending rupture in diplomatic 
relations between Italy and Egypt. Accordingly, Italian offices in Cairo alerted the consulates in 
Port Said and Alexandria that it was expected “from one moment to another” and, when it was to 
                                                            
32 See, for example, the article published by Radio Bari’s editor, Said Sciartuni “Egitto e Italia 
nel Mare Mediterraneo,” La vita italiana: rassegna politica pubblicazione mensile de ‘il regime 
fascista’“ 27, (1939); And, when Achille Vogliano, came to Egypt to interview the King, he 
wrote of the striking icons of this “friendship” adorning the walls of Abdine Palace. Achille 
Vogliano, “l’Egitto e Noi.” 
33 Romain H. Rainero La politica araba di Mussolini nella seconda guerra mondiale (Padova: 
CEDAM, 2004) 72, 104; 
34 “noi non ci muoveremo e non ci commuoveremo!” Rossi, Mussolini e il diplomatico, 276. 
35 Killearn, The Killearn Diaries, 118-119. 
36 James Jankowski Egypt’s young rebels: “Young Egypt” 1933-1942 (Hoover Institution Press, 
1975): 85. 
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occur, the representatives and officials were not to leave the premises until they received word 
from the foreign power that was to assume Italian interests in Egypt.37 Each office was requested 
to submit lists of individuals (magistrates, teachers, bankers, employees of the insurance and 
navigational companies) who wished to be repatriated immediately. On the 10th, the Legazione 
d’Italia in Bern, Switzerland, officially appealed to the Swiss Federal Political Department 
(DPF), asking if, in the case of eventual conflict between Italy and Egypt, the Swiss authorities 
in Egypt would assume “the protection of Italian interests in Egypt.”38 The Swiss chargé 
d’affaires in Egypt, Alfred Brunner, visited Mazzolini, confirming that the Swiss Legation would 
assume - as requested - control and administration of Italian interests in Egypt.39 While the 
repatriation of Mazzolini and other diplomats was anticipated, the minister insisted that a select 
group composed of prominent members of the Italian community accompany him, including 
some who had already been arrested, such as the directorship of propaganda in Egypt and Il 
Giornale d’Oriente.40 
 Accordingly, the Egyptian government published proclamations 57 and 58, rendering 
trade with Italy and Italian citizens illegal and introducing the procedures for sequestration of 
Italian assets in Egypt.41 Maher made an important protest on behalf of the Italians, which 
outraged Lampson. He wrote: 
The dangerous elements have already been interned and a strict organization has been 
established, and adequate measures taken against the Fifth Column. I believe that a 
massive internment of 12,000 people, mostly employees/clerks or artisans, whose 
absence would be felt national labor economy, cannot be recommended. If, however, it is 
                                                            
37 MAE, AC 1940, b.335. 
38 SFA, E2001D 1000/1553 BD:103 [img_2190] 
39 Petricioli, Oltre il Mito, 409; the Swiss also assumed the responsibility of Italian interests in 
Syria, Palestine and Turkey. 
40 Rossi, Mussolini e il diplomatico, 277. 
41 FO371/24605, Proclamation n57, n58, Journal Official (Cairo). 
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established that the salvation of the country depends on the adoption of such a measure, I 
will not fail to examine the scope and modalities in a timely manner.42 
 
Maher brought attention to the fact that the internment of such a large number of Italians, most of 
whom were engaged in small enterprises and artisanal trades, could have a devastating outcome 
on the already fragile economy of the country. Maher gave a similar discourse to the Egyptian 
parliament when he urged that Cairo be designated an “open city,” thereby nullifying the British 
intentions to censor the Italian community.43 In a meeting the following day, on the 17th, with 
King Faruk, Lampson made it clear that Maher “must go and must go quickly.”44 He advised the 
king “not to get misled by the dangerous and tortuous advice” of the Prime Minister.45 His veiled 
threats were enough to spark almost immediate controversy about Maher’s dismissal; it was said 
that either Hassan Sabri or Afifi Pasha would replace Maher, described by Mazzolini as “the one 
or the other English creatures.”46  
 Awaiting news on his own departure from Brunner, Mazzolini and the others remained 
“imprisoned” in the Legation.47 Early in the morning of June 23rd, Mazzolini and a number of 
the individuals indicated by him, including 33 who were already arrested, were granted 
permission to depart Egypt via rail through Palestine, Syria and Turkey.48 
                                                            
42 “Les éléments dangereux ayant été déjà internés et une stricte organisation ayant été établie et 
des mesures adéquates prises contre la cinquième colonne, j’estime qu’un internement massif de 
12,000 personnes, en grande partie des employés ou artisans, dont l’absence serait ressentie dans 
l’économie du travail national, ne saurait se recommander. Si, toutefois, il est établi que le salut 
du pays dépend de l’adoption d’une mesure de ce genre, je ne manquerai pas en temps opportun, 
d’en examiner l’étendue et les modalités.” WO201-2409, Maher to Lampson 16 June 1940. 
43 For more on Maher’s struggle with the Egyptian Parliament and the British Authorities, see 
Petricioli, Oltre il Mito, 406-47. 
44 Killearn, The Killearn Diaries, 120. 
45 Killearn, The Killearn Diaries, 121; Morsy, “Britain’s Wartime Policy,” 66. 
46 “l’uno o l’altro creature inglesi” Rossi, Mussolini e il diplomatico, 278. 
47 Rossi, Mussolini e il diplomatico, 279. 
48 Rossi, Mussolini e il diplomatico, 276-278. 
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 By the end of the month, Ali Maher’s government and the Italian diplomats were out of 
the way of the British authorities, and the arrest and internment of Italians civilians continued. 
Ali Maher had been replaced with Hassan Sabri, held in high esteem by the British. By June 
21st, over one thousand Italians were being held throughout Egypt. A process was initiated 
whereby the prisoners were transferred from Egyptian prisons and the Italian schools used as 
holding grounds, to camps in the desert along the Suez Canal; namely, in Fayed. A delegation 
from the International Red Cross was sent to visit the camps to ensure that they conformed to the 
1929 Geneva Conventions. As a result of this visit and IRC intervention - which found, for 
example, in the Moascar holding camp, “intolerable and inhumane conditions”49 - some were 
transferred to other camps. On a large scale, the Italian community was brought to an abrupt halt; 
a conservative sequester was applied to all Italian accounts and Italians were forbidden from 
signing contracts. Brunner, requesting the immediate release of 5,000 EGP from the sequestered 
Italian accounts, wrote: 
several decrees prohibit a large part of commercial activity of Italian nationals and 
establish a sequester on Italian property... a large number of indigent Italians already 
existed in Egypt and those created by the new measures [make the question of] 
immediate assistance grave.50 
 
After being forwarded to Rome through the Italian Legation in Bern (Switzerland), the Italian 
government responded with noted anger:  
the Fascist government has been informed that the Egyptian Government proceeded to 
intern around 1000 Italian citizens in concentration camps and that various decrees 
emanating from the E[gyptian] g[overnment] prohibit a large part of commercial activity 
of Italian citizens and establish a sequester on Italian goods/property in Egypt... These 
provisions, given that between Italy and Egypt there does not exist a state of war, are in 
absolute contrast to international rights and thus the Fascist government--while it presents 
                                                            
49 SFA, E2001-02 1000/111 BD:8 telegramme de la Legation Suisse de Cairo 16 July 1940. 
50 “plusieurs décrets interdisant grande partie activité commerciale des ressortissants italiens et 
établissent séquestre biens italiens Égypte...vu grand nombre indigents déjà existants et ceux 
crées par nouvelles mesures question assistance immédiate est aigue.” SFA, E2001-02 1000/111 
BD:8 subfolder “Italienische Interessen in Aegypten” 21 June 1940. 
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a formal protest for the applications that until now has been enacted of the 
aforementioned Egyptian provisions and formulate reserves for reparations of the 
consequent damages--requests the revocation of the provisions, pointing out that 
otherwise it would be forced to adopt retaliatory measures.51 
 
II. No waste of time - Arrest and Isolation 
 Nearly one month after Mussolini’s declaration, the new Egyptian Prime Minister, 
Hassan Sabri, and Lampson together organized an Anglo-Egyptian committee in accordance 
with the Tombak plan. The committee’s aim was to: 1) recommend to the Egyptian government 
which categories of Italians were to be interned; 2) decide on how they will be arrested; 3) 
arrange the preparations of camps; 4) classify the arrested to facilitate distribution to the 
internment camps; 5) arrange guarding of the camps; and to 6) advise the Egyptian government 
on “the eventual repatriation, permanent detention or evacuation elsewhere of the internees.”52 
Lampson saw these as urgent matters. Aware that Fayed, where internees were being held 
temporarily, was deemed unfit for civilian internees, his fear that any delay could put the British 
at risk of subversion was greater.53 Arrests continued, despite British complaints about the 
“drag” of the Egyptian police. Sabri, although closer to the British on most political matters than 
Ali Maher, hesitated about the establishment of the camp in Fayed. He was concerned about its 
distance from the families of the Italian prisoners. Lampson disagreed, as the British ambassador 
                                                            
51 “Il Governo Fascista è stato informato che il Governo Egiziano ha proceduto all’internamento 
di circa 1000 cittadini italiani in campi di concentramento e che varii decreti emanati dal 
Governo Egiziano proibiscono in gran parte l’attività commerciale dei cittadini italiani e 
stabiliscono il sequestro sui beni italiani in Egitto... Detti provvedimenti, atteso che fra l’Italia e 
l’Egitto non esiste stato di guerra, sono assolutamente in contrasto col diritto internazionale e 
pertanto il Governo fascista - mentre presenta formale protesta per l’applicazione che sinora è 
stata fatta dei predetti provvedimenti egiziani e formula riserve per il risarcimento dei 
conseguente danni - chiede la revoca dei provvedimenti stessi facendo presente che altrimenti si 
vedrebbe costretto ad adottare misure di rappresaglia.” SFA, E2001-02 1000/111 BD:8 subfolder 
“Italienische Interessen in Aegypten” Legazione d’Italia Bern to Dipartimento politico federale 
Divisione degli interessi stranieri 12 July 1940. 
52 WO201-2409 Lampson to Sabry 10 July 1940. 
53 WO201-2409 Lampson notes 5 July 1940, Lampson to Sabry 7 July 1940. 
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viewed the immediate internment of Italians as “a matter of extreme urgency for security 
reasons.”54 
 Brunner saw the measures taken by the British as extreme, but found it difficult to argue 
his case. First and foremost, complained Brunner, there was almost complete lack of an 
international law upon which he could base claims for the internees: “In the absence of any 
legislation regarding civilian internees... I could get that they are in principle and in analogy 
placed under the benefits of the provisions of the conventions concerning prisoners of war signed 
at Geneva on 27 July 1929.”55 While trying to relieve the pace of arrests in July 1940, he 
observed the complete paralysis of the Italian community. Most men of working age had already 
been arrested. The impossibility of finding work for those not interned and the toll the absence of 
income took on the community necessitated expansive efforts on behalf of the Swiss Legation to 
provide aid to the community of around 60,000 persons.56 
 The reality of internment was one that would eventually affect all Italians, especially 
those whose lives were already unraveling as a result of the politico-economic shifts of the 
1930s. Salvatore Caccioppo, a carpenter who lived with his wife, mother-in-law and children on 
Dardar Street57 was provided assistance from the consulate throughout the 1930s for the 
schooling of his three daughters - he supported seven people. Caccioppo had a small carpentry 
shop with three or four workers, but was unable to secure work. The staff at the Italian consulate 
administering his request observed that he and his family lived in the “the most squalid misery.” 
                                                            
54 WO201-2409, Lampson to Sabry 7 July 1940. 
55 “En l’absence de toute législation concernant les internés civils...j’ai pu obtenir que ceux-ci 
soient en principe et par analogie mis au bénéfice des dispositions de la Convention relative aux 
prisonniers de guerre, signée à Genève le 27 juillet 1929.” SFA, E2001-02 1000/111 BD:8, 
Brunner to Minister of Division des Interests etrangers DPF 20 September 1940. 
56 SFA, E2001D 1000/1553 BD:13, confidential report from Brunner to La Division des Affaires 
Etrangeres du Departement Politique Federal 10 July 1940. 
57 Also known as darda’a in Arabic. The street was highly populated by working-class Italians in 
the neighborhood of Attarin. 
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On the 13th, Caccioppo was arrested and then sent to Fayed where he remained until 1944.58 
Within a month of his departure from Alexandria, his last son was born. Aware of the 
devastating repercussions of internment and the disregard for age and condition, some 
individuals pleaded to the Swiss Legation to have their particular cases exempted.59 Umberto 
Russo, 45 years old, supported his wife, children and in-laws - nine people total - onto which was 
added his own parents after his two younger brothers, Giuseppe and Armando, had been interned 
at Fayed. He wrote to the Swiss charge d’affaires:  
With intent to adjust his business affairs, the undersigned obtained a permit to travel to 
Cairo from October 6 to 16 before being interned.... the undersigned asserts to be of… 
impeccable conduct, from all points of view [and] has never belonged to any political 
party nor was occupied with politics... regarding his special situation, Mr. Consul 
General, the undersigned asks immediate support in being exonerated from internment in 
order to continue to provide the necessary support of five children, his wife, and his 
elderly parents. 
 
Russo’s small shop, in the square in front of St. Catherine’s Church in Alexandria, just around 
the corner from his home, was his main source of income, from which he contributed around 50 
piastres on a yearly basis to the official Italian welfare fund, Ente Opere Assistenziali, money 
that was redistributed into the community and provided assistance for other families such as the 
Caccioppos.60  
                                                            
58 ACAE, Caccioppo Salvatore - classe 1897. 
59 Undoubtedly, there were more protests than there are records of. The few that I have found 
come from the personal registries in the Italian consular archives in Alexandria and Cairo. It is 
unknown how they - addressed to the Swiss Legation - made their way to these files, but they are 
irreplaceable. Traces of that moment of limbo, of anticipation and fear of the potential effects of 
internment could have on a community already suffering great economic hardship. 
60 “A fin de pouvoir ajuster un peu ses affaires le soussigné obtenu un permis de se rendre au 
Caire depuis le 6 au 16 Octobre avant d’etre interné... le soussigné peut affirmer de la façon la 
plus absolue d’etre de conduite, irreprochable sous tous les ponts de vue. Il n’appartient ni a 
jamais appartenu à aucun parti politique, et ne s’est jamais occupé de politique.... Vous ayant 
exposé sa situation speciale, monsieur le Consul General, le soussigné vous prie instament de 
bien vouloir l’appuyer afin qu’il puisse, étant exhonoré de l’internement, continuer à assurer le 
soutien indispensable de ses 5 enfants de sa femme et de ses vieux parents [sic]” ACAE, Russo 
Umberto - classe 1896. 
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 Others sought repatriation, fearing the looming repercussions of the war. One might 
imagine too that the reporting in Il Giornale d’Oriente of Mussolini’s and Ciano’s formation of 
the “permanent commission” for the return of the Italians abroad in the late autumn of 1938 
stirred those who, for economic reasons, had already begun to reorient their lives towards an 
eventual “return.” The newspaper’s portrayal of the 20 years of Fascism as culminating in the 
closing of the “sad book” of emigration and welcoming Italian workers to develop the “internal 
potential” of the Patria coincided with the increasing impossibility for Italians to remain in 
Egypt.61  Although many did in fact return,62 the process was not so easy. Unable to find work 
for several years and with the war in Europe escalating, in spring 1939, Virgilio Santoro’s 
multiple requests for repatriation went unanswered. Within eight months of Italy’s entry into the 
war, Santoro was arrested from his home on Saba’a Banat Street (Rue des Soeurs) and interned 
in Fayed.63 
 
                                                            
61 CEA, Giornale d’Oriente “l’Italia imperiale accoglierà tutti gli Italiani all’estero che 
desiderino rimpatriare” 20 November 1938, “Il richiamo” 3 December 1938. In many of the 
articles, emigration was portrayed as a “condemnation” of the regimes that preceded Mussolini 
and the great return or “rimpatrio” as the successful reconstruction of the Italian subject (in the 
cult of the Duce style). One article teleologically rewrote the objectives of the PNF: “istruire i 
fratelli lontani nel nuovo credo della Patria; fondere le loro volontà in una compattezza morale e 
politica; offrire ad essi protezione, solidarietà, amore; trasformarli tutti in uomini nuovi, in 
Italiani di Mussolini, solidi, sani nel corpo e nello spirito, generosi, ardenti.” Giornale d’Oriente 
“Il rimpatrio degli italiani: una bonifica compiuta” 13 December 1938; for more on the 
“richiamo” of Italians abroad from the emigrant communities see Annunziata Nobile “Politica 
migratoria e vicende dell’emigrazione durante il fascismo” Il Ponte 30 11-12 (1974), 1333. 
62 Agatone interview 18 March 2012. 
63 ACAE, Virgilio Santoro. 
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Image 4: Map drawn by Albino Caserta (source: ANPIE, 28). 
 
 The Fayed camp, on the edge of the Bitter Lake west of the Suez Canal, was to become 
the home for most civilian internees for the duration of the war (image 3). Following the protest 
of the International Red Cross with regard to prisoners being held at the nearby Moascar camp, 
dangerously close to a British airstrip and thus a potential target for attack (in contradiction with 
the 1929 Geneva Conventions), internees were relocated to Fayed, where preparations had only 
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recently begun to turn the grounds into a viable camp.64 The Moascar camp had housed around 
470 persons, despite that its maximum holding capacity was around 160.65 Most of the internees 
there came from Suez, where - presumably because of its proximity to the Canal - arrests were 
immediate and all-encompassing. Only two days after the declaration of war, 60 percent of the 
males had been arrested, “taking into account neither [the] advanced age nor [the] unstable 
health conditions of compatriots.”66  
 British authorities were aware that Fayed could hold around 2400 internees, but the 
Anglo-Egyptian committee hoped to double the population within months of Mussolini’s 
declaration.67 The committee agreed to arrest all males in “good health” from ages 18 to 45 and 
all official members of the PNF from ages 18 to 60.68 They were determined to be “potentially 
dangerous Fifth Columnists.” By mid August, with only around 1,334 arrested, Lampson wrote 
with noted disappointment “...that although more than two months have elapsed since Italy 
entered the war, such a relatively small number of Italians have been interned.”69 Decisively, as 
events unfolded in the Mediterranean, Lampson expressed, “the necessity for this action [the 
                                                            
64 Albino Caserta Italians of Egypt During the Second World War (ANPIE, 2009): 27. 
65 SFA E2001-02 1000/111 BD:8, Brunner to Minister of Division des Interets etrangers DPF 20 
September 1940. 
66 “senza tener conto né dell’avanzata età né delle malferme condizioni di salute di alcuni 
connazionali“ MAE, AC 1940, b.335 Vice Consolato Suez to Legazione Cairo and Consolato PS 
12 June 1940 “situazione collettività Italiana di Suez”; a list of names, birthdates, and 
professions shows that on the first night of arrests the group of internees was perhaps one of the 
least stratified (as compared to the arrests in Alexandria, for example). These include 37 
mechanics, 27 employees, 6 ship captains, 6 electricians, 6 marittimo, 6 retirees, 2 merchants, 2 
guards, 2 carpenters, and one driver, banker, barber, welder, fuochista, engineer, naval machinist, 
marinaio, palombaro, and saldatore (totaling 106). 
67 WO201-2409 Tomlyn notes 4 July 1940. 
68 Exceptions were made in the case of known Fascists. However, these lists seem to number 
very few. Attempts to discern who and how many individuals were included in these lists have 
been rather difficult. The Italian State kept track of prominent antifascists (or those who were 
ambiguously labeled as contrary to the regime), but at the most these numbers hardly amounted 
to 100 individuals. See MAE, AP Egitto (1931-45) b.33. Similar lists, with the recurrent names, 
appear in British archives, FO/371/24634/1947. 
69 WO201-2409 Aide Memoire 15 August 1940. 
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arrest of all Italian males] has now become even more imperative in view of the imminent 
possibility of an attack on Egypt by the Italians.”70 
 Fayed was to hold the younger, unmarried Italians, while those married and with 
children/families were to be maintained in camps closer to the urban centers (this however was 
never put into practice). Exceptions to these categories were only made in the case of “known” 
anti-fascists. While several categories were excluded altogether - Italian Jews, Dodecanese, 
Albanians, Ethiopians and Libyans - any one of theses exceptions was quickly cancelled if the 
individual was perceived to be a “committed” member of the PNF. The British military urgently 
accelerated the arrest rate to around 200 per week, quickening the pace at which Fayed filled: 
It was agreed that it was not only unnecessary but [a] waste of time, for the Committee to 
consider the case of each individual Italian. The Egyptian authorities would proceed with 
the internment of Italians on agreed lines and according to agreed categories, with the 
proviso that any case could be examined by the Committee at the request of any one of its 
members. The general idea is to keep the older Italians with family ties in the camps at 
Cairo and Alexandria, and for the younger men to be sent to Fayid, which would, in fact, 
be the camp for the Canal Zone and provinces.71 
 
Protests were quite insignificant in the larger framework of British efforts. In fact, Lampson 
worried that an arrest rate of 200 per week was insufficient: “Even at this rate, a month will 
elapse before the potentially dangerous elements are interned; and even this delay, in present 
circumstances, is a serious matter.”72 As the 200 to 280 individuals in the holding stations were 
transferred to Fayed, new rounds of arrests took place.73  
                                                            
70 WO201-2409 Lampson to Russel Pasha 13 September 1940. 
71 WO201-2409 Tomlyn notes 14 July 1940. 
72 WO201-2409 Aide Memoire 15 August 1940. 
73 Published sources on this are few - one can hear these stories either in the oral histories of 
surviving internees or in the Albino Caserta’s account of the internment published by ANPIE and 
in the diary (which circulates among Italians) of the Maltese priest, Castaldi, who was arrested 
and interned for professing pro Fascist propaganda. 
 115 
 By September, Alexandrian police were bringing in roughly 500 Italians per week. In 
Cairo, however, the police were “hesitant” and arrests were proceeding at a much slower rate.74 
Fayed’s population had grown to around 3,138 by the end of the month.75 By mid-October, the 
camp population reached capacity.76 It became clear that even with extensive preparation, the 
capacity of the camps would not meet British needs. To address this, British authorities proposed 
transferring between 12-15,000 Italians (interned men and their families) to India. When 
Egyptian authorities opposed “turning over” 15,000 Italians to the British authorities to have 
them sent to India, Lampson attributed this to the Egyptian authorities’ “amour propre” and the 
persisting problems of an Egypt that sought its own autonomy within this triad. According to the 
Egyptian regime, the reasoning rested on the fact that Egypt and Italy were not at war with one 
another.77 The Egyptian police grew more restrained in their arrests as they worried about the 
conditions of “destitute [Italian] women and children” within the cities. 
 Any sympathies from within the Egyptian government seem to have been lost when, in 
November, Italian air raids struck Alexandria. On 13 and 18 November, Italian bombs destroyed 
80 houses, 72 were left seriously damaged and around 200 persons were injured in Alexandria 
(this included parts of the Italian consulate -mostly broken windows and some damage to the 
outside walls- which raised questions as to whether the attack was intentional so as to destroy 
documents). Around 50 people were fatally wounded.78 While giving a speech to parliament in 
which Sabri had planned to address the raids, he suddenly died. Rumors of Ali Maher being his 
                                                            
74 WO201-2409 Lampson to Russel Pasha 13 September 1940. 
75 WO201-2409 unnamed 29 September 1940. 
76 WO201-2409 Lampson to Mansell 15 October 1940. 
77 WO201-2409 Lampson to Halifax 5 November 1940. 
78 SFA E2001-02 1000/111 BD:10, s.f. “Bombardement de villes egyptiennes par les italiens. 
Utilisation des biens sequestres italiens pour dedommager les victimes,” Brunner to DPF 2 
December 1940. 
 116 
replacement animated the British to read the riot act to Faruk. They were quite pleased, then, 
when Hussein Sirry became the new Prime Minister.79 
 After meeting with Sirry, Lampson wrote that he was “not disposed to let things go at 
that and [was] going to make Italians pay for [the bombardment].”80 The Egyptian Government 
decided to withdraw from the sequestered Italian funds to aid those affected by the air raids, a 
move the Italian Government in Rome vehemently protested, noting that their targets were all 
“objectives of military use.” While the Palace seemed to have accepted this and thought an Axis 
victory imminent, Sirry’s government would not let this go unchecked as the act provoked 
indignation from the Egyptian population.81 The Foreign Ministry in Rome warned that if such 
actions would be taken, the Italian Government would utilize frozen Egyptian assets in Italy, but 
this never came to fruition.82 By 5 December the Egyptian Government had already withdrawn 
15,000 EGP from the sequestered Italian funds.83 Acknowledging that the Italian assets were not 
sufficient to support the expense of internment and now with the Egyptian authorities drawing 
from the sequestered funds to aid those affected by the air raids, the British offered to pay the 
cost of the internment as a means of “inducing a sensitive Egyptian Government to agree to 
[more firm British control over the internees].”84 Arrests accelerated following the air raids.  
                                                            
79 Morsy, Britain’s Wartime Policy, 77-79; see also Albert Viton “Britain and the Axis in the 
Near East,” Foreign Affairs 19 2 (1941): 370-384. 
80 FO371/24605, Lampson notes 23 November 1940 
81 For more on the balance of power between the Egyptian Government and the Palace in relation 
to Axis military advances, see Morsy, “Britain’s Wartime Policy,” 73, 76. 
82 SFA E2001-02 1000/111 BD:10, s.f. “Bombardement de villes egyptiennes par les italiens. 
Utilisation des biens sequestres italiens pour dedommager les victimes,” Legazione d’Italia 
(Bern) to DPF 9 December 1940. 
83 SFA E2001-02 1000/111 BD:10, s.f. “Bombardement de villes egyptiennes par les italiens. 
Utilisation des biens sequestres italiens pour dedommager les victimes,” DPF to Legazione 
d’Italia (Bern) 17 December 1940. 
84 FO371/24605, Lampson 25 November 1940, 26 December 1940. 
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 During the consolidation of the smaller holding camps in early September, Fayed’s 
population went from 450 to 2,510, producing serious administrative problems for the Swiss 
charge d’affaires.85 By the end of the month, 3,500 to 4,000 men were in Fayed while arrests of 
Italians continued.86 Brunner vocalized his concerns about the frequency of arrests, observing 
that the conditions of the immediate arrest did not represent the same “threat” spoken of by the 
British - including men of ages 70 and older and the ill.87 As Fayed filled, Brunner questioned 
the efficacy and the long-term implications of the internment.  
 The arrest and internment, for Italians, was a confounding experience, especially as many 
Egyptian guards and police were perceived to have sympathized with Italy and its anti-British 
position.88 Reports that the Italians mocked British troops when they were nearby, jeering and 
catcalling were matched with a growing frustration by the lack of authority shown by the 
Egyptians guards in the camp. During the first days of Sunday visitation, the British authorities 
observed almost total disregard for control. Camp headquarters suggested, “I know it is not our 
responsibility but perhaps we ought to ginger up the Egyptian army authorities.”89 Lampson 
blamed the first death in the camp - an internee who died as a result of a heart attack - on the 
carelessness of the Egyptian guards. Although members of the Egyptian Government did initially 
express concern regarding Fayed’s distance from the cities and the families of internees, 
Lampson warned about the possible circulation of information “about which should not be in the 
possession of enemy aliens” during the camp visits. In November, he went so far as to prohibit 
                                                            
85 SFA E2001-02 1000/111 BD:8, Brunner to DPF 20 September 1940. 
86 SFA E2001-02 1000/111 BD:8, télégramme (Brunner) 27 September 1940. 
87 E2001-02 1000/111 BD:8, Brunner to DPF 15 January 1942 
88 For more on the relations between the internees and the Egyptian guards during the intitial 
months of internment, see: AIDE La vita degli Italiani in Egitto durante il periodo bellico 1940-
1945 (Roma: Genestampa s.r.l. 2010); Caserta Italians of Egypt. 
89 WO201-2409 GHQ (Foster) 6 October 1940. 
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visitors until the camp was under “strict control.”90 A crucial part of this entailed blocking the 
information arriving in Egypt through radio and other means; both in and out of the camps radios 
were forbidden in Italian homes. Visits to the camps were also forbidden, until January 1941 
when the Anglo-Egyptian committee decided that each internee would be allowed visitors every 
five weeks. This would keep the flow of visitors to around 300 persons every three days.91 It was 
also a compromise of the internees’ demand of at least one visit per month. Isolation was 
enforced - the internees were detached from the worlds of the cities and from the events and 
news of the war. 
 To alleviate the insufficient space in and management of the camps, and after the 
discussions of transferring the internees to India fell through, the British began to push for the 
repatriation of Italians. Brunner also saw this as an ideal solution, however arrangements never 
got off the ground as none of the parties involved could agree on the nature of the repatriation 
(questions such as, who would provide the ship, who would provide the protection, and would 
internees/citizens be exchanged and where, hindered the process). In November, this “probable 
repatriation” of the internees was discussed among internees. Rumors circulated throughout 
Fayed, and internees, with excitement, anticipated repatriation with their families. Many indeed 
had longed for repatriation in the years preceding the war but were unable to afford it. After the 
Civil Command discussed the idea in early November, however, and talks on the diplomatic 
level had disintegrated, repatriation was never again addressed by the authorities. As Piero 
Castaldi, an internee at Fayed, described it: “a new/another delusion” (una nuova delusione) 
struck the internees and compelled many to begin planning “another type of liberation... escape!” 
(un’altra specie di liberazione... la fuga!).   
                                                            
90 WO201-2409 Lampson to Sirry 23 November 1940. 
91 WO201-2409 Lampson to Eden 20 January 1941. 
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 For Lampson, it did not matter where the Italians were held, he wrote when responding to 
attempts but the Egyptian authorities to find a less conspicuously flawed location, only that “they 
were interned and interned quickly.” Discussions of finding another location also faltered and 
dissolved.92 Arrests continued in spite of the fact that Fayed was determined unfit for long-term 
internment of civilians by the Egyptian Government, the International Red Cross, the Swiss 
Legation, and by the internees themselves.93 In autumn 1940, Eugenio Farina, among the first 
arrested, described the camp to his wife for the first time, writing: “the air I breath seems arid 
and solemn... an indefinable oppression like a malaise that leaves a knot in the throat, and I am 
nearly possessed by the irreducible will to cry.”94 Nearly 20 percent of the internees were 
considered “non-suitable” for the conditions of Fayed and prone to medical risk, and as winter 
approached new needs and financial means were required to ensure the internees’ well being.  
 By the winter, Fayed was more organized. It was divided into 21 smaller camps - called 
“cages” by the British and housing between 250 and 280 internees - each of which was headed 
by a civil commander that was voted in by his fellow internees and then approved by the British 
military office.95 His job was to “maintain order and discipline” within the smaller camp; and 
each local camp commander was overseen by the Civil Commandant for the entire Fayed camp, 
Ubaldo Musso. Internees, however, were told that they all were under the sole authority of 
British officials and personnel, Egyptian officials, and the guards and sentries around the camp. 
Disobedience was to be punished with a 28-day detention in a “prison/surveillance” camp within 
                                                            
92 See the work of Erik Schewe for more on the administrative struggled between the Egyptian 
and British authorities during the Second World War. Eric A. Schewe, “State of Siege: The 
Development of the Security State in Egypt during the Second World War.” Unpublished PhD 
dissertation, University of Michigan (2014). 
93 WO201-2409 notes from conversation with Ahmed Bey Seddik 25 November 1940. 
94 “l’aria che respiro mi pare arida e grave... Un’oppressione indefinibile come un malessere fà 
groppo con un nodo alla gola e quasi una volontà di piangere mi possiede, irreducibile.“ 
95 Caserta, Italians of Egypt, 32. 
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Fayed. A strict schedule dictated life: 6:30 am wake-up; 8:30 am breakfast; 9:00 am roll call and 
reordering of the tents; 12:30 pm lunch; 4:30 pm tea; and at 10:15 pm all were to be silent for the 
night, apart from an occasional (“if necessary”) nightly roll call. Camps were inspected daily by 
the local civil command at 10:00 am following the reordering of the tents. The camp regulations, 
signed in late November 1940, covered all aspects of camp life. Regulating the lone method 
internees had to communicate with the outside world, Regulation 27 explicated “that which can 
and cannot be written”96 in correspondences that internees were allowed to receive and send 
(through a censor).  They were permitted to refer only to “affari privati” or commercial interests 
in which they were directly involved; pieces of books or other publications/documents were to be 
neither “suggested” nor “referred to”; use of code and stenographic symbols was forbidden; and 
the correspondence was not to include any illustrations, designs, or photographs.97  
 
III. “The continual vision of tents...” - Time as Frustration/Frustrated Time 
 Until now, this chapter has looked into the camps from outside. This is in part a question 
of sources and in part an outcome of that which has been presented/unfolded above. As noted, 
the break was one that severely unhinged networks of communication and disrupted the flow of 
information that had flourished throughout the 1930s. After the Italian diplomatic staff left 
Egypt, Cairo was detached from Rome and the only correspondence with Rome was through the 
Italian Legation in Bern. Archival documents from this period are also limited; the filtration of 
information from the Swiss Legation in Cairo, to the DPF in Bern, to the Italian Legation in 
Bern, to the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Rome, and back again, has left only hints of 
what the initial period of internment was like. Brunner’s small team struggled to manage the 
                                                            
96 “Cio che può e non può essere scritto.” 
97 The details of the regulations come from a document reprinted in AIDE, La vita degli Italiani, 
92-98. 
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massive and impoverished Italian community, especially as it became clear that Fayed was 
taking on a quasi-permanent form and an end to the war was not near. Capturing a view from 
inside, during the years of internment, and a sense of the isolation from the outside world (and of 
the Italians in Egypt from Italy) requires first and foremost a sense of historical imagination, the 
difficult scaffolding of its reconstruction symptomatic of the transforming circumstances 
experienced by the Italian subjects in this period. Using the reports prepared by the Civil 
Command, Brunner’s correspondence and reportage with the DPF in Bern, the diary of Pietro 
Castaldi, the letters of Eugenio Farina to his wife, Isabella, in Cairo, and the paintings and 
sketches of Salvatore Passaro, the remainder of this chapter will attempt to flesh out that 
historical experience. These traces thread together the narrative of the fading horizons over the 
duration of the Second World War. 
 Following the Italian air raids, the British severely limited family visits to the camps. 
Over the first months in Fayed, Eugenio Farina wrote regularly to his wife in a small notebook 
(one that he would eventually give her during one of his three escapes). His letters were written 
in rough pencil, the date always followed with the fascist notation (“7.10.1940 A[nno] XVIII 
E[poca] F[ascista]”). In October 1940, Farina described the continual flow of “new internees” 
coming from Cairo and Alexandria. He wrote that some of them thought life at Fayed to be like 
camping, there was a sense that the internment would not endure long (albeit he and others had 
no clear indication of what would end it): “to some, this life isn’t unpleasant.”98 There was no 
news coming into the camps and, because the letters were censored and examined, it was 
difficult to understand what was happening outside. Newspapers and periodicals were strictly 
prohibited and any discovered in the packages and letters sent to the internees (including 
                                                            
98 “Ad alcuni questa vita sembra non dispiace.” 
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clippings) were confiscated.99 Both Farina and Castaldi wrote of the British spreading rumors 
about the war to confuse the internees, insinuating that the information that did circulate was 
always marred with uncertainty.  
 Perhaps one of the few opportunities to acquire greater insight, before winter 1941, was 
through fleeing the camp. Attempts to flee Fayed were frequent and many successful - often 
ending with the internee simply being arrested again and sent back to the camp. Castaldi 
recorded in his diary that until around December 1940 many of the Egyptian guards were 
complicit in these incidents, allowing or even assisting the internees to flee by, for a few 
Egyptian pounds, turning a blind eye. In December, a mass escape was organized with the 
Egyptian guards: “the Christmas festivities were approaching, they were days of nostalgia, in 
which one felt the more stirring need for freedom, the need to have one’s loved ones close, and 
the continued vision of tents, posts, chain-link, became more nightmarish than ever.”100  
 Between 8 and 9am on 3 February 1941, once the routine of the day had already begun, a 
taxi driven by a Greek driver arrived at Fayed carrying two fugitive Italian prisoners. Believing 
there was an accord between the driver and the British Authorities - and perhaps responding to 
provocation by the driver himself, as Castaldi recorded that he had “cursed Italy, its King, 
Mussolini, and the internees in general” an insult that was presumably added to by an Egyptian 
guard standing at a distance observing the occurrence101 - a dispute began. Internees from the 
adjacent camp joined the altercation. The dispute unfolded around the Military office in camp 11, 
during the morning hours when internees were allowed free movement within the larger structure 
                                                            
99 AIDE, La vita degli Italiani, 95. 
100 “Le feste natalizie si avvicinavano, erano giorni di nostalgia, in cui più vivo si sentiva il 
bisogno di libertà, il bisogno di aver vicino i propri cari, e la continua visione di tende, pali, 
reticolati, diventava più ossessionante che mai.“ 
101 This claim is made in the diary of Castaldi, who recorded that the driver, on his way from the 
head office, had insulted and cursed at a group of on looking internees. 
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of Fayed. Egyptian sentries were out of sight, while the internees took turns insulting the driver. 
In the midst of the growing crowd, an unidentified internee smashed the window of the Greek’s 
taxi, stirring the confrontation, and the car was overturned and set ablaze. Around 200 internees 
were estimated to have participated in the incident.102 The British Commander along with some 
of the Civil Command (from other sources it seems that only the main civil commander, Ubaldo 
Musso, was present) ran to the scene and ordered all internees to return to their “cages.” 
Egyptian guards were doubled around the camps. 
 Accounts of the incident diverge at this point. Ritter, the member of the Swiss Legation 
assigned by Brunner to monitor the camps and sent to investigate the incident wrote that by 
10:30am, the camp “returned to a relative calm although some nervousness, noises, and cries 
could be heard.”103 Both Castaldi’s and the British authorities’ accounts noted that in the 
immediate aftermath, tempers remained agitated. The increased concentration of Egyptian 
sentries had little effect and some internees continued to circulate, insult the lingering guards and 
authorities, and demolish parts of the chain-linked fencing, ignoring orders and warnings from 
the guards. Around 11am, the British Colonel was discussing the morning incident with Musso, 
when several shots were fired. British reports claimed that attempts were made to disarm an 
Egyptian sentry, and that the shots were fired as warnings to disperse the internees.104 Castaldi, 
instead, described that the first shot, fired not into the air but towards a group of internees, struck 
Guglielmo Falorni and, upon hearing the discharge, the Egyptian trumpeter signaled to fire, thus 
                                                            
102 E2001-02 1000/11 BD:8 s.f. “Italie en Egypte,” Brunner to DPF (attached report by Ritter) 5 
February 1941. 
103 “rentrerent dans un calme relatif bien qu’une certaine nervosité et des bruits et des cris 
pouvaient être entendus.” E2001-02 1000/11 BD:8 s.f. “Italie en Egypte,” Brunner to DPF 
(attached report by Ritter) 5 February 1941. 
104 FO371-27406 Lampson 20 February 1941. 
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initiating what was around 10 minutes of “general and savage shooting.”105 Two were killed. 
Falorni died from a shot that penetrated his heart; the second, Angelo Caruso, suffered a fatal 
wound to his cranium. Official reports and Castaldi’s account described that Caruso, on kitchen 
duty that morning, had come to see what was happening after hearing the first shot. Approaching 
the group, he was struck and collapsed to the ground, where, despite his attempts to stand up, he 
was shot repeatedly, even after he was visibly dead. This took place in full sight of many 
internees.106 During those 10 minutes, seven others were critically wounded and four suffered 
minor injuries. Unable to determine who gave the order to fire, Ritter had the impression that a 
general sense of panic among the Egyptian guards had provoked the shooting spree.  
 More telling of the different perspectives on internment than the incident itself are some 
of its interpretations. British Authorities concluded - in an inquiry conducted by a team of British 
and Egyptian sources and described in Castaldi’s diary as “theatrical” and “staged,” a point of 
view likely shared by other internees - that the cause of the incident was the regularity by which 
internees disobeyed and ignored Egyptian sentries. The “court of inquiry” judged that repeated 
subversion had left the internees with “complete contempt for their guards.”107 They considered 
the events of 3 February “... the immediate and direct outcome of disorderly and insubordinate 
conduct on the part of the internees and that the Egyptian troops involved were subjected to 
deliberate provocation by elements among the internees.”108 The Swiss report, prepared with the 
assistance of Musso and other camp representatives, concluded that the threat may have been 
exaggerated by all parties, but that a culprit was not to be found. Similarly, Castaldi, after 
                                                            
105 “sparatoria generale e selvaggia.” 
106 ACAE “Caruso Giuseppe du Arcangelo - cl. 1876.” 
107 FO371-27406 Lampson 20 February 1941. 
108 FO371-27406 Lampson 20 February 1941. 
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concluding that the “court of inquiry” had failed to address any of the real causes of the day’s 
events, noted the impossibility of placing blame:  
...from the tragedy of 3 February, the English put the blame on the Egyptians, the 
Egyptians on the English, the internees on one or another, but no one of those internees 
wanted to put his hand on his own conscience and ask himself: if in our camps there were 
fewer hotheads, lousy heroes, violent and thoughtless ones, would that tragedy have 
happened?109 
 
Brunner visited the camp later that month, where he was given a clandestine letter from some of 
the internees - two lawyers - which brought attention to their isolation, the brutal conditions of 
the camp, and the strict measures taken following 3 February. They formulated their petition for 
Brunner’s intervention on two articles of the Geneva Conventions of 1929: article 9 on the 
circulation of prisoners within the camp, which had been forbidden; and article 46 on collective 
punishment for individual acts.110 In his own account, Castaldi wrote that he had inquired about 
the regulations of the camp in relation to the Geneva Conventions after the incident, but that the 
two documents (one on the regulations and the other on the Geneva Conventions), which had 
been available in the camp’s small library, had both suspiciously disappeared. According to 
Castaldi, these regulations were subject to debate between the Egyptian and British Authorities - 
as is steadily confirmed in Brunner’s own tribulations on the problems of managing the 
internment from outside.111 
 Both Brunner’s and Ritter’s reports were forwarded to the Italian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs in Rome. The “isolation” of prisoners mentioned above was the greatest point of 
                                                            
109 “Della tragedia del 3 febbraio gli inglesi facevano cadere la responsabilità sugli egiziani, gli 
egiziani sugli inglesi, gli internati sugli uni e gli altri, ma nessuno di tali internati volle mettersi 
la mano sulla coscienza e chiedere a se stesso: se nei nostri campi vi fossero meno teste calde, 
eroi da strapazzo, dei violenti e degli incoscienti, tale tragedia sarebbe avvenuta?“ 
110 E2001-02 1000/11 BD:8 s.f. “Italie en Egypte,” report given to Brunner by the Civil 
Command of the Geneifa Camp (Musso, Arabia, Benassi) 21 February 1941. 
111 E2001-02 1000/11 BD:8 s.f. “Italie en Egypte,” Brunner to DPF 15 January 1942; E2001-02 
1000/11 BD:8 s.f. “Italienische Interessen in Aegypten,” Brunner to DPR 20 September 1940. 
 126 
contention. The lack - or initially limited number - of visits seems to have been foreseen to some 
degree. Eugenio Farina wrote to his wife on 1 January 1941, complaining of the distance, and 
mentioned that rumors in the camps circulated that visits will no longer be conceded: “a distance 
that resembles a landscape of the worst bitterness invades my soul... I fear that they won’t allow 
us to see one another. It would kill me.”112 Farina described the internees’ sense of 
“abandonment” in the camps. Despite its anticipation, it seems that the experience of distance 
and isolation from families was among the most harrowing affective elements of internment. The 
seclusion was said to have pushed many internees to both  physical and psychological limits.113  
 Italian authorities in Rome called on Brunner to continue pushing the Egyptian 
Government:  
...the draconian and inhuman provisions that limit to only one visit every six months by 
the internees’ families resident in Egypt, the inadequate facilities of Fayed, certainly not 
prepared to hold such an imposing number of internees etcetera... could produce special 
climates/moods and it would take only one simple word, a simple gesture, a simple 
glance to provoke incidents perhaps even more severe than what has already occurred on 
3 February.114 
 
The events of 3 February 1941 did not fundamentally change anything - the British finally won 
their battle with the Egyptian Authorities115 over the control of the camps, Egyptian sentries were 
replaced with Indians, talk of repatriation was silenced and life for the internees continued at its 
hopelessly stagnant pace. Visits remained limited, repeated protests were made to Brunner from 
                                                            
112 “una distanza come un paesaggio di amarezze peggiori invade l’anima mia... Temo che non ci 
concedano (di vedere). Mi farebbe morire.” 
113 ASDMEA, AP Egitto (1931-45) B33, “Organizzazione politico-militare dell’Egitto.” 1942. 
114 “Il draconiano e inumano provvedimento che limita a una sola volta ogni sei mesi le visite 
agli internati da parte dei loro familiari residenti in Egitto, l’inadeguata attrezzatura del campo di 
Fayed, non certo sistemato per raccogliere un numero così imponente di internati ecc., possono 
determinare speciali stati d’animo e basta una semplice parola, un semplice gesto, un semplice 
sguardo per provocare incidenti forse anche più gravi di quello già avvenuto il 3 febbraio 
[emphasis mine].” E2001-02 1000/11 BD:8 s.f. “Italie en Egypte,” MAE via Legazione d’Italia 
(Bern) to DPF 17 March 1941. 
115 For more on this see Eric Schewe, “State of Siege.” 
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within the camps leading Brunner to make an urgent plea to Sirry in May 1941, in which a 
complete cessation of visitation since December 1940 was implied.116  
 In early May 1941, the camp structure was modified; Ubaldo Musso was replaced with 
Francesco Buccianti. At the same time, camp life underwent another crackdown following a 
small incident that resulted in the death of one Italian by an Indian guard. On 23 May, without 
notification, internees were made to wait outside while a team of British soldiers searched the 
camp, recovering six cameras, binoculars and electric lamps. Internees complained that personal 
items were stolen. A report by Buccianti noted that “different personal objects and certain sums 
of money were also seized.”117 These objects included watches, a compass, and a lighter - 
Buccianti added, however, that complaints were exaggerated and the belongings had already 
been returned.118 It was this “moderation” that made him a favorable interlocutor for the Swiss 
and, presumably, the British.119  
 Buccianti himself noted suspicion within the camp regarding his position; his every 
“gesture [was] misinterpreted.” This, he believed, was because he had worked for the British 
before the war and was well known in British circles. Despite being a member of the PNF, early 
in his “administration” of the camps, internees saw him as an opportunist. Notwithstanding any 
suspicions about Buccianti’s fidelity among internees, Ritter, in autumn 1941, reported a 
considerable improvement in the morale of the camp following Buccianti’s appointment as 
representative.120 Buccianti organized Fayed with a military-like discipline that was not 
                                                            
116 E2001-02 1000/11 BD:8 s.f. “Italie en Egypte,” Legation Suisse 7 May 1941. 
117 “Différents objects personnels et des sommes d’argent furent aussi saisis.” 
118 E2001-02 1000/11 BD:8 s.f. “Italie en Egypte,” Brunner to DPF 23 June 1941. 
119 E2001-02 1000/11 BD:8 s.f. “Italie en Egypte,” Brunner to DPF 9 August 1941. 
120 E2001-02 1000/11 BD:8 s.f. “Italie en Egypte,” Brunner to DPF 23 October 1941; Buccianti 
was later ostracized from the Italian community of Alexandria after the end of the internment, he 
and his family relocated to Cairo and took Egyptian nationality in 1948, leaving behind their 
Italian citizenship; Alexandre Buccianti interview 13 June 2013. 
 128 
uncommon to the protocols of the PNF, which had guided much of Italian social life in the 
decade preceding the war. Summarizing the changes in the camp, Buccianti drew upon the 
incident of 3 February, criticizing the actions of the former representatives (Musso, Arabia, 
Benassi): “Italian leaders do not and have not believed in the need to work against the tendency 
towards disorganization, obtaining instead an extension of disorder and indiscipline.”121 The 
outbursts of 3 February, according to Buccianti, were caused by the internees reacting in their 
own way to the frustration that had persisted in the camp. His “primary goal,” therefore, was the 
prevention of a recurrence of such an event, and “discipline” was the tool he employed to 
achieve this. 
 
IV. “The right to life” 
 Castaldi wrote of the time after 3 February: “life regained its rhythm, the days added up 
to months, years.”122 Yet, for Brunner, the situation became increasingly difficult. In 1942, when 
the population of interned Italians reached its apex, he wrote: “it’s practically impossible to 
maintain contact with 7000 internees.”123 Farina’s wife, Isabella, petitioned Brunner repeatedly 
to have her husband released, but all attempts were futile. Towards the end of one letter, Farina 
seems to have addressed the censors, complaining first of the limit of three letters per week, and 
then imploring them to feel themselves responsible and to “to consider our horrible situation…” 
He wrote, “there are husbands and fathers here.”124 As a psychological release to the growing 
isolation of internment and distrust of Brunner and other figures outside of the camp, Farina 
                                                            
121 E2001-02 1000/11 BD:8 s.f. “Italie en Egypte,” Buccianti confidential report to Brunner 21 
October 1941. 
122 “E intanto la vita aveva ripreso il suo ritmo, i giorni si assommavano ai giorni, e ai mesi e agli 
anni.” 
123 SFA, E2001-02 1000/111 BD:8 “Italie en Egypte: Camps d’Internés civils en Egypte. 
Rapports. Camp FAYED”, Brunner to DPF 15 January 1942. 
124 “...considerare l’orribile situazione nostra... ci sono uomini sposi e padri [in Fayed].” 
 129 
began to practice sculpting to pass time. His third sculpture was the “Madonna degli internati” 
that would occupy its place at the Fayed Chapel where internees held Sunday Mass. This 
sculpture also became the subject to another Fayed postcard (Image 5).  
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Image 5: Madonna of the Internees, Farina's sculpture depicted on a postcard. Personal 
collection, Giovanni Liciardello. 
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 Like Farina, the majority of internees were “heads of families,” calling attention to the 
significant absence of income among Italians in Egypt. The Swiss Legation supported around 
17,200 families while some 1,500 children received subsidized education or other assistance for 
schooling.125 Brunner was bombarded with requests from the internees, their families, and from 
Bern arriving indirectly from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Rome. Medicine in the camps 
was insufficient, clothing lacking, and movement for Italians both in and outside of Fayed 
strictly circumscribed. In his indirect correspondence with Rome, Brunner agreed that the 
conditions of the camps were in opposition to the 1929 Geneva Conventions, but there was little 
that could be done. The families of internees grew increasingly incapable of providing clothing, 
food supplies, and medicine to their interned relatives as life outside of the camps became more 
expensive due to the war and the sequester on Italian assets.126 When they did send medicine and 
supplies in packages, the contents often did not arrive to the internees. Farina’s letters included 
requests for consumable goods such as sugar, mint, chamomile, butter, cheese, oil, and coffee; 
and supplies for his sculpting like pliers, a hammer, small chisels, files and a saw.  
 In one report, Brunner quoted at length from a particularly moving clandestine letter that 
reached him after an International Red Cross visit to the camp. The letter, signed anonymously 
by “a group of civilian internees” (un groupe d’internés civils), claimed that the internees had not 
committed any crime nor had they been particularly loyal to the Fascist political project. Instead, 
                                                            
125 Over the course of the year, the number of assisted families in Cairo increased from 4940 to 
7045, in Alexandria from 6384 to 8345 and in the Canal Zone stayed around 1900: SFA, E2001-
02 1000/111 BD:9 “Italie en Egypte 2”, rapport sur l’oeuvre d’assitance aux colonies italiennes 
d’Egypte pendant l’annee 1941. 
126 SFA, E2001-02 1000/111 BD:8 “Italie en Egypte: Camps d’Internés civils en Egypte. 
Rapports. Camp FAYED”, Brunner to DPF 15 January 1942. 
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they described themselves as guarding their “patriotic sentiments” while always respecting 
Egyptian laws. They protested:  
we never had the intention of doing politics, our motto is that of the strictest discipline 
and most rigorous respect for the law of the country in which we live. With the same 
discipline we jealously guarded in our hearts our patriotic sentiments and we have 
suffocated both in the silence we suffer and in our physical and moral pains. But, this 
silence that we have imposed on ourselves, we internees, deprived of all civil rights… 
[the suffocation drives us to] request the right, to life, for us, our children, our families. 
We demand the RIGHT TO LIFE with all our energies.127 
 
Internees had limited options for relief and little perspective of a future. The “right to life” 
demanded by this “group of civilian internees” was the kind of life they had lived before the war.  
 Farina, whose years of correspondence with his wife present occasional and personal 
glimpses into the effects of internment on his sentimental life, described the “suffocating pain of 
isolation.” In 1942, when ill, he was sent to the “hospital camp” in Embabeh (on the periphery of 
Cairo). It was his only chance at receiving medicine, as nothing arrived in Fayed. Even the 
packaged medicines sent by his wife, if arriving at all, were always delayed. Yet, he preferred to 
stay in Fayed, in the company of his tent-mates: “it’s evident that here in the camp I would be 
physically worse-off than in the hospital, but I prefer my body to suffer rather than my heart.” 
This, he described, was the first degree of isolation; the second, was between himself and the 
outside world. Farina felt a growing doubt regarding the fidelity of his wife as rumors about 
Italian involvement in prostitution intensified and news about the destitute conditions of the 
families of the internees spread (like many others, Farina was aware that the financial situation 
                                                            
127 “Nous n’avons jamais eu l’intention de faire de la politique, notre devise étant celle de la 
discipline la plus stricte et du respect le plus rigoureux des Lois du Pays où nous vivons. Nous 
avons su avec la même discipline garder jalousement dans nos coeurs nos sentiments patriotiques 
et nous avons suffoqué dans le silence nos souffrances et nos peines physiques et morales. Mais, 
ce silence que nous nous sommes imposés, nous internés, privés de tout droit civil, deviendrait 
criminel pour des milliers d’innocents, si nous le poussions jusqu’à suffoquer la demande du 
droit, à la vie, pour nous, nos enfants, nos familles. Ce DROIT A LA VIE nous le demandons de 
toutes nos énergies.” SFA, E2001-02 1000/111 BD:8 “Italie en Egypte: Camps d’Internés civils 
en Egypte. Rapports. Camp FAYED”, Brunner to DPF 15 January 1942. 
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outside of the camp worsened - in November 1940, he had already suggested his preoccupations 
in a letter to his wife). Farina wrote that the doubt he felt caused great moral trepidation, “I have 
nostalgia in my soul… while we await our liberation with inquietude, destiny may have already 
decided our fates.”128  
 Talk of repatriation briefly resurfaced. Brunner noted in a report that all attempts to close 
the camp - which he pursued until spring of 1942 - were fruitless.129 Castaldi’s diary reveals that 
in the same month, when Brunner visited the civil command, he announced that the funds 
arriving from Rome were no longer sufficient to sustain the internees and their families, the 
Swiss were tapping into their own accounts, and that the only solution would be the “blessed 
repatriation“ of around 2,000 persons. Any repatriation would be unconditional: in other words, 
internees would cede their rights to future residency in Egypt. Within a few days, the list of 
internees requesting repatriation rose to 3,550. In May, updates to list were made, but no action 
was taken. Brunner talked of repatriation until June 1942, but again such talk dissipated and 
never reappeared.130 
 By spring 1942, visitation resumed, now facilitated by a bus that departed from Cairo to 
Fayed three times per week, several days per week free circulation in the camp was allowed, and 
bathing trips to the Bitter Lake were recommenced for the internees.131 An announcement in 
newspapers noted that at the train station, the bus departed in the morning around 8:25 am, 
arrived in Fayed at 11:40 am, and returned to Cairo at 3:30 pm. The trip by private vehicle was 
                                                            
128 “ho la nostalgia nell’anima,” “mentre noi aspettiamo la nostra liberazione con inquietudine, il 
destino può aver già deciso della nostra sorte.” 
129 “n’avoir aucune chance d’être réalisée.” SFA, E2001-02 1000/111 BD:9 “Italie en Egypte 2”, 
Brunner to DPF 16 April 1942. 
130 SFA, E2001-02 1000/111 BD:9 “Italie en Egypte 2”, Brunner to DPF 23 June 1942. 
131 SFA, E2001-02 1000/111 BD:9 “Italie en Egypte 2”, Brunner to DPF 16 April 1942. 
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forbidden.132 Despite the official resumption of visitation, permits were frequently delayed. This 
was particularly the case in Cairo; it may have been partially a result of the influx of some 
“thousands” (at least 2,000 Italian families) of Alexandrian residents who relocated to Cairo to 
avoid the threat of bombardment and to access the internment camps.133 Among them was the 
Caccioppo family (see chapter one), who stayed with relatives in Cairo during the war. After 
acquiring the required permit to visit the camps (image 6), the journey from Cairo to Fayed 
ended with brief, fretted visits.134 For many children, like Caccioppo’s youngest, this would 
become the first memory of their father; and for many fathers, like Farina, they would see their 
children only a few times during the first years. In November 1942, Farina had seen his youngest 
twice; he wrote later “I like that Robertino recognizes me by photo...”135  
 
                                                            
132 AIDE, La vita degli Italiani, 165. 
133 SFA, E2001-02 1000/111 BD:9 “Italie en Egypte 2”, rapport sur l’oeuvre d’assitance aux 
colonies italiennes d’Egypte pendant l’annee 1941; Brunner to DPF 22 May 1942. 
134 AIDE, La vita degli Italiani, 25-27. 
135 “mi piace che Robertino mi conosca per foto.” 
 135 
 
 136 
 
Image 6: Caccioppo family visitation permit (front and back). Personal collection, Francis 
Amin. 
 
 The routine of quotidian life was broken with games and other activities, but they were 
vain distractions from the thought of life outside of the camps. Farina wrote: “I destroy my 
solitude with games of chess or cards, or mostly by looking at your photographs... it’s this maybe 
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which makes me think of you [pl.] with an acute melancholia.”136 His letters often dwell on the 
photographs, on how the different individuals appear in them (“I see mother looks well, but 
you’re not so natural”),137 they are his only links to visualize the outside world. They are the only 
means by which his son will come to recognize him. He wrote how badly he envied his cousin 
who was staying in Italy as a student - “happy-go-lucky” (spensierato) - completely unaware of 
Eugenio’s conditions in internment. Dwelling on the distance and separation he felt from life 
outside of Fayed, in November 1942, Farina wrote: “the years pass slowly, inexorably... the 
sense of rebellion that invaded us earlier; when hope appeared with the cover of a sweet illusion, 
it suddenly undressed and a cruel delusion substituted [our] caressed dreams with 
abandonment.”138  
 Inside the camps, internees played sports and organized concerts and theatrical 
performances. A creative life blossomed from the frustration of boredom and inactivity. 
Buccianti wrote in one report that the camp held some of the “best musicians in Egypt.”139 
Salvatore Passaro, one of the first arrested, was among these musicians. Passaro was born in 
1907 in Istanbul and transferred to Alexandria as a child with his family in 1912. His father, 
Pasquale (born 1868 in Naples), was a violin teacher who taught private lessons in Mansoura. 
Salvatore had begun performing in clubs in Suez in the 1930s and later in Cairo.140 He was an 
amateur artist, who left a vivid depiction of the camps in his sketches and watercolors of Fayed’s 
                                                            
136 “la mia solitudine distruggo un po’ col gioco di scacchi o carte e massimamente con il 
guardare le fotografie tue... è forse questo che mi fa pensare a voi con una malinconia acuta.” 
137 “trovo mamma abbastanza riuscita... tu non sei troppo naturale.” 
138 “Gli anni passano lenti, inesorabili... il senso di ribellione che ci ha invasa in primo tempo; 
quando la speranza apparsa con i veli di una dolce illusione si è improvvisamente discinta ed una 
crudele delusione ha sostituito i sogni accarezzati con tanto abbandono.” Less than one month 
later, “...di questa guerra non vedo la fine.” 
139 SFA, E2001-02 1000/111 BD:9 “Italie en Egypte 2”, Buccianti to Brunner 22 May 1942. 
140 ACAE “Passaro Salvatore di Pasquale - cl. 1907” and “Passaro Pasquale fu Vitale cl. 1868”; 
ACCC “Passaro Pasquale di Vitale (5178).” 
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scenery (image 7). Perhaps indicative of the importance of camp visits, one of Passaro’s sketches 
of a small dining area/studio space includes a small plaque on the wall upon which are written 
the words “brief visits are the most appreciated” (image 8).  
 Unsurprisingly, as Italian and German forces drew closer to Alexandria in the summer of 
1942, visitation again was suspended and the camps were placed on a tight lockdown. Unrest 
stirred in Passaro’s and Farina’s shared home, Camp 3 (image 9). Castaldi wrote that on 25 June 
1942 two brothers had fought and were reported to the civil command because the nature of their 
argument was political. They approached Buccianti about why the report had been exaggerated 
and “filled with lies,” and a dispute ensued between the three, with many others becoming 
involved. As the dispute escalated, one of the brothers assaulted Buccianti. The brothers were 
taken away.  
 Later, a group of internees opposing Buccianti’s hold on the camp, and attempting to 
generate a reaction from the British authorities in order to bring about a change of command, 
flew a makeshift Italian flag (“il Tricolore”) while some 48 internees gathered around it. When 
Buccianti intervened - after the local camp commander had reported the unrest - and ordered that 
the flag be taken down (it was forbidden to have the flag according to the rules laid down by 
Anglo-Egyptian authorities), a small altercation ensued between Buccianti and one of the 
internees. When an announcement by the British Captain McComb was made, calling forth those 
who had disobeyed the camp commander and at the same time insulting the Italian forces 
approaching Egypt (“Chi combatte sono i tedeschi e non gli italiani, che come soldati non 
valgono proprio nulla... vi consiglio... d’esser calmi e a non farvi montare il cervello in speranze 
inutili e assurde” as it was recorded by Castaldi). After one internee refused to translate the 
announcement, Buccianti translated and two British soldiers took another seven internees to the 
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camp prison. According to Castaldi, Buccianti asked others to “collaborate” in Camps 9 and 10, 
but they refused, leaving Buccianti and the British outraged. The British authorities asked 
Buccianti to provide them with a list of names of the so-called “third party” that had risen in the 
camps and told him they would open “camp 21,” the prison/surveillance camp where internees 
were sent for punishment.141  
 Rapprochement came that night, when the internees were awakened around 11:30pm by 
soldiers entering the tents, insulting and beating the internees. Castaldi’s camp was among the 
raided. He wrote of the soldiers’ cries: “Alexandrians, you’re all Alexandrians, ruffians, sons of 
bitches... the filthiest scum cursed by God... sons of bitches... you’re all the same... all 
assassins”142 The soldiers castigated the internees for having “beaten a good man,” referring to 
Buccianti. The internees attributed the night’s violence - resulting in around 50 wounded 
internees - to Buccianti’s complicity with the British. Writing of the events of 25/26 June 1942 
and of 3 February 1941 as the “darkest days,” Castaldi noted: “everything could be forgotten by 
the internees, whether good or bad, but those days, certainly not.”143  
 Visiting the camp to inquire about the unrest, Ritter did not have the sense that that a 
majority of internees were opposed to Buccianti, but rather that an influential group of internees 
had become progressively hostile to him and denounced his authority. According to Ritter, the 
situation had reached an impasse; those in opposition did not want to take on leadership of the 
Civil Command, as they condemned the very existence of its institution, and the British 
authorities refused to permit free movement fearing a violent uprising. In contrast, Castaldi wrote 
                                                            
141 SFA, E2001-02 1000/111 BD:9 “Italie en Egypte 2”, exchange of letters between Colonel 
Sim, Buccianti, Brunner July/August 1942. 
142 “Alessandrini, già voi tutti siete degli alessandrini, tutti ruffiani figli de cani... gentagli 
maledetta da Dio e della peggiore specie... figli di cani... siete tutti uguali... tutti assassini...” 
143 “Tutto potranno dimenticare gli internati di [Fayed], sia di bello come di brutto, ma quelle 
giornate certamente di no.” 
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of Buccianti, describing him in his “khaki shirt,” and remarking that “[he] was indistinctly hated 
by everyone” and that his “dictatorship” was “a regime of insecurity and nearly terrorism.”144 It 
was Buccianti who, after others had declined, that evening, read the Italian translation that 
warned the internees of any further unrest given that Rommel was at the doorstep of Egypt. 
According to Castaldi, the announcement read by Buccianti stated: “but, you (pl.), don’t deceive 
yourselves, you won’t see your soldiers for sure.”145 Buccianti, seen as a collaborator, was 
excommunicated by the Italian community after the war, forced to transfer himself and his 
family from Alexandria to Cairo because of harassment and threats from the community and, 
eventually, he opted for Egyptian nationality in 1948 (thus losing his Italian one).146  
 While one of the more influential internees of Camp 3, Giuseppe Torchia, agreed to assist 
Buccianti and perhaps quell further unrest, the failure of the Italian invasion at El-’Alamein in 
the following months and the repression in the camps smothered any fermenting agitation. 
Fearing subversion, the British Authorities brought to a halt visitation, exchange of packages and 
correspondence, sports, concerts and other events, and they were not to resume until the 
following autumn.147 Around this time, Farina recorded: “the days pass monotonously, but 
quickly: two years have passed and we’re still not at a conclusion or epilogue - but these two 
years I think have been sufficient to make us understand the importance of our well-being and 
the futility of every misunderstanding.”148 Of small hopes that appeared throughout the time in 
the camp, hopes of release, of receiving long-awaited letters or correspondence, perhaps also 
                                                            
144 “era odiato da tutti indistantamente [sic],” “un regime d’insicurità e quasi di terrorismo.” 
145 “ma voi è inutile che v’illudete, i vostri soldati qui non li vedrete di sicuro.” 
146 Alexandre Buccianti interview 13 June 2013. 
147 SFA, E2001-02 1000/111 BD:9 “Italie en Egypte 2”, visité au camp des internés civils 
italiens de Fayed (Ritter) 29 July 1942. 
148 “Le giornate trascorrono monotone ma veloci: sono passati già più di due anni e non siamo 
ancora a nessuna conclusione o epilogo - ma questi due anni penso saranno stati sufficienti a 
farci capire l’importanza del nostro bene e l’inutilità di ogni stupido malinteso...” 
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alluding to the news of military progress earlier in the summer, Farina wrote: “all of these small, 
secret hopes do nothing but augment our sadness when we are forced to consider [ourselves] 
impotent... the delusion of reality.”149  
 
 
                                                            
149 “tutte queste piccole segrete speranze non fanno che aumentare la nostra tristezza quando 
siamo costretti a considerare impotenti... la delusione della realtà. [sic]” 
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Image 7: Collection of Passaro's sketches and watercolors of the tents. Personal collection, 
Ladi Skakal. 
 
 
Image 8: le visite più brevi sono le più gradite (Passaro). Personal collection, Ladi Skakal. 
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Image 9: Il più forte sono io! (Passaro). Personal collection, Ladi Skakal. 
 
IV. Agony and the Future 
 
 During the summer, food rations were severely cut (reducing internees’ daily regimen to 
tea, lentil soup and a salad). In early autumn, when an IRC doctor, G. Vaucher, visited the camp, 
he observed an exorbitant number of untreated cases; cases like those of Azzarelli, who suffered 
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damage to his eyes as a result of continued exposure. Others included dysentery and malaria.150 
A follow-up visit in October revealed to Vaucher the effects of long-term internment in the 
desert. He found severe debilitation in the internees’ health and, in his report, suggested, “the 
majority of internees should be evacuated from Fayed.” He noted that the long internment would 
have been harsh on military prisoners of war, but that it was excessive to subject civilians to such 
tests of endurance.151 Roughly 400 internees were transferred from Fayed to Embabeh (and some 
from Embabeh to the Italian hospital in Cairo).152 In response to these reports, and his prolonged 
frustration, Brunner pushed Rome to provide pecuniary support. The Ministry continued to 
protest that the Egyptian Government - as the detaining power - should cover the cost of 
internment, including the assistance of the families of the internees, in accord with the Geneva 
Conventions. Over the course of 1942, 584 internees - mostly ill or elderly - were released, while 
840 arrests were made.153  
 Brunner feared that, at the current rate, funds would have been insufficient - the Swiss 
Legation spent around 2,600 Franks per month on the Italian community alone.154 Discussions of 
repatriation had fizzled, but Brunner saw it as the only foreseeable solution to the community’s 
growing woes. Little is available about life outside Fayed during the years of the war, it must be 
deduced from other historical sources. What little information there is about life within the 
camps, the references to life outside, among the non-interned Italians are gleaned from rumors, 
suspicions, and the rare observations made by those who escaped during the initial years. 
Without income and with a nearly two hundred percent increase in the cost of living, both 
                                                            
150 SFA, E2001-02 1000/111 BD:9 “Italie en Egypte 2”, visité par le Dr. G. Vaucher 18 
September 1942. 
151 SFA, E2001-02 1000/111 BD:9 “Italie en Egypte 2”, visité par le Dr. G. Vaucher 10 October 
1942. 
152 SFA, E2001-02 1000/111 BD:9 “Italie en Egypte 2”, Brunner to DPF 23 June 1942. 
153 SFA, E2001-02 1000/111 BD:9 “Italie en Egypte 2”, Brunner to DPF 26 January 1943. 
154 SFA, E2001-02 1000/111 BD:9 “Italie en Egypte 2”, Legazione d’Italia (Bern) to DPF. 
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morally and materially the community suffered, wrote Brunner. By 1942, over 21,000 Italians 
received aid from the Swiss Legation.155  
 The Embabeh camp for the ill had grown overcrowded and no longer a clear alternative 
for Fayed. Fayed itself had begun to resemble a small town by 1943. Some internees built mud 
(or white) brick homes to replace the weathered tents. Letters and correspondence had 
recommenced, but were frequently delayed - an IRC report from spring 1943 expressed the 
internees desire to work for compensation, to resume their lives outside of the camp. Within the 
camps, “many internees show signs of all degrees of psychoasthenia.”156 Farina wrote that he had 
spent months on the construction of a “casetta,” but that his and other internees’ efforts to do 
anything in the camp were waning by the sheer inexistent vision of a future, of an end to 
internment: “I awake at night taken by agonizing nightmares... they give me the impressions that 
I will die... with the inquietude of this uncertain tomorrow, at the mercy of a destiny until now 
hostile and living with the weight of existence made so much more unjust by these 
circumstances... can one possibly be light?”157 On New Years Day 1943, Farina complained that 
“I lack will, I have no strength, I don’t know what has happened, I have no desire...”158 
questioning the utility of the artistic sensibility he had developed in the camp through his 
sculpting. 
 Here, an important intervention must be made. Reports and documents from the camps in 
1943 became increasingly rare, archival sources are sparse. The resources of the Swiss Legation 
                                                            
155 SFA, E2001-02 1000/111 BD:9 “Italie en Egypte 2,” Rapport sur l’oeuvre d’assitance aux 
colonies italiennes d’Egypte durant l’annee 1942 (Legation de Suisse en Egypte). 
156 SFA, E2001-02 1000/111 BD:9 “Italie en Egypte 1943,” IRC report Camp d’internement du 
Fayed (Descoeudres) 20 April 1943. 
157 “Mi alzo di notte preso da angosci incubi... mi danno l’impressione che debba morire.... con 
l’inquietudine di quest’incerto domani, in balia di un destino sinora ostile e vivere sentendo il 
peso dell’esistenza resa tanto più iniqua dalle circostanze... Si può essere allegri?” 
158 “Mi manca la volontà, non ho forza, non sò cosa mi capita non ho voglia...” 
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had thinned and the Italian Government was no longer able to provide the assistance that it had 
provided in earlier periods. The consequences of continual imprisonment in Fayed reveal that 
severe attrition had stifled any hope in the future. Passaro’s sketches and watercolors were 
generally done in the fascist aesthetic of futurism. His artistic representations of the camp 
provide one of the few visual glimpses into Fayed, and into the arrangement of quotidian objects 
touched by and surrounding the internees (image 6). However, one sketch stands apart (image 2). 
Here, he drew the fence-post that encircled the camp, wrapped in barbed wire, in the same style 
of his earlier sketches and paintings. A thread of barbed wire, however, then forms a noose that 
wraps around the neck of a chicken who is glaring angrily (perhaps even defensively) towards 
three blue-eyed androgynous figures lined up one next to the other. The three figures stoically 
stare back at the chicken. Upon the belly of each figure is written a year: 1940, 1941, 1942, and 
1943. Could Passaro have suffered from the same temporal anxieties that Farina detailed in the 
letters to his wife? Was Passaro’s mental state disturbed by the same sense of uncertainty that 
plagued Farina as the years passed in the camps without any foreseeable future? Perhaps the 
symptoms of this disillusionment were even more acute because of the intense future-gazing that 
had developed in the 1930s as a result of the Fascist regime’s propaganda in Egypt? The Easter 
postcard of 1941, with which this chapter began, had been adorned with the image of the chick 
hatching from an egg painted with a tent from the camp (image 1). Had that chick matured into 
Passaro’s maddened chicken-beast? 
 Castaldi’s diary also provides a vantage point from which one can see this sense of time 
weathering the internees’ aspirations, draining them of hope in the restorative possibility of the 
future. On the first anniversary of the 3 February incident, commemorative ceremonies were held 
in honor of Caruso and Falorni. Another ceremony was held on the second anniversary, in 1943, 
 148 
yet when the priest came to bless the commemorative stone for the two fallen, few attended. One 
internee, as Castaldi described, perhaps struck by the indifference of his fellow internees, called 
an appeal to the “Fascist” Angelo Caruso, to which several others responded “present!” annoying 
the camp 11 commandant, Gino Dangeri (part of Buccianti’s administrative structure). The 
following year, Castaldi wrote, “it’s best not to speak of it... we were five persons, also in Campo 
3.” Projecting forward, Castaldi noted, “I’m certain that had the internment endured several years 
more, the few rational thinkers would have ended with the demand to destroy the two stones 
commemorating Caruso and Falorni. They would have said, ‘it’s water under the bridge’ (acqua 
passata non macina più).”159  
The separation from life outside Fayed and the sense of time’s passage within Fayed 
made it such that the past no longer turned the wheels of the present. Farina wrote to his wife: 
“like you, I count the days and minutes that separate us... if you only knew how long the days 
seem to me.”160 During the last three years he had ceased to write the Fascist date on his letters. 
However, in early 1943, he began to write the time adjacent to the date. Whereas Castaldi 
observed the platitude among internees that the past ceased to affect the present, Farina and 
Passaro seem to intimate something more compelling. In a letter from January 1943, Farina 
wrote, “the future no longer belongs to me... I’m nothing to the dominion of dark desires.”161 
Years of internment had suffocated the lives of the prisoners, taking from them not only their 
pasts (and all it anticipated), but the future itself.  
 
                                                            
159 “è meglio non parlarne...eravamo in 5 persone, altrettanto in campo 3,” “Sono sicuro che se 
l’internamento si sarebbe prolungato ancora di qualche anno, i soliti ben pensanti avrebbero 
finito con l’esigere la distruzione dei due cippi commemoranti Caruso e Falorni. Tanto  - essi 
avrebbero detto - acqua passata non macina più!” 
160 “Come te, anch’io conto i giorni e i minuti che ci separano... sapessi quanto mi sembrano 
lunghe le giornate.” 
161 “l’avvenire non mi appartiene... Sono un nulla al dominio di oscure volontà.” 
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V. Conclusion 
 Serafino Mazzolini, the former Italian Minister, had hoped to return to Egypt on two 
occasions during the war. After leaving Cairo in June 1940, Mussolini assigned him to head the 
Egypt Office at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where his main task was to secure covert 
diplomatic relations with Egyptian militias and the Royal Family in Egypt.162 At the time, the 
Fascist regime aspired to see an independent Egypt allied with Italy and, alongside this alliance, 
a complete end to any “British presence” in the country. Leadership within the regime saw Egypt 
as a point of “strategic security” in the Mediterranean and North Africa, but not a prospect for 
territorial occupation (as they had indeed hoped for Tunisia).163 Months before the first Italian air 
raids in Egypt, which were not as extensive as the British had anticipated,164 the Italian state 
announced through Radio Bari, in Arabic, that should Italian forces arrive in Egypt, it would 
only be to rid Egypt of the British.165 With Axis advances in 1941 it seemed possible that the 
British could lose Egypt. This was presumably believed by many in Egypt, including King Faruk 
himself.166  
 In June 1942, the question of providing aid to the Italian communities in Egypt, urgently 
raised by both the IRC and the Swiss Legation, seems to have resonated very little in Rome.167 
At the time, plans were being finalized for the invasion of Egypt after much debate between the 
                                                            
162 De Felice, Il fascismo e l’Oriente, 79. 
163 Rainero, La politica araba, 77, 175-176. 
164 Italian forces substantially bombed Haifa in Palestine in 1940 and were expected by the 
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166 Morsy, “Britain’s Wartime Policy,” 76. 
167 SFA E2001-02 1000/111 BD:9 “Italie en Egypte 2” DPF to Service des Intérêts étrangers 
Légation du Suisse à Roma 26 June 1942. 
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German and Italian governments.168 Mazzolini expected to return to a “liberated” Egypt as the 
Italian ambassador. Later that summer, however, while he awaited the invasion’s completion 
from Libya, he was reassigned roles by higher authorities and he was to enter instead as the Civil 
Administrator to an Egypt that would be occupied by Rommel’s military forces.169 Mazzolini 
waited three months in Libya and then, after a brief pause in Italy, returned to Libya in 
November, but the final defeat at El-‘Alamein robbed him of any hope he had of ever “setting 
foot [again] in Egypt.” He was shuffled around within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Rome, 
and, after the armistice in 1943, he played a prominent part in Mussolini’s Republic of Salò. He 
died fleeing allied forces in Switzerland in March 1945.170 
 Following the failure of the invasion, the antifascist Angelo Tartagni published a series of 
short articles in the Libera Italia bulletin, modeled on the France Libre (Free France) movement 
based in Egypt. He attacked the fascist hierarchy in Egypt and its appropriation of the cultural 
and institutional life of the Italian community. Tartagni specifically called out Il Giornale 
d’Oriente for having been the “right arm” of the PNF, listing the names of its administrators and 
denouncing the most vocal advocates for the regime as opportunists--Catraro, the former editor 
of the Giornale, and Cignolini, the director of Cairo’s Fascio, were listed among them. Drawing 
attention to the trinity of the Italian Legation, the Fasci, and the Italian press, Tartagni argued 
that while Italian Fascism had been proclaimed a “revolutionary and constructive” movement, “it 
has shown itself to be the greatest destroyer that history remembers.” He continued, “what value 
are monuments and palaces when every spirit of bounty, initiative, and the liberty to create 
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political and social institutions is taken from a people?”171 The propaganda of the PNF had 
shaped the horizons of Italians in Egypt during the interwar years. During the Second World 
War, these horizons vanished, leaving few alternatives in their wake. 
 Between late 1942 and 1943 at least 250 internees had signed on to Libera Italia 
(described by the Swiss charge d’affaires as a “pro-monarchy antifascist movement”) and were 
thus due to be released from Fayed. Moreover, authorities had granted the liberation of internees 
over 60 years of age (although the process itself took time). The total number of internees in 
summer 1943 was 6,200, reduced by 800 from the previous year. Brunner continued to urge the 
Egyptian authorities to relax restrictions. In August, he wrote, “the recent events have completely 
crippled the internees and the Italian colony.”172 By December, the number of internees was 
down to around 5,000 total. By then, over 2,000 individuals had signed on to Libera Italia:  
Internees’ morale is very low. The collapse of the ideal that helped them bear many 
sacrifices for more than three years has meant that the internees today are completely 
disinterested in political matters. They want only one thing: their freedom (leur 
libération).173 
 
In June 1944, the camp remained relatively full, with around 3,000 internees at Fayed. Although 
some had been released following the armistice, the British and Egyptian authorities, whose 
“attitudes” towards the Italians in Egypt remained unchanged by the political events, slowed the 
                                                            
171 “si è dimostrato il più grande demolitore che la storia ricordi, poichè a che valgono 
monumenti e palazzi, quando si è tolto ad un popolo ogni spirito di bontà, di iniziativa, di libera 
creazione di istituzioni politiche e sociali?” MAE, AP, Egitto, b.7, s.f. “Tartagni Angelo - 
giornalista.” 
172 “Il est un fait que les derniers évènements ont complètement désemparé les internés et la 
colonie italienne.” SFA E2001-02 1000/111 BD:9 “Italie en Egypte 1943” rapport sur les camps 
des internes civils italiens en egypte 16 August 1943. 
173 “Le moral des internés est très bas. L’effondrement de l’idéal qui leur a fait supporter tant de 
sacrifices pendant plus de trois années a eu pour conséquence que les internés se désintéressent 
aujourd’hui complètement de toutes questions politiques. Ils ne désirent plus qu’une chose: leur 
libération.” SFA E2001-02 1000/111 BD:9 “Italie en Egypte 1944” Brunner to DPF 31 
December 1943. 
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process.174 Around 2,000 internees were employed by the British authorities, while the Swiss 
Legation struggled to have Fayed liquidated. Mass release began in July and, by October, only 
around 310 internees remained in Embabeh, Tantah, and at the Italian hospital (some presumably 
remained until martial law was lifted the following year, although even then a clause was enacted 
permitting the Egyptian government to retain those deemed politically dangerous).175 
 Outside the camps, talk of betrayal--both political and personal-- was widespread and the 
internees began to realize the extent to which the news they had received about the war in 
Europe, North Africa, and elsewhere had been filtered through the British. Many women had 
worked as prostitutes in Egypt’s regulated and unregulated wartime brothels.176 Italian jobs were 
taken by Egyptians or members of other foreign communities, many of whom (especially within 
the Greek community) continued to express hostility to the Italians in the aftermath of the war. 
Some observers noted that nearly 80 percent of the community was in a situation of absolute 
“desperation.”177 The cost of living had risen 300 percent from prewar conditions. In terms of 
aid, 28,791EGP of the total 41,0889EGP over the course of 1943 went to supporting the roughly 
2,000 Italian families whose lives were entirely dependent on the Swiss Legation subsidies (most 
of these were families who had suffered damage to their buildings during the air raids in 
Alexandria and were forced to evacuate or were evicted by landlords because they did not have 
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sufficient means to pay rent).178 After years of internment, internees were thrust into a context 
where little resembled what they had left behind in 1940. 
 Some 14,868 families received support from the Swiss Legation in 1943.179 None of the 
authorities showed the urgency desired by members of the communities; despite the armistice, 
the Swiss Legation reported that eight months later the Italian community felt “duped,” 
abandoned by the changing Italian regime.180 The sense of betrayal seems to have been 
pervasive. All archival traces point to bitterness, confusion, and a sense of disorientation. 
Internees and their families felt that Brunner’s efforts during the war had been insufficient, that 
he had been the one to abandon them.181 Tartagni claimed that the Swiss Legation was, in fact, 
itself full of sympathy for the PNF and that anyone claiming to be antifascist during the war had 
been discriminated against by its staff.182 Brunner wrote that Buccianti had given the sum of 
2,000EGP that was garnished from supplies remaining in the camps to Lady Killearn 
(Lampson’s wife) as a gift to be donated to the charity of her choice. After the war, Buccianti 
was despised by the internees and their families so much that he and his family relocated from 
Alexandria to Cairo, where they could be more anonymous.183 Brunner suspected that 
Buccianti’s “gift” was a bribe aimed to put Buccianti in a favorable position for high-level 
                                                            
178 SFA E2001-02 1000/111 BD:10 “Italie en Egypte: Assistance et Pension” rapport sur 
l’oeuvre d’assistance aux colonies italiennes d’Egypte durant l’annee 1943. 
179 6055 in Cairo, 7291 in Alexandria and 1502 in the Canal Zone. 
180 Brunner wrote: “Enfin, à la misère est venue s’ajouter une profonde démoralisation. Par 
l’armistice, la Colonie Italienne avait espéré être arrivée au terme de ses souffrances qu’elle avait 
jusque-là vaillament supportées. Les événements militaires et politiques en Italie, et surtout 
l’attitude adoptée depuis par les Autorités Britanniques et Egyptiennes à l’égard de la Colonie 
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en Egypte: Assistance et Pensions” rapport sur l’oeuvre d’assistance aux colonies italiennes 
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183 Alexandre Buccianti interview 13 June 2013. 
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employment by the British. He argued that the money should have been redistributed to the 
community.184 Tartagni concurrently published a harsh condemnation of Buccianti for his 
preservation of the “fascistic” organization in the camps. He argued that the camps could have 
served as sites of reform and reeducation, but with Buccianti’s fascist-style hierarchical system 
and military-like authoritarianism, Buccianti himself was to blame for the perseverance of fascist 
“tendencies” in the Italian community. Perhaps Tartagni was trying to expose Buccianti as an 
opportunist to the internees who may have seen him as a traitor to the regime or an antifascist. 
Tartagni observed that while the internees lived in the desert, Buccianti, during his brief trips to 
Cairo to discuss matters of the camp with Anglo-Egyptian authorities, was seen driving his car 
around the city conducting personal business.185 Everyone seemed willing to blame another, but 
few placed responsibility on the fallen regime in Rome.  
 This was the world to which most internees returned. Families had grown quiet. Fear 
permeated apartments and people were afraid to speak of politics, of the war, and of what 
happened during the war. Insults and provocations towards Italians became part of immediate 
post-internment life.186  With the economic life of the community frozen, the number of assisted 
families rose in 1944 to around 15,827.187 The incessant problems of aid could no longer be dealt 
with by the Swiss Legation and, with the exhaustion of sequestered funds, many families were 
left without assistance. The health of many former internees had severely deteriorated, and 
efforts were underway to repatriate individuals in need of urgent medical attention. Mostly, a 
“resumption” in relations between Egypt and Italy was awaited “with great impatience (avec 
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grande impatience).”188 With little progress in restoring diplomatic relations by the spring of 
1945, Brunner hoped that the Swiss Legation would at least get permission to issue new 
passports to meet the frequent requests by Italians seeking, in the face of uncertainty, departure 
from Egypt.189  
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Nostalgia and the Perils of Historical Time 
 
 
Image 10: The letters of Eugenio Farina. 
 
 
Image 11: Longo, Farina, and Ras al Bar in the 1950s. 
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G. Longo took me to meet a close friend, L. Farina. They had met years after departing Egypt, 
through shared acquaintances among the Italians of Egypt working in the airline and tourist 
companies in Rome in the 1970s. Farina’s family was from Cairo, Longo’s from Alexandria. 
Today both lived on the stretch of coastline that runs west of Rome and south of Ostia, where 
many Italians of Egypt have settled since their arrival in Italy. After a brief introduction, Longo 
and I sat down while Farina vanished upstairs. She returned, holding an aged cardboard 
briefcase. Her son, she complained (who was roughly my own age), was attached to his 
computer following the latest news of the new political “movement,” Movimento Cinque Stelle, 
inspired by comedian Beppe Grillo, and was uninterested in participating in any conversation 
about her and her family’s past in Egypt. She opened the briefcase. Enclosed within were stacks 
of family photographs. Some from vacations to Egypt’s north coast in the 1950s, to Ras al Bar 
(where Cairenes preferred to vacation); others of family members around Cairo. As she flipped 
through the photographs, she passed them to Longo, who glanced at them, remarking 
occasionally about the differences between Italians from Cairo and Alexandria. Farina’s father, 
Eugenio, was one of 12 brothers. They lived in Downtown Cairo, on Sherif Street, in an area that 
was not marked by one particular European community, but was instead a distinctly 
“cosmopolitan”--and elite--commercial center. It is from this apartment that Eugenio was 
arrested and taken to Fayed at the outbreak of the Second World War. Underneath the stack of 
photographs, Farina unveiled a bundle of faded and weathered letters. Some were written in 
pencil, others in pen. Some were written on scraps of paper, others carefully penned on folded 
paper. In total there were 330 pages of letters that Farina’s mother had preserved, written over 
the course of her husband’s internment from 1940 to 1944 (image 10). The bundle of letters in 
hand, Farina spoke to me without looking at me: “these letters… [she paused] How did he do it, 
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in the concentration camp (in campo di concentramento)… I don’t know, I’m in love with these 
letters… this one from ’42, when my brother was born!”  
 It would be several weeks before I returned to photograph the letters in order to carefully 
read through them at a later date. Although I imagined they contained hints of the past, I was 
unaware of the profoundly intimate spaces of Farina’s life in Fayed and the vast social 
landscapes of the Second World War in Egypt that filled the pages of the letters. Interestingly, 
neither did Farina, for she had only read a few pages from the dense stack. Although she 
recognized my anticipation about their potential as historical sources, she did not see the letters 
as containers of historical “data.” When I asked her about this, she described that, to her, the 
stack of weathered letters were material artifacts, traces of her and her family’s past in Egypt that 
served to keep this past alive in her present. From across the room, Longo interrupted, laughing 
in resignation, “eh, they are the good times past” (sono i bei tempi passati, image 11).  
 What occupied the space between Longo’s “good times past,” Farina’s love for the 
handwritten letters her father had sent to his wife from Fayed, and the evocative uncertainties-- 
those imagined and real--that propelled the prose of the letters? How were the expectations of the 
interwar years that had so profoundly shaped the historical circumstances of the Italians of 
Egypt, and with which the letters were pregnant, elided in the remembering of the community’s 
relation to and origin in Italian fascism? At first glance, the relation appears to be one of 
backward-gazing nostalgia. One might easily read the grounding of the community in a notion of 
“culturalized” politics expressed by many Italians of Egypt as an attempt to establish innocence 
while addressing the worlds whose destruction they themselves brought on as members of 
colonial communities.1 Indeed, the very description of “worlds within worlds” contains an 
                                                            
1 To “culturalized politics,” I would oppose a depoliticized notion of cultural form. In this case 
there is a rather explicit linkage of the origins of the community in the cultural institutions of 
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implicit innocence and protection from the broader structures that characterized the colonial 
Mediterranean. Renato Rosaldo calls this act of exoneration through nostalgic lament 
“imperialist nostalgia.”2 What is revealed in these episodes, I argue, is more complex. It provides 
a blueprint for apprehending the ways in which repatriated Italians of Egypt navigate the distance 
between historical experience and historical consciousness.  
 The acts of remembering the community’s origins and formation within the framework of 
fascist politics make available for analysis wide temporal separations.3 The sense of belonging to 
an irretrievable past world that materializes in nostalgic lamentation reveals instances of the 
slippage in time’s continuity. This slippage, in turn, points to the irreversibility of historical time. 
But it is not “memory” that is at stake here. In recent years, an overemphasis (or 
“overextension”) of memory in scholarly analysis has hindered our capacity to understand the 
temporal functions of recollection.4 Analysis tending to focus on memory as “representational,” 
and thereby separating past and present into simplistic dialectic relations, has persistently 
reproduced the past as something no longer alive, no longer vital for and in the present.5 In these 
models, the past is only relevant (or active) insofar as it is re-presented, thus centralizing the 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Italian fascism, but that politics is argued to be firmly rooted in a national culture (and not 
primordial itself).  
2 Renato Rosaldo, “Imperialist Nostalgia,” Representations, 26 (1989): 107-122. 
3 Paul Riceour makes this point in talking about the difference between “beginnings” and 
“origins.” Whereas the former suggests a “constellation of dated events,” it is the latter that 
“designates the upsurge of the act of taking a distance that makes possible the whole enterprise 
and therefore also its beginning in time.” He continues, “History continues to be born form this 
taking of a distance which consists in the recourse to the exteriority of the archival trace.” This is 
the distance that I think is important in the drawing out of origins among the Italians of Egypt; 
this leads to the generation of history. Paul Riceour, Memory, History, Forgetting (Chicago, 
2004), 139. 
4 See David Berliner, “The Abuses of Memory: Reflections on the Memory Boom in 
Anthropology,” Anthropological Quarterly 78 1 (2005): 197-211. For a perspective from 
historical studies, see Jay Winter, “The Generation of Memory: Reflections on the ‘Memory 
Boom’ in Contemporary Historical Studies,” Canadian Military History 10, 3 (2001):57-66. 
5 Dariusc Gafijczuk, “Dwelling Within: The Inhabited Ruins of History, “ History and Theory 52 
(2013): 149-170. 
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present at the expense of an awareness of continuities or extensions in time. In short, the gap 
remains. This mode of interpretation fails to step into the realm of historical consciousness. It is, 
rather, illustrative of a kind of “retrospective absurdity”--to borrow from Henri Bergson--that 
comes with reading the past as a series of static moments (or memories) brought into distinct 
presents and not as processes extending into (and beyond) and constituting the present. It does 
not help us understand the workings of historical time. Part of the dilemma here may be that 
“process” is often taken to imply mere accumulation, whereas any temporal extension can just as 
well lead to the weathering or erosion of lived experience, as is the case of Farina’s disinterest in 
the experiences narrated in her father’s letters.6 Herein lies history’s vulnerability, the widening 
crevasse between past and present that propels de Martino’s notion of the crisis of presence. It 
entails the forgetting not just of “events” or facts of the past--of images and details, in other 
words--but the forgetting of the connectivity of history’s multiple times, of the horizons of 
“shared possibilities” that give dimension to historical events.7  
 As I moved among archives and historical documents and continued to meet with 
repatriated Italians of Egypt, the relief between the unfolding events of the past and the practice 
of recounting historical moments as complete episodes understood incompletely (as events 
analyzed as static within a given narrative) became more visible. I am not claiming that the 
relation between the remembering of the past and the historical events that shaped the past is one 
of false consciousness or “misrepresentation.” Instead, both past and present are part of the same 
duration, contemporaneously untangled from the other. Each contains traces of the other, but the 
                                                            
6 It is useful here to point to the literature on “ruin” and “ruination,” which does show how the 
processes of erosion or yielding to the trials of historical time are active. Among these I highlight 
Georg Simmel’s short essay, “The Ruin” in (ed.) Kurt H. Wolff Essays on Sociology, Philosophy 
and Aesthetics (New York, 1965). See also Ann Laura Stoler, “Imperial Debris: Reflections on 
Ruins and Ruination,” Cultural Anthropology 23, 2 (2008): 191-219. 
7 Alessandro Portelli, The Battle of Valle Giulia: Oral History and the Art of Dialogue (Madison, 
1997): 88. 
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trace is different than the event/s to which it refers. As Emmanuel Levinas writes, “In the trace 
there has passed a past which is absolutely fulfilled…[and] within the trace the irreversible 
revolution is sealed.” In other words, as the Italians of Egypt articulate a presence out of 
fragments of a past, they are also attesting to its pastness, its distance from the present. These 
traces help to provide the tissues of the multiple layers of history (Koselleck has called this a 
“postdialectical” concept of nonsynchronicity).8 Past and present are joined in this duality of 
separation and extension, of absence and presence. Farina gazes lovingly at the handwritten 
letters of her father because they are living embodiments of the past, and Longo sighs 
nostalgically that they are the residues of “the good times past.” Neither one draws upon the vast 
and painful prose articulated by her father in the sea of uncertainty that marked the unfolding 
presents from the interwar period into the Second World War, and well into later decades (as we 
will see the second part of this dissertation). It is possible that this hints at the silence that 
marked the transition to life outside Fayed after the war. The worlds (within worlds) of the 
Italians of Egypt, through which they derive their sense of community, are not retrieved and yet 
concurrently they continue to function as limiting conditions for the community. Although part 
and parcel of the larger workings of Italian fascism (by means of its hold over Italian institutions 
in Egypt) and the lingering structures of imperialism in the Mediterranean, these pasts endure in 
what the Italians of Egypt refer to as their “culture.”9 They have lost much of the indeterminacy 
they had as historical experiences, despite being products of that very indeterminacy, and 
become the stuff of definition. The substance of layered histories, they are also “unfinished 
                                                            
8 Kerstin Barndt, “Layers of Time: Industrial Ruins and Exhibitionary Temporalities,” PMLA: 
theories and methodologies (2010): 1-15, 2. 
9 By “culture” I refer here not to a category of analysis, but rather to the way community is 
comprehended by the Italians of Egypt themselves. It is that substrate of national culture upon 
which politics was mapped.  
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histories.”10 As philosopher Edward Casey reminds us, the past, being absent, is “always more… 
layered than we can contain in a single set of representations.” Contradiction in this multiplicity, 
then, circumscribes what can and cannot be activated in historical consciousness.11  
 The articulation of the community’s origins (or the search for its originality) bridges 
these gaps. Svetlana Boym notes that the nostalgic “desires to obliterate history and turn it into 
private or collective mythology, to revisit time like space, refusing to surrender to the 
irreversibility of time that plagues the human condition.”12 This occurs through the embodiment 
or materialization of the past. Farina’s “love” is one example wherein the boundaries between 
human and historical relic are blurred and her “being in love” with the letters indexes the vast 
histories of which they are traces. But this goes beyond the realm of embodiment. Objects as 
traces “obliterate history” through their endurance; we saw this, for example, in Liciardello’s 
medal acknowledging his parents’ contribution to the PNF during the Ethiopia campaign in 1935 
or in the photographs held by il Dottore. In each case, these relics embodied and materialized the 
past, dismantling historical time that extended to their origin. I would take this argument one step 
further to contend that the stories told about personal and shared pasts--legitimated, for example, 
in the case of Buccetti’s chronology of encounters between Italy and Egypt--are also 
instantiations of these embodiments. Each of these traces seals the past as past while at once 
containing its presence, as described by Levinas. The narrators dwell in these objects and 
memories, which elaborate worlds past, engaging absence and presence in a DNA-like helix, 
each twisted around the other. It is not enough to say that they are dialectic, that one precedes the 
other; instead, they are mutually generative of the pace and rhythm of historical time. They 
generate the original past of the community by reducing the “historical possibilities” from which 
                                                            
10 Stoler, “Imperial Debris,” 195. 
11 Edward Casey, “The world of nostalgia,” Man and World, 20 (1987): 361-384, 377-379. 
12 Svetlana Boym, The Future of Nostalgia (New York, 2001), xv . 
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they emerged, to employ Carlo Ginzburg’s definition of context. Possible futures of the past are 
elided (such as those that exhibited anxiety and uncertainty about futures in Egypt during the 
interwar period) and histories are neglected (such as the great influx of Italians into Egypt long 
after the “grandiose” deeds of the Italians of Egypt during the early nineteenth century). The key 
here to understanding the importance of history’s vulnerability is a kind of anti-dialectic--a 
magic, to return to de Martino’s “release” from the crisis of presence and the fear of 
dehistoricization--that navigates the contradiction that arises from the passage of time as the 
resonance of the worlds to which its material remains refer thins.13 In dismantling historical time 
(the time of process and duration), these assemblages of embodied pasts place the community in 
history, and restore time’s horizon to their cultural presence. In doing so, the community 
maintains itself as present. If these are the processes which help to illustrate how Italians of 
Egypt utilize the past to insert themselves in the present, the second part of this dissertation will 
consider how they become--and remain--a community through the unfolding politics of 
departure and repatriation after the Second World War and into the 1960s. 
 
                                                            
13 Gafijczuk notes that as the distance between present and past increases, “contact” loses its 
resonance, and the realities of the past “fall into disrepair,” “Dwelling Within,” 159. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
Disjointed Histories: Political Representation and Uncertainty in Postwar Egypt, 1943-1953 
 
The relief that came with the end of the Second World War and the release of the internees from 
Fayed was only briefly celebrated. It quickly became apparent within and around the Italian 
community in Egypt how little postwar Egypt—and the larger realm of postwar Mediterranean 
politics—resembled its former incarnation. Although the red card required by the Anglo-
Egyptian authorities of all Italians had been abolished and freedom of movement was restored to 
them, their juridical rights and financial accounts remained blocked.1 After over four years of 
internment and unemployment, freed Italians were, as described by an English delegate from the 
Holy See, “living in complete destitution.” The delegate, who had exhibited “humanitarian 
interest” in the circumstances of the Italian community described, “in the [Italian] colony, 
poverty has provoked a flooding of moral degradation and prostitution in tandem with a 
troubling confusion of spirits.”2 The isolation and detachment imposed by the internment tore 
some families apart. Around 500 cases of marriage annulment were brought to the local religious 
                                                            
1 From 1940 to 1946, Italians in Egypt remained without juridical rights, which meant they could 
not “firmare neanche un contratto di affitto od una semplice fattura.” MAE AP Egitto 1946-50 
B1, “situazione politica interna” 22 February 1946. 
2 “Nella colonia l’indigenza ha provocato un dilagare della digradazione morale e della 
prostituzione insieme con una penosa confusione di spiriti.” MAE AP Egitto 1931-45 B33, 
“interessi italiani in Egitto” 1944. 
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authorities in the months after release and the delegate noted that, accompanying the low morale, 
individuals refused to make confession in church.3  
As early as 1944, the Italian government, still temporarily based in Salerno, expressed 
concern over the situation in Egypt. The unremitting arrival of news of the deplorable conditions 
in which the Italians in Egypt lived caused great alarm. Prostitution and poverty were rumored to 
be widespread. The captain of an Italian ship passing through Egyptian ports observed, “a 
collectivity that just yesterday resonated with admirable and prosperous patriotism... is today 
taken as undesirable and lives precariously, in a state of [lethargy], on the boundaries of 
destitution.”4  
The implications of the community’s declining conditions went far beyond the familial; 
they generated an array of unsettling political questions for the Italian state. Without formal 
diplomatic ties, it was difficult for Renato Prunas, Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs in the Badoglio government, to make any intervention with the Anglo-Egyptian 
authorities on behalf of the Italians. The Egyptian government delayed taking action, which was 
attributed to their desire to first renegotiate the terms of the 1936 treaty with the British, 
“indirectly provoking a sense of disinterest towards any other question of foreign policy.”5 
Several requests to send a delegation of Italians to reconnect with the Italians of Egypt and 
                                                            
3 “Dans les familles où les hommes avaient été internés, les femmes se sont trouvées dans la 
nécéssité de pouvoir au besoin du foyer, ce qui a démembré un grand nombre de ceux-ci. Dans le 
domaine spirituel aussi, on peut percevoir du laisser-aller, ce qui a entre autre permis au Délégué 
Apostolique de constater que les fidèles Italiens répugnaient à se soumettre à la discipline de la 
confession.” SFA E2001-02#1000/111 BD:7, Memoire June 1944 ; see also MAE AP Egitto 
1931-45 B33, “interessi italiani in Egitto” 1944. 
4 “una collettività pur ieri vibrante di patriottismo stimata e prospera... è oggi tenuta per 
indesiderabile e vive precariamente, in istato di abulia, ai confini dell’indigenza” [sic]. ACS, 
PCM 1944-47 15-3/11222, “notizie sulla collettività italiana d’Egitto” 21 December 1944. 
5 “provocando indirettamente un senso di disinteresse verso qualsiasi altra questione di politica 
estera.” MAE AP Egitto 1946-50, B2, rappresentanza italiana in Egitto to MAE 4 September 
1946. 
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attempt to resolve some of the growing problems went unanswered.6 Finally, in 1945, Prunas 
obtained permission to send a small mission to Egypt with the scope of reconnecting the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, by that point reestablished in Rome, to the Italian community in 
Egypt. Leading the trip, Giovanni de Astis arrived in Egypt on 23 September 1945, where he 
stayed until December. No attempts, however, to reinvigorate diplomatic ties between Italy and 
Egypt were made; this would be reserved for the Paris talks in the autumn of 1946.7  
An article critical of the Italian government for its perceived disinterest in the community 
in Egypt appeared in the national newspaper, Il Giornale della Sera. It described the situation 
after de Astis’s brief visit: “it is as though the Italians of Egypt are stateless, even below the 
beneficiaries of the Nansen International Office [for Refugees], reserved for those without 
nationality and protected by international conventions.”8 The funds of the Swiss Legation had 
been exhausted and the community was without political representation. This description is 
especially telling of the political configurations which would shape the postwar landscape of the 
Italian community in Egypt. Identified as a national community by themselves and those around 
them, the Italians of Egypt were now isolated from the political bodies which had invested 
heavily in their community’s foundations.  
Many Italians became hostile towards the postwar Italian regime. That de Astis had 
arrived in Egypt merely to “explore the situation” only deepened the fissure; a community that 
had been convinced of its central role in Italy’s fascist empire and as an essential organ in Italy's 
                                                            
6 MAE AP Egitto 1931-45 B33, Memorandum 30 November 1943 (Brindisi); Memorandum 12 
February 1944 (Salerno). 
7 Matteo Pizzigallo, La diplomazia italiana e i paesi arabi dell’oriente mediterraneo (1946-
1952) (Milano, 2008), 13-14. 
8 “È come se gli italiani d’Egitto fossero degli apolidi al disotto dei beneficiari del passaporto 
dell’Ufficio Internazionale Nansen, riservato a quanti sono privi di nazionalità i quali peraltro 
sono tutelati da convenzioni internazionali.” “Dannoso disinteresse del Governo per gli italiani 
d’Egitto,” Il Giornale della Sera 26 July 1946. 
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relationship with Egypt, found itself without any polity.9 This imbalance put the new Italian 
Republic at risk. As Il Giornale della Sera’s anonymous writer observed, it was as though the 
Italians of Egypt were stateless, marked as a marginal colonial community. Their “statelessness” 
was one defined by the irreconcilability between the recent past and the emergent present. By the 
time de Astis left the community, the lack of employment opportunities and the sense of 
uncertainty reignited prewar talk of departure from Egypt. Terms shifted, however, from 
repatriation to emigration. 
This chapter addresses the emergent and competing frames of national and political 
belonging that shaped the Italian community in the immediate postwar years. The projection of 
fascist national imaginaries (Chapter One) and the foreseen impermanence of the communities in 
Egypt had mutated into the horizon-less time of internment (Chapter Two). This chapter, in 
contrast, addresses the uncertain politics of the present. Although there is ample evidence that 
Italians of Egypt foresaw an ending to the conditions that had previously existed, in this chapter I 
contend that the postwar period effectively made “uncertainty” a defining condition of their 
political worlds. The collapse of the fascist regime left Italian residents in Egypt without the 
shelter of the Patria to which they had previously turned in times of uncertainty and need. 
Indeed, the very notion of Patria--built up since Italy’s unification--came under question, leaving 
the Italians of Egypt in a state of political orphanage. Differing from the general precariousness 
of the postwar period in Italy and Europe, the case of the Italians in Egypt is unique because this 
instance of uncertainty regarded both their political role for the Italian state and the conditions of 
their remaining in Egypt.  
                                                            
9 In line with this Labanca suggests that much of the work on “consensus” in the colonial 
context, and to which I would add especially during the years of overlapping extraterritoriality 
and Fascist propaganda in Egypt, turns out “inappropriate” because the hegemony of nationalist 
discourses in many of these communities stifled any chance for a viable antifascist opposition 
(without appearing “antinationalist” to other Italians). Labanca, Oltremare, 129-130. 
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One goal of this chapter, and of this second part of the dissertation, is to capture the 
overlapping durations of the events that shaped the postwar years and to illustrate how their 
accumulating effects reached different actors at different moments. Diplomatic correspondence, 
newspaper articles, and reports from various institutions in Egypt make clear how, frequently, 
before an “event” took place (before it had actualized on the ground), it was anticipated in a 
variety of ways, circulating as rumor or as leaked information in newspaper articles, and 
individuals or groups reacted to its foreseen implications. This, for example, was the case when 
the former editor of Il Giornale d’Oriente, Athanos Catraro, struggled to reinitiate the project of 
an Italian newspaper as a “mouthpiece” for the Italians in Egypt. Prominent members of the 
Italian community, who assumed it was the Italian diplomats blocking Catraro’s attempts, 
inferred that the new Italian Government opposed the community’s recovery, and acted hostile to 
new representatives. In fact, it appears that Catraro’s attempts to reestablish the newspaper were 
blocked by Egyptian—rather than Italian—authorities, but this was revealed only once he was 
given permission to publish after 1950. After an event took place, actors reacted in a different 
mode. This, for example, was the case when Italian residents accused the Italian administration 
of having neglected them after the accumulation of events between 1948 and 1953. In both 
circumstances subjects responded to an event, whether it had been actualized or not.  
These coinciding temporalities betray the challenge in delineating the boundaries of an 
“event,” or what Anders Shinkel refers to as the “two sides of... experiential units” that 
demonstrate how events might be seen as durations that cut through the actors and objects of 
history.10 Events unfold in a series of diachronic turns based on assumptions about other actors’ 
                                                            
10 Anders Shinkel, “History and Historiography in Process.” History and Theory, 43 1 (2004): 
39-56, 40; in other words, for an historical fact to have been realized, to cross into the realm of 
experience, some aspect of the event’s ontogeny—that which gives it its factual nature—must 
have settled. Shinkel’s, and my own, take on “events” and the durations of a becoming present in 
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pasts, their actions in the present, and judgments regarding what recourse might be taken in the 
future. In other words, the processing of an event itself sheds light upon the non-synchronic and 
multiple timings of history. Sociologist Richard Madsen calls this “the messy flow of concrete 
events.”11 This is the point of departure for this chapter: to highlight the constant disruption to 
the sense of historicity that had substantiated political narratives of the Italian community in 
Egypt. This disruption rendered the community “anachronistic,” making the Italians of Egypt 
appear inevitably “nostalgic,” or out of time.12  Events in this chapter accumulate quickly and 
have ephemeral consequences. Few documentary sources are available and, therefore, much of 
this chapter (and the next) grasps at the circumstances of the Italians in Egypt through the eyes of 
individuals diversely attached to the community itself: Italian diplomats, political organizers in 
Egypt, prominent members of the community, among others. It is worth noting that, after the 
reestablishment of diplomatic relations, Italian offices in Egypt became increasingly central to 
the lives of Italians as they were one of the sole conduits through which residents could seek 
resolution to the growing sense of uncertainty. Consular offices functioned as intermediaries 
between the policies emanating from Rome and Cairo and the concerns of Italian residents. 
Drawing on these sources, I focus on how the actions and lives of the Italian residents influence, 
shape, and unsettle postwar geopolitics. Here, I argue that these immediate postwar conditions, 
and the absence of an easily identifiable “event” that set the stage for what would become the 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
relation to the past are predominately borrowed from Alfred Whitehead’s, Process and Reality 
(New York, 1979); see an earlier, albeit less thorough, attempt to integrate Whitehead’s 
philosophy into the historical craft Dale H. Porter, “History as Process.” History and Theory, 14 
3 (1975): 297-313. 
11 Richard Madsen, Morality and Power in a Chinese Village (Berkeley, 1984), 26. 
12 Building on Adorno’s notion of negative dialectics, Butler notes that an anachronistic ethos is 
one that “refuses to become past, and violence is the way in which it imposes itself upon the 
present, but also seeks to eclipse the present.” Here, I imply something similar, yet in terms of an 
embodied socio-politics that, in its imposition, introduces into the historical narrative new 
potentialities. It has its own duration and continuity. Judith Butler Giving an account of oneself. 
Fordham University Press: NY (2005), 5. 
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massive emigration and repatriation of Italians over the following decades. And, that the political 
configurations of these years were fundamental in solidifying a nostalgic sense of political 
identity. 
 
I. Fascist Residues 
The collapse of Fascism (the implications of which were largely unknown in Egypt), the 
loss of territories that symbolized Italy’s “greatness” in and around the Mediterranean, and an 
Egypt accelerating towards its independence from foreign domination marked the eventfulness 
of the postwar.13 Moreover, the “interruption” in ties between Italy and Egypt left a profound 
gap, demonstrated in both the Italian government’s lack of awareness regarding the reality of the 
Italians in Egypt and the dearth of information for the Italian residents concerning occurrences in 
Italy over the course of the Second World War. Before the war had ended, one diplomat 
described the Italians of Egypt as “fuori tempo (out of time).”14 The Second World War had 
introduced a disjuncture that, according to the new Italian regime, needed to be sutured.15 
Nearly all reports reaching the Foreign Ministry mentioned the reluctance of the Italian 
community to break from the ideological and political structures of fascism, a theme that 
continued well into the 1950s. Before the allied occupation of Italy in 1943, a report arrived in 
Rome via German counter-spy networks in Cairo. It described antifascist activities in Egypt. At 
                                                            
13 Christopher Seton-Watson refers to this period (1945 to 1953) as Italy’s “imperial hangover.” 
Although Italian administration of territory in Egypt never quite took place, his analysis does 
provide insight into the ambivalence in relating to the “Patria” facing the Italians of Egypt, who 
were and remained pervious to nationalist sentiments. Christopher Seton-Watson “Italy’s 
Imperial Hangover,” Journal of Contemporary History, 15 1 (1980). pp. 169-179. 
14 ACS, PCM 1944-47 15-3/11222, “notizie sulla collettività italiana d’Egitto” 21 December 
1944. 
15 It was potentially volatile, not necessarily because the community expressed political 
opposition but because it placed the community outside of the new political configurations being 
developed, outside of the boundaries of (any) state control. 
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the time, the Centro d’azione del movimento italiani liberi was a combined effort of the Azione 
antifascista (Antifascist Movement) and Italiani liberi (Free Italians), the former a Jewish 
antifascist organization, the latter defined simply as an Italian “democratic” movement. The 
central headquarters of the Centro d’Azione was in Washington DC, under the authority of Carlo 
Sforza.16 This was the only group officially recognized by the Anglo-Egyptian authorities (it 
morphed later into the Movimento Libera Italia, MLI). However, it had little support from within 
the Italian community.  
Stefano Terra, a founding member of the Giustizia e Libertà group in Cairo (active in 
Egypt since 1940-41), noted that the other groups were poorly organized and at risk of “losing” 
the Italian community in its entirety. He wrote ironically, “the four antifascist Italians of Egypt (i 
quattro antifascisti italiani d’Egitto)” were making the mistake of concerning themselves with the 
abstract politics of Turin, Milan, Naples, and:  
of the committee of liberation, and of this and that party, of Sforza and the son of Sforza, 
of Croce, and of the King and the nephew of the King, disregarding their own patriots 
born and raised in Egypt like them.17  
 
A call to fight on the Italian front in 1944 by one of the antifascist groups was met with only 20 
responses.18 Another report described that there were at most “one hundred or so” antifascists.19  
                                                            
16 MAE AP Egitto 1931-45 B33, Vidau to Ministero Interno 22 March 1943. 
17 “Torino, Milano, Napoli e del comitato di liberazione, e di questo e di quel partito, di Sforza e 
del figlio di Sforza, di Croce e del Re e del nipote del Re, trascurando i propri patrioti nati e 
vissuti come loro in Egitto.” MAE AP Egitto 1931-45 B33, Cuppari Annibale 2 February 1944, 
Stefano Terra article published in the G&L “edizione per l’Italia” in 1943. 
18 MAE AP Egitto 1931-45 B.33, Radio Tevere August 1944; While Petricioli notes that the 
antifascist movement was rather strong by the end of the war (specifically during 1944 and 1945) 
there seems to be considerable evidence that it by no means was hegemonic and, perhaps once 
the real threat of war was gone, was seen as a mere opportunity to escape from the hardships of 
the war. In a similar way as the commitment to the PNF is portrayed in reports produced by 
antifascists at the time, joining the Libera Italia movement seems to have been a largely 
pragmatic decision. The brief life of antifascism in the community may have been stymied by its 
lack of success in 1) representing the interests of the community itself (or the majority of its 
workers) and 2) its collusion - or the appearance thereof - with regimes and movements that were 
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Similar numbers appeared in British reports.20 The antifascist groups were frequently seen as 
having been led by individuals who had never shown themselves to be “patriotic” or 
“nationalist.”21 Rumors that the antifascist groups struggling for power sought the eventual 
“denationalization” of the Italian communities circulated into the late 1940s.22 In other words, 
many Italian residents feared that the antifascists sought a dissolution of the very links to 
metropolitan Italy that they claimed to have enjoyed during the Fascist period.   
A visit from a delegate of the Italian Red Cross found that the constant change of names 
and leadership of the antifascist groups had caused many to find their role ineffective and 
irrelevant. Instead, the failure of fascism in Italy was often attributed by Italians in Egypt to the 
“cowardliness” (vigliaccheria) of metropolitan Italians and the sabotage of antifascists.23 During 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
hostile or opposed to ideologies it seemed to hold close to heart. See Petricioli, Oltre il Mito, 
450. 
19 MAE AP Egitto 1931-45 B33, Appunto 28 July 1944. 
20 BNA, FO371-24634 Lampson. September 18, 1940. 
21 ACS 1944-47 15-3/11222 segreto 23 July 1944. 
22 The case of Maurizio Boccara is interesting. As an active antifascist, he organized a large 
donation of winter goods to be sent to Italy in 1945 and continued to publish apologetic articles 
in French language Jewish newspapers (l’Aurore and La Menorah) into the 1950s arguing that 
the Italians were innocent and should not be blamed for the racist policies enacted during 
Fascism. A controversial interview he gave for La Bourse Egyptienne in late 1946, in which he 
claimed to be a leader of Nuova Italia, regarding the possibility of an eventual “purging” of the 
Italian communities in Egypt drew harsh criticism from members of the community, who 
claimed that this rumor was being spread so that the antifascist groups could quickly consolidate 
their hold. ACCC, Maurizio Boccara Armando. 
23 ACS, CRI servizi affari internazionali, B144, “situazione collettività italiane in Egitto” 1944; 
this same observation is made several years later, in 1948, by Paolo Caccia Dominioni, an Italian 
who was raised around the Mediterranean (including Tunisia and Egypt), as his father was a 
notable diplomat. He served in various military posts until moving back to Egypt in 1924, while 
distancing himself from the fascist regime. He was called back to service during the Second 
World War and participated in the battle of el-‘Alamein. As a survivor--and a well-respected 
resident among members of the Italian community in Egypt--he devoted himself to the 
memorialization of the battle of el-‘Alamein and the construction of the memorial monument for 
the Italian soldiers that died in the desert. In his incredibly detailed account of the battle and its 
connection to Italian politics on the borders of Libya and Egypt--which interestingly extends 
chronologically from 1933-1962--he writes from Cairo, in an entry dated July 1948: “Gli italiani 
d’Egitto non si sono ancora riavuti dopo che il loro paese, nel mondo intero, sazio di frequentare 
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a break from navy service with the allied forces,24 Annibale Cuppari visited family in Egypt 
where he observed “great contempt by the entire colony, which classified me as a traitor of the 
patria and a mercenary of the English.” He goes on to say that he was suspected to have come 
solely “to propagandize... in the service of the enemy.”25 The frequent arrival of such reports 
likely led Rome to hesitate in responding to the numerous requests sent by the MLI to undertake 
guardianship over the Italian communities in Egypt.26 For the same reasons, Brunner, the Swiss 
chargé d’affaires, had refused to work with the antifascists during the Second World War: 
according to him, they lacked “impartiality and objectivity.”27 By 1949, however, events in 
Egypt would bring about the complete dissolution and expulsion of the antifascist groups. 
What alarmed the new Italian government the most was the deepening cleft between the 
past and the emergent present of the Italian community in Egypt. A report from the summer of 
1944 described the once “prosperous” community--the institutions, schools, hospitals, Il 
Giornale d’Oriente--and noted that “to this recent past (passato prossimo) corresponds quite a 
miserable present, of which the absence of precise news allows only a tracing.”28 Institutions and 
schools remained closed, the hospitals were occupied by the Anglo-Egyptian forces, Il Giornale 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
gli atrî trionfali, si accontenta delle scale di servizio: e ne accusano l’esercito antifascista, 
‘colpevole di aver sabotato una vittoria tedesca’ ad Alamein.” Paolo Caccia Dominioni, Alamein: 
1933-1962 (Milano, 1966): 269. 
24 It should be added that the Italian fleet was among the first to join the Allied Forces. See 
David W. Ellwood Italy, 1943-45 (Leichester, 1985), 41-43. 
25 “molto disprezzo da parte dell’intera colonia, la quale mi ha classificato da traditore della 
patria e prezzolato dagli inglesi... a far propaganda... al servizio del nemico.” MAE AP Egitto 
1931-45 B.33, Cuppari Annibale 2 February 1944. 
26 SFA E2001-02#1000/111 BD:7, Brunner to DPF, 3 August 1945, 8 July 1945, 18 April 1944. 
27 “impartialité et objectivité.” SFA E2001-02#1000/111 BD:7, Notice 3 August 1945. 
28 “a questo ‘passato prossimo’ corrisponde un ben misero ‘presente’, che la mancanza di precise 
notizie permette solo di tratteggiare.” MAE AP Egitto 1931-45, B33, “interessi italiani in Egitto” 
1944. 
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had been shut down since 1940 and replaced with a publication by the antifascists that was 
boycotted by most Italians.29 Nothing of the present resembled that of the recent past.  
The postwar Italian government had to deal with the residues of Fascist propaganda in the 
community: “the [Italian] colony of Egypt had known, of Fascism, only the phenomena that 
could have made the Italians abroad proud; from Fascism it received enormous material 
subsidies for the realization of its activities...”30 Before the fascist consolidation of the 
community, the community had been largely absent of strong political ties to Rome, the report 
stated, however they had been characteristically “nationalist.” After the war, “remembering the 
antique abandonment and neglect of the prefascist governments, [the Italian community] 
generally looked favorably upon the Fascist Party which cared for it and, ultimately, gave it quite 
a few advantages.” Their refusal to listen to other sources of news during the war, including the 
boycott of the antifascist publications, had meant they remained “completely in the dark 
regarding what was happening in Italy.”31 For this reason, Prunas, attempting to reconnect the 
community to Rome suggested the need for a systematic “reeducation.”32 Ideally, this was 
supposed to represent the suture that the new regime thought the Italians of Egypt needed. It 
                                                            
29 Marchi, “La presse d’expression,” 119. 
30 “La colonia d’Egitto aveva conosciuto, del fascismo, solo quei fenomeni che potevano 
inorgoglire l’italiano all’estero; dal fascismo aveva ricevuto ingenti sovvenzioni materiali per la 
realizzazione delle sue attività....” MAE AP Egitto 1931-45, B.33, Appunto Salerno 23 June 
1944. 
31 “ricordando l’antico abbandono e trascuranza dei Governi prefascisti, era generalmente 
favorevole al Partito Fascista che si occupava di essa e gli aveva dato, in definitiva, non pochi 
vantaggi.” MAE AP Egitto 1931-45, B33, “interessi italiani in Egitto” 1944; another report noted 
“...la propaganda fascista cominciò a sostenere che la disfatta era dovuta non alla mancanza di 
preparazione, ai piani strategici sbagliati ecc. ecc. ma esclusivamente al sabotaggio e al 
tradimento degli antifascisti... In seguito a questo stato e più di tutto alla completa ignoranza 
della verità ed allo sbandamento delle molte correnti la gente non sa più cosa pensare.... 
illustrando un po’ gli avvenimenti reali ed attuali la stragrande maggioranza dei fascistizzanti 
capirebbe benissimo l’orrore nel quale incorre.... Bisogna trovare il modo di fare questa 
propaganda.” Appunto 28 July 1944. 
32 MAE AP Egitto 1931-45, B33 Prunas to Bounous 17 February 1944. 
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would be a re-historicization that would bring the recent past into harmony with the emerging 
present (or at least alleviate the otherwise drastic breakage between the two). 
 
II. Open Wounds and Unsettled Questions 
Italian residents had hoped de Astis’s visit would close some of the wounds left by the 
internment, but its inconclusiveness led to a general sense of abandonment. In January 1946, 
Ugo Fiorentino, one of the leaders of the MLI and one of the few intermediaries between the new 
administration in Rome and the community in Egypt, wrote to De Gasperi, the Italian Prime 
Minister: 
The abrupt interruption of these treaties [settlement treaties between the two 
governments], precisely when one hoped that agreements were about to be obtained, 
threw the Italian colony in a state of discouragement boarding on desperation. The fact of 
still being without civil and economic rights after nearly six years—after more than two 
years of Italy siding with the Allies and without [any] national authority to defend its 
interests—has put the Italian residents in an intolerable situation.33 
 
Fiorentino was likely also concerned about the potential of the MLI to become the representative 
body for the Italian communities in Egypt, already the only point of reference between Italy and 
Egypt. British authorities hesitated in their support of the MLI, due to the suspicion that several 
of its members were also involved in communist organizing in Cairo and Alexandria.34 Another 
report described the community following de Astis’s visit:  
The hopes of the Italians of Egypt were aimed at the de Astis mission, which 
unfortunately failed, and [now] they’re eagerly awaiting the prompt return of a 
representative from our government who can conclude the interrupted treaties... 
                                                            
33 “La brusca interruzione di queste trattative, proprio quando si sperava che risultati concerti 
stessero per essere ottenuti, [hanno] gettato la colonia italiana in uno stato di sconforto tale che 
rasenta la disperazione. Il fatto di essere ancora privi dei diritti civili ed economici dopo quasi sei 
anni e dopo più di due anni da che l’Italia si è schierata a fianco degli Alleati e di non aver 
nessuna Autorità nazionale che ne tuteli gli interessi, ha posto gli Italiani qui residenti in una 
situazione intollerabile.” MAE AP Egitto 1946-50 B2, Fiorentino to De Gasperi 13 January 
1946. 
34 FO 371/24634/1947 “Anti Fascist Italians in Egypt.” 
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politically, the Italians of Egypt are isolated... literally parched for precise news on the 
internal situation in Italy.35 
 
By March, Italy and Egypt had agreed on the reopening of respective “offices” (agence) in each 
country. Despite the profuse doubt about the Egyptian Government’s desire to return to the 
prewar conditions, especially given its intention to hasten the end of the terms of 1936 treaty and 
the transitory period of the Montreux Convention due to expire in 1949, discussions for postwar 
settlements were indeed underway between the two countries. Italian schools remained closed 
(except for the religious schools which has been left untouched during the war) and rumors 
circulated that the school inaugurated during Vittorio Emmanuele III’s 1933 visit to 
Alexandria—occupied by the British Military and used as a field hospital since the summer of 
1940—was to be turned into an Egyptian school.36  
The question nagging both the Italian state and the residents in Egypt, however, was 
whether it was possible to transition from a community whose lifeline was assistance—as it had 
been in the years immediately preceding the war—to an employed community. Unemployment 
was widespread and, when work was procured, it was often on a provisory or temporary basis.37 
Many of Cairo’s largest companies had fired their Italian employees just before Italy’s entry into 
the war.38 After the war, some of these same companies refused to rehire or provide assistance to 
                                                            
35 “Tutte le speranze degli Italiani d’Egitto erano puntate sulla missione de Astis, purtroppo 
fallita, ed essi auspicano un sollecito, immediato ritorno di un rappresentante del nostro Governo 
che possa riprendere a condurre a termine le trattative interrotte... Politicamente gli Italiani 
d’Egitto sono sbandati...sono letteralmente assetati di notizie precise sulla situazione interna 
dell’Italia.” MAE AP Egitto 1946-50 B1, “situazione politica interna” 22 February 1946. 
36 ibid.; “Una requisizione inutile e vessatoria?” Il Mattino della Domenica 14 July 1946. 
37 MAE AP Egitto 1946-50 B9 Luigi Carbone to Ivanoe Bonomi 1 June 1947. 
38 Le Sucreries d’Egypte fired between 50 and 60; Crédit Foncier around 20; Egyptian Hotels 
around 100; Groppi around 30; Société Anonyme des Eaux du Caire around 200; National Bank 
of Egypt around 100. MAE AP Egitto 1946-50 B5, Ufficio Consolare Cairo to MAE 19 February 
1947. 
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its former employees.39 In the Canal Zone, following the closure of the Fayed camps, the 
majority of workers were unemployed, their positions at the Suez Canal Company filled by 
Egyptian, Greek, and Maltese workers.40 The hiring anew of Italians appeared unlikely, 
especially given the increasing tendency to “Egyptianize” the workplace, as it was called by the 
media and in both official and unofficial documents. Maurizio Basso, the new Italian Consul in 
Port Said, estimated that the Egyptian employees were projected to be around 80 percent of the 
total workforce.41 The lone opportunity for employment in the Canal Zone was provided by the 
new British military headquarters, located on the site of the former internment camp. Apart from 
this, Basso argued, their rehiring by the Canal Company would provoke unfavorable responses 
from the other communities as the political sentiments of the war did not vanish with its ending. 
Basso claimed that the British military employed almost 100 percent of the Italians from 
Ismailia, but their employment was only temporary.42 He added, as though to qualify the realities 
facing the workers: 
NB. It is not excluded, in closing, that [behind] the difficulties confronting the Italians 
there are concealed motives linked to the Egyptian Authorities’ desire to abolish the 
Montreux Convention and then to be free to expel undesirables. Today, an unemployed 
foreigner is always an undesirable one.43 
 
                                                            
39 MAE AP Egitto 1931-45 B33, interessi italiani in Egitto 1944. 
40 Interestingly, Ntalachanis points to evidence that the jobs Greeks took during the Second 
World War were then returned to Italians. More than anything, these contradictory reports 
demonstrate that the jobs available to members of both communities were quite restrictive and 
most likely subject to competition within small social spheres. See Angelos Ntalachanis, “The 
Emigration of Greeks from Egypt during the Early Post-War Years,” Journal of Hellenistic 
Diaspora 25, 2 (2009), pp. 35-44. 
41 MAE AP Egitto 1946-50 B2, Basso to De Astis 6 November 1946; see also Dalachanis, 
“Leaving Egypt,” 119-121, 123. 
42 MAE AP Egitto 1946-50 B2, Basso to De Astis 7 November 1946. 
43 “N.B. Non si esclude infine che nelle difficoltà opposte agli Italiani, non entrino motivi 
inconfessabili, collegati al desiderio delle autorità egiziane di abolire la convenzione di 
Montreux nei nostri riguardi, e quindi di avere mano libera nella espulsione degli indesiderabili. 
Ora un disoccupato straniero è sempre un indesiderabile.” MAE AP Egitto 1946-50 B2, Basso to 
De Astis 6 November 1946. 
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The possibility to continue living in Egypt necessitated employment and, without opportunities 
for employment, Italians would be unable to secure their futures in Egypt. 
Although juridical capacity had been restored in March 1946, the block on banks, bank 
accounts, and properties continued to hinder many from returning to their prewar lives. Radios 
that had been sequestered from Italians during the war were being sold back. One member of the 
community wrote to the Consul, “one doesn’t even talk of restitution of the [objects] 
sequestered.”44 Others lost property. Beniamino Paonessa, a veteran from the First World War 
resident in Alexandria, wrote to the Consul in 1947 describing the challenge he faced in finding 
work because, previously employed as a maintenance worker by the Italian schools, his tools 
were lost with the sequestration of the schools. They included “personal clothing” and what 
Paonessa described as an “even more serious loss... cabinetry tools.”45 The personal tools of 
Michele Ardizzone, a mechanic based in Port Said, remained under sequester until after 1949.46 
Some cases were more muddled, such as that of Guido Fiore Miraglia. Fiore Miraglia ran a small 
chemistry laboratory and was founder and partial owner of Chemical Import-Export Company of 
Egypt, which maintained two pharmacies (Farmacia Galetti and Joannides) in Alexandria. All 
were placed under sequester with Italy’s entry into the war. While Fiore Miraglia was interned, 
his part of the company was sold off, effectively expunging him from any ownership. With 
continual changes in the political and legal situation, Fiore Miraglia’s case stretched unresolved 
into the 1960s.47 His experience proved formative when Fiore Miraglia became an active voice 
in the call for the recognition of refugee status for Italians of Egypt in the 1950s when he became 
                                                            
44 “non si parla neanche di restituzione di quelle sequestrate.” MAE AP Egitto 1946-50 B1, 
“collettività italiana in Egitto.” 
45 ACAE, “Paonessa Beniamino - cl.1883.” 
46 ACAE/PS, “Ardizzone Michele fu Francesco - 1886.” 
47 ACAE, “Fiore Miraglia Guido.” 
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a founding member of the Associazione Nazionale Profughi Italiani d’Egitto (National 
Association of Refugee Italians of Egypt, ANPIE) 
Still others sought reparations for the damage to their homes caused by the Italian air 
raids on Alexandria. After four years and four months of internment, Francesco Bagnara, a 
sailor, discovered that his wife and four children were no longer living in their house on 
promenade de la reine (part of the Alexandrian corniche), which had been severely damaged by 
air raids during the war. Bagnara’s family relocated to the district of Attarin (rue farahda) where 
he was unemployed until 1949.48  
With the continued sequester, the Società italiana di Beneficenza (SIB)—“[once] one of 
the most prosperous organizations of the Italian colony” and the main source of assistance that 
was relatively independent from the consulate—was unable to resume its payments of 
impoverished Italians.49 Its members meeting without access to their accounts, the SIB could not 
find solutions for the families it had supported prior to the war. In this moment, the consulates 
began to assume even greater material responsibility as they were the only conduit through 
which Italians could request relief. Requests flowed into consular offices, yet most went 
unanswered. The overwhelming demand led officials to estimate that nearly all of the roughly 
                                                            
48 Bagnara opened a claim for reparations after the reestablishment of diplomatic ties that went 
unanswered; he resubmitted the claim in 1956 asking for compensation for the damage suffered 
to his house and biancheria. A note is written in pencil on the bottom of the claim that accuses 
Bagnara of exaggeration: “Secondo notizie assente presso il Banco Italo-Egiziano, il cambio 
della Lira italiana era - nel maggio 1940 - di Lit. 100= Pt.164.25. Stando a onesto cambio, il 
Bagnara avvrebbe possedute e lasciato in Egitto, all’inizio alla guerra, 40 paia di mutande al 
prezzo di Pt. 328.5 il paio!!” [sic]. ACAE, “Bagnara Francesco fu Leonardo.” 
49 MAE AP Egitto 1946-50 B2, MAE to Legazione d’Italia Bern, “beni italiani in Egitto - 
assistenza” 23 May 1946. 
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30,000 Italians of Alexandria suffered damages as a consequence of the actions taken against 
Italians during the war.50  
Consular offices were unable to respond to individual claims because it was unclear 
whether or not sequestered properties would eventually be returned. Noting the gravity of the 
problem at hand, an article entitled “Solidarity not Charity” appeared in the pages of Il Mattino 
della Domenica, the only Italian newspaper published in Egypt at the time, published by 
members of the MLI. It read: 
Although assistance is an immediate necessity, let’s not forget that this cannot resolve the 
problems of Italian families. The colony cannot and should not live by charity: it needs to 
live by work. The essential problem is to create possibilities for work in order to absorb 
the energies of our workers…either giving them life through artisanal cooperatives or 
creating employment agencies [for them].51 
 
Amid the growing distance between the Egyptian political sphere and the European communities 
in its territory rumors circulated regarding “massive expulsions” of non-Egyptians. Because 
these rumors could not be outright dispelled, concern over unemployed Italians becoming 
“undesirables” only fueled fears of expulsion.52   
With diplomatic ties still unresolved completely between the two countries, much of the 
information that found its way into the halls of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Rome arrived 
in the form of letters from and interactions with concerned Italians of Egypt. Moreover, due to 
the informal nature of political representation, lines were blurred between official representatives 
                                                            
50 “Ritiene...doveroso segnalare sin da ora a codesto Ministero che questo Consolato Generale, 
rispetto alla entità della Collettività italiana da esso amministrata - costituita da circa 30000 
connazionali, i quali, nella gran maggioranza, hanno tutti subito danni in seguito agli 
avvenimenti bellici.” MAE AP Egitto 1946-50 B4, Ufficio di Alessandria to Legazione d’Italia 
Cairo 25 April 1947. 
51 “Se l’assistenza è immediatamente necessaria, non dimentichiamo però che essa non può 
risolvere i problemi delle famiglie italiane. La colonia non può e non deve vivere di carità: deve 
vivere di lavoro. Il problema essenziale è di creare possibilità di lavoro per assorbire le energie 
dei nostri lavoratori, oggi disoccupati, sia dando vita a cooperative artigiane, sia creando uffici di 
collocamento.” “Solidarietà non carità,” Il Mattino della Domenica 10 November 1946. 
52 MAE AP Egitto 1946-50 B2, MAE to DGIE 12 June 1946. 
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of the Italian state, prominent members of the community, and individuals seeking solutions to 
their everyday problems. Il Mattino della Domenica dismissed rumors of an expulsion “before 
the end of the transitory period.” Instead, the newspaper stated that these were the hopes only of 
an extreme group of politicians within the Egyptian government. Indirectly, however, the writers 
at Il Mattino implored the Egyptian administration to specify the overall threat of expulsion to 
foreigners that accompanied the approaching end of the transitory period.53  
The rupture in diplomatic ties had legally cancelled Italians from the rights of the 
Montreux Convention, meaning that they now were required to renew residency visas annually 
and that an absence from Egypt for a period of more than four months would annul an otherwise 
automatic reentry visa. The new reentry visa could only be re-administered by the Egyptian 
Ministry of the Interior. The Montreux Convention stipulated that residents of more than five 
years in Egypt could not be expelled (except in rare cases) and could maintain a visa that lasted 
until 14 October 1949, the expiration date of the Convention, at which point an entirely new 
policy towards non-Egyptian residents would be negotiated between Egypt and the respective 
countries. Although talks were underway to modify this, the Egyptian press suggested that all 
foreigners would soon be required to apply for annual visas.54 
 With such uncertainties in mind, the Italian Consul in London forwarded a letter to the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs addressing the circumstances in Egypt. He alerted them of the arrival 
from Argentina of a Salesian priest who was to serve as the Plenipotentiary Minister of 
Emigration. Argentina solicited around four million Italian immigrants and the Consul suggested 
                                                            
53 “Le voci di espulsione degli italiani dall’Egitto non hanno carattere ufficiale,” Il Mattino della 
Domenica 28 July 1946. 
54 MAE AP Egitto 1946-50 B6, de Astis to MAE DGAP “trattamento degli stranieri in Egitto” 4 
February 1947; de Astis 31 January 1947. 
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that this might relieve the urgent question of “displaced persons” in Italy.55 It was also a subtle 
reminder that Italy was not prepared to receive a large number of Italian repatriates—from Egypt 
and elsewhere in North and East Africa.56 Concurrently, Il Mattino began to publish 
advertisements and articles about the possibilities for Italian emigrants in Belgium, France, 
Switzerland and Venezuela.57 The newspaper made various attempts to organize and expedite 
large numbers of requests for repatriation, noting that groups would be handled collectively and 
would be filing for “definitive repatriation,” thus relinquishing future residential rights in 
Egypt.58 Passport renewals motivated by the desire for “repatriation” and “emigration” streamed 
into the consulate. On individual cases, the consulate covered expenses of repatriation but did so 
requiring that the departees renounce both their residency in Egypt and any future claim to 
assistance from the Italian government.59 
At the Paris peace talks in late 1946, diplomatic ties were finally restored.60 However, the 
delay of the talks had worn on the community and practical relief from the sequester was far 
from the horizon. Hinting at that frustration, a letter signed by a group of “sequestered Italians of 
Egypt (italiani sequestrati d’Egitto)” was sent to Rome with a newspaper clipping of a 
                                                            
55 MAE AP Egitto 1946-50 B1, Con.Gen.d’Italia London to MAE “Argentina-Emigrazione” 3 
December 1946. 
56 Romain H. Rainero, Le navi bianche: Profughi e rimpatriati dall’estero e dalle colonie dopo 
la seconda guerra mondiale: una storia italiana dimenticata (1939-1991) (Milano 2015). 
57 “I nostri lavoratori e le possibilità d’emigrazione,” Il Mattino della Domenica 7 July 1946; 
“L’emigrazione nel Venezuela è aperta agli Italiani,” Il Mattino della Domenica 14 July 1946. 
58 “Il rimpatrio dei connazionali,” Il Mattino della Domenica 10 November 1946. 
59 This is not something I found documented often and seemed an illusive point for many 
departees during these years. Occasionally, in the archives of the Italian consular offices in 
Alexandria and Cairo, I did find traces of these requests, such as that of Domenico Santoro, who, 
in 1950, implored the consular offices in Alexandria to grant him, his wife and their small child a 
consular repatriation. In 1952, he wrote, “they don’t give work to Europeans any longer.” He 
was added removed from the list of prospective repatriates shortly thereafter, however, because 
he procured temporary employment. Finally, in 1954, he was granted permission for a consular 
repatriation and a brief stay upon arrival in temporary housing, but they were asked to “renounce 
any other form of assistance” in accepting the repatriation. ACGA, Santoro Domenico. 
60 Petricioli, Oltre il Mito, 466-467; Pizzigallo, La diplomazia italiana, 11-32. 
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photograph from the Journal d’Egypte depicting de Astis, in the company of his wife and several 
foreign and Egyptian elite, at an opera performance in Cairo. The note read: 
While your representatives enjoy their trip in Egypt between banquets and orgies and 
theaters, here, for six years we sequestered Italians suffer la miseria and hunger, and all 
of this for maintaining our Italian citizenship... We ask you to push for the return of our 
properties (beni), under sequester, made with our blood, for the common interest. If, after 
the peace treaty, you do not liquidate the sequester, we warn you that hunger gives way to 
terrible thoughts.61 
 
Terms were finally set for the restitution of sequestered properties and the payment of 4.5 million 
EGP to the Egyptian Government for expenses during the war (damages suffered as a result of 
the air raids), including the 2,172,735 EGP spent on the Italian community during their 
internment. During the peace talks, when issues had been raised by the Italian representatives 
regarding the irregularity of the sequester—namely liquidated property and accounts, but also 
their very legitimacy as the two governments had not officially declared war against one 
another—the threat of expulsion had indeed been levied against the Italian Government.62 Both 
sides received criticism for the outcomes of the Paris talks. The Wafdist newspaper, al-Misri, 
widely read among Egyptian nationalists, attacked the Egyptian government for having agreed to 
the accords in the first place; while the Italian community in Egypt saw itself as having been sold 
out by the postwar Italian government.63 Il Globo estimated the Italian losses in Egypt during the 
war at between 70 to 100 million EGP, dismissed by the Italian Government as an exaggeration 
based on Swiss estimates.64 As articulated in the letter above, some Italian residents had 
                                                            
61 “Mentre i vostri rappresentanti godono del loro soggiorno in Egitto tra banchetti e orgie e teatri 
qui noi italiani sequestrati soffriamo la miseria e la fame da sei anni, e tutto cio per mantenere la 
sudditanza italiana... Vi preghiamo di sollecitare il ritorno dei nostri beni fatti col nostro sangue e 
che sono sotto sequestro; per l’interesse comune. Se dopo il trattativo di pace non liquidate il 
sequestro vi avvertiamo che la fame da brutti pensieri. [sic]” MAE AP Egitto 1946-50 B4, 
“grande reception a l’opera” and attached letter 26 January 1947. 
62 MAE AP Egitto 1946-50 B2, de Astis to Cattani 23 December 1946. 
63 MAE AP Egitto 1946-50 B2, Legazione Cairo to MAE 28 June 1947. 
64 MAE AP Egitto 1946-50 B4, de Astis to MAE 29 April 1947. 
 184 
suspected that they themselves would bear the cost of the liquidation of sequestered properties. 
In fact, in the final rendering of the law, one million Italian lire of the funds due to the Egyptian 
Government was to be drawn directly from sequestered accounts in Egypt, tapping into key 
assets used to support the community.65  
 
III. Representing a Community Detached  
In this uncertain present, political representation and image became important both for members 
of the Italian community in Egypt and for the new diplomats in Egypt (without a plan for their 
own future ties with Egypt). The Italian administration in Rome and de Astis in Cairo viewed the 
invitation of around 20 “prominent Italians of Egypt” to a ceremony in Port Said in February 
1947 celebrating the anniversary of Faruk as promising. The invitation was the first of its kind 
since the war. MLI leadership, however, responded negatively. The invited had all been active in 
Italian institutions prior to the war and were known loyalists to the PNF. The MLI leadership 
feared the reliance on the “old guard” in reestablishing Italy’s place in Egypt would only reify 
the fascist ideology already present in the community, rather than lead to a “re-education” of the 
Italian residents.66 Contrarily, the new Italian diplomats saw the invitation as a step forward in 
rebuilding relations between the two countries and as relief for the community’s dwindling sense 
of its own importance. With the terms of the Paris talks approved in April 1947, threats of 
expulsion subsided and there was talk of new economic initiatives between the two countries. At 
                                                            
65 Atti parlamentari - Assemblea Costituente N.17 
(http://www.camera.it/_dati/Costituente/lavori/DDL/17A.pdf). 
66 MAE AP Egitto 1946-50 B4, rappresentenza italiana in Egitto PS to Legazione Cairo 12 
February 1947; MAE AP Egitto 46-50 B6 MLI to Nenni 25 February 1947. 
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the completion of his term in Egypt, de Astis even announced the birth of a “new Mediterranean 
politics,” hoping to signal a split from Mussolini’s fascist empire.67 
Members of the Italian diplomatic and business community who had been consulted by 
offices in Rome claimed that among Egyptians—politicians and populace alike—there existed 
great sympathy for the Italian community in Egypt and for Italy. They sought to profit from this. 
Postwar relations with the large Greek community remained tense, in part due to the Italian 
occupation of the Greek Islands and in part from competition within the Egyptian labor market.68 
However, an early report noted that Egyptians generally expressed positive opinions about 
Italians and still held Mussolini “in high regard.”69 Some placed blame on the Italian King for 
“having led Mussolini astray.” The Egyptian newspaper, el-Moqattam described Mussolini’s 
imperial drive as a brief interruption of the “old friendship” between the two nations and as one 
encouraged by foreign competition.70 Similar articles favorable to Italy continued to appear in 
the Egyptian press, to the great relief of Italian authorities, especially when framed against the 
prevalent nationalist discourse in the Egyptian public sphere (referred to as “xenophobic” almost 
universally in diplomatic correspondence). In light of discussions about the hastening end to the 
Montreux Convention and proposals to nationalize education (eventually put into action in 
1949), rendering Egyptian history and geography and Arabic language instruction obligatory for 
all schools (not only public, as was previously the case), any sympathy was interpreted as a move 
in the right direction.  
The “friendly” view of Italy took a more public role over the course of the year, 
particularly as the diplomats reinvigorated old under-the-table relations to Egyptian journalists. 
                                                            
67 MAE AP Egitto 1946-50 B5, de Astis to MAE 15 May 1947. 
68 MAE AP Egitto 1946-50 B1, “collettività italiana d’Egitto” 28 January 1946; Dalachanis, 
“Leaving Egypt.” 
69 MAE AP Egitto 1946-50 B1, “situazione politica interna” 22 February 1946. 
70 MAE AP Egitto 1946-50 B2, de Astis to MAE 6 November 1946. 
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In response to an article on tourism in Italy published in the fall of 1947 in La Bourse 
Egyptienne, de Astis commented: 
it shouldn’t be forgotten that the Italians, considered here as real enemies, not so long ago 
were reduced to the point of not hearing their language spoken in public... [now] the 
comparisons being made by Egyptians between Italy and other European countries are all 
in our favor.71 
 
In fact, both the increasing hostility towards the British and a prospective boycott against Jewish 
goods given the fermenting question of Palestine’s destiny were seen as economic opportunities 
by the Italian administration.72 
In summer 1947, the new Italian Minister in Egypt, Cristoforo Fracassi, during his first 
meeting with Faruk, spoke of the importance of developing “a Mediterranean politics.” It was a 
political sphere, he argued, at risk of “exploding” in the ascendant tensions between West and 
East. But it was also a pathway for Italy and Egypt to become closer as jointly  “neutral” 
powers.73 Finally, Fracassi highlighted his plan to dismantle and remove “all vestiges” of Italy’s 
colonial past. Italy had renounced its claim to its colonies at the Paris negotiations, which gave 
them an advantage over the French and the British in the Middle East.74 The press, drawing on 
these exchanges, noted that Italy was quickly rising to the second place in the Egyptian 
economy. Despite the diplomatic employment of the community’s image as a symbol of 
                                                            
71 “Non è infatti da dimenticarsi che gli italiani, considerati qui come veri e propri nemici, erano 
ridotti fino a qualche tempo fa al punto di non osare di parlare in pubblico la loro lingua... i 
confronti che si sentono fare da costoro [the Egyptians] tra l’Italia e molti altri paesi europei sono 
tutti a vantaggio del nostro.” MAE AP Egitto 1946-50 B5, de Astis to MAE 11 September 1947; 
“Lettre d’Italie” La Bourse Egyptienne 3 September 1947. 
72 “Le possibilità dell’Italia nel commercio con l’Egitto,” Giornale del Mattino 1 February 1946. 
73 MAE AP Egitto 1946-50 B4, Fracassi to Sforza 3 July 1947. 
74 Seton-Watson, “Italy’s Imperial Hangover”; for more on Italian “decolonization” as a means 
to garner more prominence in the Mediterranean see Alessandro Brogi, “‘Competing Missions’: 
France, Italy, and the Rise of American Hegemony in the Mediterranean” Diplomatic History 30, 
4 (2006): 741-770, 742-3 and Alessandro Brogi, A Question of Self-Esteem: The United States 
and the Cold War Choices in France and Italy, 1944-1958 (Connecticut, 2002).  
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historical affinity between Italy and Egypt, the Italian residents were absent from this story of 
foreign policy.  
The fragile “morale” of the Italians had been severely damaged, described Ugo 
Fiorentino of the MLI. Both the failure to reconnect the community to metropolitan Italy and the 
common perception of the antifascist groups as opportunist and communist-leaning led to a 
boycott among Italians of Egypt of Fronte Unito and its later incarnation Il Mattino della 
Domenica published from 1943 to 1946.75 Both published articles that spoke optimistically of an 
alliance with Russia, an unfavorable view in an Egypt where many individuals had profited from 
the structures of the colonial Mediterranean, and a view that would have irreparable 
consequences for the newspaper.76 The newspaper declined despite editor Fausta Cialente’s 
repeated attempts to garner support for its publication from Rome and from the British 
Authorities in Egypt. British Authorities viewed its anti-colonialist stance unfavorably and made 
several bids to shut it down. According to Cialente, it was “the only democratic newspaper in the 
Middle East.” Although she hoped that it would become “the newspaper of the [Italian] colony” 
she acknowledged the difficulties from within the community: “it needs to be taken into 
consideration that the Italian colony of Egypt is still gravely infected by fascism and therefore 
the work of penetration [of antifascist ideology] has been slow, drawn out, and difficult.”77  
Around the same time, Athanasio Catraro, the former editor of Il Giornale d’Oriente, 
expressed his intention to publish a new Italian newspaper. Following his internment (Catraro 
was among the first arrested in 1940 and released in November 1944), he worked as a 
                                                            
75 MAE AP Egitto 1946-50 B1, “collettività italiana d’Egitto” 28 January 1946. 
76 Fondazione Antonio Gramsci, Fronte Unito 23 March 1944. 
77 “Bisogna tener presente che la colonia italiana d’Egitto è ancora gravemente infetta di 
fascismo e quindi l’opera di penetrazione è stata lenta, lunga e difficile.” MAE AP Egitto 1946-
50 B2, Cialente to Giolitti 15 October 1946; for an excellent analysis of Cialente’s political 
activism, attitudes towards Fascism and colonialism, and their expression through her writing, 
see Lucia Re “Painting, Politics, and Eroticism in Fauta Cialente’s Egyptian Narratives.” 
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correspondent in Rome for the Egyptian daily La Reforme. Several months prior to Fracassi’s 
arrival, Marcello Fiorentino—a member of the Unione democratica italiana (Italian Democratic 
Union, UDI), a group that had split from the MLI—wrote to de Astis and to the Italian diplomats 
in Alexandria warning that Catraro intended to publish a paper “with evident antidemocratic 
objectives.”78 Egyptian authorities had in fact denied Catraro permission to publish in what was, 
at the time, a decision condoned by de Astis, who wrote: “[Egyptian authorities] take perfect 
account of the fact that the publication of any Italian daily that’s not inspired by sound 
democratic criteria would locally harm our collectivity and wouldn’t be appreciated by us.”79 
The utility of depicting the Italians of Egypt as lodged in the past provided for the antifascist 
organizations an impetus for seeking greater control over information, whereas for the 
representatives of the Italian State it served (again) as an historical reference on which a new 
Mediterranean politics could be established.   
Repercussions from the Egyptian authorities inspired great caution in the Italian 
diplomats. Rumors of changing residency laws80 compounded the transforming circumstances in 
Palestine. In fact, with the growing tensions, Cialente—and many others on the political left—
abandoned the country. Il Mattino della Domenica became Il Gazette, under the editorship of a 
member of Giustizia e Libertà, but it did not complete one year of publication. The UDI, 
maintaining a marginal following and yet the unique Italian organ with “political character” in 
Egypt, issued a statement supporting the Egyptian cause against the British in the summer of 
1947. The statement was met with outcry among other Italians of Egypt. With the sequester still 
                                                            
78 ACGA, Catraro Athanasio/Catraro Demetrio. 
79 “Queste autorità si rendono perfettamente conto che la pubblicazione di qualsiasi quotidiano 
italiano che non sia ispirato a criteri di sana democrazia nuocerebbe localmente alla nostra 
collettività e non sarebbe a noi gradito.” MAE AP Egitto 1946-50 B6, de Astis to MAE 28 
February 1947. 
80 MAE AP Egitto 1946-50 B6, de Astis 31 January 1947. 
 189 
only resolved on the official level (it was not fully lifted until 1950) and unemployment rising, 
many found it “inopportune” to intervene in a “cause” that, according to Italian sources, 
concerned only England and Egypt. Ironically, Italian residents had come to rely more than ever 
on British protection in a context in which the logics of the anti-colonialist movement turned 
against all foreigners in Egypt. As discontented Italians visited consular offices in Alexandria 
and in Cairo, Fracassi was unable to respond, knowing that siding with the residents would, in 
turn, compromise his position with Egyptian Authorities. Silence was his best option.81  
Catraro grew frustrated with the continued opposition he faced from the UDI. He wrote 
that the accusation of having “undemocratic intentions based on [his] past” would hinder anyone 
in the community from moving forward. Instead, he argued that the UDI and the MLI were 
trying to monopolize the community, but that they in fact “had never represented the opinion of 
[the] Italian colony.”82 These debates were brought to a sudden halt when Resolution 181, the 
UN partition plan for Palestine, was adopted on 29 November 1947.  
The events that ensued over the following months determined the outcome of this 
struggle to be the “mouthpiece” of the community in Egypt. The majority of the UDI and MLI 
leadership were associated with communist organizing in Egypt. Many were arrested, expelled, 
or intimidated on the basis on the conflation of Zionist and communist movements.83 Members 
of the Italian community themselves participated in this provocation. One case was that of 
Umberto Terni (the separated husband of Fausta Cialente), who reported continuous harassment 
                                                            
81 MAE AP Egitto 1946-50 B6, Fracassi to MAE 30 August 1947; see also the article itself “Les 
Italiens et la cause égyptienne” La Bourse Egyptienne 22 August 1947; During this period, 
Fracassi was constantly working to balance Italy’s emergent Arab-oriented politics with the news 
that many Jews were illegally departing from Italy to Palestine. See Maria Grazie Enardu, 
“L’immigrazione illegale ebraica verso la Palestina e la politica estera italiana, 1945--1948.” 
Storia delle relazioni internazionali, 2 (1986): 147-166. 
82 ACGA, Catraro Athanasio/Catraro Demetrio. 
83 For more on the politics behind this conflation, see Joel Beinen, The Dispersion of Egyptian 
Jewry. 
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outside of his house when other Italians, provoking the arrival of Egyptian police, shouted, “he 
isn’t Italian, he’s Jewish!”84  
In April, a large-scale police strike in Alexandria and Cairo accompanied by 
demonstrations and looting damaged the shops and houses of several Italians and resulted in one 
death (a total of 24 deaths, 300 wounded; 30 automobiles, seven cinemas, and several hundred 
small shops and public spaces burned). Similar disturbances continued throughout the summer, 
materializing the schisms between the Monarchy, the Wafd, the Muslim Brotherhood, 
communist organizers, the police, and various opposition groups.85 Tensions between political 
parties were aggravated as the Egyptian military built its forces in preparation for conflict in 
Palestine.  
Fracassi closely monitored events as arrests began; he felt it an important and ominous 
fact that, although many communists supported total Egyptian independence and release from 
the Anglo-dominated economy, few had supported the war for Arab Palestine.86 Indeed, in Italy 
the influx of Jewish refugees from Europe was becoming an overwhelming concern for the 
police. The Italian administration saw the formation of a Jewish state as a remedy to the growing 
population of displaced persons in Italy and the perceived threat of communist propaganda it 
brought with it. They did not, however, want to compromise their relations with the Arab world 
and thus exercised caution in taking any official positions on the conflict. In Egypt, this strategy 
                                                            
84 ACGA, Terni Umberto - Cialente fu Michelangelo 1879.  
85 MAE AP Egitto 1946-50 B7, Fracassi to MAE 16 April 1948. For more on the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s involvement in this political moment, see Richard Mitchell’s now classic study, 
The Society of the Muslim Brothers (Oxford, 1969). 
86 MAE AP Egitto 1946-50 B7, Fracassi to MAE 29 January 1948. 
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of neutrality translated to the Italian representatives’ avoidance of collaboration with the UDI 
and MLI.87  
When war in Palestine broke out in May and martial law was declared in Egypt, arrests of 
individuals with suspected communist or Zionist affiliation increased in frequency.88 Of the 
roughly 1,300 arrests, around 100 were foreigners (the vast majority, around 1,000, of those 
arrested for suspicions of antigovernment activity, while only around 300 were arrested for their 
connections with Zionism). Twenty-seven of the arrested were Italians, mostly members of UDI 
and MLI. They were released after the intervention of Italian authorities, but under the condition 
that they leave Egypt definitively. With attacks aimed at Jewish quarters (and often areas 
generally occupied by foreigners) increasing, Pio Archi, a clerk in the Italian Legation in Cairo, 
cautioned that, although the restrictions and sequesters classified under Proclamation N26 of 30 
May 1948 were targeted at Jewish enterprises, they threatened to harm all foreign communities.89 
Many sensed that Mahmoud al-Nukrashi, the Egyptian Prime Minister, was trying to push 
                                                            
87 The Italian government was in fact well aware of the growing illegal immigration and the 
economic stress it was causing, namely in costal towns/cities on the Adriatic Sea. While trying to 
limit the emigration, none of the facilities were prepared to hold refugees and assistance from the 
UNRRA was insufficient. Pressure from the American based Jewish Agency to welcome 25,000 
refugees in transit to Palestine provoked a strong opposition from the fragile postwar Italian 
administration. ACS, PCM 44-47 “espatrio clandestino di ebrei”; see also MAE AP Egitto 46-50 
B8, el-masri 17 August 1948; Enardu, “L’immigrazione illegale,” 157, 163. For more on Italy’s 
ambivalent relationship with Jews in the postwar context see (eds.) Ilaria Pavan and Guri 
Schwarz, Gli ebrei in Italia tra persecuzione fascista e reintegrazione postbellica (Firenze, 2001) 
and Guri Schwarz, Ritrovare se stessi: Gli ebrei nell’Italia postfascista (Bari, 2012). 
88 Communist activity in Egypt was extremely limited during the 1920s and 1930s, only to 
emerge during the Second World War, in part due to the Wafd’s declining popularity in the labor 
movement, general disillusionment with liberalism, and for foreign and indigenous Jews the 
hope for a political alternative to the Wafd that would protect their interests. Trade unions were 
legalized and regulated from 1942. Beinin and Lockman, Workers on the Nile, 310-314; for an 
earlier study on the growth of trade unions and their connections to nationalist causes over the 
course of the 1940s (not only communism) see William J. Handley, “The Labor Movement in 
Egypt” Middle East Journal 3, 3 (1949): 277-292. 
89 Laskier, “Egyptian Jewry,” 575-576; for more on the subject see Gundrun Kramer The Jews in 
Modern Egypt, 1914-1952. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1989 and Joel Beinin The 
Dispersion of Egyptian Jewry, Berkeley: UC Press, 1998. 
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through laws to further “nationalize” the country. To avoid the persecution of Italian residents, 
Archi advised that the Italian government refrain from recognizing the State of Israel—a position 
aided by Italy’s non-member status in the UN.90 He warned that doing so would make the 
already marginalized community susceptible to acts of violence. Fracassi met with Ahmed 
Khashaba, Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs, with Archi’s comments in hand, and expressed 
his concern that the Italians, “live in a state of true agitation after recent events, especially due to 
the lack of protection by local authorities.”91  
 
IV. Andarsene - Leaving Egypt 
In the midst of these struggles, many practical concerns of the Italian residents were left 
unresolved. The place of the Italians of Egypt in the postwar Mediterranean remained uncertain. 
One resident, Luigi Carbone, addressed a letter to Ivanoe Bonomi, then President of the Italian 
Senate, complaining of the abandonment of Italians in Egypt. He echoed the sentiments of the 
author who had described the community as “stateless.” Carbone wrote: “reports, memorandums, 
articles in various journals, etc. have been written by authoritative people... but all seems to 
finish in nothing... no one moves to meet this people [the Italians of Egypt] that awaits anxiously 
an effective rescue.”92 The closing line of Carbone’s letter begs that one consider the shift from a 
politics of hierarchy under Fascism to the “statelessness” characteristic of the search for a place 
in the present. He wrote, “this brief exposé is addressed to the new Italian government so that it 
                                                            
90 MAE AP Egitto 1946-50 B7, Archi to MAE 1 June 1948; Italy did, however, recognize the 
state of Israel in 1949. Enardu, “l’immigrazione illegale,” 166. 
91 “vive ormai in uno stato di vero orgasmo per gli incidenti che si sono verificati e, soprattutto, 
per la mancanza di protezione da parte delle autorità locali.” MAE AP Egitto 1946-50 B9, 
Fracassi to MAE 21 July 1948. 
92 “Sono state scritte relazioni da persone autorevoli, pro-memoria, articoli su vari giornali ecc. 
ma tutto sembra vada a finire nel vuoto... nessuno si muove per andare incontro a questa gente 
che attende ansiosamente un efficace soccorso.” MAE AP Egitto 1946-50 B9, Carbone to 
Bonomi 1 June 1948. 
 193 
sees to it, demonstrating that the Patria is a concrete reality in which on can replace [his] faith 
without being deceived.”93 Carbone’s letter spoke for a large number of Italians writing from 
Egypt. Fracassi, when asked to respond by Bonomi—who himself worried about the inundation 
of such letters in government offices in Rome—attributed Carbone’s tone to ignorance: “to his 
excuse, he probably doesn’t realize the extremely scarce resources available to our authorities for 
assistance to [Italian] connazionali and he completely ignores actions taken for more than two 
years to protect their interests.”94 If such efforts were indeed being made, why were they 
unknown to the community? The repetition of similar interactions sheds much light on the 
diplomatic actions taken behind the scenes and their perception by a disconnected public, and on 
the general messiness of events in postwar Egypt.   
Fracassi navigated difficult waters. A report by the Stato Maggiore della Marina that 
attempted to portray the state of affairs in Egypt after the tensions of spring 1948 described the 
Italians of Egypt as “entrapped” by fascism (an estimated 99 percent) and noted a shared sense 
that the new government had initially leaned on Jewish Italians that had been exempt from the 
internment during the war and “for that reason the [Italian] colony has distanced itself from our 
authorities.”95 Indeed, much of the leadership of the MLI was of Jewish origin. The same report 
suggested that Pulli Bey, an Italian electrician who had earned elite status in the royal palace and 
the confidence of King Faruk, be used to rebuild ties between the two peoples. This was in 
marked contrast to the position taken by the MLI, which asserted that the new administration 
                                                            
93 “Questo breve esposto è rivolto al nuovo governo italiano affinchè Egli provveda dimostrando 
che la Patria è veramente una realtà concreta e che in Essa ripone la sua fiducia non s’inganna.” 
94 “a sua scusa può valere il fatto ch’egli probabilmente non ha notizia di quali scarsissimi mezzi 
dispongono le nostre autorità per l’assistenza ai connazionali ed ignora del tutto l’attività da esse 
svolta, da oltre un biennio, per la protezione dei loro interessi.” MAE AP Egitto 1946-50 B9, 
Fracassi to MAE and DG Emigrazione 30 July 1948. 
95 It is unclear precisely why this report was done and how it was done without informing the 
Italian diplomats in Egypt. MAE AP Egitto 1946-50 B7, Appunto - Stato Maggiore della Marina 
17 June 1948. 
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leaned too heavily on the old guard. Fracassi responded again in frustration, calling the Stato 
Maggiore report “ridiculous” and reiterating that for two years negotiations had been underway 
to realize the lifting of the sequester and the restitution of properties. However, Fracassi 
understood the force of the past the he was up against:  
it’s natural that the Italian colony in Egypt gratifies itself with unfortunate comparisons to 
the Fascist epoch, in which enormous sums were squandered each year for propaganda in 
the various colonial institutions, while the [then] current balances did not permit more 
than limited donations.96  
 
A return to this past, he wrote, was “inconceivable.” He explained their frustration as resulting 
from comparison to the rhetorical role they had occupied in fascist propaganda. Fracassi 
neglected, perhaps, that this attribution to political identity was only further distancing the 
community from the contemporary regime.  
Months later, Vittorio Zoppi, the Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, wrote to 
Fracassi asking his opinion about the steady flow of Italians leaving Egypt and arriving at 
governmental offices in Italy with requests for support and assistance, “demonstrating angst over 
the future of our collectivity.” Zoppi feared that the labor market in Egypt had entirely closed for 
Italians and the only way to reintegrate would be to request specific privileges, but, only a year 
from the full cancellation of the Capitulations: 
this would appear to [Egyptians] as a new capitular regime and an intolerable 
discrimination, for which the times have passed... I hear that the mood of the Italians is 
rather low, that the workers feel unprotected, and that many employees (impiegati) will 
be fired even from Italian institutions, and that even at a higher level... there are fears for 
the future, so much that one notes a diffuse desire to... ‘get out’ (andarsene).97 
                                                            
96 “Ciò malgrado è naturale che la colonia italiana in Egitto si compiaccia di paragoni sfavorevoli 
con l’epoca fascista, in cui somme enormi venivano profuse ogni anno a scopo propagandistico 
tra le varie istituzioni coloniali, mentre le attuali condizioni di bilancio non consentono che assai 
limitate elargizioni.” MAE AP Egitto 1946-50 B7, Fracassi to MAE 4 August 1948. 
97 “apparirebbe loro come un nuovo regime capitolare per il quale i tempi sono passati e come 
una discriminazione insopportabile... Mi si dice che lo stato d’animo degli italiani sia alquanto 
depresso, che i lavorati si sentono poco protetti, che molti impiegati debbono venire licenziati 
anche da istituti italiani, e che pure ad un livello più elevato... vi sono timore per l’avvenire, tanto 
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It is worth pausing on this. Zoppi implied that “get out” (andarsene) was being used regularly by 
Italians of Egypt arriving in Italy. In this case, “get out” meant to leave definitively, to save 
oneself and one’s family from both an uncertain present and an uncertain future.  
Although limited archival evidence remains to tell us precisely how individuals were 
reacting to the events of these years, the letters and reports reaching the offices of Italian 
ministries do exhibit a high degree of regularity both in terms of observations on a general sense 
of dismay and in terms of Italian residents’ frustration with the lack of resonance between their 
experiences living under the fascist regime abroad and their contemporary circumstances in 
postwar Egypt. In other words, the flight from Egypt evoked ideas about belonging to a 
community that had participated in the broader architecture (and rhetoric) of the Italian state and 
empire, but they were ideas that were no longer tenable—and perhaps never were.  
Indeed, examining briefly the changing demographics of the Italian population between 
1937 and 1947, one sees how vastly the makeup of the communities transformed. In 1937, 
Italians represented a quarter of all foreigners in Egypt, numbering 47,706 registered persons. In 
1947, the population was reduced to 19 percent (having decreased in size more than any other 
community), numbering 27,958. Broken down further, around 17,200 Catholic Italians and 2,400 
Jewish Italians appear absent from Egyptian census data. These data are probably imprecise, 
however their inaccuracy is revelatory: while the decrease in the population was most likely 
sizable and quite visible (doubtfully as high as 20,000), they might indicate a hesitancy in 
participating in such a survey given the unstable circumstances of a community already looking 
elsewhere for its future. Still, of the population that remained accounted for in 1947, roughly 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
che si note un diffuso desiderio di... ‘andarsene’.” MAE AP Egitto 1946-50 B7, Zoppi to 
Fracassi 9 December 1948. 
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18.2 percent was unemployed.98 At the time, as the Italian representative of Port Said noted, the 
future of an unemployed foreigner was bleak.  
 Adding to this uncertainty, the Company Law of 1947 stipulated that all joint-stock 
companies in Egypt be composed of a 75:25 percent ratio of Egyptian to non-Egyptian 
employees and a 90:10 percent ratio of Egyptian to non-Egyptian laborers.99 To quell growing 
unrest, the law addressed a tendency of foreign companies to avoid hiring Egyptians and sought 
to resolve the divide between unemployed Egyptian graduates and foreigners.100  To ensure that 
hiring of Egyptians was effective in redistributing wealth, the new regulations also required that 
the salaries for Egyptian employees equal 65 percent and for laborers 80 percent of the total. 
This entailed radical reconfigurations in the labor force. 
 On 10 June 1948, the Banco Italo-Egiziano held its first meeting since being placed under 
sequester nearly eight years earlier.101 Internally, even before the bank’s reopening, its 
administration was reconsidering its role within the Italian community. In one report, an Italian 
member of the bank’s board noted, “the war distanced (aside from few exceptions) all the young 
and capable personnel” and the current employees (while the bank was under sequester, it still 
functioned internally) were searching for work elsewhere or for a second job due to the fact that 
“nothing [in Egypt] has much promise.”102 At the time, Italian employees of the bank made up 
over 80 percent and Egyptian employees only received 37.5 percent of the total salaries. Over the 
course of the following years, the bank had to undergo considerable change, reshaping itself to 
                                                            
98 Davide Amicucci, “La comunità italiana,” 82-84. 
99 For an insigntful analysis of the company law, see Floresca Karanasou Egyptianisation: the 
1947 Company Law and the Foreign Communities in Egypt. Unpublished PhD thesis. St. 
Anthony’s College, Oxford (1992). 
100 Handley, “Labor Movement in Egypt, 289-291”; Tignor, “Economic activities,” 448-449. 
101 Gabriele de Rosa Storia del Banco di Roma: Volume III. (Roma, 1984), 170-171, 251, 273. 
102 “la guerra ha allontanato (fatte poche eccezioni) tutto il personale giovane e capace” BR, 
XI/8/15/II B.7 f.7 Memoria no.4 25 July 1947. 
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fit a new Egypt. It could no longer present itself as a bank for the integration of Italian accounts 
in Egypt, nor as an intermediary between the Italians in Egypt and metropolitan Italy. It ceased to 
serve the economic “penetration and expansion” of the Mediterranean for which it had been 
founded in the early twentieth century.103 Instead, it had to adapt its role into a bank that could 
contribute to the local economy. When the director of the bank, Aldo Vitale, was preparing for 
retirement, noting the difficulty in finding Egyptian partners, the decrease in the Italian 
population, and the struggles to meet the qualifications of the Company Law, he anticipated the 
bank’s eventual closure. Symbolic of this tendency to “get out,” between 1948 and 1950, the 
Banco Italo-Egiziano began to sell off Italian land holdings in Egypt.104 
 
V. Broken Bridges 
Unresolved antagonism between dominant political factions in Egypt—the Wafd, the Royal 
Family, and the military—and the British Authorities’ forceful attempts to maintain a foothold in 
the Suez Canal yielded strong criticism from opposition groups from 1948 to 1952.105 Attempts 
to renegotiate the 1936 treaty dragged on and apprehension among non-Egyptian communities 
simmered as the stalemate between nationalists and the British brought the economy to a halt. 
Questions regarding the role foreigners would play in Egypt’s future went unanswered. In 1948, 
anticipating the end of the transitional period, English diplomats called a meeting of former 
                                                            
103 Luigi de Rosa Storia del Banco di Roma: Volume I. (Roma, 1982), 175; Luigi de Rosa Storia 
del Banco di Roma: Volume II. (Roma, 1983), 176-178; while the bank went through a brief 
optimistic moment in the early 1950s, discussing the news of Taviani’s “politica araba” and 
citing the Fiera per il Levante as an opportunity to redefine itself as an intermediary between the 
Italian and Egyptian regimes, by the mid 1960s its administrators were preparing for its 
liquidation. 
104 BR, XI/8/15/II B.7 f.7 Promemoria per il Ministero degli Esteri 2 December 1949. 
105 MAE AP Egitto 1952 B870, Tarchiani to De Gasperi 9 November 1951 - although this is 
cited rather extensively in historiography (see for example Tignor, Berques, and others, it was 
also something rather explicit in the documents and correspondence between the Italian 
diplomats, their interlocutors in Egypt, and the Ministries in Rome. 
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capitulatory powers to discuss the possibility of stabilizing new accords. The Egyptian 
government and press vehemently protested England’s neocolonialist action. Although France, 
the United States, Belgium, Denmark, Holland and Sweden accepted, Italy, Greece, Switzerland, 
South Africa, Pakistan and the Holy See declined.106 At the time, Fracassi had been cautioned by 
the undersecretary of the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the British were living in an 
“imperial and capitular fog” and that the Italians and Greeks (the countries with the largest 
communities in Egypt) would only arrive at settlements through bilateral talks with the Egyptian 
government.107  
When the Wafd took power in 1950 they turned sharply against the British and abrogated 
the 1936 treaty in October 1951.108 The party, however, struggled to maintain popularity as it 
was plagued with corruption and a general lack of efficacy in dealing with the British. Within 
one month, British troops in the Canal Zone met a forceful resistance from guerrilla groups. 
Conflict persisted over the autumn as the British expanded their base, while reducing Egyptian 
labor from 58,000 to 2,300 persons.109 Victor Mallet, British Ambassador to Italy, suggested to 
the Italian government the possibility of hiring Italian contractual labor in the Canal Zone to 
replace the Egyptians, noting the history of “[Italian] migratory exigencies.” They did not want 
to hire from the Italians of Egypt. Zoppi responded that, although Italy would happily send 
“several thousand” unemployed Italians to work, the Italians currently in the Canal Zone were 
“abandoning the zone for fear of reprisals against themselves and their families and other Italians 
                                                            
106 MAE AP Egitto 1951 B703, Fracassi to MAE 21 April 1948. 
107 MAE AP Egitto 1951 B703, Fracassi to MAE 23 April 1948; Robert L. Tignor, 
“Decolonization and Business: The Case of Egypt,” The Journal of Modern History 59, 3 (1987): 
479-505, 488. 
108 Tignor, “Decolonization and Business,” 491; Joel Gordon, Nasser’s Blessed Movement: 
Egypt’s Free Officers and the July REvolution (Oxford, 1992), 21. 
109 Tignor, “Decolonization and Business,” 492. 
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in Egypt...”110 This was not to mention the strain that it would cause on Italian and Egyptian 
relations. Zoppi continued, emphasizing that many Italians “request even to be included in the 
emigration quotas for... Australia!”111  
Reports published in the postwar magazine Italiani nel Mondo estimated that around 
6,000 Italians had left Egypt since the end of the war, searching in “other locales the security of a 
future more prosperous and serene.”112 The same magazine began to talk of an “exodus” from 
Port Said: “those who can get out (andarsene), do.”113 
The stipulations of the company law of 1947 were being strictly enforced and, 
notwithstanding that the Egyptian government passed laws to grant Egyptian citizenship to non-
Egyptians, their application was left to the discretion of individual clerks.114 Of the roughly 800 
foreigners who submitted applications (including Italians among others, no precise numbers 
exist), less than half were accepted and these included either individuals with advanced technical 
training or wealthy industrialists, whereas the cases of laborers, artisans, and the unemployed 
often went unanswered or were outright denied.115 A project for stabilizing the rights of Italian 
residents in Egypt had already been initiated, but both Egyptian and Italian proposals received 
severe criticism from within the Italian community. Among the most outspoken opponents was 
Ernesto Cucinotta, the director of the Italian Chamber of Commerce (see Chapter One), who 
remained an important intermediary between the Italians of Egypt, the diplomatic team, and the 
                                                            
110 “stanno abbandonando la zona per timore di rappresaglie nei loro confronti e in quelli delle 
loro famiglie e dei loro connazionali in Egitto...” 
111 “chiedono addirittura di essere inclusi nelle quote di emigrazione... l’Australia!” [elipsis 
included in the letter]. MAE AP Egitto 1952 B788 Zoppi to Theodoli ND. 
112 G.P.d.F “Il passato e il presente degli italiani in Egitto,” Italiani nel Mondo 25 February 1951. 
113 Raniero Giani, “Declino a Porto Said della collettività italiana” Italiani nel Mondo, 25 
January 1951. 
114 MAE AP Egitto 1951 B703 Prunas to MAE 26 December 1950; see also Handley, “Labor 
Movement in Egypt,” 291. 
115 MAE AP Egitto 1951 B703 Appunto acquisto della cittadinanza egiziana 30 October 1950. 
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ministries in Rome since the 1930s. He argued that the proposals did not address actual 
circumstances. Cucinotta contended that both the Egyptian laws and the Italian proposal ignored 
the diverse composition of foreign communities and that the ten percent quota for foreign 
laborers (operai/‘omal) would gravely affect the possibility of Italians to secure work.116 Any 
“establishment treaty (trattato di stabilimento),” he averred, would have to account for the 
minimal “assimilation” of Italians in Egypt: 
With the passing of years, strong groups of national minorities (allogeni) were created in 
these colonies, either due to new migrations or for the natural growth of residents; they 
enjoyed the accrued privileges of the capitular regime, and were considered by the local 
authorities as autonomous groups that, even having their residence (domicilio) in Egypt, 
they were under the disposition of the legislative norms of their respective countries. 
From another point of view, the foreigner that enjoyed those privileges did not have any 
interest to ask for naturalization or to await assimilation... At this point, we must ask 
ourselves if the individuals who have lived and worked for a country that had never asked 
of them to naturalize, and in consequence maintained their own nationalities, will be 
considered as foreigners. 
 
In other words, the legal conditions of the capitular regime had rendered concrete national 
identities in such a way that assimilation into a new Egypt was interpreted as an impossibility. 
Cucinotta advised that a settlement between the countries ensure that protection be extended to 
Italian subjects—similar to pre-1937 terms—and, because of the increasing tendency to 
emigrate, Italians should be given the unconditional permission to transfer their properties (beni) 
to Italy at the moment of “definitively” leaving Egypt. Additionally, he argued that while in 
Egypt they should be allowed to transfer a portion or the totality of their income to Italy in the 
case that they would leave Egypt without liquidating their [business] activity in Egypt. 
Cucinotta’s proposal was an attempt to suture the gaps that had separated not Italy and Egypt, 
but the Italians of Egypt and metropolitan Italy. It acknowledged the disruption of continuity for 
                                                            
116 MAE AP Egitto 1951 B703 Appunto 31 October 1949; the Italian proposal, however, was 
seen as highly effective by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Rome precisely because it allowed 
space for the ambiguous circumstances in Egypt. 
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the Italians of Egypt and mapped out a plan to maintain the “protective embrace of the Patria” to 
which the community had grown accustomed under fascism.117 
 Meanwhile, Italy’s cautious position (or its strategic neutrality) sought to bring the two 
countries closer in a myriad of ways. The Wafd’s failure to build promised arms and munitions 
factories and England’s reneged agreement to furnish more than “light arms” to the Egyptian 
military was Italy’s ideal entryway into new economic and industrial relations.118 Profiting from 
the deepening rift between the Wafd and the Egyptian military, proposals and discussions began 
in the spring of 1951 for an Egyptian military visit to Italy to study Italian military and police 
infrastructure and receive instruction from military technicians.119 This was to play a key role in 
Italy’s emergent “Mediterranean vocation”--its supposed ability to navigate the waters between 
the West and the Middle East.120 
                                                            
117 “Con l’andare degli anni si venivano cosi a costituire dei forti gruppi di allogeni sia per nuove 
immigrazioni sia per il naturale aumento dei residenti queste colonie che godevano dei privilegi 
decorrenti dal regime capitolare allora vigente, venivano considerate dalle autorità locali stesse 
come gruppi autonomi che, pur aventi il loro domicilio in Egitto, erano sottoposti alle norme 
legislative dei loro rispettivi paese. D’altra parte lo straniero che godeva di tali privilegi non 
aveva nessun interesse a chiedere la naturalizzazione o attendere verso l’assimilazione.... A 
questo punto è da domandarsi se vanno considerati come stranieri degli individui che da 
parecchie generazioni vivono, lavorano per un paese che non ha mai domandato loro di 
naturalizzarsi e che in conseguenza hanno conservato la loro nazionalità...” MAE AP Egitto 1951 
B703 “Trattato di Stabilimento - Camera di Commercio italiana Cairo” October 1950. 
118 MAE AP Egitto 1951 B698, Prunas to MAE 21 May 1951. 
119 MAE AP Egitto 1951 B698 Appunto per DGAP 25 May 1951, “visita in Italia Ministro 
Commercio Egiziano” 15 May 1951. 
120 MAE AP Egitto 1952 B787, Janelli to MAE 29 November 1951. It should be noted here that 
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 When the British attempted to disarm the Egyptian police in Ismailia in 1952, anti-British 
and anti-European demonstrations culminated on Saturday, 26 January, in the destruction of 
symbols of the European presence in Cairo.121 Approximately 300 thousand EGP worth of 
damage to Italian property was suffered, but the more visible effect was the rapid increase in 
unemployment and the accelerated flight of Italian (and foreign) capital.122 Interestingly, we 
recall that the earlier Stato Maggiore report had suggested Pulli Bey—the Italian electrician-
cum-officer of Faruk’s private affairs—as a viable line into Egyptian politics. On the 26th of 
January, Pulli, who had forfeited his Italian citizenship to remain employed by the King during 
the Second World War, wrote to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Rome seeking protection 
stating that he suspected he was the subject of a British assassination plot.123 If Pulli’s 
desperation reveals anything, it is that the symbols of the old genealogy that connected Egypt 
and Italy were crumbling. 
In the weeks following the Free Officers’ seizure of power on 23 July 1952, the military 
regime quickly passed laws to settle the residency issues. They increased the terms of residency 
for foreign residents, especially those whose economic and technical skills could benefit the 
faltering Egyptian economy. Rather than being viewed as a solution to the unresolved 
preoccupations of foreign communities, however, these new regulations were interpreted as a 
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“political measure” to contain the flight of foreign capital.124 Without clear answers to confusing 
policies regarding residency, rumors of expulsion, and after the events of January, sudden 
attempts to resolve issues, wrote one Italian clerk, “will not eliminate the sense of growing 
unease, because it has deep roots and depends, by now, on the uncertainty of the political and 
economic future of the country.”125 The possibility that an abrupt political decision would offer 
security, the previous years had taught, seemed absurd. Instead, a sense of uncertainty was 
merely highlighted by a hasty legal resolution to increasingly pressing issues. 
 Meanwhile, talks had begun between the Italian regime and the Free Officers for the 
expulsion of King Faruk. In September 1952, Faruk revealed to the Italian diplomats that the 
abolition of the monarchy was inevitable. In fact, in accord with the young officials, and given 
the refuge provided to Vittorio Emanuele III in Alexandria in 1946, the Italian government went 
against what it considered its own internal interests (aware of Faruk’s tendency to create scandal) 
and agreed to host the King. He was to be provided a “dignified and honorable” welcoming at 
the port of Naples.126 Pulli Bey, too, was exiled. Zoppi assured the Egyptian police that a “tight 
informative network” surrounded Faruk, his movements would be closely followed. Under 
careful surveillance the dethroned King was cautioned to respect the “obligations of hospitality 
and to not embarrass the Italian government.”127 Pasquale Janelli, the new chargé d’affaires in 
                                                            
124 MAE AP Egitto 1952 B788 Ferrero to MAE 8 August 1952. 
125 “non varranno ad eliminarlo [senso di crescente disagio] perchè esso ha radici più profonde e 
dipende ormai dall’incertezza dell’avvenire politico ed economico del paese.” MAE AP Egitto 
1952 B788 Ferrero to MAE 6 June 1952. 
126 MAE AP Egitto 1952 B788 Appunto arrivo in Italia reali Egitto 29 July 1952. 
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carefully documented. These include a suspect meeting with a guest from Egypt at the famous 
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Cairo, suggested that Faruk be housed away from Rome, due to likely encounters with new 
Egyptian representatives in Italy.128 
 Following the events of January 1952, the Italian government had agreed to furnish two 
large police squadrons to the Egyptian military, justifying the deal to the international 
community as “non belligerent” since public security was also in the interest of foreign 
communities in Egypt.129 The Egyptian military arranged for further study of the Italian police 
structure. Under Naguib, Italian diplomats and officials in Rome hoped that a purging of the 
Wafd might stabilize “extremist” activities that had caused much tension in recent years:  
the growing xenophobia these last years has depended largely on the ‘one-upmanship’ 
(surenchère) of political parties in order to win over the masses... regarding Italy, our 
position will be reinforced by the new situation since we represent a power to which 
Egypt looks with less distrust and without fear.130 
 
Italian politicians and Egyptian military leaders considerably tightened their relations, as we will 
see unfold over the following decade.  
 In January 1953, just after the Free Officers declared a three-year transitional period of 
martial law, it was announced that the Italian Ministry of Defence, Randolfo Pacciardi, would 
visit Naguib in Egypt. The revelation brought contempt from the British.131  The visit intended to 
solidify these ties and unite the two countries in a new politics aligned on the “defense of the 
Mediterranean.” However, its purpose was broader, as Pacciardi was to inquire as to Naguib’s 
                                                            
128 MAE AP Egitto 1952 B788 Appunto 19 September 1952; see also ACS MI PS H2 1952 
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129 MAE AP Egitto 1952 B789 Appunto 22 February 1952, materials included 12 armored cars, 
21 jeeps with radio, 21 camions for transporting people, 900 nightsticks, 150 submachine guns, 
50 shotguns and tear-gas guns, 20 motorcycles and a group of around 20 technicians for training. 
130 “Infatti la xenofobia accentuatasi in questi ultimi anni dipendeva in massima parte dalla 
‘surenchère’ che i partiti si facevano l’uno sull’altro al fine di accappiarsi il favore delle masse.... 
Quanto all’Italia, la nostra posizione verrebbe rafforzata con la nuova situazione in quanto noi 
rappresentiamo una Potenza alla quale l’Egitto guarda con minore diffidenza e senza 
preoccupazioni.” MAE AP Egitto 1952 B787 Nota per gli atti 10 September 1952. 
131 MAE AP Egitto 1953 B871 Appunto 30 January 1953. 
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personal insights on the internal situation and the military’s plans for the future (it is important to 
note here that during these years Pacciardi was a major proponent of Italy’s participation in 
NATO). This, importantly, was to be done under the guise of “refreshing the numerous Italian 
colony... [which had been] subject to the vicissitudes of war and internal affairs.”132 The choice 
of sending Pacciardi, a tried veteran, was strategic. With this in mind, he needed to be briefed on 
the conditions of the Italian community.  
The damage caused by the riots one year earlier affected around 20 Italians out of the 600 
total cases, but unemployment had increased in its wake and, as noted, as the infrastructural 
supports of the community deteriorated with the departure of Italians.133 The professional class 
had thinned, partially a response to vanishing clientele and partially a result of the restrictions 
imposed by the 1947 company law. The community lost much of the network of the wealthy 
Italians whose contributions to the SIB and other enterprises sustained the laborers and 
artisans.134 Importantly, in a draft of Pacciardi’s speech for the Italians of Egypt, the diplomats in 
Egypt responsible for its editing removed “prosperous” from his description of the community. 
An additional word of caution to Pacciardi regarded the growth of the Movimento Sociale 
Italiano (Italian Social Movement, MSI), a neo-fascist political party that absorbed many 
members of the former PNF, and the vibrant presence of monarchists. Faith to each movement, it 
was claimed, was founded on “nostalgia for a past that seemed to open more rosy colored 
                                                            
132 “rinfrancare la numerosa colonia italiana... soggetta alle vicitudini della guerra e degli 
avvenimenti interni.” 
133 MAE AP Egitto 1953 B871 Appunto relazioni italo-egiziane 10 January 1953; a report from 
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134 MAE AP Egitto 1953 B871 Appunto relazioni italo-egiziane 10 January 1953. 
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prospects to their existence.”135 From Rome, the Italians of Egypt were viewed as though they 
were ruins of a lost time, disjointed from the present. According to this logic, the community 
looked to the past because its horizons were more hopeful than those of the present. By 
articulating the Italians of Egypt as anachronistic in this way, the Italian state reified the 
community’s shared sense of abandonment, distance, and disillusion. Unable to integrate into 
postwar Egypt, Italian futures in Italy also appeared precarious due to the political identities to 
which they were assigned.   
When Pacciardi left Egypt, he assured the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that Naguib was 
united in the fight against communism in the Mediterranean, but would only join Italy once 
Egypt’s “national aspirations” were fulfilled.136 Aside from a toast to the Italians, who, he said in 
his speech, signified “the most solid wedding band uniting our two peoples,” little mention was 
made of the community (only that they “enjoyed” his visit).137 The Italians of Egypt surfaced 
merely as an index to a vast historical narrative of national kinship, emptied of its present 
significance for them. Shortly thereafter, the Free Officers declared Egypt a Republic. Janelli 
wrote, “thus proclaimed a Republic, every bridge with the past is definitively broken.”138 He 
continued, with doubt, “the storm that the black clouds presaged has effectively been let loose... 
but one can’t say that the sky, after the hurricane, has cleared: the air is still oppressive and not 
all of the clouds have dispersed.”139 Paths were paved for Italy to serve as a “bridge” between the 
Middle East and Europe.140 The ties between the two countries had been repaired in new terms, 
                                                            
135 “rimpianto di un passato che sembrava aprire più rosee prospettive alla loro esistenza.” 
136 MAE AP Egitto 1953 B871 Ferrero to MAE 5 February 1953. 
137 “il più saldo anello di congiunzione tra i nostri due popoli.” 
138 “proclamata la Repubblica è rotto così definitivamente ogni ponte con il passato.” 
139 “la tempesta che le nuvole nere facevano presagire si è effettivamente scatenata... ma non si 
può dire che il cielo, dopo l’uragano, si sia schiarito: l’aria è tuttora greve e non tutte le nuvole si 
sono disperse.” MAE AP Egitto 1953 B870 Janelli to PCM 21 November 1953. 
140 MAE AP Egitto 1952 B788 Appunto de Strobel 1953. 
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into which the Italians of Egypt figured little. An eventual mass repatriation was anticipated by 
the offices in Rome, it was only a matter of time. 
 
Conclusion: Twice Without a King 
In the spring of 1952, while residency laws were open to discussion, the Egyptian General 
Director of Passports and Nationality, Ali Darwich, stated “it’s necessary that the foreigners 
convince themselves that they are guests, with all the significance carried in this word, especially 
for Orientals [sic].”141 This language was echoed in Naguib’s early speeches to the foreign 
communities after the Free Officer’s coup. The company law of 1947, new residency laws, the 
tightening of Egypt’s control over the Suez Canal, the overthrow and exile of Faruk were all 
defining Egypt’s new boundaries. The concept of extraterritorial protection—and its associated 
sense of always being at home under the authority of the Italian state—had long vanished. 
Confusion penetrated non-Egyptian communities.142 The replacement of the autonomy granted 
under the Capitulations with the temporality of “hosting” also represented a new sense of 
belonging (or not quite belonging) at a moment when the emerging political configurations no 
longer conformed to the structures that had once defined the colonial Mediterranean. 
Indeed, when the publication of Italian newspapers resumed in 1950, Catraro was granted 
permission to publish Cronaca under the condition that the newspaper excluded “political 
nostalgia.” But the past crept in.143 Concurrently, Max Terni founded Oriente. The former was 
staunchly anticommunist and monarchist-leaning, while the latter was directly in line with the 
MSI. In Egypt, both papers engaged with the present through the past: each issue included full 
                                                            
141 “Bisogna che gli stranieri si convincano che sono ospiti, con tutto il significato che questa 
parola ha, sopratutto per gli orientali.” MAE AP Egitto 1952 B787 15 April 1952. 
142 MAE AP Egitto 1952 B787 “La giustizia in Egitto dopo il 1949” Prunas 18 December 1951. 
143 ACGA, Catraro Athanasio/Catraro Demetrio. 
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pages devoted to “times past” (“Il tempo che fu” in the case of Cronaca) comprised of stories 
and photographs from the years of internment.144 Oriente reported the rhetoric of “Italians abroad 
(italiani all’estero)” being “the most dear to Italy’s heart” and championed the MSI’s campaign 
to include them—for the first time—in the national vote.145 At the same time, Terni criticized 
Italy’s postwar emigration policy and De Gasperi’s call for young Italians to emigrate, citing the 
continual loss of potential destinations and even going so far as to use “refugees” (profughi) to 
talk about the Italian emigrants returning from Tunisia, Libya, the Greek Islands, and 
Yugoslavia, territories seeking to “liberate themselves from the Italians.”146 Perhaps he echoed 
local fears. Catraro’s Cronaca, on the other hand, portrayed the proposal to give Italians abroad 
the right to vote as an indication of the disintegrating unity of “the Patria”:  
These [Italians abroad] want to continue to love Italy as they love it, as they always loved 
it. Italy; not whatever Italian [political] party. They want to continue to see in the 
compatriot (connazionale) who works beside them, or whom they meet in the evening at 
the hangout or in the street, a brother: not a political adversary. They also want their 
relations with the countries hosting them to go undisturbed.147 
 
The new papers struggled to reinvigorate prewar notions of Italians abroad as natural extensions 
of the Italian state, ideas that still resonated with the Italians of Egypt but found no grounding in 
the present. 
                                                            
144 Some even drew attention already to the migration of those who spent four years together in 
the camps and now found themselves “dispersed in the world,” “Ricordi di un tempo che fu,” 
Oriente 13 April 1950. 
145 “MSI agli Italiani all’estero,” Oriente 15 January 1953, “Il voto agli Italiani all’Estero - non 
sono stranieri gli Italiani fuori d’Italia” Oriente 18 January 1953. 
146 “liberarsi degli italiani... ripulsa del lavoro italiano.” 
147 “Essi [italiani all’estero] vogliono continuare ad amare l’Italia come l’amano, come l’hanno 
sempre amata. L’Italia: non un qualsiasi partito italiano. Essi vogliono continuare a vedere nel 
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fratello: non l’avversario politico. Essi vogliono anche che i loro rapporti con i Paesi che li 
ospitano non vengano turbati.” Leonide Felletti, “A chi giova il voto degli italiani all’estero?” 
Cronaca December 1952 (reprint from Italiani nel Mondo). 
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 When Vittorio Emanuelle III had left Italy for Egypt in 1946, he benefitted from the 
history of exchange between the House of Savoy and the Mohamed Ali dynasty. In Alexandria, 
he had been welcomed by those who still held strongly to this affinity, those for whom the 
historical narrative employed in political discourse was imagined to be a reality. They were the 
generation that had lived through the Fascist consolidation in Egypt, which promulgated the 
ideology that Italians abroad had been an essential “asset” for the “Patria.” The majority 
remained loyal to the Italian King and he was, in a sense, recognized in his exile—both by King 
Faruk and the Italians in Egypt. Vittorio Emanuelle III lived in Alexandria until his last days, 
when on 31 December 1947 he passed away (where his remains are buried to this day). Flags at 
the Italian Legation in Cairo and the Consulate in Alexandria were flown at half-staff and a full 
military funeral was given at Faruk’s order.148 However, with the exile of Faruk several years 
later, the Italians of Egypt were twice without a king, guests without a home in two emergent 
regimes. The end of a political era, these political transformations redefined the terms of their 
belonging. Although the same past was alluded to in the attempts of the Italian state to solidify 
its relations with the new Egyptian regime, as this chapter has demonstrated, the state’s actors 
interpreted and viewed the Italian community in Egypt as an anachronism and a threat to 
political stability. In search of a new orientation, it was unclear to whom or in which direction 
Italians should and would turn. The disjuncture between past expectations and the emergent 
present offered little direction for the future. In this statelessness, while “bridges” were being 
built between the new Republics, as remarked the new Italian ambassador in Egypt, the Italians 
of Egypt suffered from chronic “uncertainty and disquiet.”149 
 
                                                            
148 ACGA Vittorio Emmanuelle di Savoia, telegramma n.39 Fracassi. 
149 “[hanno] ricominciato... a soffrire d’incertezza, e d’inquietudine.” MAE AP Egitto 1952 B870 
Janelli to PCM 21 November 1953. 
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VIGNETTE TWO 
 
“When are you leaving?”: Political Transformation in Postwar Egypt 
 
When I met with B. Buccetti,1 he introduced his story by emphasizing that not one member of 
his family had acquired Egyptian nationality. Almost as a side thought, he said, “until 1952, I 
think, not one Italian even thought to leave (di andar via) Egypt.” Although Buccetti said that no 
one thought to leave Egypt before 1952, one of his elder brothers had, in fact, departed for 
Argentina immediately after the Second World War.2 His use of “andar via” could have meant to 
leave suddenly, to escape or flee, or it could have meant to leave definitively. He paused, as 
though there was something strange about what he said, “it’s very peculiar, this thing.” He 
continued, remembering the mumbled conversations at the time,  
so and so is going to work in Brazil, so and so is going to work in Australia... that’s how 
it began, you know, someone leaves Egypt... this initiated a movement (questa porta un 
movimento)…to think… everyone’s leaving... it circulated, people were leaving.3 
 
In the biographical essay published by a journalist with whom Buccetti had grown close 
during the organization of a neighborhood committee in Milan, he recounted the destruction of 
Downtown Cairo in January 1952. To him, the event was an indication that an “anti-British and 
anti-Western” antipathy had expanded beyond the realm of cultural and political rhetoric and 
into violent action. What stood out to Buccetti was, first and foremost, the destruction of the 
cinemas. During interviews, Italians of Egypt repeatedly described to me the importance of the 
                                                            
1 B. Buccetti interview, 23 March 2012. 
2 Guastamacchio, Il Profugo Italiano, 83. 
3 “questa porta un movimento, l’idea di pensare... stanno andando via tutti... comincia a 
propagarsi, la gente andava.” 
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cinemas as loci of cosmopolitanism, especially for the youth of his generation; if the film was in 
English, there were Arabic and French subtitles, if it was in French or Italian, they were subtitled 
in English and Arabic, and so on. Some contended that their frequent viewing of films helped 
them learn to move between languages that marked the public spaces of Alexandria and Cairo.4 
The second, and more jarring mark left by the Cairo Fire—he described it to me as it was 
narrated also in the book—was the interaction he had with his father on the occasion. They had 
been out together in Downtown Cairo and witnessed the initial stages of demonstrations. His 
father worriedly contacted Buccetti’s brothers at work and advised them to return home, and then 
rushed through the city with his son. In the essay, Buccetti recounts his father’s tearful words 
that evening, “my sons, Egypt will not return as it was, for us Europeans there will no longer be 
an easy and tranquil life... for me, there are no more possibilities to leave Egypt, but you (voi), 
who are young, think about it!”5 Buccetti’s biographer-friend frames this encounter as an event 
that had transferred a father’s fears to his sons. In my own conversations with Buccetti, he 
implied that, rather than being a catalyst for radical change or sudden transformation, the events 
of 1952 brought ongoing political processes to bear on public life, giving them a more distinct 
presence in the experiences of Italians in Egypt.  
 
With his characteristically sardonic humor, Berni said, “unfortunately, it’s a nasty page of 
history, but it’s true!”6 He stated that the first “exodus” (esodo) of Italians from Egypt occurred 
after the events of 1948. Repeating a phrase that he had used before in relation to the Italian 
                                                            
4 Many noted that, although they could not afford to see films as children, they would often 
sneak into the theaters or pay for one film and stay inside for an entire day.  
5 “cari figlioli, l’Egitto non ritornerà più come prima, per noi europei non ci sarà più una vita 
facile e tranquilla... per me non ci sono più molte possibilità di lasciare l’Egitto, ma voi, che siete 
giovani, pensateci!” Guastamacchio, Il Profugo Italiano, 55. 
6 “purtroppo, è una brutta pagina di storia!” Interview with R. Berni, 16 March 2012. 
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state’s failure to support the Italians of Egypt, he said: “we no longer felt defended, protected.” 
This time, however, Berni elaborated: “it became obligatory to write in Arabic... Many 
Europeans didn’t know the language because they had never learned it, they always spoke their 
own languages... people were leaving (la gente andava via).” The instruction of Arabic-language 
and Egyptian history in all foreign schools in Egypt was made compulsory in 1949 as part of 
broader policies to integrate non-Egyptian residents into national life. Years later, some would 
even cite this among their reasons for departure. This was the case, for example, when one 
Italian of Egypt, Berta Massoni, wrote to the consul in 1957, requested to be repatriated due to 
the fact that: “I won’t have work here because I don’t know the Arabic language and now they 
want (vogliono) everything in Arabic.”7  
Berni spoke more of abstracted processes than of explicit regulations or events that 
marked change. He claimed to vividly remember that the expiration of the 12-year transition 
away from the Capitulations and the growing resentment exhibited by the Egyptian Military 
towards the English— especially since their loss in the 1948 war in Palestine—set into motion 
the initial years of political transformation. Although Mohamed Naguib took power for nearly 
two years after the coup d’état in 1952, Berni concluded that the Free Officer’s Movement 
heralded a new style of Egyptian politics guided by Gamal Abdel Nasser, which sought quickly 
to “nationalize social and economic life” and to place the military at the forefront of Egyptian 
society.  
Nasser arrived, and it was right (giusto), liberty for [his] people... now they [the 
Europeans] weren’t protected anymore... one talks of around, more than one million, one 
million and a half, I don’t know the numbers. Everyday you encountered someone the 
first question was no longer ‘how are you’... it was ‘when are you leaving?’ and ‘where 
are you going?’... This one was going to South American, Venezuala, Uruguay, 
                                                            
7 “...non avrò più lavoro qui essendo che non conosco la lingua araba ed ora vogliono che sia 
tutto in arabo...” ACGA, Massoni Maurizio fu Michele. 
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Argentina, Brazil... or there were those who went to Europe, and those who returned 
(tornava) to Italy, ‘I’m going to Rome, to Milan, to Naples,’ the question was when.8  
 
In the years following 1952, Berni recalled feeling afraid in the streets: he remembered groups of 
Egyptian youth, having discovered a new sense of national pride, that provoked and harassed 
foreigners.9 More than the literal defense of foreign (and colonial) bodies confronting the actors 
of Egyptian nationalism, the parallels drawn in Berni’s accounts implied the emergence of an 
imperative to defend the very presence of Italians and Europeans in Egypt. The counterpoint to 
defense, however, was departure.  
Berni summarized the period between 1952 and 1956 as the transition between the first 
phase (1948-52) and the second phase (1956 and on) of departure. It was during these four years, 
according to Berni, that most Italians decided that leaving Egypt was necessary. “By then it was 
certain that you needed to get out (andar via)… and that is the story of the Italians of Egypt, all 
of them!”10 He spoke more of his own family’s emigration to Venezuela—his mother, brother, 
and three sisters who left during the first phase while he stayed in Egypt trying to sell off 
(svendere) their belongings.11 He repeated, “it’s a nasty page of history, but it’s right that it 
happened this way, the country (il paese) was theirs, we were born there, but so what? 
Unfortunately, that’s the story...”12 The four years he delineated as “transitional” are those during 
which decisions to leave, he claimed, were taken by many individuals and families. Although 
circumstances had already influenced the decisions during this first period, most departures came 
during the second phase, after 1956, argued Berni. He did not end his story on a personal note, 
                                                            
8 “arrivò Nasser, giustamente, la libertà per il popolo...” 
9 “ti istigavano a fare cazzoti e ti dovevi difendere. Poi non era fair play, one against one, no, 
dieci venti contro uno.” 
10 “Ormai era talmente sicuro, certo che devi andar via...  e questa è la storia degli italiani 
d’Egitto e gli italiani tutti quanti...” 
11 “Non comprava nessuno, abbiam dovuto... svendere.” 
12 “È una brutta pagina di storia... Però è giusto che si è stato cosí, il paese era il loro. Noi siamo 
nati lì, che c’entra? Purtroppo questa è la storia...” 
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but rather slipped into a critique of the political changes enacted by Nasser’s regime. He 
applauded Nasser’s intentions, but also charged Nasser with the destruction of Egypt: “the 
revolution was just, Gamal Abdel Nasser was a nationalist, [but he] destroyed the country (kan 
ragal watani, kharrab al balad), it needs to be recognized.... he practically decapitated the 
Egyptian economy…” He argued that these changes brought ruin upon Egypt.  
 he committed the worst error. Socialism (eshtrakiyyah), but that wasn’t socialism, it was 
communism (sho’aiyyah). You could have a shop, could handle as much as 5,000 EGP 
per year, if you went beyond that, it would be nationalized, sequestered. This is 
communism. You had a company, five soldiers arrive, ‘what are you doing?’ (ta’mel eih) 
‘Where is the safe?’ (el khaznah fayn) ‘It’s there, what do you want with it?’ ‘The safe is 
the people’s!’ (khaznat el sh’ab) ‘No, it’s mine’... money from the bank? [slurping 
sound]... this is where he erred.13 
 
Berni ended as he had begun: “it’s an ugly page of history, but it’s true!” His lived experiences, 
according to him, could be attributed to these macrohistorical processes, which in turn extracted 
the Italians of Egypt from the worlds they had known.  
 
I had known G. Longo for several months--his former classmate G. Liciardello introduced me to 
him--when he took me to meet two of his acquaintances, A. Piperno and B. Salerno, both in their 
nineties. Their families had been neighbors in Alexandria. Because they were 15-20 years older 
than Longo, he insisted that they would have a different perspective on the Italian community in 
Egypt. We met in their home near Piazza Bologna, Rome (a neighborhood that became widely 
popular among repatriates from Egypt and former Italian colonies during postwar years). While I 
began to describe my research and my interest in hearing stories about the events I was following 
                                                            
13 “ha commesso il più grav’errore...Estrakiyah, ma quello non era estrakiyah, quell’era 
sho’aiyyah... Tu potevi aver un negozio, potevi trattare sino a 5 mille lire egiziane all’anno, se 
andavi oltre veniva nazionalizzato, sequestrato. E questo il comunismo. Tu avevi una società, 
cinque soldati arrivano, ta’mel eih? El khaznah fayn? Henak. 3ayz eih min al khaznah, Khaznet 
al sh’ab! la’ al khazna bet3ty. ... Falos el bank [slurping sound]… ecco dove ha sbagliato lui.” 
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in archival sources, Longo said, “let’s say that everything began to change in ’52...” But he 
barely finished uttering “fifty-two” when he was interrupted by Piperno, who exclaimed,  
no, it was ’48! With the declaration of the State of Israel everything began! That’s when 
it began. Then, after the war of 1948, they [undetermined] began to (agitarsi)... and then 
in 1952 there was the revolution in Cairo... the king left (il re è andato via).”  
 
Longo intervened, “that’s the problem, they got rid of the King, who was himself against the 
English and so the English didn’t help him stay.” Longo responded as though the presence of the 
monarchy naturally implied greater possibilities for minority communities. In fact, he continued 
by explaining that, throughout history, when there was a king or an emperor, “there [was] always 
tolerance... when there was the Ottoman Empire, there was tolerance, and then Ataturk made a 
revolution... and afterwards came the youth (i giovani) and they massacred the Armenians, that’s 
where it began to go wrong.”14 Longo’s vague and imprecise mention of “the youth” moved the 
conversation from the (inferred, on my part) Young Turks and the collapse of the Ottoman 
Empire to the Muslim Brotherhood and the disintegration of the Egyptian Monarchy.  
Longo remembered, trying to situate his own experiences in this timeline, “it was either 
in ’48 or ’52... we were going to the beach and a group of Arabs (arabi) tried to be tough-guys 
because they thought we were Jews... I insisted that I wasn’t.” Piperno used this occasion to 
interrupt and to address the contemporary situation—mention of the Muslim Brotherhood and 
generalized “youth” allowed her to make this leap from Longo’s encounter in the past to the 
present (at the time of the interview, the Muslim Brotherhood was in power in the Egyptian 
Government under the recently elected president Muhammad Morsi). As though attempting to 
correct or adjust my understanding of the Muslim Brotherhood, she described that, in the past, 
the Muslim Brotherhood was the most extreme among opposition groups. Piperno added that 
                                                            
14 “c’è sempre tolleranza... quando c’era l’impero ottomano, c’era molto tolleranza, poi Ataturk 
ha fatto la rivoluzione... dopo sono venuti i giovani e hanno cominciato a massacrare gli armeni 
... è li ch’è cominciato il male.” 
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today there are much larger fundamentalist (integralisti) groups that span continents. After telling 
me this, she turned to Longo, as she did not agree with his logic. Drawing from her own family’s 
Sephardic Jewish history, she said, “look at Spain during the reign of Isabella the Catholic, she 
was a queen but...” Longo gently dismissed this and instead placed the blame for the 1492 
expulsions from Spain on “the religious (i religiosi).” He returned to talking about Egypt, “as 
soon as there was the Republic, things began to go wrong.”15 Piperno piped up again. It was not 
a question of deterministic forms of government to her, but rather a matter of settling political 
injustice. She interjected, “but he [Faruk] was a king who didn’t matter (non valeva niente), he 
was a king who satisfied his own comforts and showed no interest in the people (il popolo).” 
Piperno suggested that the possibilities of the revolution could have been otherwise. Unlike 
Longo’s understanding of the republic as a naturally totalitarian space, she claimed, the 1952 
revolution was motivated by the disregard for the Egyptian populace shown by the monarchy. In 
reorienting Longo’s narrative in this way and by stressing 1948 as the decisive date of change, 
she cancelled the post-1952 regime’s culpability in transforming the lives of non-Egyptians, and 
placed it within a larger and more structural narrative of political inequalities in the colonial 
Mediterranean. 
 
C. Cherini and L. Morpurgo were both born in 1940s Egypt, but they met and married in Italy, 
years after having departed with their respective families. Cherini spent his childhood just around 
the corner from Talaat Harb Square (known to him as Suleiman Basha Square) in Downtown 
Cairo.  
Of politics, I knew nothing, I was young, [politics] didn’t interest me. But I can tell you 
of my personal experiences in a beautiful cosmopolitan environment (un ambiente 
                                                            
15 “hanno dato la mano ai religiosi e c’era l’inquisizione... in Egitto appena c’è stata la 
repubblica, da qualche parte è andato male.” 
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cosmopolita bellissimo)... in those years, remember, let’s say, to a certain point, Cairo 
was the city, if we want, between brackets, ‘ideal’ from the point of view of the amalgam 
of peoples and religions... Reconsidering it (ripensandoci) at this moment, one didn’t take 
account of things, because one lived normally (non se ne accorgeva perché viveva 
normalmente). 
 
Cherini’s utterances were punctuated with subtle dismissals and a hesitancy that skirted around 
the incongruity between his current knowledge of the past and his past experiences. In his 
retrospective gaze, he recognized aspects of the circumstances under which he and others had 
lived “normally” that had been unavailable to him at the time of his youth. He explained that, 
from the point of view of his experiences after he left Egypt and continuing to this day, he had 
lived in context evacuated of “politics.” He and many others described this as “a carefree life” 
(una vita spensierata), “it was a paradise from this point of view.”  “This point of view,” for 
Cherini, was the position of reflection, which collapsed past and present into one another and 
erased the politics of the past.  
 His father had passed away while he was young and he and his mother had little money, 
but they were able to “get by,” said Cherini. He went out, played football with the neighborhood 
youth, and frequented Cairo’s cinemas. He vividly recalled the interior decorating of each 
cinema. As Buccetti had described, the cinemas were sites that that facilitated the existence of a 
“cosmopolitan youth.” Cherini remembered that he learned English in the cinema, watching and 
listening to the films while following the French subtitles. Then, he paused in the middle of this 
story, and said, “from the political point of view, yes, we lived... [He hesitated] the burning of 
Cairo was really nasty.”16 The destruction of Downtown Cairo touched the places that he saw as 
essential to the style of life he had known as a child: the cinemas, Groppi (a popular café in 
Talaat Harb Square owned by a Swiss family), large department stores. The Cairo Fire 
                                                            
16 “Dal punto di vista politico poi, si, abbiamo vissuto... l’incendio del Cairo è stato veramente 
brutto.” 
 218 
transformed the urban landscape of possibilities that had enabled a carefree and youthful 
freedom. Few suffered personal attacks, and few homes were damaged. The destruction of the 
public, collective spaces that formed the center of Cairo as a “European” city contemporaneously 
destroyed the perceived separation between “Egyptian” and “European” politics.17 Indeed, it 
appears to have done so in a more visceral-affective manner than the dismantling of the legal 
regimes which had perpetuated such divides over previous generations.18  
 Cherini and Morpurgo drew the conversation away from the destruction of Downtown 
Cairo and towards the departure of Italians from Egypt.  
You know… the famous exodus wasn’t, contrary to how it may be thought, macroscopic, 
it was something that, yes, one heard in talk, but one didn’t live it... every once in a while 
one heard that ‘that family over there’ had to leave, and [then they] left... therefore, it 
wasn’t a climate of terror or of... one knew that people were ‘invited’—quote unquote—
to leave.19  
 
Morpurgo remembered discussions within her family about leaving Egypt; her parents had 
decided to go to Venezuela. Unlike Cherini’s family, which was hesitant to accept the change, 
Morpurgo’s family treated it as an adventure. She recalled that her parents made a game out of 
their departure and began to study Spanish together around the dinner table.  
Cherini interrupted, “it’s not that it was something forced [upon us] in the manner of... a 
deportation.”  
“Exactly,” agreed Morpurgo.  
                                                            
17 In a similar way, Kirli describes how the Smyra Fire of 1922 created national spaces out of 
Ottoman spaces. Kirli, “Forgetting the Smyrna Fire,” 27. 
18 See also Amr Kamal, “Empires and Emporia: Fictions of the Department Store in the Modern 
Mediterranean,” Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Michigan (2013), 279-281. For more on 
the Cairo Fire, see Nancy Y. Reynolds, A City Consumed: Urban Commerce, the Cairo Fire, and 
the Politics of Decolonization in Egypt (Stanford, 2012), especially pp. 1-46. 
19 “Una cosa che volevo dire, l'esodo  famoso , non è stata contrariamente a quello che si può 
pensare una cosa macroscopica, è stata una cosa di cui sì si sentiva parlare ma non si viveva 
perché ogni tanto si sentiva che quella famiglia lì ha dovuto lasciare e se n'era andata... quindi 
non c'era un clima di terrore o di... si sapeva che la gente veniva invitata - tra virgolette - ad 
andarsene.” 
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Cherini continued, “it was about taking spaces away from people… for example, they wouldn’t 
renew residence (permits) and then you couldn’t do anything, you couldn’t work... And if you 
needed to close up (chiuderla).” No direct threat was held against the Italians, he recalled, “but in 
the end, you understood, you understood de facto that you couldn’t live any more in that country 
(paese) because you couldn’t work.”20  
Cherini and Morpurgo spoke mostly amongst themselves as I listened. This 
transformation, they explained, was not physically traumatic, nor was it specific (“non è che sia 
stata una cosa…”). Cherini clarified that the process of transformation could be defined as 
“morally traumatic” precisely because it was not attributable to a specific event or action.21 To 
demonstrate this, he returned to his experiences in the schools. As a child, he attended French 
schools—as did many of the children in Downtown Cairo, he explained—until around 1952, 
when his mother transferred him to the Italian school.  
Already, one began to understand that things were changing, and my mother began to say 
‘you’re going to the Italian school’... for me that was traumatic because I knew Italian 
only from home, I had never studied it... my mother understood that for me there wasn’t a 
future in Egypt.”22  
 
When he asked her the reason for this change, he noted, she responded: “because one day, we’ll 
need to return to Italy.”23  
 
                                                            
20 “Era il togliere gli spazi dalla gente nel senso non rinnovavano il permesso di residenza e in 
questo punto qui, non potevi fare più niente, non potevi lavorare, e così dovevi chiuderla... sotto 
la minaccia delle armi, devi andare fuori, no! ma... però alla fine capivi che, capivi di fatto che 
non potevi più vivere in quel paese lì perché non potevi più lavorare, non potevi più...” 
21 “ma proprio del punto di vista morale.” 
22 “Già si cominciava a capire che lì le cose stavano cambiando, e inizia mia mamma, ‘ci vai alla 
scuola italiana’ che per me era un trauma perché io, l’italiano, non l’ho mai sutdiato... mia 
mamma capiva che per me non c’era futuro in Egitto.” 
23 “perché un giorno dovremo tornare in Italia.” 
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Vitulli was about 10 years older than Cherini. He saw the destruction of Downtown Cairo in 
January 1952 as key to understanding the following decade. Having finished school in 1951, 
Vitulli planned to go to Italy. He had recently begun performing in local theater groups, 
however, and a theater acquaintance helped him find work in the French schools in Bulaq (the 
Cairo neighborhood in which he lived) in order to pursue this newfound interest.  
Then, in January 1952, there was a moment, a police strike, which created a possibility 
for the Muslim Brotherhood... who burnt all of the city... the cinemas, the large Jewish 
department stores, Chemla, Salon Vert, Cicurel, the bars…there was a Greek who made 
brandy below my home, they came to burn his shop, but the doorman (bowwab), who 
was known by all said ‘what do you want to burn? I also have a café here!’24 
 
Vitulli explained that the demonstrations incited Faruk to call on the army to regain control over 
the city. “Let’s not forget that they lost the war in 1948.” This was important, he said, because 
the action prepared the army for the occupation of a city, tactics that they would use later that 
year when overthrowing the King. What is more, he claimed, it concretized the bonds of a young 
group of officers—the Free Officers—who had “formed this friendship and ideology”25 when 
they suffered losses on account of poor preparation and outdated equipment acquired from the 
British in the 1948 war. Vitulli drew on the history of British colonialism in Egypt to illustrate 
how different processes affected the unfolding events of the Cairo Fire, which he imagined as a 
catalyst for the following decade.  
 
I met L. Mieli at a dinner organized by the Milan chapter of the Amicale Alessandrie Hier et 
Aujourdui (Alexandria Yesterday and Today Club, AAHA). She traveled from Pavia to join the 
                                                            
24 “in gennaio 52... c’era stato un momento, uno sciopero generale della polizia, ha creato una 
possibilità per i fratelli mussulmani... chi hanno bruciato tutta la città. i cinema... grandi negozi 
degli ebrei... chemla, salon verde, cicurel, tutti i bar... c’era un greco che faceva un brandy, sotto 
casa, sono venuti per bruciare lui, però il mio portanaio era conosciuto da tutti, diceva ‘che 
volete bruciare?’ lui ha detto ‘ma ho un caffé” 
25 “hanno stretto questa amicizia e anche ideologia.” 
 221 
group twice each year. AAHA was created with the intention of reuniting former residents of 
Alexandria, but the extension of social and familial networks in Egypt made it appealing to 
former residents of most cities in Egypt.26 Although most individuals delineated between 
Alexandrian, Cairene (Cairoti), and Port Saidian (Port Saidini) Italians, many of these same 
families had relatives in or had themselves lived in more than one city. Mieli invited me to 
interview her at her home where, as we spoke, her daughter recorded the interview for her own 
memory.27  
Mieli’s father was from a Livornese Jewish family that arrived in Egypt in the mid-
nineteenth century. Initially having settled in Suez, the family moved to Cairo, where she was 
born. Her mother was from a family of Italian protégés from Istanbul who moved to Alexandria 
in the early-twentieth century. As an Italian Jew, Mieli said, contrary to the experience of most 
Italian families, her father was not interned during the Second World War.28 After having 
distinguished her family’s experience from others, however, she connected her history to that of 
other Italians through the Cairo Fire. The event, for her, was the beginning of the revolution. She 
said,  
but I remember the revolution well... I was 14 or 15 years old. The center (il cuore) of the 
demonstrations departed from Piazza dell’Opera and I was precisely 100 meters from 
Midan Opera, I had gone into a music store... Papazian...29 to purchase a harmonica. I exit 
[the store] and a man, very cordially, in French, asks me, ‘what are you doing here?’ I 
told him I was out to buy something. And he told me to run home... I turned around and 
saw the crowd (la folla) behind me. Immediately afterwards was the real demonstration 
(c’è stata la vera manifestazione), they burned Cairo for three days... it was ’52... if 
someone tells you it wasn’t true, I was there, and this was the revolution.30  
                                                            
26 [more here about Sandro Manzoni and AAHA, the organization based in Manzoni’s home in 
Cologne, Switzerland]. 
27 L. Mieli Pressel interview, 21 April 2012. 
28 Although Italian Jews were officially excluded from the internment, those who showed 
sympathies to the regime were interned nevertheless. I have been unable to find statistics on this 
number of Jews interned, perhaps in part because of the arbitrary nature of the arrest process. 
29 An Armenian musical instruments store on the corner of Midan Opera. 
30 “era il ’52... se qualcuno ti dice che non è vero, io c’ero, e questa era la rivoluzione.” 
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She explained that it was “hard to watch” (ti faceva male vedere). Mieli remembered the burning 
of the cinemas, stressing that only Downtown Cairo was touched, “they did nothing to Shobra... 
they went to the European neighborhoods, they were against the English and French, not the 
Italians… and that’s where they did damage, where there was the European neighborhood in the 
center.”31 Here she made a further distinction. By mentioning Shobra, Mieli isolated a 
neighborhood whose Italian population was comparatively significant: Shobra included nearly 
one quarter of all the Italian residents in Cairo in 1947 (around 35 percent of the neighborhood’s 
population were non-Egyptians residents).32 It was also middle-class, much like the 
neighborhoods on the periphery of Downtown Cairo such as Daher, Abdin, or Bulaq, each of 
which contained a large Italian population. Mieli clarified that the sites destroyed during the 
Cairo Fire—while affecting all who witnessed them—were chosen because of their signification 
with regard to a specific “European” (and not Italian) landscape within the city. Her daughter 
interrupted and said, “tell him the story about the bwabo,” mispronouncing the word for doorman 
in Arabic (bowāb), nevertheless making it clear that Mieli had told the story many times. As in 
Vitulli’s account, an Egyptian doorman chased away the demonstrators when they arrived at the 
threshold of the apartment building in which they lived.  
At that time, Mieli claimed, Italians were not involved in political activity or discussion. 
Hearsay of the Muslim Brotherhood commenced after the events of 1952, she described, as 
though the Cairo Fire itself propelled Egyptian politics into Italian circles. “I can’t forget that 
date, 26 January 1952... then in July they sent away the King... there was one general, Naguib, 
but it was Nasser that led (guidava) and after a year he took power, that’s when it became really 
                                                            
31 “non sono andati a shobra, sono andati nei quartieri europei... erano contro gli inglesi, 
francesi... e hanno fatto i danni li, dove c’era... il quartiere europeo era lì nel centro...” 
32 Amicucci, “La comunità italiana,” 87-88. 
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difficult to live in Egypt.”33 She explained that, notwithstanding the damage done to buildings 
owned or operated by members of different communities, “the Egyptians” (always ambiguously 
signified and generalized by use of “loro”) were against the English—“they’d had it with the 
English (ce l’avevano contro gli inglesi)!” These events convinced her father that their presence 
in Egypt was no longer welcome. He had understood, she said, that it was time to depart, but did 
not do so until 1956.34  
 
P. Paoletti insisted that “the problem” in Egypt was that neither Italy nor Egypt had favored 
“integration” (integrazione). “Our country (paese) was there,”35 she said, “we could have been 
recognized [in Egypt] as an ethnic minority (una minoranza etnica)... it could have been, it could 
have saved the whole community.” According to her experience, she said, the change was 
sudden and drastic, “[after 1956] one had to pay the same taxes [and use] the same courts, we 
didn’t have this perception the year before!” Ironically, it was the “integration” into Egyptian 
economic life that cancelled the possibility of Italians to claim their “paese” as Egypt (or as 
located on Egyptian territory, but abstracted from it politically) whilst maintaining a sense of 
national belonging. As such, the “integration” sought by Paoletti was one of exception in which 
socio-political life would mirror capitular Egypt. 
As if confessing a secret realized in the telling of this story, Paoletti said, “[the Italians] 
didn’t buy Egyptian newspapers... In effect, there was also this, this underestimation (sotto 
valutazione) of Egyptian life.” She elaborated,  
from a sociological point of view... this was an antique people. Yes, the Italian was 
wealthier, but equal, only richer... not more advanced… therefore there wasn’t this [type 
                                                            
33 “e lì è cominciato a diventare molto brutto vivere in Egitto.” 
34 “non era più tempo di stare lì... ha detto che è meglio che andiamo via” 
35 “il nostro paese era lì” 
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of] distinction... this could have been (poteva essere) an element that could have (poteva) 
favored integration... but there was always an alterity (alterità).  
 
To Paoletti “paying the same taxes and using the same courts” did not signify integration. Her 
model of integration, instead, drew from a font of antiquity. She articulated a notion of historicity 
that united Egyptians and Italians as members of an antique Mediterranean kinship. And it was 
on this claim that she perceived integration as a possible course in historical time, yet it was a 
course in which an alterity pervaded, keeping the two communities arranged in a hierarchy. The 
fact of having been “of” Egypt—she always used “italiani d’Egitto” to describe the abstracted 
Italian community and also interrupted her speech with the phrase “il nostro paese era lì” (our 
country was there)—generated a timeless difference and evaded questions about the historical 
conjunctures that had permitted the Italian community to emerge there, such as the Capitulations 
or British colonialism.  
The rupture of this imbalance through the insertion of Egyptian “politics” disturbed the 
atemporal sociological equivalence that Paoletti saw between Italy and Egypt, Italians and 
Egyptians. Referring to a memoir of her father’s life published by her elder sister, she said, 
“you’ve read my father’s book, it was sudden (è stato un improvviso).” Despite her claim that 
change came suddenly, Paoletti’s father had left around six months prior to the 1956 Suez Crisis 
to search for housing and employment in Italy. Once having procured work in Pisa, his wife and 
two daughters joined him in Italy, in the midst of the conflict.  
Here, generational cracks appear in the temporal sense of departure from Egypt (similar 
to Buccetti’s note that, prior to 1952, not one Italian had thought about the possibility of leaving 
Egypt despite that his brother had left immediately after the war). In these narratives, social 
hierarchies are presented in such a way that they appear stable until what was defined as an 
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essentially “Egyptian” politics tore apart the fabric that constituted the lives of Italian residents in 
Egypt. For Paoletti, this rupture happened in 1956.  
Her sister sat quietly as we talked. I asked when or if there was an event that caused 
people to leave or that stoked dormant fears, trying to navigate around this notion that the change 
was “sudden.” Paoletti’s sister answered, “when Naguib took power some people left.” She 
paused, “many left.” She then clarified: “When Nasser arrived the people (la gente) began to 
depart... seeing as we had nothing in particular to do (siccome non avevamo da fare).” Paoletti 
then opined, “that’s what I was saying [before], Nasser lost the occasion to integrate... [instead] 
they nationalized! (nazionalizzavano)!” The “nationalization” referred to the processes set into 
action with the transition away from the Capitulations, including the Company Law of 1947, and 
further accelerated during Nasser’s regime (1956-1970). The incorporation of Italian subjects 
into Egyptian jurisdiction, another side of the same process of nationalization according to 
Paoletti, was responsible for dismantling the conditions that permitted the existence of the 
Italians of Egypt as an exceptional community.  
 
One individual who experienced the nationalization was A. Ades. I met him through an 
individual in attendance at Caroline Delburgo’s book presentation in Milan, R. Cohen, who in 
turn had received my contact from an anonymous source. He insisted that the valuable stories of 
Italian experiences in Egypt were those of the Italian Jews. The rest, he said, were “mere 
immigrants.” Thus—after meeting with him—he put me in touch with Ades, who invited me to 
his home to talk more.  
Ades’s father had arrived in Egypt from Syria, where he already held Italian nationality 
in the 1920s. Ades, however, could not pinpoint the family’s original connection to Italy. He 
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presumed that his father’s family members were Italian protégés. His mother was from a town on 
the outskirts of Izmir (then known as Casaba, Turkey).36 They married in 1926 and A. was born 
soon thereafter, while his father—after having worked for some years as a representative for an 
Italian fabric firm—opened a small factory in the desert near the al-Maza airport, then on the 
periphery of Cairo. The factory, which employed workers from two nearby villages, expanded 
until the late 1950s. While detailing the many successes of the factory, Ades remembered a story 
his father had told him, one that took place in the early 1930s. A Jewish merchant from Palestine 
came to Egypt to study his father’s factory as he had planned to open a similar one outside of the 
young city of Tel Aviv. Upon seeing his land, the visitor asked his father, “you are planting trees 
here in Egypt?” to which his father, confused, responded, “yes.” The visitor asked, “you think 
you’ll finish your days in Egypt?” to which his father, again confused, responded, “yes.” The 
visitor said, “you will not finish your days in Egypt!” This anecdote was the preface for Ades’s 
story. Indeed, he added, although his father had confidently stabilized the factory, the family 
never rooted themselves in Egypt and changed homes frequently in Cairo. First, they lived in 
Daher, and then during the Second World War in Downtown Cairo, and finally in Garden City: 
“no one bought apartments at that time.”37  
 Ades remembered that tensions and antagonism between Egyptians and foreigners 
became overt around the time of the declaration of the state of Israel, but then subsided for some 
years after the war. He recalled the years 1948-52 with great pleasure. Even the Cairo Fire, he 
said, affected only those who lived and worked in Downtown and left his home in Garden City 
                                                            
36 For more on the importance of this area during the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth 
centuries see Sevket Pamuk, The Ottoman Empire and European Capitalism, 1820-1913: Trade, 
Investment and Production (Cambridge, 1987). 
37 “nessuno acquistava appartamenti in Egitto in questo tempo.” Although no one explicitly 
mentioned it, this constant movement may also indicate the lack of an idea of permanence in 
Egypt. Angelos Dalachanis has made a similar claim with regard to the Greek community. 
Dalachanis, “Leaving Egypt.” 
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and factory on Cairo’s periphery untouched.38 “Around ’53 or ’54 they [undefined, Egyptian 
Military] got rid of the King and installed Muhammad Naguib... the first thing he said to the 
foreigners (stranieri) [was] ‘don’t worry.’”39 Ades saw this reflected in the life of his family’s 
factory, which, marking the passage of time, remained untouched until 1956. During the Suez 
Crisis, it was “temporarily” sequestered, permitted to run under the supervision of a high-level 
Egyptian officer who, knowing nothing of the industry, confided in Ades’s father. At this 
moment, Ades recalled, the family understood the changes at play in Egypt would result in a 
fundamental restructuring of social and economic life: his father transferred the company to his 
sons and moved to Switzerland with a large portion of the company’s wealth (where it had been 
safeguarded in Swiss banks since the founding of the company). Within two years, Ades and his 
brother also left Egypt and joined their father in Switzerland where they searched for work in 
European capitals (London, Paris, and Rome). Within six months his brother found work in 
Milan and soon thereafter so did Ades. “It wasn’t too difficult because we had money... therefore 
we began [the transfer away from Egypt] smoothly... but it wasn’t easy, because from one world 
you arrived in another... you felt a little uneasy, a little foreign (un po’ straniero).”40 
 I asked him to elaborate on how he experienced the departure from Egypt. He responded, 
moving away from the affective and towards a political framing: “look, the English exaggerated 
with the Egyptians,” he said, and then he described how the Capitulations and Mixed Court 
system had perpetuated social imbalance under British control.  
                                                            
38 The larger Ades department stores, in fact, suffered great damages during the Cairo Fire. A. 
Ades—part of a large family involved in running the enterprise—supplied goods to the Ades 
department stores through his factory. See Reynolds, A City Consumed, 187-188. 
39 “’54 o ’53 hanno tirato il re e hanno messo Muhammad Naguib il quale la prima cosa ha detto 
agli stranieri ‘non vi preoccupate’” 
40 “non è stato molto duro perché avevamo soldi... quindi abbiamo iniziato in un modo 
abbastanza rilassato... ma non è stato facile, perché da un mondo arrivi a un altro mondo... ti 
senti un po’ a disagio, un po’ straniero” 
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It wasn’t right! I think they were cancelled after the war... it finished there... if a foreigner 
beat an Egyptian, the Egyptian couldn’t do anything... there was a word ‘hemāya’ 
(protection)... ‘I’m protected by the Italian consulate, I’m protected by the French 
consulate’... as long as there was the King...[it was that way].41 
  
The ease with which he recalled the usage of “protection” is telling of the knowledge of 
structural divisions that existed under the capitular regime and of the perceived implications of 
their abolishment—even if precise details of their cancellation were often ambiguous. Ades 
could not remember when these privileges were abolished, but he remembered vividly how they 
were employed by individuals. He implied fluency in people’s engagement with the capitular 
legal regime by jumping into various personalities protected by the Italian or French consulates.  
 More than a legal concept denoting a state of exception, hemāya was a social practice or 
strategy used among members of the groups protected under the capitulatory regime to exempt 
themselves from culpability in Egyptian life.42 Certainty and precision do not follow the 
temporality of legal and political histories, which extend beyond the confines of their sanctioned 
validity.43 The archival records reveal that the variety of legal changes enacted to “integrate” 
foreign nationals into Egyptian politico-economic life were unclear and vaguely interpreted by 
the very individuals under whose authority the Italian subjects fell. The application and 
knowledge of procedures that reconfigured the possible worlds of Italians residents in Egypt 
between 1948 and 1956 (and into the 1960s in some cases) are similarly imprecise and 
confounding, just as they often appear in narratives of change and transformation. By 1961, 
Ades’s factory had been nationalized and its control ceded to the Egyptian officer who had 
                                                            
41 “una cosa esagerata, non era giusto! mi sa che sono stati cancellati dopo la guerra... la cosa era 
finita li... se un straniero picchiava un egiziano, l’egiziano non poteva fare niente... c’era una 
parola che si chiamava hemāya... sono protetto dal consolato italiano, sono protetto dal consolato 
francese... finche’ c’era il re...così.” 
42 I mean this in the sense of Bourdieu’s notion of strategy in his Outline of a Theory of Practice 
(London, 1977). 
43 Jane F. Collier, Bill Maurer, & Liliana Suàrez-Navaz “Sanctioned Identities: Legal 
Constructions of Modern Personhood” Identities, 2 2-1 (1996): 1-27. 
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worked with him and his father since its sequester in 1956. Ades exhibited little remorse. His 
only critique of the political changes that occurred during 1950s regarded Nasser’s failure “to do 
enough” for the Egyptian populace. The events that contoured Ades’s life were the political 
transformations that affected the functioning of the factory. To close, he returned to the warning 
his father had received in the early 1930s and exclaimed, “the end of colonialism arrived, and 
goodnight!”44 His father did not, in fact, finish his days in Egypt.  
 
Few experienced the political transformations with the ease recounted in Ades’s story. B. d’Alba, 
born in the first year of his father’s internment, remembered a difficult exit from the Second 
World War.  
Those who left the concentration camp (campo di concentramento) found a horrible 
situation [on the outside]… those who had a small [business] activity that was closed 
didn’t have the opportunity to open the same activity... this is how it was for my family.  
 
D’Alba’s grandfather arrived in Egypt from Trani (Puglia) between 1860-74 and settled in 
Alexandria. His father—the first child born in Alexandria—ran a construction firm, which grew 
throughout the interwar period, but lost all of its business due to its closure during his internment 
from 1940-45. After the war, d’Abla’s father found occasional work as an independent 
contractor. Unable to support his family on temporary employment, around 1952 he began to 
search for work outside of Egypt. Having understood that “overall, things needed to change,” his 
father transferred to a construction firm based in Saudi Arabia.45   
D’Alba recalled hostile encounters between groups of Egyptians and foreigners that 
instilled a sense of unease among his peers. But this was not, he claimed, the cause of departure. 
He finished his studies in 1958 and traveled to Italy. “By then things had worsened in Egypt… I 
                                                            
44 “è arrivata la fine di colonialismo e buona notte!” 
45 “le cose dovevano cambiare in totale” 
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was in Italy, my mother and brother joined me in Italy, and then even my father came to Italy.” 
D’Alba specified that, in contrast to French and British subjects, who were explicitly targeted by 
Egyptian nationalists due to their affiliation with colonialist regimes, Italians in Egypt suffered 
primarily from a lack of work.46  
They began to make laws... my father, luckily, always anticipated [them]… he avoided 
[departure] for some time with work... many had problems of this nature, therefore in 
some way, they were constrained (costretti) to take to the idea of leaving...[but] there 
wasn’t a threat.47 
 
D’Alba’s narrative here is important. The “laws” to which he refers are undefined, but they 
concerned at least the limiting of employment opportunities (probably the Company Law of 
1947, blended into the nationalization laws of the late 1950s and early 1960s, which brought an 
end to large foreign industries like Ades’s). D’Alba focused not on causal or determinant factors 
that led to transformation in and departure from Egypt, but rather on the processes through which 
possibilities to remain in Egypt closed. In many cases, Italians of Egypt used “costretti” 
(compelled) in describing the impetus for departure. No direct “threat” (minaccia) was made to 
Italians, I was told repeatedly—perhaps this rendered one’s ability to point to specific historical 
events as catalysts for departure even more challenging—instead, macro-scale political 
transformations were argued to have reconfigured the futures of the Italians in Egypt. One of the 
most striking patterns pronounced in this regard is the intervention of “Egyptian” politics into the 
lives of Italians (and, more broadly, Europeans) as an effective force of change, dissolving 
perceived boundaries between the communities that were described as essential. It was the 
destruction of the public “points of encounter” that had rendered the space of Downtown Cairo 
                                                            
46 “per quello che riguardava agli italiani era sopratutto legato al lavoro.” 
47 “cominciavano a mettere leggi... mio padre per fortuna ha sempre anticipato... mio padre l’ha 
evitata per il lavoro... ma questo è quello che succede e molti hanno avuto problemi di questa 
natura quindi in qualche modo sono stati costretti a prendere in modo l’idea di andarsene. ... non 
c’era una minaccia” 
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“European” and that had excluded Egyptian politics--as well as the Egyptian populace, who 
appear in these narrations only in terms of certain kinds of labor, such as doormen 
(bowabin/portieri), domestic workers (servi). Speculation on what “could have been” (poteva 
essere) introduced into this narration a sense of unrealized potential which restored possibility to 
futures past.48 It is not that Nasser was wrong, I was told—although a link was made to 
emergence of the Free Officers, interviewees were hesitant to place blame on the policies of one 
political leader—but it was that he missed the opportunity to “integrate” Italians. Where agency 
was placed in these explanations illustrates how notions of national and regional belonging were 
imagined to have factored into (or to have been excluded from) geopolitical conditions as 
possibile trajectories of the unfolding of history. In being “compelled” to depart, the Italians of 
Egypt were objects acted upon by historical forces from which they perceived themselves to be 
absent.  
                                                            
48 Alessandro Portelli has called a similar phenomenon “uchronic dreams”--replacing topos with 
chronos, “utopia is a nowhere place, uchronia is a nowhen event.” Alessandro Portelli, 
“Uchronic Dreams: Working Class Memory and Possible Worlds,” Oral History Journal, 16, 2 
(1988): 46-56.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
Repatriates, Emigrants, and Refugees: 
Leaving Egypt between Politics and the Past, 1954-1958 
 
On 15 August 1956, Edoardo Giorgianni arrived in Naples, probably aboard the Enotria 
or Esperia, two of the most popular passenger ships that connected Egypt to Italy. Giorgianni, 
born in Alexandria, was 65 years old at the time and had been living in Port Said after he was 
“dismissed” from the Mixed Courts in Cairo in 1940, when Italy entered into the Second World 
War. He and his wife lived on a small pension and support from two of their children, both of 
whom remained in Port Said. His daughter worked for a passenger line, and his son for an Italian 
dredging company in Suez. He, his wife, and his youngest son left Egypt on account of 
Giorgianni’s “own will [and] excessive precaution.” He left his apartment to his children, and 
had no other belongings in Egypt. He arrived in Italy with around 40,000 Italian lire. 
 Upon his arrival, Giorgianni went directly to the Questura (central police station) in 
Naples, where he left a declaration regarding his family’s circumstances and a plea for assistance 
from the local authorities.1 He described, “honestly, I have nothing and no one to lean on, aside 
from a few distant maternal relatives that I have yet to track down.”2 He claimed to have escaped 
the increasing tension between foreigners and Egyptians and the fear that his home, and Port 
Said generally, would become the center of an international conflict. He wrote, “I was struck, 
indeed, by the bellicose tension that each day grows more acute in Egyptian cities, and which is 
                                                            
1 MAE AP Egitto 1956, B1049 DG Pubblica Sicurezza to MAE, 24 September 1956. 
2 “in verità non ho alcun punto di appoggio, ad eccezione di alcuni lontani parenti di mia madre, 
che mi riservo ancora di rintracciare.” 
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described without exaggeration even in the Italian newspapers that I’ve had the chance to read 
these days.”3 
 According to Giorgianni--information that he thought pertinent for the Italian 
government--the Egyptian government had ordered some kind of mobilization (“una specie di 
mobilitazione generale”) of troops. War equipment and arms were being moved into the Canal 
Zone at a steady rate and there was a growing presence of Soviet technicians among Egyptian 
military personnel. He noted that, personally, he had not suffered “any persecution… and not 
even by Egyptian Authorities.” Interestingly, the Questura sent Giorgianni’s declaration to the 
Direzione Generale di Pubblica Sicurezza (General Directorate of Public Security) of the 
Ministry of Interior, highlighting, aside from his request for assistance, his “impressions” that 
Egypt leaned on Russia for military intensification and that an international conflict was 
looming.  
Before the Ministry could respond, more families left Egypt in similar circumstances. 
The consulate in Alexandria paid for the voyage of several families that arrived in Bari (Puglia) 
on the same day Giorgianni disembarked in Naples. Upon arrival in Bari, Virgilio Santoro took 
his family directly to Naples, despite being forewarned that there were no active protocols 
regarding assistance for Italians departing Egypt. After having turned over their belongings in 
Alexandria to a family friend, and with a definitive departure in mind, the Santoro family waited 
for one week outside of the Comune in Naples where they received neither monetary aid nor 
temporary housing. Furious, Santoro traveled back to Alexandria and left a letter for the Italian 
Consul describing that the only advice he had received was that he request aid from Egyptian 
                                                            
3 “Sono stato, infatti, impressionato dalla tensione bellica, che ogni giorno va sempre più 
acuendosi nelle città egiziane e che efficacemente viene descritta, senza alcun carattere di 
esagerazione, anche dai giornali italiani, che in questi giorni ho avuto occasione di leggere.” 
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authorities. Clearly, he noted, the Italian officials did not realize that he was an “Italian” from 
Egypt.4 
It was not until late September that the Ministry responded to the Questura regarding 
Giorgianni’s case. They reiterated the same message that had been relayed to Santoro prior to his 
departure: that if “these Italians... need to repatriate… they do not benefit from any legal 
entitlements to special treatment.”5 An undefined “initial assistance” could be dispersed by local 
offices upon their arrival. Afterwards, they were to be directed to their Municipality of Origin 
(comune di origine, their legal residency in Italy) or, if they did not have one, to that of their 
father or paternal grandfather, where they were to benefit from the same assistance provided to 
locals by Municipal Assistance Offices (Enti Comunali di Assistenza, ECA), an organ of the 
Direzione Generale di Pubblica Assistenza (DGPA).6  
 
This chapter takes the dynamic of departure~arrival of Italians from Egypt as an 
entryway into the events through which the social and legal conditions of the community shaped 
contingent identities as emigrants, repatriates, and refugees. None of these terms is exclusive of 
the other, but each one—in its employment—signifies a fluctuation in the scale of possible 
courses of action. Each represents a layered history. During the events of the mid 1950s, the 
conjunction of political circumstances placed Giorgianni and other Italians of Egypt on the 
precipice of redefining where they fit in relation to the “Patria,” its history, and its territorial 
boundaries. Giorgianni’s case—and many of the stories that appear in this chapter—points to the 
importance of international politics in the lives of the Italians of Egypt. That he drew attention to 
                                                            
4 ACGA, Virgilio Santoro. 
5 “dovessero rimpatriare... non rivestono alcuna qualifica per fruire di speciali provvedimenti di 
leggi...” 
6 AdSN - Questura Gabinetto - dispozioni di massima, B158, fasc.3171 “Egitto - connazionali 
rimpatrio” Ministero dell’Interno/DGAP to Questure di Napoli 29 September 1956. 
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the ongoing changes in Egypt’s military suggests that he saw himself as, in some form, an actor 
for the state (and not just a subject of it). In the midst of recounting his own departure and 
requesting assistance, Giorganni “scaled-up,” refusing to let the meaning of his arrival stop at its 
micro-level effects. Indeed, this sense of macro-scale political belonging is what resonated with 
many Italians of Egypt in the aftermath of the long 1930s, and that which inflected “repatriation” 
with the hope of “returning” to the Patria. Frustration and anger filled Santoro when this went 
unseen by Italian Authorities upon his arrival in Naples. If Italians had become “immigrants” 
only with the end of extraterritoriality in Egypt, by utilizing an idealized form of the 
community’s history the Italian government tried to create conditions that would help them to 
remain immigrants. However, without pushing for the very privileges the Montreux conference 
had abolished, Italian residents could not stay in Egypt. The historical and legal conjunctures no 
longer endorsed the exceptionality that had made the Italians of Egypt a possible community. 
Devoid of such privileges, the community endured in a state of precariousness, on the precipice 
of its own redefinition. Emigration, repatriation, and refuge served as conduits through which 
these historical circumstances could be rerouted.  
Two processes combine at this historical moment. The first regarded Italy’s foreign 
policy in Egypt. As Nasser’s regime sought to render Egypt a sovereign state, free of foreign 
dominance, between 1954 and 1956, the decisions made by representatives of the Italian state 
necessarily affected the conditions of possibility for Italian residents and institutions in Egypt. If 
Italians of Egypt “scaled-up” in their framing of departure and arrival, Italian diplomats and 
politicians often “scaled-down,” drawing on the historical presence of Italians in Egypt to 
solidify their ties with the Egyptian administration amidst these changes. This practice was 
intertwined with Italy’s developing neo-Atlanticist policies—particularly after 1955—as its 
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leaders sought to secure industrial and oil interests in Egypt and recuperate the country’s role as 
a “mediatory” power in a constellation of American, European, Egyptian, and Middle Eastern 
relations.7 The second process regarded Italy’s internal political dynamics. The Italian 
administration recognized that the means to deal with Italian residents leaving Egypt in 
impoverished conditions could not be met on a large scale--in both political and economic terms. 
This process pointed to an awareness that the Italian state lacked the resources to properly 
address the growing crisis of population displacement.8 The conjoining of these processes put the 
definitions of the community in flux. 
Many of the Italians of Egypt requested collective repatriation, which they perceived as a 
recognition of their “historic community” because it placed them within a nationalist narrative. 
Similar to the pieds-noirs of Algeria, the Italians of Egypt imagined Italy from a distance and 
within a different assemblage of socio-political realities.9 Initially, they did not portray 
                                                            
7 “Neo-Atlanticist” refers to Italy’s repositioning of its link to NATO and the United States that 
followed the Second World War. While initially towing the line on many of Washington’s 
policies and interests in the Mediterranean, after 1955, Italy took a more active role in redefining 
its own interests. One of the main tools used to negotiate this role was the Italian-Egyptian 
connection. For more on this see, Federica Onelli, “L’Italie et la crise de Suez” Guerres 
mondiales et conflits contemporains, 1, 245 (2012): 21-40; Federica Onelli All’Alba del 
Neoatlantismo: La politica egiziana dell’Italia (1951-1956) (FrancoAngeli: 2013); Alberto 
Tonini “L’Italie la naissance de l’état d’Israël et le premier conflit israélo-arabe, 1948-1950” 
Guerres mondiales et conflits contemporains, 1, 245 (2012): 7-20; Giovanni Fornari ad Amintore 
Fanfani, il Cairo, lì 15 gennaio 1959 Riservato alla persona del presidente Fanfani. Ventunesimo 
Secolo, 6, 14 (2007): 177-184; Francesco Perfetti “Il Mediterraneo e Medio Oriente nella politica 
estera italiana,” La Comunità Internazionale, 2 (2001): 185-202; D.W. Ellwood, “Italy, Europe 
and the Cold War” the politics and economics of limited sovereignity,” in (eds.) Chris Duggan 
and Chris Wagstaff, Italy in the Cold War: Politics, Culture and Society, 1948-1958 (London, 
1995); Antonio Varsori, “Italy’s policy towards European integration (1947-1958),” in (eds.) 
Chris Duggan and Chris Wagstaff, Italy in the Cold War: Politics, Culture and Society, 1948-
1958 (London, 1995). 
8 Matteo Sanfilippo “Per una storia dei profughi stranieri e dei campi di accoglienza e di 
reclusione nell’Italia del secondo dopoguerra” Studi Emigrazione/Migration Studies, XLIII, 164 
(2006): 835-; Silvia Salvativi Senza Casa, Senza Paese (Mulino: 2008). 
9 Andrea Smith “Europe’s invisible migrants” in Andrea Smith (ed.) Europe’s Invisible Migrants 
(University of Amsterdam Press: 2003) 9-3; Andrea Smith Colonial Memory and Postcolonial 
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themselves as “refugees (rifugiati)” fleeing their home in Egypt per se, but rather as Italians 
“returning” (or hoping to be collectively returned) to the home which they had “served” and 
represented from abroad.10 The policy of the Italian administration was to avoid collective 
repatriation as late as possible. Instead, they encouraged Italian residents to repatriate 
independently. By sponsoring slow, individual repatriation, the Italian State attempted to 
forestall the blossoming of new collective (political) identities based on displacement. This only 
underscored the disjunction between social and legal categories of belonging.11 The events of the 
Suez Crisis, however, rendered a slow repatriation impossible and the community departed 
Egypt en masse. In the Refugee Sheltering Centers (Centri di Raccolta Profughi, CRP), Italians 
leaving Egypt became “refugees” de facto when the collective circumstances of their departure 
appeared to go unacknowledged. 
Only a few months after Giorgianni and Santoro had arrived in Naples, Italiani nel 
Mondo published an article titled “Why the Italians [are leaving] Egypt” which detailed the 
situation of some 3-4,000 families that had departed since late 1956. The author described the 
Suez Crisis and its effect on the already scant labor market, noting that Italians continue to leave 
Egypt, “searching in Patria, or in emigration destinations, work that permits each one to live and 
bring life to, even modestly, one’s family.”12 It took several years for the procedures to grant 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Europe: Maltese Settlers in Algeria and France (Indiana University Press: 2006); Todd Shepard, 
The Invention of Decolonization, 89. 
10 For more on the linguistic distinctions between these terms see Pier Luigi Zamporlini La 
Tutela del Profugo Italiano nell’Ordinamento Interno. Università degli studi “La Sapienza” 
Roma: PhD Thesis (2008). 
11 Pamela Ballinger, “Borders and the Rhythms of Displacement, Emplacement and Mobility” in 
Thomas M. Wilson & Hastings Donnan (eds.) A Companion to Border Studies (Blackwell: 
2012): 395; Liisa H. Malkki “Refugees and Exile: From ‘Refugee Studies’ to the National Order 
of Things,” Annual Review of Anthropology 24 (1995): 515. 
12 “per cercare in Patria, o nei contingenti di emigrazione, un lavoro che permetta ad ognuno di 
vivere e di far vivere, sia pur modestamente, la propria famiglia.” A.C. “Perchè gli italiani 
lasciano l’Egitto” Italiani nel Mondo, XIII 7 (10 April 1957). 
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status as “national refugees” to the Italians of Egypt to be finally concluded. At the time, the 
category of “refugee” was especially unclear in the Italian context given the country’s history of 
ambiguous policy with regard to immigrants and refugees since unification.13 The legal category 
itself had only recently emerged on the European scene.14 This new form of legal belonging for 
the Italians of Egypt cemented a sense of the historical collectivity to which Italians of Egypt 
claimed to belong, while also entitling them to an unique relation to contemporary Italian 
society. In a sense, granting the legal status of “national refugee” was one way to incorporate 
non-contemporaneous layers of history into the present. It created from the unfolding of 
historical events—at a nexus of histories of migration and decolonization in the postwar 
Mediterranean—a particular set of relations among the Italians of Egypt, the Italian state, the 
Italians in Italy, and the past. 
 
I. Taking Positions 
The Italian ambassador in Cairo, Pasquale Janelli, described an attempt on the life of 
Nasser in October 1954 as a key moment for the latter to consolidate power: particularly in 
dealing with the Muslim Brotherhood, the largest opposition, which had been rendered illegal 
since the 1952 military coup.15 Janelli saw the Muslim Brotherhood as Nasser’s greatest obstacle 
                                                            
13 Marij Leenders “From Inclusion to Exclusion: Refugees and Immigrants in Italy Between 
1861 and 1943,” Immigrants and Minorities, 14 2 (1995): 115-138; see also Sabina Donati A 
Political History. 
14 Malkki discusses the emergence of the historicized refugee, the “knowable, nameable figure 
and... object of social-scientific knowledge.” Malkki “Refugees and Exile,” 498; see also Marie-
Louise Karttunen “Repatriates of Refugees? Narrating the Loss of Transnational Community,” 
History and Anthropology 25 3 (2014):376. 
15 Giuseppe Galassi, a former editor and director of Il Giornale d’Oriente at the height of Fascist 
propaganda efforts in the 1930s, had been brought in to write an article earlier on the occasion of 
the Revolutionary Council’s consolidation by Il Tempo. Giuseppe Galassi, “Prima inchiesta in 
Egitto dopo la fine della monarchia” Il Tempo 25 June 1953. 
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in his dealings with Europe and the United States.16 Studying carefully the changing political 
environment in Egypt—as he had been sent to Cairo to do—Janelli witnessed Nasser’s 
propaganda campaign which portrayed the young figure as the de facto “president” of the 
country. The scant attention given to international political events, such as the visit of Italian 
defense minister Randolfo Pacciardi in 1953 which we saw in the last chapter, seemed to prove 
that. The visit had not yielded the results anticipated by the Italian administration. Janelli 
expected that international political allegiances would take on new forms in the coming years, 
and part of his goal in Cairo was to find a strategy that would benefit the Italian state in these 
emergent configurations.  
 Janelli met with Nasser in May 1954, and, although impressed with his physical presence, 
he noted condescendingly in one report that Nasser lacked the sophisticated “cultural” 
background of the former Egyptian royal family. Like his predecessors, Janelli stressed a 
“Mediterranean affinity, commonality of customs and mentalities, [and] reciprocal economic 
interests,” observing that, for Nasser, “the concept ‘Italy’ evoked only the thought that the Italian 
community approaches and sometimes mixes more willingly with Egyptians than the other 
foreign communities.”17 Earlier that month the two countries had settled contracts on around 600 
million EGP worth of public works projects.18 By stressing the collaboration and the shared 
“heredity” of the Mediterranean, Janelli attempted to convince Nasser of the “historic and 
geographical necessity” to organize a common defense against a “threat that looms so close.” 
That attempt, however, was largely unsuccessful.19 Janelli described Nasser as “cold, if not 
                                                            
16 MAE AP Egitto 1954, B934 Janelli to MAE 9 November 1954. 
17 “[il] concetto ‘Italia’ ha evocato soltanto... il pensiero che la comunità italiana si avvicina e 
qualche volta si mischia più volentieri delle altre Comunità straniere alla popolazione egiziana.” 
18 MAE AP 1954 B935 Janelli to MAE 14 May 1954; MAE AP 1954 B935 Janelli to MAE 17 
May 1954. 
19 “difesa contro una minaccia che incombe così vicina.” 
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negative.” The Italian diplomat understood that if there was a conduit through which he could 
connect with Nasser, it was the Italian community in Egypt.20  
The framework used by the Italian diplomats mimicked the cultural propaganda of the 
Fascist period. Cognizant of the ongoing “exodus” of Italians from Egypt since the end of the 
Second World War, Janelli addressed the Italian press office in 1954 as journalists prepared to 
write about the anniversary of the military coup to assure them that a “period of uncertainty 
(periodo di incertezza)” had passed and that “the Italians of Egypt” continued their activities 
“just as they had in the past.”21 For the occasion, Janelli also requested that Nasser publicly 
address the Italians of Egypt. The content of the speech—which was to be read in Italian by 
Nasser—was written by members of the diplomatic team. It contained, “a recognition of the 
Italian contribution to the construction of modern Egypt and precise guarantees for the protection 
of our interests and communities (collettività) in Egypt.” Nasser read the following:  
 No one better than the Italian people, who fought hard for their independence, can 
understand and appreciate these efforts [for the liberation of the territory from foreign 
troops]... the centuries-old friendship between Italy and Egypt, their common interests in 
the Mediterranean and their historic affinities, are more than tokens of growing future 
collaboration between the countries... The politics of the new Egypt aim to intensify 
cultural and economic exchanges with Italy. I wouldn’t want to conclude this message 
without mentioning the thousands of Italians who for several generations live in Egypt 
and collaborate in the affluence of the country with their work and industriousness in all 
sectors. To these Italians, the Revolution ensures that their work, their initiatives and 
activities will be protected and valorized because we believe in loyal collaboration of all 
men of good will.22 
                                                            
20 MAE AP 1954 B935 Janelli to MAE 14 May 1954. 
21 MAE AP 1954 B935 Appunto Ufficio Stamp 20 May 1954. 
22 “Nessuno meglio del popolo Italiano, che tanto ha lottato per la sua indipendenza, è in grado di 
comprendere ed apprezzare questi sforzi [per la liberazione del Territorio dalle truppe 
straniere]... La secolare amicizia tra l’Italia e l’Egitto, i loro interessi comuni nel Mediterraneo e 
le loro affinità storiche, sono altrettanti pegni di crescente collaborazione futura fra i due Paesi... 
La politica del nuovo Egitto mira ad intensificare ulteriormente gli scambi culturali e 
commerciali con l’Italia. Non vorrei concludere questo messaggio senza accennare alle migliaia 
di Italiani che da parecchie generazioni vivono in Egitto e collaborano al benessere del Paese con 
il loro lavoro e la loro operosità in tutti i settori. A questi Italiani, la Rivoluzione assicura che il 
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The speech was broadcast in Egypt and aired simultaneously on Radio Roma, in Italy. It was 
envisioned as a continuation of the propaganda emphasizing the role of the Italians of Egypt in 
Egypt’s modernization. Keeping with the emergent Italian policy in the Mediterranean, which 
sought to strengthen ties between Italy and unaligned Egypt, the Italian diplomats sought to 
maintain an image of the Italians as prestigious contributors to Egypt’s modernization and its 
march towards independence; in other words, as agents in Egyptian history. 
Around this time, an elite Italian insurance broker in Egypt, Vittorio Giannotti, was 
publicly accused of making irregular financial transactions. It was another example of the way 
foreign subjects were exploiting their privilege in the Egyptian economy. Vittorio Zoppi, then 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, cautioned Janelli to avoid taking a position on the case so as not to 
spoil the image of the community’s “prestige.” Any slight on the Italian community, he believed, 
would harm the potential “to boost Italy’s economic penetration of Egypt.” The new Italian 
policy was to explicitly avoid taking any positions with regard to the political present, while 
continuing to emphasize the community’s historic presence in Egypt. These political projects--
contemporaneously economic and social--were inseparable: so long as the Italian residents were 
seen in good light by the Egyptian regime, the Italian diplomats felt that they had an advantage 
over other foreign powers and thus greater economic maneuverability.  
But it was not so easy. The Egyptian administration harbored suspicions that foreign 
residents were responsible for carrying out communist and Zionist activity. Many of these same 
suspicions carried over into the public, and the image of the “foreigner” often assimilated all 
non-Egyptian national communities into one collective Other. Italian diplomats worked against 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
loro lavoro, le loro iniziative [e] la loro attività saranno protetti e valorizzati perché noi crediamo 
nella leale collaborazione di tutti gli uomini di buona volontà.” 
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this current, highlighting the differences between the Italians and other foreign communities. 
These suspicions were also behind the desire of the Italian diplomats to keep the Italian residents 
as far removed from (Egyptian) national politics as possible. To remain detached from ongoing 
political changes in Egypt, the position of the Italian state needed to carefully generalize its own 
national community as one concerned solely with its own coherency. 
In preparation for the commemoration of the military coup, Egyptian Authorities held a 
meeting in Bulaq, the Cairene district where Italians made up over half of the foreign residents.23 
Nasser and other members of the Revolutionary Council were present, as well as local journalists 
and the Italian Consul De Michelis. During the meeting, Giuseppe Cattaneo, an Italian from the 
district, stood up to address the Egyptian officers. The following day, the Le Progrès Egyptien 
reported that Cattaneo had spoken in the name of the Italian community, declaring “in perfect 
Arabic... that it was natural for the Italian community to support the Liberation Movement.” Al-
Ahrām inflated the incident, claiming that “the Italian community (al-gāliya al-ītaliyyah), which 
represents a large part of the foreigners [in Egypt], announced its support for the revolution and 
its leaders and puts the lives and goods of its children at Egypt’s service for the realization of its 
national claims.”  
The Italian Consul present later claimed that Cattaneo had spoken only for himself and, 
without clarification, maligned “the enemies of Egypt and its independence,” therefore not taking 
a clear stance with respect to national alliances (in relation to the Anglo-Egyptian tensions, 
                                                            
23 In the 1947 census one sees that, although the number of Italians was high in relation to other 
foreigners (54.3%) and this area is often referred to by Italians of Egypt as an “Italian district” 
(the Italians from Bulaq called “bulacchini”), the ratio of Italians to the total population was a 
mere 0.7%. These numbers are a constant reminder that the Egypt described by the diplomats 
and by many of the Italians of Egypt themselves was one which left invisible the large majority 
of Egyptian residents. In the Cairo neighborhood in which Italians had their largest population in 
relation to total population, in al-Ezbakiyya, the percentage was still only 2.1%. Amicucci, “La 
comunità italiana,” 88. 
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Italian politicians were always wary of taking a stance against the British). Janelli considered 
“any collective manifestation that could give the impression of participation in the political life 
of this country [Egypt] by our community” too risky, yet taking a position on this—as in the 
Giannotti case—would appear to be taking a stance against the authority of the Revolutionary 
Council, even more so because of Cattaneo’s outright declaration of support. Since Cattaneo 
vocalized a favorable opinion of Nasser’s movement, Italian Authorities decided not to challenge 
the attention the incident was receiving in the press.24 
The only damning public reaction came from Catraro’s Cronaca—which was rather 
important given its circulation within the Italian community. Since its founding in 1950, 
Cronaca had become the most popular newspaper among Italian residents and its sponsors were 
among the largest contributors to the Società di Beneficenza Italiana (SIB).25 Due to the role the 
Cronaca played in shaping the opinions of the Italians of Egypt, the Italian government 
subsidized its publication.26 In an opinion piece, Catraro cautioned Italian residents about making 
statements in the name of the larger community. Referring to Cattaneo’s comments (and their 
reprinting in various newspapers), Catraro noted that Cattaneo’s statement had indeed been made 
“for a good cause.” The sympathy expressed by Cattaneo was echoed by the current Italian 
administration and by Italian residents in Cairo, wrote Catraro, but Italians should avoid any 
public input on “Egyptian politics.” He asked rhetorically what might happen if someone else 
spoke, “believing to be authorized to speak in the name of the Italians”: “are we sure that things 
would go well and there wouldn’t be errors? Are we sure that [these statements of partnership] 
will be favorable criteria for Italo-Egyptian friendship? And if someone, irresponsible, were to 
                                                            
24 MAE AP Egitto 1954 B935 Janelli to MAE 2 June 1954. 
25 CEA, Cronaca 2 July 1955. 
26 Catraro observed that “la povertà di mezzi della gran massa dei connazionali che trovano più 
comodo di passarsi il giornali di mano in mano anziché di comprarlo” had left the paper in dire 
straights. MAE AP Egitto 1955 B1006 “Rapporto Consolare 1954” Alexandria 30 June 1955. 
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err?”27 Catraro saw that, on this occasion, Cattaneo’s statement had been in line with the politics 
of the Egyptian regime. Yet, he also knew that, given the quickly changing nature of the political 
context and the growing precariousness of the Italian community, vocalization of political 
sympathy risked being misinterpreted. Here, Catraro underlined the attention given to defining 
the position of Italians as extraneous to Egyptian political life--and thus friends rather than foes.   
 
II. A Place for the Italians of Egypt?  
The Italians residents’ historical narrative had been formed around the idea that the 
community was foundational to Italy’s national history abroad--and not only to Egypt’s 
modernization. Yet, the community’s “prestige” remained a source of concern for the Italian 
state only insofar as it provided an important tool in negotiating new political-economic 
arrangements with the Egyptian regime. The Italian government profited from these ties, for 
example, when it began to negotiate large-scale projects—technical training and public-works 
contracts such as the oil pipeline in Suez, business promised to the Italian companies Dalmine 
and Snam (Società Nazionale Metanodotti).28  The response to Nasser’s broadcast in July had 
indeed helped to boost the community’s perceived prestige relative to other foreign 
communities.29 But it did not affect the pace at which the political-economic circumstances in 
Egypt were changing. In observing that the economic activities of Italian residents were “tightly 
linked to the economy and, in general, to all of life in Egypt,” Janelli highlighted—perhaps 
unintentionally—that the Italian residents had few resources outside of Egypt. Being an “asset” 
                                                            
27 “Siamo noi sicuri che le cose andrebbero ancora bene e che non sarebbero sommessi degli 
errori? Siamo noi sicuri che ‘tratto’ e ‘sempre’ sarà fatto con criteri favorevoli all’amicizia italo-
egiziana? E se qualcuno, irresponsabile, sbagliasse?” 
28 CEA, “La costruzione dell’oleodotto Suez-Cairo affidata al gruppo Dalmine-SNAM” 
Cronaca, May 29, 1954. 
29 MAE AP Egitto 1954 B935 Janelli to MAE 3 August 1954. 
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linking Italy to Egypt, the burgeoning political friendship that employed the rhetoric of their 
historic “prestige” strongly contrasted their everyday prospects. Many wondered whether the 
Italian community could find a place in this present constituted on residues of the past.  
A critique was levied against the Italian administration in the pages of Cronaca. It noted 
a disinterest on the part of the administration in rebuilding the institutions that were, during the 
interwar period, so fundamental to the quotidian lives of the Italian residents.30 The newspaper 
published a short article—authored by its editor, Catraro—that reported rumors of the Italian 
government’s plan to allocate 120,000 EGP to the Alexandrian community and 30,000 EGP to 
the one in Cairo, out of the total 150,000 EGP given to the Italian state from the sale of the 
Alexandrian school and the Italian stadium in Cairo as part of the postwar settlement. Few 
families could afford private schooling and subsidized education was necessary.  
If the government was serious about its interest in the future of Italian residents, Catraro 
argued in the article, any commission formed to determine the use of the available funds should 
include “eminent and competent” members of the community who understood its troubles.31 The 
importance of the Cronaca lent urgency to the issue. The Foreign Ministry organized a meeting 
between Janelli and Pellegrino Ghigi, who had served as the Italian Minister in Egypt during the 
Fascist consolidation in the 1930s, to discuss plans for the funds. No community members were 
invited. The Ministry had in fact proposed to use 120000 EGP to purchase a new building in 
Alexandria to use as a state school and to split the remainder between schools run by the Salesian 
missionaries in Alexandria and the Italian hospital in Cairo. The two diplomats, however, 
believed that the most pressing concerns to be addressed for the future included: first, the need 
for institutions that would foster cultural exchange between Italians and Egyptians and not serve 
                                                            
30 MAE AP Egitto 1955 B1006 Janelli to MAE 25 April 1954. 
31 CEA, Athos Catraro, “I problemi della collettività... le scuole gratuite” Cronaca, June 23, 
1954. 
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exclusively Italian residents; and, second, the quickly declining welfare conditions of the Italian 
residents. Young Italians had been abandoning Egypt since the end of the war in large numbers, 
leaving behind their parents and elders, who could survive on lesser funds, subsidies, or 
remittances from relatives abroad. The diplomats warned that the “aging and impoverishment” of 
the community meant a continual increase in assistance services would be required by the State. 
If something was not done, the SIB (the locally-based Italian charity organization), already 
burdened with the task of subsidizing unemployed Italians, would have to liquidate its accounts 
to make available resources for the aging community.32 The repercussions of such an event, “in 
the heart of a community well aware of a fund of substantial size that is derived directly from 
their own properties,”33 were dangerous, argued Janelli—both for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
in Rome and for the Italian residents in Egypt.  
Janelli saw cultural institutions as having the potential to reinvigorate the timeless 
“friendship” between Italy and Egypt. Less than a year later, he would write of his frustration 
about how the Italian schools were managed: these schools were “almost exclusively for the 
Italian community, the diffusion of Italian language and thought are held up only by private and 
commercial initiatives.”34 The events of the Società Dante Alighieri were neither well-attended 
nor publicized in Egyptian spheres and his attempts to introduce Italian language education into 
Egyptian middle schools failed due to a shortage of willing and trained instructors.35 Funding for 
a new school, in the end, was thus rejected because it did nothing to bring together Italian and 
Egyptian communities. Janelli and Ghigi instead agreed on putting 60,000 EGP towards a center 
                                                            
32 MAE AP Egitto 1955 B1006 Cairo Appunto 20 October 1954. 
33 “in seno ad una collettività cui è ben nota l’esistenza di un fondo di notevole entità che deriva 
da beni delle collettività stessa.” 
34 “quasi esclusivamente verso la comunità italiana, la diffusione della lingua e del pensiero 
italiani sono additati in Egitto solo alle iniziative private e commerciali.” 
35 MAE AP Egitto 1955 B1005 Janelli to Martino 3 August 1955. 
 247 
for “cultural gatherings” part of which could be rented out for private use; 30,000 for the 
constitution of a similar locale in Cairo; 15,000 each for the Italian hospitals in Alexandria and 
Cairo; and the remaining 3,000 to the Salesian schools.36 
These changes underlined other trends, such as a steady decline in attendance of Italian 
schools by Italian children. The consul in Alexandria explained this to be a result of both the 
decrease in births due to the internment and the “exodus” of Italians who no longer found work 
in Egypt. The consul, in his 1954 annual report, cautioned that investing in new schools would 
be “useless, even damaging” to the community. He suggested investing more energies in the 
Salesian schools, which were also seen as the solution to the “flooding” of communism in Egypt, 
and would thus help bring Italian and Egyptian regimes closer to one another.37 The introduction 
of new schools, he argued, would divide the community into smaller factions and could only 
weaken its homogeneity, risking manipulation by oppositional political parties just at the 
moment when many Italians had turned their attention to the Italian state in seeking an answer to 
the question of departure.  
 
With departure always on the agenda of the Italians of Egypt, Catraro’s newspaper 
closely followed debates regarding quotas and possible destinations for Italian emigrants (as well 
as the recent constitution of the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration, ICEM).38 
An anonymous writer to the Cronaca petitioned for the inclusion of the Italians of Egypt in a 
                                                            
36 MAE AP Egitto 1955 B1006 Appunto 20 October 1954. 
37 MAE AP Egitto 1955 B1006 “Rapporto Consolare 1954” Alexandria 30 June 1955. 
38 ICEM, the forerunner to the IOM, was constituted in the early 1950s to address the challenges 
posed by refugees and “surplus” populations in Europe. Although working with refugees was not 
in its mandate, it was not beyond its scope and, after 1952, relocating refugees became a key 
aspect of its practices. For more on the history of ICEM and its position in postwar assistance of 
refugees, see Jérôme Elie “The Historical Roots of Cooperation Between the UN High 
Commission for Refugees and the International Organization for Migration,” Global 
Governance, 16 (2010): 345-360. 
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national emigration quota: “even a modest one… for obvious reasons.” Another article noted 
that, given the high numbers of Italian residents in Egypt who had participated in the First World 
War and their service to “the Patria… it’s logical that today in light of the new living conditions 
resulting form the laws of the country that hosts us, our compatriots (connazionali) have the right 
to work, as do their brothers in the Peninsula.”39 Italian residents in Egypt claimed to be entitled 
to the same opportunities as Italians in Italy, even more so—many argued—because of their 
“service” and “sacrifice” from abroad.40  
Around the same time, in Spring 1955, an article in Le Reforme (a French-language 
newspaper in Egypt), penned by Antonio Lovato, the newspaper’s correspondent in Rome, 
responded to the Cronaca asserting that the Italian administration in fact had no intention to 
address the interests of the Italian community in Egypt. The article blamed Catraro for creating a 
false sense of hope among unemployed Italians. Lovato, instead, suggested individualized 
migration as a solution: “the free emigrant is preferred, well-received, makes a fortune and 
doesn’t return. The assisted emigrant, protected, for obvious reasons is less well-received in the 
countries where he goes.”41 What was at stake here were two competing visions of how the 
Italian residents in Egypt figured into a national imaginary: Catraro’s—and that commonly 
expressed in the pages of Cronaca—portrayed the Italians of Egypt as an essential appendage of 
the Italian state, and thus active in/for it wherever they migrate; and Lovato’s, which saw Italians 
as independent emigrants, detached from the state, in search of fortune and a future. 
                                                            
39 “Patria... è logico che, oggi, dinanzi alle nuove condizioni di vita risultanti dalle leggi del 
Paese che ci ospita, i connazionali abbiano il diritto di lavorare, come gli altri loro fratelli della 
Penisola.” 
40 CEA, “I nostri problemi: una quota di emigrazione anche per gli italiani residenti in Egitto,” 
Cronaca, April 16, 1955. 
41 “l’emigrante libero in generale è preferito, bene accolto, fa fortuna e non ritorna. L’emigrante 
assistito… protetto… e per ovvie ragioni è meno ben visto nei paesi dove si reca.” CEA, 
Cronaca “Un altro scettico articolo del corrispondente romano di ‘La Reforme’” 
 249 
Lovato—picking up on what seemed a contradiction but instead signaled a shift in Italo-
Egyptian relations—questioned how it was possible that the Egyptian Minister of Economy and 
Industry requested “men and work” from Italy, but that nevertheless “the Italians of Egypt ask to 
emigrate.” Catraro responded harshly to Lovato’s call to abandon hope in the administration. He 
averred that Lovato failed to grasp the severity of the “total unemployment” looming over the 
community. Catraro estimated that within six years, young Italians would be unable to find work 
due to the nationalization of the work force—even those trained and specialized in the trades 
requested by the Egyptian Government—and that this entailed a large-scale departure from 
Egypt that could not be dealt with on an individual basis. He argued instead that departure 
needed to be envisioned as part of the broader political exchanges between the two countries.  
The 1954 annual report prepared by the staff of the Alexandrian consulate described the 
“end of immigration” in Egypt, not merely referring to the actual flow of people, but to the 
conditions that permitted the Italian residents to live in Egypt as immigrants. It was estimated 
that the decline in the population was around “20 to 25 percent.” Although official statistics 
showed that some 1,086 families had left Egypt since 1949, the numbers were likely much 
higher.42 Only 655 “definitive departures” were registered between 1946 and 1951. However, 
during this period, many left without registering precisely because a definitive departure 
signified abandoning one’s rights to residency if circumstances proved unavailable elsewhere. 
This was something, many hoped, a sponsored emigration would alleviate, despite Lovato’s 
claim that fewer independent emigrants returned. Over thirty percent of the population was 
officially unemployed. Apart from the hundreds of laid-off workers as a result of the new 
                                                            
42 The departures of part of a family or temporary departures of individuals who did not register 
their departure so as not to relinquish residency are likely excluded from these estimates. Instead, 
these numbers should reflect only the number of “official” departures, which means those that 
were somehow arranged or conducted through the consulates. 
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company laws, the 1954 report noted the impending problem of the hundreds of unemployed 
youth seeking their first jobs. 1,053 families received welfare support. Subsidies took the form of 
monthly or biweekly distributions of half to two EGP per family, depending on need.43 A total of 
1,373,710 EGP in aid was distributed over the course of 1954. Once the elite structure on which 
much of the community relied, so many of the “passport Italians”—the definition of their 
citizenship status still ambiguous, especially with the end of a model of imperialism that sought 
to profit from their presence in the Levant—requested passport renewals for departure that the 
Italian Foreign Ministry, the consulates in Egypt, and Italian authorities in Turkey compiled a 
partial list of the families that had arrived as protégés from Ottoman territories at the beginning 
of the century to determine whether the Italian Government was legally responsible for them.44 
This is one of the first reports to include details about the ambiguous status of Italian protégés, in 
what became known as the “Ankara List” of “former protégés of Ottoman origin (ex-protetti di 
origine ottomana).” Only afterwards was a process initiated to concede to them full Italian 
citizenship, but only to those exhibiting signs of “spiritual and political” relations with the Italian 
state.45  
The Egyptian government concurrently enacted new regulations to control the outflow of 
people and capital. One of these changes required an exit visa of all departees, temporary and 
                                                            
43 This data comes from the consultation of the registri archives at the now defunct Consolato 
Generale in Alexandria and the current Cancelleria Consolare in Cairo, where each receipt of 
received payment is placed in the individual family folders. 
44 MAE AP Egitto 1955 B1006 “Rapporto Consolare 1954” Alexandria 30 June 1955.  
45 For example, in July 1956, when Riccardo Cardoso requested a rennewal of his Italian 
passport, the Consul noted that the reasoning was “evidently opportunistic”--in other words, he 
was seeking a passport so that he could depart from Egypt and the Italian one had been what he 
carried since the interwar period. The Consul further declared that Cardoso was absent of the 
“continuata esistenza di quei rapporti spirituali e politici con lo Stato italiano che, anche 
all’estero, concretizzano la qualità d’Italia” See ACGA, Cardoso Riccardo fu Giuseppe 1897, see 
also ACGA, Roditi fu Abramo cl. 1877 (lista di Ankara).
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permanent.46 These measures confirmed the pessimistic outlook of the consular report, which 
took its perspective beyond Alexandria. The report’s conclusion spoke on two levels. First, it 
described the Italian community as firmly cemented at an impasse. Second, it offered the Italian 
Consul’s interpretation of what this impasse looked like from the position of the Italian state. The 
consul concluded that the combined effects of the Second World War and the tighter restrictions 
on foreigners in Egypt precluded any possibility for “placement (sistemazione)” in Egypt for the 
unemployed Italians. Moreover, he refuted the remedial potential of repatriation en masse. The 
influx of Italians from Egypt, he claimed, would only “swell” the “already long lines of 
unemployed [in Italy],” and the expenses of repatriation would cost far more than the subsidies 
that were provided to the Italians in Egypt at the time. However, in the report, the consul draws 
attention to one other factor which, he claimed, provided exemplary evidence that the Italians of 
Egypt would be unable to integrate into metropolitan Italy: 
 Without family ties, which are especially important for the reinsertion in the national life 
of those individuals who repatriate even after a few years’ absence, accustomed to living 
conditions totally different from those in Italy, speaking a language deformed by the long 
presence in the Near East to the point to make it sensibly different from what we speak , 
these compatriots (connazionali), once repatriated, would end up feeling foreign in the 
country of which they have nationality, and might even regret what they had left [behind] 
notwithstanding the life of restrictions and humiliation that they were constrained to 
live.47 
 
This “abnormal” situation, however, could not be prolonged, argued the consul. The enduring 
circumstances had forced the Italian residences to “panhandle” (elemosinare) from the consular 
                                                            
46 MAE AP Egitto 1955 B1006 Appunto 25 June 1955, Cerimoniale to Ambasciata Cairo 30 July 
1955. 
47 “Privi dei legami familiari, che pur si rivelano così importanti ai fini del reinserimento nella 
vita nazionale di chi rimpatria soltanto dopo pochi anni di assenza, abituati a condizioni di vita 
del tutto diverse da quelle esistenti in Italia, parlando una lingua che la lunga permanenza nel 
vicino Oriente ha deformata al punto dal farla apparire sensibilmente diversa da quella che 
parliamo noi, questi connazionali, una volta rimpatriati, finirebbero per sentirsi stranieri nel 
Paese di cui hanno la nazionalità, e forse anche per rimpiangere quello che hanno lasciato 
nonostante la vita di ristrettezze e di umiliazioni che erano costretti a condurvi.” 
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offices and the SIB. Many awaited “any initiative” that might bring stability to their lives—even 
confronting the risks of another emigration. In the report, the consul interestingly added that if 
there had been a moment to encourage naturalization, it had long passed, and thus action needed 
to be taken: 
 to exit from this paralysis that could be dangerous to the morale of our nationals, who 
naturally associate the memory of a period of exceptional prosperity at the time of the 
Capitulations with the particular prestige promised to Italian communities abroad by the 
authoritarian regime of the Ventennio.48 
 
Until that moment, departures had been largely independent choices of individuals and families 
who were finally able to settle elsewhere—the model encouraged in Lovato’s article. The consul, 
however, following Catraro’s advice, wrote: “I see no other alternative than massive repatriation 
unless a series of windfalls opens new employment possibilities in other countries for the 
chronically unemployed of Alexandria.”49 The limitations that had grown to characterize the 
collective life of the community put the entire population at risk of impoverishment. In response 
to this, the consul excluded both the integration of the Italians of Egypt into Italy and the 
subsistence of the community in Egypt. Within this framework, emigration was the only 
solution. 
 Days before the consular report was published, Italian residents in Alexandria gathered to 
celebrate the “Day of Solidarity (Giornata della Solidarietà).” The event commemorated the 
roughly 5,000 Italian residents in Egypt who participated in the First World War. It was widely 
attended by members of the Italian community. For the occasion, Camillo Giuriati, the Consul to 
                                                            
48 “di uscire da un immobilismo che può rivelarsi pericoloso per il morale di questi nostri 
connazionali, i quali sono naturalmente portati ad associare il ricordo del periodo di eccezionale 
benessere goduto al tempo delle Capitolazioni a quello del particolare prestigio assicurato alle 
collettività italiane all’estero dal Regime autoritario del Ventennio.” 
49 “non vedo quale altra alternativa possa contrapporsi al rimpatrio in massa, se non un 
complesso di provvidenze particolari che aprano ai disoccupati cronici di Alessandria nuove 
possibilità di lavoro in altri Paesi disposti ad accoglierli,” MAE AP Egitto 1955 B1006 
“Rapporto Consolare 1954” Alexandria 30 June 1955. 
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Alexandria during the Fascist period who had been repatriated with other diplomats in June 
1940, made his first return to the city.  In the presence of the current and former Italian Consul 
and the Alexandrian Governer, members of the veterans association (Associazione Mutilati ed 
Invalidi di Guerra) raised the flags of the different Italian military divisions and, in the afternoon, 
aired documentaries on the war in the main hall of the Don Bosco Institute. Beyond 
commemorating the First World War, the event took on an exceptional importance in the heart of 
the community, it was dedicated to “the pioneers who, also in the field of their work abroad, 
gave their blood so that the Patria would become greater and more beautiful.”50 Through 
reenacting the community’s participation in the national narrative, the event also redistributed its 
wealth in a moment during which the flow of capital had been severely reduced.51 It generated 
donations ranging from one to 32,280 EGP made by individuals and Italian companies operating 
in Egypt.52  
 As though to confirm the current consul’s assertion that the Italians of Egypt only looked 
backwards to find the prestige they purported to have known during the “Ventennio,” the former 
consul was celebrated with great appreciation for his “actions taken, many years ago, in favor of 
our community.”53 While the current administration attempted to reformulate its political and 
economic ties in relation to the new Egyptian regime, it also reinforced a notion of the Italian 
community as one that was extraneous to state interests. Integration in neither Egypt nor Italy 
seemed possible to the administration that portrayed the Italian community as locked in a 
nostalgic gaze towards the “prestige” garnered from a political moment that no longer resonated 
                                                            
50 “…anche a tutti i pionieri che, anche sul campo di lavoro all’estero, diedero il proprio sangue 
perché la Patria fosse sempre più grande e più bella.” 
51 CEA, “La ‘Giornata degli Italiani di Alessandria’,” Cronaca, May 2 1955. 
52 CEA, “L’elenco totale delle donazioni per la ‘Giornata della Solidarietà Italiana’,” Cronaca, 
July 2, 1955. 
53 CEA, “Il Ministro Giuriati in Alessandria” Cronaca, May 21, 1955. 
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with the present. If the community was irreconcilable with both Italy and Egypt, however, the 
question of departure and emigration remained: where were these Italians to find a place?   
 
III. Conflict Looms 
 When Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal on 26 July 1956, Italy’s position 
within the constellation of Atlantic, European, and Middle Eastern politics was further 
obfuscated.54 England, however, who had large investments in the Canal Company, and France, 
who owned the company for another ten years, saw the removal of Nasser as the only means to 
secure their interests in the region (their hostility towards Nasser predated the nationalization but 
became more pressing at that moment).55 In Rome, Amintore Fanfani—secretary of the 
Christian-Democrats and protagonist of the emergent “friendship politics” centered around 
Nasser—thought that the nationalization of the canal posed two major challenges for Italy: 
assuring free navigation for Italian ships; and maintaining international control while 
concurrently recognizing Egypt’s right to sovereignty. Other powerful figures in the Italian 
political hierarchy sympathized with Nasser, such as Gronchi, Taviani and Tambroni, and even 
members of the philo-Atlantic circles of Segni and Saragat. To this group of politicians, Nasser’s 
professed neutrality in growing Cold War tensions rendered him an ally and provided hope for 
an alternative political alliance. Janelli, the only politician vehemently opposed to Nasser’s 
                                                            
54 Robert Tignor, “The economic activities,” 449; see also the short article published by Nasser 
himself in English in which he articulates the rational behind the massive industrial projects of 
the mid 1950s. Gamal Abdel Nasser “The Egyptian Revolution” Foreign Affairs, 33 2 (1955): 
199-211. For a more complete analysis of the events of 1956, see the volume by Wm. Roger 
Louis & Roger Owen (eds.), Suez 1956: The crisis and its consequences (London, 1989).  
55 Ralph Dietl “Suez 1956: A European Intervention? Journal of Contemporary History, 43 2 
(2008): 259-278. 
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actions, had since been replaced in Cairo with Giovanni Fornari. Fornari was assigned to Cairo 
specifically because of his experience in the “decolonization” of Somalia.56  
 Following the military coup, the build up of military forces in Egypt had given the 
impression of an impending conflict. As early as April 1956, the Italian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs decided it would not take a position in the event of a conflict unless it was backed by the 
United Nations.57 Surveillance of the flow of arms from “beyond the curtain (oltre cortina)” into 
Egypt revealed that fighter jets and light bombers were arriving in Egypt from Czechoslovakia.58 
A secret NATO report cautioned that the contracts of several major development projects—such 
as the construction of a military and merchant port in Alexandria—would go to Soviet 
companies, despite the Egyptian regime’s preferences for a private firm.59 NATO forces 
interpreted this as an occasion for the entry of Soviet-trained “experts,” who could then establish 
commercial relations and serve as valuable conduits of pro-Soviet propaganda.60 As we have 
seen, the growing presence of Soviet propaganda was not lost on the Italians of Egypt, as was the 
case when Edoardo Giorgianni reported on these trends upon his arrival to Naples in 1956. 
As tensions over Suez grew, the Italian State tried to affirm its role as an unaligned party. 
In May, Fornari was interviewed by Al-Tahrir, the newspaper run by the Egyptian military, as 
part of a campaign to reach out to the Egyptian public and secure Italy’s preferential status in 
                                                            
56 Giuseppe Vedovato, “La Crisi di Suez del 1956,” Rivista di Studi Politici Internazionali, 77 4 
(2010): 547-571, 550; Onelli All’Alba del Neoatlantismo, 34-36, 119; It should be noted here 
that Fornari’s role in Egypt was, perhaps, rather important. He had previously been sent to 
Somalia under the auspices of the United Nations to prepare the country for its independence. In 
1952, talk of sending him to Egypt stirred much debate among Egyptian (and presumably 
British) politicians, aware that discontent was brewing from within the Egyptian Government 
and Military. See, MAE AP Egitto 1952 B787. 
57 MAE AP Egitto 1956 B1048 “situazione interna ed internazionale dell’Egitto” 28 April 1956. 
58 MAE AP Egitto 1956 B1048 Appunto 17 May 1956. 
59 The reasoning behind this was, reportedly, the better credit ratings offered by the Soviet 
companies. 
60 MAE AP Egitto 1956 B1048 secret NATO report “comité sur la politique economique 
Sovietique” 13 July 1956. 
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relation to other powers.61 Despite Nasser’s hostility to the ways Western media covered the 
situation—including the Italian press—he met with the Italian ambassador and assured him of 
his commitment to Italo-Egyptian partnership, offering even to encourage the Ministry of 
Education to explore possibilities for cultural exchange between the two countries.62 Only a short 
time before the nationalization of the canal, agreements had been made between Enrico Mattei of 
ENI (the Italian oil tycoon), and the Egyptian regime, a partnership envisioned as a continuation 
the “traditional spirit of friendship” between the countries and marking a victory for the Italian 
company, which had seen previous efforts to procure accords stifled by Americans in Iran.63 
Importantly, ENI was also representative of the new kind of partnership between the countries, 
one built on high-level industrial agreements that did not mirror the interests of the on-the-
ground realities of Italian residents.  
The more immediate antagonism was between London and Cairo. Vittorio Zoppi, the 
former Minister of Foreign Affairs who had been sent to London as an ambassador in 1955, 
wrote of the relations between Cairo and London: “I can’t possibly avoid noting how these 
oscillations of hope and delusion, smile and offense, openings and closures, recall so closely the 
Anglo-Italian skirmishes between 1936 and 1939.”64 The reference to the shifting dynamics of 
Anglo-Italian-Egyptian relations perhaps implied that the Italians could take advantage of the 
tensions between Britain and Egypt in similar ways as the British had capitalized in the 1930s on 
the tensions between Italy and Egypt (see Chapter One).  
                                                            
61 MAE AP Egitto 1956 B1049 Fornari to MAE 18 March 1956. 
62 MAE AP Egitto 1956 B1049 Fornari “colloquio col Presidente Nasser” 3 May 1956. 
63 MAE AP Egitto 1956 B1048 “oleodotto Suez-Cairo” 25 July 1956, CEA, Cronaca 28 July 
1956; Onelli, All’albe del Neoatlantismo, 76, 86. See also Claudio Corduas, Impresa e cultura: 
l’utopia di ENI (Milano, 2006); Dow Votaw, Six Legged Dog, Mattei and ENI: A Study in Power 
(Berkeley, 1964); Paul H. Frankel, Mattei: Oil and power politics (London, 1966). 
64 MAE AP Egitto 1956 B1049 Zoppi “rapporti anglo-egiziani” 21 June 1956. 
 257 
 The London conference, called by the British and co-organized by American and French 
Governments, left the Italian administration in an ambiguous position. They were hesitant to 
participate and preferred to mediate. In a meeting between Fornari and the Egyptian Foreign 
Minister, Mahmoud Fawzi, Fornari tried to convince the latter to participate in the conference. 
However, Fawzi noted, Egypt did not intend to participate in a conference that was organized 
solely on European terms, with a premise of military threat, that dealt with an issue of Egyptian 
sovereignty. On another attempt to convince the Egyptian administration to participate (after the 
failed Mensies mission to deliver a note from Dulles to Nasser), Fornari acknowledged that the 
note sent to Nasser from Dulles was a poor starting point for any negotiation, yet alerted Nasser 
that his denial would bring a grave response from Western countries, even if this was contrary to 
the Italian position of neutrality.65 Nasser told Fornari that he had nothing to compromise.66 
 These unsuccessful attempts to mediate the frictions that arose after the nationalization of 
the Suez Canal Company led Italian diplomats to outline the implications for the Italian residents 
in the case of conflict. They sought to prepare centers of protection where Italians might gather 
“under the authority of the Italian flag” and a decision--one that quickly became controversial-- 
was made to “authorize our diplomatic authorities to facilitate the repatriation of Italians who 
wish to leave Egypt.”67 Italy may have secured its political and economic relations with Egypt, 
but it had not mitigated the possibility of conflict. Moreover, the neutrality shown by the 
government left much to be desired for the Italian residents, who did not gain from the deals 
Mattei and other economic leaders brokered and who felt slighted by the Italian authorities’ 
hesitant intimations to “repatriate.” 
                                                            
65 MAE AP Egitto 1956 B1051 Appunto 8 August 1956. 
66 MAE AP Egitto 1956 B1051 Appunto 20 September 1956. 
67 “...autorizzare le nostre autorità diplomatiche e consolari a facilitare il rimpatrio dei 
connazionali che desiderassero lasciare l’Egitto.” MAE AP Egitto 1956 B1051 Appunto 20 
September 1956. 
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 On 14 September, one Italian resident, S. Bellamare, angrily penned a letter to Italian 
president Giovanni Gronchi. Bellamare rebuked the president for his apparent disinterest in the 
community of Italians and his catering to French and English interests. He wrote:  
 In Egypt there are, and you know it well, 50,000 Italians for whom Egypt has been a 
second mother, better than the original. You who govern our Patria seem to care more 
about the capitalist interests of England and France than [the interests] of our compatriots 
(connazionali). We have just recovered from the internment and now your behavior 
rejects us--I hope that you understand that it’s our interest to remain neutral and 
estranged from everything.68 
 
The possibility of conflict had very real consequences for the Italians of Egypt. More than that, 
the turn in Italian politics towards England and France (two countries against which the Fascist 
regime had been particularly aggressive in its Mediterranean propaganda), shortly after the 
Italian community had suffered the consequences of its policies, appeared to be an inconvenient 
alliance from the perspective of the Italians in Egypt. Following the experiences of 1948 and 
January 1952, there was a general fear among Italians of reprisals against foreign residents for 
the actions of their respective governments against Egypt’s burgeoning regime.69 Many wanted 
to depart, sensing the looming conflict. As in Bellamare’s letter, the “rejection” came from the 
Italian State appearing to seek its own interests at the expense of the Italians in Egypt. Its 
attempts to distinguish Italians from other foreign subjects was not enough.  
 Only one day before the arrival in Naples of Giorgianni and Santoro, with which this 
chapter began, and the same day Bellamare mailed his letter to Gronchi, the Cronaca published 
                                                            
68 “Esistono in Egitto, e lei lo sa molto bene, 50000 italiani per i quali l’Egitto è stata una 
seconda Madre, più buona di quella originale. Voi che dirigete la nostra Patria sembra che avete 
[sic] più a cuore gli interessi dei capitalisti Inglesi e Francesi che quella dei nostri connazionali. 
Ci siamo appena ricoverati dall’ultimo internamento ed ora il vostro agire ci rispinge [sic] di 
nuovo - spero che comprendete che il nostro interesse è quello di restare neutri ed estraniarsi di 
tutto.” ACS, PCM (1951-1953) 15/3 36039. Letter from S. Bellamare 14 September 1956. 
69 ACS MI Gabinetto (53-56) B19 f. 1295/3 “questione di Suez” Appunto 8 September 1956: 
“...appare difficile che la folla egiziana, fanatica xenofoba e antiebraica, eccitata ancor più dagli 
avvenimenti attuali, sarebbe in grado di distinguere fra francesi, inglesi, ebrei ed italiani.” 
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an advisory by the Italian Authorities. The short statement denied rumors that the increasing 
departures of Italians occurring at the time were “organized and encouraged by the Italian 
Authorities.” Rather, it specified that these departures did not have a political character, that they 
were neither recommended nor encouraged by the Italian consulates, and that they should not be 
associated with the evacuations of other communities by their respective consulates. The 
departures, it alerted, were “a continuation of the departures (begun long ago) of Italian citizens, 
most of whom are unemployed.” Reiterating Italy’s commitment to Egypt’s “rights and 
interests,” the advisory was clearly aimed more at the Egyptian Government than at the Italian 
community.70 The announcement hints at the careful work that was being done to create a 
distinction between the Italian community and other foreign residents; and yet it also helps us to 
understand the gap between the rhetoric of the Italian diplomats (and the administration in 
Rome) and its actions on the ground with respect to the fears and anxieties expressed by Italians 
of Egypt.  
Only a few years earlier, the consul had disavowed collective repatriation on the basis 
that the Italians of Egypt would be unable to integrate into metropolitan Italy. It seemed that this 
was a second occasion in which collective repatriation was blocked. The third point of the 
announcement clearly warned against equating the Italians’ departure to the evacuations of other 
foreigners at the behest of their respective consulates and embassies. For this reason, Italian 
authorities decided to facilitate a temporary and voluntary repatriation of women and children. 
They were, indeed, invited to temporarily repatriate aboard Italian ships passing in transit 
through Egyptian harbors.71 But this intended to mark repatriations as individual decisions rather 
than collective measures administered by the Italian government. As we saw in the case of 
                                                            
70 CEA “Necessaria chiarificazione per gli italiani d’Egitto,” Cronaca, September 14, 1956. 
71 MAE AP Egitto 1956 B1059 Riunione preliminare presieduta dal Ministro Straneo. 
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Santoro, those who repatriated would be doing so at their own risk and were informed that they 
would relinquish claims to assistance from the Italian state.72  
 The Italian Navy decided to move several Italian ships closer to Egypt when conflict 
appeared imminent in September, after the London conference had failed to reach any 
conclusion.73 Because the journey to and from Egypt took around three days, ships were to be 
sent to Crete, whence they would be able to quickly reach Port Said and Alexandria in the case 
of an eventual need to evacuate Italian residents.74 Part of the risk of a collective repatriation by 
the Italian authorities was the perceived damage it would cause to the deals diplomats had 
brokered between Nasser and the Italian industrialists. Italian authorities worried that collective 
repatriation would appear as a sign of mistrust, detrimental to the continuation of friendly 
relations. Attempting to dilute any tensions, as a seemingly last-minute decision, one of these 
ships, an Italian naval-school ship—the Palinuro—was sent for a brief visit to Alexandria. 
Italian naval officers held a ceremony during which they conferred honors to Egyptian military 
officials marking the continued exchange between the two countries. The intent of the trip went 
beyond these performances: it was to “distract” the public from the looming conflict. The ploy 
was deemed largely successful, and the visit occupied the front pages of many Egyptian 
newspapers as well as the Cronaca.75 Yet, the trip served a second purpose. Surveillance 
conducted during the trip brought to light the constant unloading of war materials in the heavily 
secured port, confirming that the observations made by Giorgianni--an otherwise inconspicuous 
Italian of Egypt--were of actual importance to the Italian regime.76  
 
                                                            
72 MAE AP Egitto 1956 B1051 Appunto 20 September 1956. 
73 MAE AP Egitto 1956 B1059 Appunto Presidenza del Consiglio 1 September 1956. 
74 MAE AP Egitto 1956 B1051 Appunto 20 September 1956. 
75 MAE AP Egitto 1956 B1049 Consolato Generale Alessandria to MAE  10 September 1956. 
76 MAE AP Egitto 1956 B1049 Rapporto di permananza ad Alessandria. 
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IV. Crisis, Repatriation, and Evacuation 
 While the first half of this chapter centered on the changes in Italo-Egyptian relations 
with particular emphasis on the conditions of departure, departure and arrival became 
increasingly inseparable phenomena as the numbers of repatriates grew. The latter also 
implicated a constellation of internal dynamics in postwar Italy, which will become the focus of 
the remainder of this chapter. Around 800 requests were made to be admitted on board the 
Argentina, one of the Italian ships requisitioned for the possible evacuation. By mid October, 
many women and children who had already left Egypt were temporarily being hosted in the 
Emigration Center in Naples, even though it had been discounted as a destination for those 
fleeing Egypt on legal grounds because was established to host individuals and families awaiting 
emigration.  
The policy of the Italian Ministry of Interior was to discourage the establishment of 
additional Refugee Sheltering Centers (Centri di Raccolta Profughi, CRP). The Ministry of the 
Interior requested supplemental aid for repatriates from the Vatican Assistance Commission, but 
the Interior’s unofficial policy was to maintain a state of emergency so as to “expedite” the 
integration of repatriates in Italy’s national fabric.77 In September, during a meeting regarding 
the influx of Italians from Egypt, the Ministry cautioned that extended presence in the CRP 
would “create in the repatriated Italians maladjustments to work and the tendency to live on 
public welfare.” Therefore, following prior strategies, initial assistance would be provided to 
poor Italians upon their arrival at local police stations, and then only the “most needy” would be 
                                                            
77 ACS PCM 59-61, cat. 2.3/59993/4, 24 November 1956. I owe this observation Giacomo 
Canepa’s ongoing research on the emergence of welfare in postwar Italy.  
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directed to Enti Comunali di Assistenza (ECA) for additional aid.78 The women and children 
temporarily housed at the Emigration Center, against regulations, had been awaiting their reentry 
in Egypt, but this prospect changed with the intensifying conflict: “now that their reentry [in 
Egypt] is no longer possible, these families should be reunited with their family-heads who will 
arrive on the Argentina, and be placed in housing that is not the Emigration Center.”79 
 Conditions at the center were difficult. Individuals housed there complained about the 
paucity of resources available to them and questioned why they were unable to enjoy the same 
benefits bestowed on people on their way out of Italy. The General Directorate of Emigration 
(Direzione Generale di Emigrazione, DGE), in charge of the center’s management, warned that 
the influx of families would exacerbate problems and suggested that a modification of their legal 
status was imperative to their contentment and integration into Italian society. Having left most 
of their belongings in Egypt and having arrived with little money, the Italians of Egypt in the 
camp were seen as de facto refugees, but not as refugees de jure. The distinctions in status 
between the different “guests” at the center, described in a memorandum from the DGE, 
restricted its capacity to help the Italians of Egypt, especially considering that: 
the refugees from Egypt had to abandon all of their belongings... in that respect, it is 
necessary to confront the problem not on the base of normal assistance, which is 
obviously insufficient, especially for people who repatriate from abroad and don’t have 
even the minimum of housing and adjustment period that the normal assisted have, but 
with exceptional means.80 
                                                            
78 “creare nei connazionali rimpatriati disadattamento al lavoro e la tendenza a vivere a carico 
della pubblica beneficenza.” ACS MI Gabinetto (53-56) B19 f. 1295/3 “questione di Suez” 
Appunto 8 September 1956. 
79 “Ora che tale rientro non è più possibile, dovrà essere provveduto a che questi familiari si 
ricongiungano con i capi-famiglia che arriveranno con l’ ‘Argentina’, per essere sistemati in 
alloggiamenti che non siano quelli del Centro di Emigrazione.” 
MAE AP Egitto 1956 B1059 DGE promemoria 11 October 1956. 
80 “...i profughi dall’Egitto hanno dovuto abbandonare ogni loro avere... A tale riguardo, si rende 
necessario affrontare il problema non sulla base della normale assistenza, che è ovviamente 
insufficiente, soprattutto per gente che rimpatria dall’estero e non ha quindi nemmeno quel 
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The DGE pushed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to reconsider its legal definition of the 
repatriated Italians--taking into account the “cultural” specificity of the community described in 
the consular report several years prior--and to recognize the status of “refugee” for the Italians 
“that needed to repatriate from Egypt following a very real situation of emergency.”81 The 
existing definition of “refugee” was defined by Law 137 of 4 March 1952 (also known as the 
Scelba Law), which granted refugee status to those forced to depart Italy’s former possessions, 
and either foreign or “national territories,” struck by war. The same law entitled refugees to 18 
months of housing and small subsidies.82 
 When British Authorities announced that British and French troops planned to occupy the 
Canal Zone in early November, following the Israeli attack on Sinai, already over 1,000 Italian 
residents had prepared for evacuation. British and French naval officers, however, warned the 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
minimo di sistemazione e di ambientamento che hanno i normali assistiti, ma con mezzi 
eccezionali.” 
81 It is worth mentioning here that there was considerable discord between the different 
institutions involved in settling the issue of the refugees and repatriates, and this added to the 
confusion of the issue. The DGE was run by the Ministry of Labor, whereas the DGAP was 
controlled by the Ministries of the Interior and of Foreign Affairs. The DGE was solely 
concerned with matters of emigration, and its resources were overstretched in housing repatriates 
who were unable to emigrate, for one reason or another. Giacomo Canepa, personal 
communication; “la qualifica di ‘profughi’ agli italiani che hanno dovuto rimpatriare dall’Egitto 
a seguito di una vera e propria situazione di emergenza.” MAE AP Egitto 1956 B1059 DGE 
promemoria 11 October 1956. 
82 The terms of the Scelba Law--named after Mario Scelba of the Ministry of Interior--are 
incredibly ambiguous. Its original iteration declares that housing of refugees should not go 
beyond 30 June 1953 and that all of the CRP should be dismantled by the summer of 1955, at 
which point those still housed in them would be transferred to public housing (case popolari). 
When funding for said public housing did not work out (in July 1954), the law was extended to 
the summer of 1957. In 1956, however, in a state of juridical limbo, the law had officially 
expired and parliament had not yet passed a new version, until 1958, when the law was extended 
until 1960. Giacomo Canepa, “Rifare gli italiani: Profughi e progetti per il welfare (1944-1947),” 
Meridiana XXIX, 2 (2016) and “L’amministrazione come pedagogia: il Ministero per 
l’assistenza post-bellica e la costruzione della democrazia,” Forthcoming; ACS MLPS - DG 
Collocamenteo della manodopera - divisione VIII emigrazione verso paesi extracomunitari 
B457, MI 30 June 1952. 
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Italian passenger lines to avoid Egyptian and Israeli waters.83 On 4 November, several bombs fell 
in Alexandria—reportedly from British ships—as the coalition moved into the Canal Zone. One 
bomb struck the post office in central Alexandria. Although the Italian Consul in Alexandria 
reported that only military objectives had been hit,84 Umberto Russo went to the consulate to 
report that his daughter’s husband (who was stateless) had been killed, and his son and daughter 
had been injured by the explosion and were recovering in the Italian hospital. His apartment, in 
the building adjacent to the post office, was severely damaged by the fire caused by the bomb.85 
The Egyptian Government stepped up measures against English and French subjects, as well as 
anyone suspected to have connections with Israel, thereby justifying measures against the Jewish 
community. Accounts and businesses of 50 prominent Italian Jews were blocked and 46 were 
arrested and held without formal charges, as the 1954 State of Siege permitted.86 Anxious 
members of Italian families from Egypt who had immigrated to Brazil in the years after the 
Second World War flooded the consulate in Rio de Janeiro demanding news of their family 
members.87 
Life in the Canal Zone was brought to a standstill. As the conflict escalated, many 
requested an official collective repatriation.88 Italian newspapers described an “exodus” from 
                                                            
83 ACS MI Gabinetto (53-56) B19 f. 1295/3 “questione di Suez” DGE to Ministero Marina 
Mercantile 1 November 1956, DG Navigazione Traffico Marittimo to Ministero Difesa-Marina 2 
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85 ACGA, Umberto Russo. 
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Egypt.89 Concurrent with the British and French air invasion of Port Said, the Corriere della 
Sera, whose position aligned with the other European powers, reported that traffic of Italian 
passenger lines in the Eastern Mediterranean had risen twenty-five percent to accommodate the 
heavy outflow of foreigners from Egypt.90 Some simply noted that with the departure of other 
Italians, they could not carry on even basic services within the community. Such was the case 
with Giuseppe Patanè, who watched as his barbershop continuously lost money since the 
nationalization of the canal. He implored that the consulate repatriate him along with his 
family.91   
Responding to the chaotic exchange of telegrams communicating the desire to evacuate 
Italian residents from the Canal Zone, Dino Del Bo, director of the DGE, noted “it seems that 
now a real exodus from Egypt has begun.”92 The DGE signed agreements with the Adriatica 
shipping and passenger lines to address the overwhelming number of requests for consular 
repatriation; the Italian state covered expenses and authorized an increase in the passenger 
capacity of their main ships, the Esperia and Enotria.93 Several Swissair flights were rerouted 
and commissioned for Italians able to pay for their repatriation. While some ENI workers and 
their families were evacuated, individuals with important leadership roles in the company, 
including its founder Enrico Mattei, were asked by Italian Authorities to remain in Egypt so as 
not to put in doubt Italy’s commitment to the Egyptian regime.94 Some of those families were 
                                                            
89 Corriere della Sera “Paura in Oriente: l’esodo degli Europei dal Nord-Africa e dei Paesi 
Arabi...” 8 November 1956. 
90 Corriere della Sera, “Disposizioni per la tutela degli italiani in Egitto” 6 November 1956. 
91 ACGA, PS, Patanè Giuseppe fu Alfio 1897. 
92 “mi sembra di capire che ora comincia un certo esodo dall’Egitto.” MAE AP Egitto 1956 
B1059 Appunto 12 November 1956. 
93 MAE AP Egitto1956 B1059 Appunto Del Bo ND. 
94 MAE AP  Egitto1956 B1059 telegramma 26173 7 November 1956. 
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among the roughly 40 Italians bused by the consul in Alexandria to board a ship in Tobruk that 
had been blocked from entry in Alexandria by the British navy.95 
Arrangements were made to have the Italian naval-hospital, the Ascania, sent into Port 
Said. Although the objective was to assist and evacuate Italian residents in the Canal Zone, the 
message relayed by the Italian Authorities to the Egyptian Government was that the ship would 
provide medical assistance to wounded Egyptian soldiers. Its officers offered to carry wounded 
Egyptians to Alexandria where they could receive medical attention and where the Italian 
diplomats would encourage some of the Italians from the Canal Zone to stay (and not to be 
repatriated).96 They hoped that this would diminish the overall number of Italians arriving in 
Italy during the conflict. The Egyptian government, however, rejected the proposal on the 
grounds that an equal ratio of Egyptians to Italians would have to board the ship; they wanted to 
be sure that the Italians were not, in fact, evacuating the area of their citizens. The plan to return 
to Alexandria was aborted. Instead, the Ascania “temporarily” evacuated women and children to 
Messina and Naples where they were housed in the crowded Emigration Centers. The officers 
distributed rations to the Italians who remained in the blocked city and delivered rations to 
Egyptian troops, much to the chagrin of the occupying British troops.97 
Eager to emphasize the special status of the Italians of Egypt compared to other foreign 
subjects, Fornari asked the press to exercise restraint in reporting about the events unfolding in 
                                                            
95 MAE AP Egitto 1956 B1059 telegramma 27020 14 November 1956. 
96 MAE AP Egitto 1956 B1067 telegramma 13385 11 November 1956. 
97 MAE AP Egitto 1956 B1067 Appunto 15 November 1956; 16 November 1956; “Porto Said - 
situazione.” The message relayed about the response from the British read: “La cosa [the 
approach of the Ascania to Port Said] non è piaciuta alle autorità di occupazione britanniche. Un 
alto ufficiale inglese ha, infatti, dichiarato in proposito: per qualche inesplicabile ragione gli 
italiani stanno cercando di far giungere a Porto Said una nave carica di viveri. Non sappiamo il 
perché. Fra gli italiani non si annoverano perdite e i feriti di Porto Said vengono curati negli 
ospedali.” 
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the Canal Zone.98 Indeed, when Corriere della Sera published an article on the mission of the 
Ascania, there was no mention of the 255 passengers that were taken out of Port Said.99 When 
the Ascania arrived in the port of Naples on 22 November, 215 Italians and 41 foreigners 
disembarked. Of the Italians, 40 planned to go directly to their legal residences (paesi di 
origine)—as was the policy of aid provisions—14 were hosted by relatives in Naples, while the 
remaining 160 were temporarily lodged in the crowded Emigration Center, as they arrived with 
neither pecuniary resources nor family connections in Italy. There, they were provided with two 
meals per day.100 Ships large and small continued to bring Italian residents out of Egypt. 
 In early November, during a parliamentary session, one of the founders of the Italian 
Social Movement (Movimento Sociale Italiano, MSI), Arturo Michelini, raised the issue of 
granting the status of “refugee” to the Italians of Egypt. He noted that, although the events taking 
place in Egypt did not directly implicate the Italian State, Italian residents had been encouraged 
to depart by their own diplomatic authorities and thus the Italian Government was conclusively 
involved:  
 [these events reveal] the deficiency of [Italian] authorities who, after insistent requests 
[by Italian residents], negate any form of assistance, forgetting that it was the [Italian] 
diplomatic authorities and consulates in Egypt that pushed them to repatriate.101 
 
                                                            
98 MAE AP Egitto 1956 B1067 Appunto 6 November 1956. 
99 Arrigo Levi, “La nave-ospedale ‘Ascania’ ha gettato l’ancora a Porto Said” Corriere della 
Sera 16 November 1956. 
100 ACS Ministero dell’Interno - Gabinetto 1953-56 B446 fasc.7271/98. 
101 “si fa rilevare, oltre allo stato di miseria nel quale tali cittadini versano attualmente, la carenza 
delle autorità che, alle loro insistenti richieste, negano qualsiasi aiuto, dimenticando che a 
spingerli al rimpatrio sono state le autorità diplomatiche e consolari di Egitto.” MAE AP1956 
B1059 DGE Appunto 9 November 1956; earlier in the month a similar point had been raised in 
Parliament by a representative of the Monarchists, Caroleo, regarding the measures that would 
be taken for the Italian students from Egypt whose families’ accounts were blocked in Egypt as 
part of the measures taken by Nasser’s government, leaving them without means to pay tuition 
and support themselves. MAE AP Egitto 1956 B1059 Appunto 3 November 1956. 
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A rebuttal from the DGE clarified that “legally” Italian authorities in Egypt had only 
“communicated” the existence of “special subsidies for the trip… in order to encourage the 
spontaneous exodus from Egypt.” Repatriated Italians, therefore, could not depend on organized 
assistance and were required to sign a declaration acknowledging this before departing Egypt.102 
When Italians had departed Egypt several years earlier and were hosted in CRP, their 
circumstances were deemed exceptional (in other words, these cases were not to be used as 
precedents). For example, in 1952 Domenico Santoro, along with 51 other Italian residents from 
Alexandria, were hosted in the Termini Imenese (Palermo) CRP because they had neither 
relatives nor work in their legal residences. In these earlier cases, these repatriates had officially 
given up other forms of assistance by accepting the temporary housing. The aforementioned law 
regarding assistance to refugees (Law 137) did not apply to them because they were 
characterized as “citizens repatriating for reasons of political character not concerning Italy.”103 
This was the point Michelini sought to challenge by questioning the impetus for “individual” 
repatriation. 
During the events of the 1956, the burden placed on the many ECAs demanded a heavy 
increase in state funding. This included expenses required to host and provide food rations and 
small welfare payments. The funds were not released until several years later.104 Finding little 
relief at ports of entry, several groups of repatriated Italians went directly to the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs in Rome demanding attention.105 Others traveled between cities seeking 
                                                            
102 “particolari agevolazioni di viaggio... per favorire l’esodo spontaneo dall’Egitto.” MAE AP 
Egitto 1956 B1059 DGE Appunto 26 November 1956. 
103 “connazionali che rimpatriano per motivo di carattere politico non concernenti il nostro 
paese.” ACGA, Santoro Domenico fu Andrea cl.1892. 
104 ACS PCM 1959-61 15.3/57749. 
105 MAE AP Egitto 1956 B1059 DGE to PCM, DGAP 15 December 1956. 
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assistance and work. In early December 1956, the Ministry of the Interior warned the Prefecture 
in Milan:  
the gathering of compatriots [from Egypt] in this city should be avoided and they should 
be sent, where possible, to their respective legal residences or at least to other 
municipalities... of their choice, giving them the necessary means for travel.106 
 
In addition to the financial strain that would be caused by the amassing of unemployed Italians, 
they also feared political instability caused by groups of Italians from Egypt largely sympathetic 
to the MSI. 
 At the end of November, British and French citizens and around 500 Egyptian and 
stateless Jews were expelled from Egypt. Most of the expelled were heads of families, thus 
prompting their dependents to follow.107 The Italian press highly exaggerated the number of 
expulsions (from 30,000 to around 50,000). Nevertheless, over the following months departures 
cut the Jewish community in half. Alongside the expelled subjects, lack of employment 
compelled other nationals to flee at their own will. The Adriatica lines carried thousands of 
passengers in repeated trips between Alexandria and Venice. The passenger capacities of the 
Enotria and Esperia, were raised to the limits, 670 and 444 respectively.108 News that European 
troops were to withdraw following the UN negotiated cease-fire, which gave Nasser and his 
supporters a sense of victory, caused great distress. Around 400 requests for “immediate and 
definitive” repatriation and 300 for temporary repatriation from the Canal Zone were made to the 
                                                            
106 “che dovrà evitarsi il raggruppamento di detti connazionali [d’Egitto] in questa città e curare 
che essi siano avviati, ove possibile, ai rispettivi paesi d’origine o quanto meno in altri Comuni 
della Repubblica di loro scelta, munendoli dei necessari mezzi di viaggio.” 
ALPE archivio assistenziale, atti 948/56, Prefettura di Milano 17 December 1956. For more on 
this archive and a general history of the ECA in Milan, see Massimiliano Paniga, Welfare 
ambrosiano: Storia, cultura e politiche dell’ECA di Milano (1937-1978) (Milano, 2012). 
107 For a detailed analysis of the relationship between expelled subjects and departures that 
occurred during the conflict among Jews of various nationalities see Laskier, “Egyptian Jewry,” 
581-582. 
108 MAE AP Egitto 1956 B1059 telegramma 29376 7 December 1956. 
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Italian consulates. The Consul in Port Said, who had supported the government’s negative stance 
on repatriation en masse, rescinded his previous statements and made repeated appeals to 
evacuate Italian residents.109  
 As the Italian diplomats had feared—and despite their various attempts to distinguish 
Italian residents from other national communities—Italians were being equated to other foreign 
residents and subjected to rising hostility. One report described: 
the mood... of our communities in Port Said, Alexandria, and Cairo is such that one 
prefers to abandon the country, [their] belongings and positions of employment, to put 
oneself in safety... our consulates in Alexandria and Cairo are invaded daily by families 
requesting repatriation despite assurances—to them seen as falsehoods—given officially 
by the Egyptian Authorities; and consular repatriations are given with more liberality 
than the norm. Many complain that the Italian Government welcomed the Hungarian 
refugees neglecting instead the Italian refugees... These are the declarations of the 
representatives of the refugees.110 
 
Another ship, the Argentina, was sent to Port Said. Many hoped to depart before the British and 
French troops evacuated the zone.111 The ship departed after several days in port, leaving on its 
return around 200 Italians in Messina, and 167 in Naples. In both cities, newspapers published 
announcements about the “refugees from Egypt (profughi dall’Egitto)” in search of extended 
family members, as they were housed in the Emigration Center (in Naples) and Casa Pia CRP (in 
Messina).112 At the national level, the Corriere della Sera made a point of mentioning that just as 
                                                            
109 MAE AP Egitto 1956 B1067 Appunto 6 December 1956. 
110 “lo stato d’animo... delle nostre comunità di Porto Said, Alessandria e Cairo è tale che si 
preferisce abbandonare il Paese, i beni e le posizioni o posti di lavoro, pur di mettersi al sicuro... 
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trascurando invece i profughi italiani.... Queste le dichiarazioni dei rappresentanti dei profughi.” 
MAE AP Egitto 1956  B1059 DGE promemoria 10 December 1956. 
111 Corriere della Sera, “Argentina arriverà a Porto Said” 11 December 1956. 
112 Pietro Bruno, Messina e La Sua Provincia Attraverso La Stampa: Diario Dei Principali 
Avvenimenti (Gran Mirci a Missina: 1956): 27, 56, 307. 
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the Argentina left Port Said on 12 December, the Enotria entered the harbor.113 With the 
increasing outflow of Italians from Egypt, discourse shifted from one framed in terms of 
“emigrants” and “repatriates” to one that incorporated the idea that the Italians of Egypt were 
becoming “national refugees.” 
 
V. Becoming Refugees 
 In the absence of clear policies of assistance and accommodation—and alongside the 
slow incorporation of the Italians of Egypt into the folds of legal provisions for “national 
refugee”—the identity of the Italian community of Egypt became one framed on historical 
contingencies that unsettled political narratives. The terms used both by its members and by the 
political actors surrounding it to define the community amidst these changes fluctuated between 
social and legal categories of belonging. Each of these—the social and the legal—centered on 
the physical displacement of the Italians of Egypt. But they defined the Italians of Egypt as 
members of a national community entitled to certain rights based on the relevance of their 
historical experiences in the present. In this sense, they also denote a temporal displacement. 
These social and legal categories, when married to the conditions in which Italians of Egypt 
found themselves to be displaced national subjects, projected courses of possible action. 
 Over 3,000 refugees from Hungary entered Italy over the course of the first eight months 
of 1956.114 As noted, many Italians knew of the large expenditure in housing and aid provided to 
Hungarians, estimated to be about four times as large as that spent on repatriated Italians 
(excluding the cost of transport from Egypt). Italians arriving from Egypt--unable to benefit from 
the qualification of “refugees”--were classified under state procedures as “impoverished 
                                                            
113 Corriere della Sera 12 Decembre 1956. 
114 ACS MLPS - DG Collocamenteo della manodopera - divisione VIII emigrazione verso paesi 
extracomunitari B457 “verbale della riunione...” 10 September 1956. 
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(indigenti).” Therefore, they could receive the same aid as any Italian recipient of welfare.115 
This did not account for the circumstances of their displacement. This perceived inequity became 
a point of political contention. In February 1957, when Edoardo Costa, the representative of the 
MSI responsible for foreign affairs, made a trip to try to distance Nasser from Soviet influence, 
he addressed a gathering of Italians, stirring them against the contemporary Italian 
administration.116 He claimed that the Italian government revealed its disinterest in the Italians of 
Egypt by neglecting to acknowledge that repatriated Italians of Egypt were not simply 
“impoverished,” but were the victims of international politics. Costa portrayed the ambiguous 
“welcoming” practices of the Italian state as a disavowal of the “historic role” of the Italian 
residents who, he repeated, had “developed Italy’s prestige” abroad.117   
 Just after the first day of 1957, Carmelo De Lorenzo, a foreign-language teacher born in 
Cairo, wrote to Antonio Segni, then Italy’s Prime Minister. He had arrived in Genoa nearly one 
month earlier. De Lorenzo was dismissed from his job in Egypt in November. His son, a 
designer working with the el-Moqattam newspaper, was also dismissed at the beginning of 
hostilities. De Lorenzo identified himself as an Italian “without political affiliation (senza colore 
politico)” and advised Segni that a similar letter had been sent to all Genoese newspapers, 
without political distinction. The only paper that had agreed to publish his letter was (an 
unspecified) one on the political left; and he asserted that other papers (namely, Secolo XIX and 
Nuovo Cittadino) had promised publication but then declined, stating that the letter expressed 
strongly worded anti-governmental sentiments.  
                                                            
115 MAE AP Egitto 1956 B1059 telegramma 28647 2 December 1956. 
116 Gianni Rossi La Destra e gli Ebrei: Una Storia Italiana (Rubbettino: 2003),109-110. 
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 In his letter, De Lorenzo explained that, being unemployed and “in danger for our lives, I 
sold all of my belongings and objects…” thus he bought five tickets for his family and they 
departed for Italy. He had already been accepted to emigrate to Brazil through the Giunta 
Cattolica d’Egitto (Catholic Relief Services), and awaited departure in Genoa, where he was 
hosted in the ICEM regional center.118 “Despite that I made clear my family’s grave state of 
poverty, especially with this cold and freezing weather that has invaded Genoa,” he wrote, the 
ICEM center had notified him that they could no longer host him.119 After the Prefecture 
provided an initial welfare payment, they advised De Lorenzo to go to his legal residence, 
Reggio Calabria. De Lorenzo refused to do so on account of the anticipated paperwork for his 
emigration to Brazil. He reported having been told by a representative of the Italian Red Cross 
that regarding “Italian refugees from Egypt he didn’t have any directions and he couldn’t help us, 
they had only been ordered to help Hungarian refugees.”120 Steeped in nationalist rhetoric, he 
proclaimed once again before closing the letter that as a “lover (amante) of the Patria” he 
implored Segni to concede the title “refugee from Egypt” to him and others in his situation, so 
that they too could benefit from the assistance provided to non-national refugees.121 
As the influx of Italians from Egypt continued, political parties pressured the 
administration to take action. Rumors about the circumstances under which Italian departed 
spread quickly. In December 1956, Il Tempo published a letter from one Italian of Egypt who 
                                                            
118 “in pericolo per la nostra vita ho pensato di vendere tutti i miei mobili ed oggetti...” It seems 
that Giunta Cattolica d’Egitto was linked to the Catholic Relief Services, whose office in Cairo 
functioned as an office for the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (known as 
CIME in Italian) helping to transfer Italians in other countries. MAE DGAP 1948-60 Uff.III 
B148 fasc.465 comunità italiane in Egitto, telegramma 7952 9 March 1957. 
119 “Malgrado che ho fatto presente lo stato grave di indigenza della mia famiglia specie con 
questo freddo e gelo che ha invaso Genova.” 
120 “profughi italiani dall’Egitto non aveva nessuna direttiva e non poteva aiutarci. Avevano solo 
l’ordine di aiutare i profughi ungheresi.” 
121 ACS PCM 1955-58 15/3 B336 fasc. 57749 Carmelo De Lorenzo to Segni 2 January 1957. 
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criticized the Italian press for its portrayal of the conflict. In the letter, Italo Milano claimed that 
the Italians expelled from Egypt were only those who had signed against the Fascist regime at 
the outbreak of the Second World War and thus had left a “trace” of their “political affiliations” 
in Egyptian archives. He referred to individuals who had signed in support of the Libera Italia 
movement (MLI) and were thus seen as sympathetic to British, French, or Israeli interests. He 
wrote, “it doesn’t appear that one single Cristian Italian (un solo italiano cristiano) was asked by 
the Government in Cairo to leave the country.” The presumption that Italians of Egypt “are being 
chased away (vengono cacciati via), mistreated or worse...” was false, he claimed. Although the 
conflict had not been advantageous to European residents, Milano concluded that to call Nasser’s 
actions in favor of Egyptians “unjust” for the foreigners living in its territory—as many Italian 
newspapers were doing—was incorrect and ignored the long Egyptian struggle against the 
British.122  
 By early 1957, over 3,000 Italian repatriates had requested assistance from the Italian 
state or from its regional offices. In Livorno, the ECA rented four villas to house 71 families 
(237 persons in total); over the course of the 1957, at least 89 individuals left in search of work 
in other cities and abroad.123 Some went to centers like Milano where, between August 1956 and 
February 1957, over 400 families arrived requesting assistance from the Prefecture.124 This 
urgency made it impossible to see the “exodus” as a series of individual decisions, requests, and 
movements, and instead signified a community in need of legislative protection upon arrival. 
This concurrently entailed acknowledging the factors that had brought the Italians out of Egypt.  
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Around this time, the news of the “exodus” of Italians from Egypt sparked controversy in 
sessions of the Italian parliament. Two representatives demanded to know precisely how 
“voluntary” were the departures, citing the restrictions placed on foreigners leaving Egypt.125 
Randolfo Pacciardi—a political centrist who had visited the Italian community and met with 
Egyptian military officials several years prior—spoke angrily to members of the Italian 
parliament, pleading them to act and noting that Nasser’s government was “appropriating” the 
earnings of thousands of Italians “sending Italian citizens back to their country with the money 
for cigarettes!” 126 He wanted to know why “thousands of Italians” were being “induced” to 
repatriate.127 In February, members of the Italian Communist Party (Partito Comunista Italiano, 
PCI) intervened several times to inquire as to whether similar procedures as those available to 
Hungarian refugees would be extended to the Italians. The PCI representatives demanded a 
guarantee of employment to ensure “adequate financial resources for a life in Italy.”128 Members 
of the ruling Christian Democrat Party intervened, warning that the growing population of 
repatriated Italians risked attracting the attention of “subversive” parties, given the “miserable” 
conditions of the camps and the lack of employment opportunities available to them.129 
Parliament decided to extend the title of “refugee,” according to Law 137, to the Italians of 
Egypt, but it would be several years before legal status would be conferred, holding many in a 
state of limbo.130 
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 In response to these inquiries, the Ministry of Interior responded that it had assumed 
financial responsibility for the assistance of 2,500 Italians from Egypt, housed in CRP 
throughout the country, and that efforts were being made by the Ministry of Work and Social 
Welfare (Ministero del Lavoro e Previdenza Sociale, MLPS) to procure employment for them. 
Stress was placed on the interpretation of the departures as voluntary “precisely because [the 
Italians of Egypt] were without work.”131 To resolve the problem of employment, the MLPS 
planned to profit on the fact that many Italians arriving from Egypt spoke several languages. 
They would seek out work environments such as translators and interpreters, capitalizing on the 
very history that the Italian Consul in Alexandria had described as problematic for their 
integration into Italian society in the aforementioned 1954 report.  
Within one month the situation worsened and the pace of departures accelerated: 
[repatriations] continue with a rhythm of hundreds of persons on each ship arriving from 
Alexandria, despite that our diplomatic and consular authorities ... are clarifying for the 
repatriates the objective difficulties of the situation in Italy, both with regard to the 
possibility of employment and of adequate assistance. 
 
The MLPS worked with ICEM to relocate repatriates to Brazil, Australia, Rhodesia, Argentina, 
and Uruguay.132 Notwithstanding harsh criticism levied against its practices, this cooperation 
was seen as one of the few answers to the growing economic and financial strain caused by 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
housing (initially in one of three refugee camps in Puglia) or a small subsidy. (Gazzetta Ufficiale, 
n.279, 15 November 1960).  
131 “proprio perché rimasti senza lavoro” It should be noted here that the number of 2,500 was a 
small portion of the total number of Italians being housed throughout the peninsula, which 
hovered around 25,000 since the end of the Second World War. Giacomo Canepa, personal 
communication.  
132 “non cessano ma continua anzi con un ritmo di un centinaio di persone per ogni nave di linea 
proveniente di Alessandria nonostante che le nostre Autorità diplomatiche e consolari... non 
manchino di rendere noto ai rimpatrianti le difficoltà oggettive della situazione in Italia sia per 
quel che riguarda le possibilità di lavoro che di assistenza adeguata.” MAE DGAP 1948-60 
Uff.III B148 fasc.465, “elementi di risposta alla interrogazione n/3209 degli Onorevoli Roberti e 
Gray...” 8 March 1957. 
 277 
repatriation. Emigration was portrayed as a way to alleviate “moral and economic poverty.”133 
Both the political right and left depicted the government’s practice of sending Italians abroad 
through ICEM as a failure of the Italian state itself.134   
Despite the Italian government’s various petitions, however, only limited numbers could 
emigrate from Italy.135 The administration of the State Treasury feared that the financial strain of 
housing and welfare would topple the fragile national budget. By summer 1957, the financial 
situation in Livorno was at a breaking point and the Prefecture encouraged the ECA to push 
refugees out. As elsewhere, many individuals lacked resources to facilitate travel, even in the 
case where emigration had already been approved.136 The cost of travel was above and beyond 
the budget for many families.137  
Moreover, many were unable to access accounts in Egypt due to border restrictions 
enforced by the Egyptian government. One group of Italians in Egypt preparing to repatriate 
wrote to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs inquiring about the possibility to transfer money in Italy, 
noting that the “nationalization of the economy” had caused many to leave, and “others will soon 
be obliged to follow them,” but some refused to do the same simply hoping to preserve their 
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accounts.138 By March, around 380,000 EGP had been deposited in the Italian offices in Cairo: 
nearly 10 percent by departed individuals and the remainder by those safeguarding their accounts 
from nationalization policies in preparation for departure.139 
 The restriction on exports of more than 20 pounds sterling per family and the strict 
limitations on the belongings that could be taken out of the country led to the impoverishment 
even of those Italians who had managed to find work in the postwar years.140 In August 1957, the 
Italian Red Cross (Croce Rossa Italiana, CRI), which participated in the bureaucratic 
infrastructure of the CRP, noted that funds were nearly exhausted and the continuous support of 
repatriated Italians was impossible. The CRI advised that emigration should be expedited when 
possible, drawing from typical situations to illustrate the weight of the problems facing 
repatriates. 141 Angelo Fantuzzi, born in 1915 in Zagazig, an electro-technician who had worked 
for Fiat in Egypt, was recommended by the CRI to work for Air France at Ciampino Airport, 
where he carried luggage. He was unable to support his family on the income. Although he had 
family in Australia, he could not afford the cost of travel. Arturo Bajo stayed with his wife and 
four children in the station for two nights before being sent by the Questura to the La Marmora 
Barracks in Rome, where they were placed in a small room without windows. The La Marmora 
Barracks refugee camp, which was a reused military barracks from the First World War, had 
been officially closed to refugees since the late 1940s. Its reappearance in the late 1950s is 
                                                            
138 MAE DGAP 1948-60 Uff.III B148 fasc.465, letter to MAE 17 May 1957. 
139 MAE DGAP 1948-60 Uff.III B148 fasc.465, Amb Cairo to MAE 8 March 1957. 
140 ACS CRI Ufficio Madrinato B83 fasc. varie s.fasc. profughi dall’Egitto “Padre Governanti” 
ND. 
141 In the same fall, the circumstances at large were troubling for the Ministry of Interior, as 
some 26,000 refugees were in camps in Italy (mostly from Istria, Dalmazia, Fiume, and Pola) 
and another 20,000 were subsidized by the government outside of the camps. Italy was described 
as having become a “bridge” for refugees. ACS - Ufficio del consigliere diplomatico B24 fasc. 3 
“profughi” memorandum of conversation (Mascia) 19 October 1957; see also Sanfilippo, “Per 
una storia,” 848. 
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undocumented, implying that the local police illegally used the quarters to house refugees when 
other options were not available.142 Between September 1956 and August 1957, Bajo was unable 
to find work. Michele Azzellini was a driver in Alexandria for a Jewish commercialist who fled 
at the outbreak of war, leaving Azzellini without work and unable to find a replacement job. 
When he arrived in Italy, he was could not procure employment. His daughter was hired as a 
nanny, but the rest of the family ate only once every 48 hours. The 20 pounds sterling he took 
out of Egypt lost much value after the exchange and quickly vanished. The CRI managed to get 
around 100 families approved for emigration, but material assistance was still urgently needed.143 
In the following months, around 350 families were sent to South America (mainly to Brazil) 
through ICEM, which continued to pressure Australia to raise its quota to accommodate the 
Italians of Egypt.144 
 
In Italy, for individuals in the camps, conditions deteriorated and small collectives began to 
form, appealing to politicians to intervene on their behalf. A group of repatriated Italians in 
Genoa, the same city from which De Lorenzo had written, formed the National Committee of 
Italians of Egypt (Comitato Nazionale Italiani d’Egitto, CoNIE). The mission of CoNIE was to 
represent, stabilize, and secure the perceived interests of the Italians of Egypt, “those who, with 
much sacrifice, worked and [continue to] work in Africa.”145 The organization connected the 
interests of repatriated Italians with Italian residents remaining in Egypt, thus subverting state 
                                                            
142 Giacomo Canepa, personal communication.  
143 ACS CRI - Servizio Affari Internazionali B32 f. conflitto di Suez, Corvini to Nonis 3 August 
1957. 
144 Australian authorities had approved 22 workers, 52 families based on invitations, 19 of whom 
Italian authorities in Australia offered to cover the voyage. MAE DGAP 1948-60 Uff.III B148 
fasc.465, Appunto 4 October 1957. 
145 “quelli che con tanto sacrificio hanno lavorato e lavorano in Africa.” MAE DGAP 1948-60 
Uff.III B148 fasc.465, Dott. Albano Gennaro to Pres. Istituto Italiano dell’Africa 24 October 
1957. 
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efforts to distinguish the two communities. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs immediately 
responded offering neither support nor financial backing to CoNIE, and warned regional political 
offices to do the same, hoping to avoid the constitution of analogous “associations and 
committees.” Apart from providing a political threat through their mobilization by opposition 
parties (which might have come from either the right or left), associations and committees like 
CoNIE were thought to cement a sense of shared hostility among the Italians of Egypt towards 
the state, rendering the community itself an autonomous political force.146 This autonomy 
threatened both domestic and foreign political spheres.  
  One group of repatriates who had arrived on the Argentina and Ascania remained in the 
CRP in Messina for over one year. 89 family heads signed a petition calling attention to the “lack 
of possibilities to be absorbed in Patria”—not due to the socio-cultural rationale expressed by the 
Italian Consul in 1954, but rather they claimed, because they were excluded from being 
recognized as legal refugees and therefore deprived of the “entitlements” that characterized their 
circumstances. Again, they wondered how the Italian state could accommodate Hungarian 
refugees but not its own national subjects. Moreover, they blamed the London Conference for the 
hostility they faced in Egypt, arguing that the ambiguous Italian position had caused the 
“assimilation” of Italians to other foreign communities and created conditions that forced Italians 
to “suddenly leave their belongings, houses, positions, and interests in Egypt.” Adding that 
means to travel were not easily accessible, even to those who had obtained permission to 
emigrate to Australia, the signees demanded “immediate accommodation.” This argument was 
framed on a specific iteration of their history, referring directly to episodes from the Fascist 
                                                            
146 “per non costituire precedenti per Associazioni e Comitati analoghi.” MAE DGAP 1948-60 
Uff.III B148 fasc.465, MAE (Straneo) to PCM 30 November 1957. 
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period when Italians donated large amounts of gold to the regime during the Ethiopia campaign 
and the “54 month internment” during the Second World War:  
we suffered oppression, hunger, threats and murders by our enemies at the time for 
holding high our faith as Italians, without any protection... we ask if it is our right to have 
a settlement (liquidazione), which was given to all prisoners of war, deported politicians, 
and civilian internees, upon their return in Italy. Notwithstanding the parenthesis of us 
Italians of Egypt who, in each calamity experienced in Italy each one [of us] always 
contributed in blood and gold.147 
 
Within one year, the refugees in Messina were brought under the umbrella of CoNIE, which by 
then had established committees among groups of repatriates in Rome, Genoa, Milan, Livorno, 
Naples, Brindisi, and Messina. They estimated that nearly half of the Italian community had left 
Egypt. In Rome, around 600 individuals were in need of employment or assistance. Attilio 
Morini, the director of the Roman branch of CoNIE, wrote: “days pass [without resolution] and 
the majority of refugee Italians of Egypt become more oppressed by harsh daily realities.”148  
Overcrowding in the regional CRP grew as the concentration of refugees in urban centers like 
Roma and Milan was discouraged.149 Instead, both the General Directorate of Public Assistance 
and the local ECAs attempted to relocate refugees, redistributing them into smaller camps, in 
cities such as Arezzo, Brindisi, Bari, Brescia, and Frosinone.150 Jewish families were encouraged 
                                                            
147 “subimmo soprusi, fame, minacce ed uccisioni da parte dei nostri nemici di allora, per tenere 
alta la nostra sola fede di Italiani, senza alcuna protezione... chiediamo se è nel nostro diritto 
avere una liquidazione che fu data a tutti i prigionieri di guerra, deportati politici ed internati 
civili, al loro ritorno in Patria. Non trascurando la parentesi di noi Italiani di Egitto che in ogni 
calamità avvenuta in Italia ognuno ha sempre dato il proprio contributo in sangue ed in oro.” 
ACS PCM 1959-61 15.3/57749.3 “I connazionali tutti, dicono e chiedono” 11 December 1957. 
148 “i giorni passano e la maggior parte dei profughi italiani d’Egitto è sempre più stretta dalle 
dure realità quotidiane.” ACS, PCM 1959-61 15.3/57749.3, CoNIE (Attilio Morini) to Gronchi 
22 May 1958. 
149 ACS PCM 1959-61 15.3/57749.3, MI to PCM 1 June 1958. 
150 ACL Archivio ECA N.713 Profughi dall’Egitto 1957-62, Prefettura di Livorno 14 February 
1961; Sanfilippo, “Per una storia,” 851. 
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by Italian, American, and Israeli Jewish organizations to emigrate to Israel (at least 11 of 41 
families in Livorno had in fact already left Italy for Israel by late 1957).151 
 As repatriates moved between locales, precise details concerning the types of assistance 
available to them were often unclear. A group of 22 families in a CRP in Bari wrote to Fanfani 
(then Minister of Foreign Affairs), demonstrating this confusion: “we haven’t been informed 
about the subsidies (sovvenzione) made available to each family.” In Bari, each family was 
housed in a one-room unit without furniture. They were encouraged to leave the camp by local 
authorities, but insisted that they were in no condition to do so.152 How, wrote the “group of 
refugees”--as they collectively signed the letter--were they supposed to “make a home (formar 
una casa)” when as soon as someone found a job, even temporary, “[the ECA] instantly cuts the 
minimum support… [where are the] so-called public houses (case popolari)?”153   
 
Conclusion 
 Little time had passed since the arrival of Giorgianni and Santoro in the autumn of 1956, 
with which this chapter began. Giovanni Wian, a journalist and lawyer who had spent over 30 
years living in Egypt, penned an essay speculating on the “dramatic forecasts” of the Italians in 
Egypt. Echoing Catraro’s prediction that the “traditional friendship” between Italy and Egypt 
would be no more than a memory if a “revolutionary” change in policy did not occur first, Wian 
wrote: “the Italian community will be reduced to a meager, inconsistent minority, numerically 
                                                            
151 ACS CRI - Servizio Affari Internazionali B32 f. conflitto di Suez, Parlato to Schlatter 14 
January 1957; ACL Archivio ECA N.713 Profughi dall’Egitto 1957-62, Prefettura 7 December 
1957. 
152 In Livorno, when the rented villas no longer became manageable, the ECA offered 50,000 
Italian lire per family to leave and renounce future assistance. ACL Archivio ECA N.713 
Profughi dall’Egitto 1957-62, Prefettura 4 December 1959. 
153 “toglie istantaneamente quel minimo sussidio?... [dove sono le] così chiamate case popolari?” 
ACS, PCM 1959-61 15.3/57749.3, italiani profughi d’Egitto to Fanfani 3 September 1958. 
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irrelevant, economically nothing, or almost…” The only certainty, observed Wian, was that “the 
Italians are leaving.”154 
Born in Alexandria in 1929, Aldo Fiorentino’s family received support from the Fascio 
in the 1930s to send him and his siblings to the Italian schools. And then, during the postwar 
years, Fiorentino himself received welfare from the consulate, unable to find work. He applied 
repeatedly to emigrate to Brazil and Australia beginning in 1951 and remained unemployed or 
held temporary employment during those years. In November 1957, he requested repatriation, 
after all other options proved futile. Apart from listing his arduous efforts at procuring work and 
the hardship of living on welfare, he asserted: “being in Egypt is no longer our future.” He was 
granted a consular repatriation on the condition that his elderly mother stays in the Casa di 
Riposo (Italian elderly home) in Alexandria, rather than repatriate with him. Finally, in 1958, his 
request was accepted by ICEM and he traveled to Italy to prepare for his emigration to 
Australia.155  
That same year, Virgilio Lilli, correspondent for the Corriere della Sera, who had 
frequently written on Italian politics in Egypt during the 1950s, traveled to Egypt to write a story 
on the Italian residents. In his article, “Agony more than life for the Italians in Egypt,” he drew 
attention to the incongruities in the language used by Italian officials and by the Italians of Egypt 
to estimate the community’s changing demographics. The consulates responded to his inquiries: 
“the Italians residing (che si trovano a risiedere) in Egypt amount to…”; whereas the Italian 
residents in Egypt responded, “the Italians still remaining in Egypt amount to… (gli italiani 
finora rimasti in Egitto ammontano a…).” The difference between the former (those residing in 
                                                            
154 “la collettività italiana verrà ridotta ad una sparuta, inconsistente minoranza, numericamente 
irrilevante, economicamente nulla, o quasi...”; “gli italiani se ne stanno andando.” Giovanni 
Wian “Drammatiche previsioni in Egitto per la Nostra Collettività,” Concretezza 15 May 1957. 
155 “essendo in Egitto non è più il nostro avvenire.” ACGA Fiorentino Francesco - 1866. 
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Egypt) and the latter (those remaining in Egypt), to Lilli, expressed the sentiments of a 
community that had transformed from immigrants to emigrants, and to refugees through the 
processes of repatriation. Many of the remaining Italians, noted Lilli, were elderly left behind by 
their children who had gone elsewhere in search of a future—as in the case of Aldo 
Fiorentino.156 
With the nationalization of the Egyptian economy, options to live and work in Egypt 
thinned. In Italy, many continued to move between cities, request emigration, and seek work. 
The Ministry of Interior implemented laws that made obligatory the employment of a quota of 
“refugees from Egypt (profughi d’Egitto)” in various sectors.157 Meanwhile, Fanfani worked 
with Nasser to secure economic ties between the two countries. Large-scale projects, however, 
involved cooperation between metropolitan Italian companies and the Egyptian military regime. 
At the cusp of the 1960s, even the Banco Italo-Egiziano complained that while the political 
relationship between Italy and Egypt had been ironed out since 1957, politicians did nothing to 
protect the institutions and individuals already present in the territory.158 Banks, insurances 
agencies, and big industries were all nationalized under Nasser’s authority between 1957 and 
1963, in a final blow to the structures of privilege that had been sustaining many of the Italian 
residents.159 
Whereas many Italians from Egypt had hoped that a collective repatriation would 
incorporate them into the national body, the Italian state had worked to keep their departure 
individualized and voluntary in legal terms. This exonerated the state of responsibility, at the 
                                                            
156 Virgilio Lilli, “Agonia più che vita per gli italiani in Egitto,” Corriere della Sera, ND July 
1958. 
157 ACS, MI Gabinetto 1961-63 B390, MI Circolare P.E.L. n5/62 3 September 1962. 
158 BR XI/8/15/11 B14 fasc.39 Appunto 30 December 1959. 
159 Alessia Melcangi “La collettività italiana nell’Egitto di Gamal ‘Abd al-Nasser. Alcune note a 
proposito dei documenti diplomatici italiani sulla visita di Fanfani al Cairo” PoloSud: Semestrale 
di Studi Storici, 3 (2013): 55-79. 
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moment at which Italians turned to the state for assistance. Nevertheless, repatriation became a 
collective experience. This was in part the result of pressure and influence of political parties like 
the neo-fascist MSI, as well as the political isolation of the community in the aftermath of the 
Second World War. Denied the official “welcome” as “repatriates (rimpatriati),” the Italians of 
Egypt adapted to the new environment as “refugees,” in spite of the fact that they initially were 
excluded from the legal definition of the term. Finally, with the granting of refugee status, the 
Italians of Egypt were entitled to obtain work and seek new lives in Italy, notwithstanding that 
behind the new label was the desire on the part of the government to lessen the load on its budget 
and send as many refugees as possible on to other destinations through ICEM and other 
intergovernmental bodies. Emigration from Italy came to be desired by many, after brief 
experiences in CRP, a shared sense of being neglected and marginalized from Italian society. At 
the same time, new organizations, such as CoNIE, emerged to represent their interests and link 
the community across shores, signifying the materialization of collective (political) identities 
based on their spatial displacement and historical emplacements. The 1960 Egyptian census 
counted the Italian population at 14,089—a decline of at least 13,000 from 1947.160 More than 
half of the Italians of Egypt had left: both Wian and Lilli noted that the only certainty was that 
the Italians were leaving, and the perception on the ground was of a community defined by what 
it had been, and by those who “still remained.” 
 
                                                            
160 Amicucci, “La comunità italiana,” 82. 
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VIGNETTE THREE 
 
Arrival~Departure: Displaced from the Present 
 
The apparent contradictions in the positions taken by the Italian administration and its diplomats 
in Egypt, who appeared to move closer to the Egyptian regime precisely at the moment that 
Italian residents faced great difficulty in finding a place in the postwar Mediterranean, played a 
central role in memories of departure from Egypt. M. Ardizzone recalled that on the “third day of 
the war” in the autumn of 1956 (he was not certain of the timeline of the conflict itself, but he 
did remember that this event occurred on the third day), “the Italian Consul in Port Said went 
around to all of the Italian homes announcing the arrival of a ship that, within 24 hours, would 
depart for Italy.” His father was not prepared to leave, he said, noting that the family’s modest 
finances were blocked in an account at the Banco Italo-Egiziano, but when an Egyptian soldier 
knocked on the door asking if they had hosted a British officer in preceding days (his father had 
indeed worked closely with the British military after his release from Fayed and knew many of 
the British officers based in Port Said), he “resigned himself” to departure, sensing that the risks 
of staying outweighed the financial loss. “In those days almost all of the Port Saidians (port-
saidini) were trying to get out, [before the conflict, most] were preparing paperwork to go to 
Australia.” The ship, the Argentina, he recalled, had 2,000 Italians aboard—when I questioned 
him about this number he remarked that this was the memory of a child (himself) too small to 
take account of the reality of the situation (the scale of evacuation aboard the Argentina, as we 
saw in the previous chapter, was much smaller). The family arrived in Brindisi (Puglia), where 
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they were hosted for several days in a refugee camp, which had served as a temporary holding 
grounds for Jewish refugees fleeing Europe after the Second World War.1 Shortly thereafter, 
they were relocated to Naples by the administration of the camp, where they were placed in the 
overcrowded Emigration Center. The conditions of the camp and the Emigration Center, 
Ardizzone recalled, “embarrassed us... we were treated like refugees!”2  
By the winter of 1956-1957, when departure became a large-scale event, the 
administrative procedures that had been used prior to the conflict in Suez were by all practical 
means obsolete. Debates in the halls of the Italian Ministries in Rome regarding the granting of 
refugee status to Italians entering the country from Egypt took place on a consistent basis 
following the Suez Conflict, as we saw in the previous chapter. Departure had become a social 
fact for Italian residents by the late 1950s. Official accounts describe the rate of return by 1958 at 
around 16 families per month.3 The gap between the functional application of legal categories--
such as repatriates and refugees--and the social meanings given to those same categories is filled 
with a variety of experiences that define, in their own way, the departure and arrival of the 
                                                            
1 The camp in which he and his family were held was likely that of Restinco, which had hosted 
Jews who, with tacit consent of Italian authorities in the mid and late 1940s, fled to Palestine. For 
most of the 1950s, this camp was then used for “foreign refugees” (profughi stranieri) until 1959, 
when it was officially designated as a camp for Italian repatriates, most of whom were from 
Tunisia. Giacomo Canepa, personal communication. For more on the presence of Jews in these 
transitional camps see MAE, AP Egitto (1946-1950), B8; see also Enardu, “l’immigrazione 
illegale,” Schwarz, Ritrovare se stessi, Eric Salerno, Mossad base Italia: Le azioni, gli intrighi, 
le verità nascoste (Milano, 2010), Ada Sereni, I clandestini del mare: L’emigrazione ebraica in 
terra d’Israele dal 1945 al 1948 (Milano, 2006). 
2 “ci ha imbarazzati... [siamo stati] trattati da profughi.” 
3 By 1958, the massive collective departures that were associated with the events of the Suez 
Conflict had declined. According to official statistics, over 5,000 Italians departed definitively 
and the Italian Embassy estimated that the overall Italian community had been reduced to around 
35,000 persons. Despite the reduction in scale, however, the rate of repatriation remained steady 
at around 16 families per month. MAE, Direzione Generale Affari Politici Uff. III, 1948-61, 
B309, “Comunità Italiana in Egitto” Telespresso 916/440, 20 March 1958. 
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Italians of Egypt from the 1950s into the 1960s. It is these experiences which draw departure and 
arrival into an inseparable relation.  
 
After attending several meetings held by the Associazione Italiani d’Egitto (AIDE), I met with 
G. Santoro, the son of Virgilio, who we met at the beginning of the previous chapter. G. Santoro 
is the editor of the small bulletin published by AIDE and distributed among its members. He 
invited me to his home where he had arranged two books for my viewing: one the photocopied 
“diary” of Castaldi detailing his internment during the Second World War (see Chapter Two), 
and the other a “directory” of the Italians of Egypt—a “who’s who” of the community—
published in 1933. Before I turned on my recorder, and without being prompted, he began to 
recount his family’s departure from Egypt. “The consulate advised us to repatriate in 1956... 
[and] with a consular form that said we would be received by the local administrative office [in 
Naples]… we departed for Italy.”4 It was thus, according to Santoro, that his family left the keys 
of their house to a family friend—an Egyptian businessman with whom Santoro’s father had 
worked—and boarded the Esperia on 15 September 1956. When the family disembarked in 
Naples, no one was waiting for them, as they were told would be the case. There was no 
indication as to where they were to present themselves. Santoro recalled:  
 in Italy they had no news for us, no documentation, there had been no communication 
[between Alexandria and Naples], they knew nothing of these Italians who came from 
Egypt!...without any possibility [of assistance] from the local administrative office, my 
father, quite angry by this point, stops at the [train] station, opens our luggage, and we 
remain there for several days... gazed at strangely by the Neapolitans who walked by...5  
 
                                                            
4 “[Nel 1956] il consolato italiano ci consiglia di rimpatriare... con un foglio del consulato che 
diceva che saremmo stati ricevuti alla prefettura... partiamo per l’Italia.” 
5 “venammo in Italia e in Italia non hanno notizia per noi, non ci sono documentazioni, non ci 
sono comunicazioni, dalla parte dell’ambasciata, questi in Italia non sanno nulla di quest’italiani 
che venivano dall’Egitto.” 
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At this point, tears formed in his eyes and his voice cracked, moved by his own memory of the 
event. He exclaimed, continuing, “[they stared as though] we were wretched!”6 Santoro 
remembered that several local journalists came to interview the family, but he had never had the 
courage to search for the articles. Police intervened after several days and relocated the family to 
a nearby hotel, where they remained for one week before Santoro’s father, frustrated by the lack 
of help, decided to return to Egypt with his family.  
After several years of unemployment in Egypt and despite numerous requests to emigrate 
to Brazil, Argentina, and Australia, the senior Santoro returned to Italy with his family in 1960. 
“The situation had worsened... there were no longer Italian youth (ragazzi italiani) and parents 
were thinking about their children’s futures.”7 Again, their experience of arrival was marked by 
suffering and hostility. Santoro explained,  
to disembark one had to show their passport... my father displayed his to the security 
officer at the port, an officer with dark skin (pelle scura) said ‘but you are Egyptians?’ to 
which my father, an Italian, one of the real ones (di quelli veri) who took it seriously (e ci 
teneva moltissimo), said ‘no, I’m Italian!’  
 
Santoro described how his father argued with the official, who did not understand that his father 
was an Italian born and raised in Egypt and had maintained Italian nationality, and was not an 
Egyptian who had obtained Italian nationality. The argument resulted in Santoro senior telling 
the officer (impolitely) that the officer in fact looked more “Arab” than Santoro. This racial 
marking was common—“Arab” often stood in place of “Egyptian” when contrasting the 
communities.8 Albert Memmi calls this depersonalization the “mark of the plural” and notes that 
it is central to the colonizer’s oppression of the colonized. What is interesting in this case is that 
the Italians of Egypt use the same structures of rendering “anonymous” the collectivities of many 
                                                            
6 “come da miserabili!” 
7 G. Santoro interview, 7 June 2012. 
8 Albert Memmi, The Colonizer and the Colonized (Boston, 1991[1957]), 85. 
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of the social actors around them, including Italians (of Italy), Italian repatriates from other 
countries, and, in a sense, of themselves. The latter point signifies, beyond the coherency of their 
community, an internalization of the fascist iteration of their own role in the nationalist narrative 
(and thus a kind of colonization of the Italians of Egypt). 
This time, the Santoro family was sent to the Canzanella CRP, on the periphery of Naples 
(Fuorigrotta). The camp was originally used to hold prisoners of war between 1944-1945, after 
allied occupation of the Italian south. Between 1946 and 1950, it was transformed into a holding 
camp for the sorting of Italian war veterans, housed “national refugees” from Istria, and 
eventually was used as a refugee camp--supported by international funds--for foreign refugees 
(profughi stranieri). Only after 1960 was it officially sanctioned as a camp to house repatriates 
and refugees from Tunisia and Egypt.9  
Santoro reminded me,  
you need to understand that Canzanella was one of those camps used for the Dalmatians 
(i dalmati) when they were expelled, the shacks (barracche) were unchanged since the 
early 1950s... we were one of 1,500 families housed there, some [were] Italians from 
Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia... who spoke a language that sounded like Berber... and they 
weren’t the best people (migliori persone)!  
 
The camp, he recalled, was locked at night, guarded by two military guards, and one could only 
exit and reenter during prescribed hours.10 On several occasions, when the young Santoro left the 
camp to search for work and returned after the permitted hours of entry, he was forced to sleep 
outside of the camp’s walls, whistling to his mother inside to throw a blanket over the walls. The 
                                                            
9 Giacomo Canepa, personal communication. Accounts of these camps are difficult to find. Only 
occasionally are they mentioned in short articles or memoir essays. See for example, online 
forums such as: http://www.editfiume.com/lavoce/esuli/3840-da-napoli-al-collegio and 
http://intranet.istoreto.it/esodo/parola.asp?id_parola=19. 
10 The militarization of the camps--in Italy and, more broadly, on a European scale--occurred 
during the 1950s, after the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) 
encountered great difficulty in trying to maintain refugee camps as open areas. For more on this 
see, Gerard Daniel Cohen, In War’s Wake: Europe’s Displaced Persons in the Postwar Order 
(Oxford, 2011).  
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family stayed in a small room crowded with six beds and ceilings open to the sky. It was cold in 
the Italian autumn, recalled Santoro. “I don’t say all of this with shame (vergogna), but instead 
with regret (dispiacere) for those who mistreated us in this way...”11 Santoro saw this reception 
as an example of the postwar Italian state’s inability to acknowledge the role the Italian residents 
in Egypt had played as purveyors of Italian “prestige” abroad during prior epochs. 
The policy of housing the Italians of Egypt in refugee camps seemed, to Santoro, out of 
place with respect to what the community had represented historically. Searching for work 
outside of the camp often proved as difficult as it had been in Egypt. During interviews, many 
commented on having experienced hostility from the Italians “of Italy” (italiani d’Italia). In this 
regard, Santoro found himself competing in a limited market, encountering contempt at every 
angle.  
We weren’t seen well down there. It was said that we had arrived to steal work [from 
them], above and beyond all the hardships [we faced]... but then... it was true that we 
were searching for work, and yet there wasn’t any in Naples.12  
 
Although Italy was undergoing the so-called “economic miracle” (1958-1963), the “miracle” of 
the period had not trickled down into the lives of workers, and was not equally distributed 
between the Italian north and south. Many unemployed Italians, therefore, felt the arrivals of 
Italians from Egypt diminished their own opportunities.13 
                                                            
11 “ci ha maltrattati cosi.” 
12 “non eravamo molto ben visti laggiù perché si diceva che eravamo arrivati per togliere il 
lavoro, oltre tutti i guai... che poi ... era realtà perché noi cercavamo lavoro e lavoro non c’era a 
Napoli...” 
13 Although it is beyond the scope of this section, by the late 1960s, when many Italians from 
Egypt found employment with airlines and tourism companies based in Fiumicino, many 
reported that an official complaint had been filed through the union by “Italians of Italy” about 
the preferential status given to Italians of Egypt, favored in part because of their linguistic ability 
and in part because, as refugees, they were entitled to an employment quota in various sectors. 
European repatriates from Egypt indeed occupied similar positions throughout Europe—most 
notably I heard stories about Paris, Athens, and Rome—during the late 1950s and into the 1970s, 
utilizing the networks they had formed in Egypt for this emergent industry. 
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Soon thereafter Santoro left the camp and moved to Rome, where several of his 
schoolmates from Alexandria were living, to search for work and a means to get his family out of 
Canzanella. These experiences upon arrival, explained Santoro, inspired repatriated Italians to 
call Italy “la matrigna” (the evil step-mother), echoing the language of the letter written by 
Bellamare in the heat of conflict in 1956, which we saw in the last chapter. Santoro’s critique 
quickly jumped from his arrival to the political present. He compared the conditions in which he 
and other Italians of Egypt were received to the perceived reception and “welcoming” 
(accoglienza) of immigrants and refugees in contemporary Italy: a common myth among some 
members of the anti-immigration political right is that refugees and immigrants are housed in 
hotels and new apartments, and are provided with substantial welfare payments by the Italian 
State. Likewise, one Italian from Egypt—a close acquaintance of Santoro’s who did not stay in 
Canzanella but, in the early 1960s, frequently went to visit friends from Alexandria housed 
there—described the camp:  
it was really disgusting how and where [the Italians of Egypt] were received in Patria… 
[they were] Italian citizens much more Italian than those Italians resident [in Italy]… it 
certainly wasn’t the way in which we are now welcoming wretched populations 
(popolazioni disgraziate) and even thieves, bandits, and murderers, and so on, in hotels of 
three, four, and five stars!14 
 
When I met with G. Longo and his elder acquaintances, A. Piperno and B. Salerno, each 
reflected on their departures from Egypt. Longo asked how they chose Rome, to which Piperno 
responded, “his [her husband’s] brother and sisters were already here... it was supposed to be our 
reference point (punto di riferimento).” Situating their story within the timeline of his own, and 
perhaps in the broader sequence of events, Longo inquired pensively, “ah, but when you arrived 
                                                            
14 “cittadini italiani molto più italiani di quelli residenti… non era certamente il modo in cui 
stiamo accogliendo popolazioni disgraziate ma anche ladri, banditi, assassini ecc. ecc. in alberghi 
da 3-4-5 Stars.” 
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there wasn’t the [legal] designation of refugee, right?” Longo continued, revealing that the 
official designation of refugee status had distinguished one collective experience of arrival from 
another. Salerno then added, “we arrived early... I searched for work as an accountant, because it 
was what I was doing in Egypt. First, I went to Florence [his official “hometown”], but I learned 
that, for work, one either went to Milan or Rome.” His wife interrupted him, “we chose Rome 
because of his family and the presence of other friends from Egypt [who had left in 1953]... then 
he found work in a car-rental company.”  
 Longo was surprised to learn that, upon his arrival in 1962, six years after Salerno, he had 
worked at the same company. This realization prompted Longo to describe his own arrival. He 
repatriated with a friend from Messina (Sicily), his official “hometown.” His friend had advised 
him to go to Rome, where his brother worked “illegally” (in nero). His contact was employed at 
the same car-rental company as Salerno, who vaguely remembered the brother of Longo’s friend. 
Longo recalled of his colleague,  
[he] was a little jealous of me… he used to say ‘ah, but when you (voi) arrived [in Italy] 
there were refugee camps, [the government] helped you, they helped you’... and he was 
right, they gave us a small compensation.15  
 
Piperno nodded in agreement, adding that for the Italians who had arrived earlier, it was only 
after the laws were modified that they were able to claim refugee status and collect a modest 
welfare payment from the ECA in Rome. Before that moment, she noted, they faced continuous 
struggles in procuring steady employment and many lived precariously, working illegally for 
short periods and frequently changing jobs. What sustained them and facilitated these 
movements, however, was the tight network of relatives, friends, and acquaintances who had 
arrived from Egypt. 
                                                            
15 “era un po’ geloso di me... diceva ‘o ma quando voi siete venuti c’era il campo profughi, [il 
governo] vi ha aiutato vi ha aiutato’... e infatti ci ha dato un piccolo indennizzo.” 
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Many encountered difficulties in procuring employment due to existing restrictions 
intended to limit urbanization that had been enacted by the Fascist regime in 1939. These 
restrictions required residency in order to obtain legal work, but concurrently made employment 
a prerequisite to obtaining residency. Politicians who thought to cancel these restrictions in the 
postwar period also had to face the fact that this would grant the right to vote to Italy’s vast 
number of internal migrants—mostly Southern Italians working in northern cities who had come 
to be known as Marocchini or Napuli. This, it was feared, would give these migrants an 
opportunity to challenge the exploitation that fueled the ongoing industrial boom.16 The massive 
movement of refugees after 1945 to urban centers (both from outside of Italy and from rural 
areas destroyed during the second war) in part facilitated the end to this legal ambiguity. The 
Ministry of Interior favored ending these restrictions after 1951 and the original law was finally 
abolished in 1961.17 This dilemma was resolved in the case of the Italians of Egypt by granting 
them refugee status, which entitled them to forms of social welfare similar to disabled persons or 
war veterans (“invalidi” and “mutilati di guerra”) and thus to an employment quota in certain 
sectors. As Longo described, this preferential status created a divide within the community of 
repatriated Italians of Egypt between those who had arrived before, and therefore had struggled 
to integrate into Italian society without support, and those who arrived afterwards and had 
received assistance from the Italian state.   
 
                                                            
16 See Graziella Parati, Migration Italy: The Art of Talking Back in a Destination Culture 
(Toronto 2005), 144-145, and also Miriam Mafai, Il sorpasso: Gli straordinari anni del miracolo 
economico, 1958-1963 (Milano 1997), 23. For more on the relation between the “economic 
miracle,” migration, and the legacies of fascism, see Chris Duggan, “Italy in the Cold War years 
and the legacy of fascism,” in (eds.) Chris Duggan and Chris Wagstaff, Italy in the Cold War: 
Politics, Culture and Society, 1948-1958 (London, 1995).  
17 Giacomo Canepa, personal communication.  
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Questions of work and employment often factored into stories about departure. A. Sinigaglia 
recalled that while the subjects of France and England were expelled from Egypt in 1956, “we 
Italians never had those problems, our problem was always [finding] work!”18 The restrictions on 
employment enacted with the Company Law of 1947 in Egypt affected many of the young 
Italians seeking employment. On one of the many afternoons I passed with Longo, walking along 
the lungomare in Ostia—he often said that it reminded him of Alexandria’s corniche—he began 
to reflect on the circumstances of his departure. Having finished secondary school in the late 
1950s, Longo remained unemployed for nearly four years. Finally, he was hired “under the 
table” at the Italian Hospital in Alexandria. After six months, however, he was required to 
formalize his employment to assure that neither he nor the hospital would suffer legal 
consequences, which could place the institution at risk of being taken over by Egyptian 
Authorities. He went to the Municipal Employment Office to register his employment, he 
remembered, “and the officials [working there] said to me, ‘ah, they’re searching for 
employees!?’ and then they denied me the position... instead sending one of them, an Arab 
(mandavano uno di loro, degli arabi).”19  
 Longo’s elder brother had departed the previous year, in 1962. On his request for 
repatriation (domanda di rimpatrio)—the form required of all Italian residents requesting a 
consular repatriation, which fill the folders of the Italian consular archives in Egypt—his brother 
responded to the question regarding the motivation for departure with “reduction of personnel” 
(diminuzione del personale).20 There were no longer companies willing to hire Italians. The 
structure of the colonial economy was being dismantled. Longo himself left one year later.  
                                                            
18 A. Sinigaglia interview, 13 March 2012. 
19 P. Longo interview, 10 May 2012. 
20 ACGA, “Antonio Longo”; To give a sense of the scale, of the nearly 250 personal files that I 
looked at in the Italian consular archives in Alexandria, Cairo (and a small number from Port 
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Longo’s father remained employed at the time because he was in charge of around 800 
Egyptian workers in the restoration of cotton magazines in Alexandria. Egyptian Authorities 
denied his father an exit visa when he attempted to depart, deeming his presence necessary for 
the training of workers and continual functioning of the restoration. Once Longo and his brother 
had found work in Italy, they set aside money to bribe Egyptian officers to grant his father 
permission to depart. Longo’s brother had to request special permission to reenter Egypt, 
however, because he had renounced his Egyptian residency in order to claim refugee status in 
Italy. Once he acquired the necessary paperwork, in 1964, he put his mother and father on a 
flight out of Egypt. In Rome, his father immediately fell ill, spending one week in a hospital 
before passing away.21 Many of the young who departed in search of work left their parents in 
Egypt, hoping to stabilize their situations in Italy before bringing their parents, who could 
survive in Egypt on little income or on the remittances of family members.22 Often, for those that 
could afford to do so, one member of the family would go to Italy in search of work and housing 
before bringing the rest of the family to Italy. This was the case in the Paoletti family, for 
example, when the father left Egypt in early 1956 to find work in Italy, settled in Pisa, and then 
sent for his family who arrived in Italy aboard the Achilleous, as one of the few paying families 
amidst several hundred expelled French, English, and Jewish residents during the Suez Crisis in 
November 1956.23  
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Said), only a small minority did not contain at least one “domanda di rimpatrio.” In other words, 
nearly every Italian family living in Egypt, had at least one of its members request a repatriation 
at some time between the early 1950s and the early 1960s. 
21 ACGA, “Longo Antonio fu Santi.” 
22 Several of the newspaper articles published in later years mention the fact that the community 
of Italians remaining in Egypt is constituted by elderly and those who can manage to live on the 
moderate welfare checks provided by the consulates and the SIB. Giuseppe dall’Ongaro, “Gli 
Italiani in Egitto,” Il Giornale d’Italia (1 October 1964); Francesco Piccione, “Appunti sulla 
collettività italiana in Egitto” Affari sociali internazionali, 3 (1989): 133-135. 
23 P. Paoletti interview, 28 January 2012. 
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Longo often reflected on how departure became a necessity for the Italians of Egypt. 
Addressing the events of the 1950s and early 1960s, and the collective experience of departure, 
he paused and said ponderously, “it’s not that they [Egyptians] kicked us out... it’s just that they 
left nothing for us to do, one couldn’t go forward.” He even exonerated “the Egyptians of 
Alexandria,” stating that the pressure to leave came from the newly empowered authorities and 
officials. “During that period, Nasser enflamed the spirits [of Egyptians] against foreigners 
(infuocava le anime contra gli stranieri)...” In Cairo, he explained, the results were more 
dramatic because the populations were less integrated within the urban space, whereas in 
Alexandria close proximity helped to dissolve potentially violent demonstrations.  
But, it’s true that the authorities, employment offices, for example, would refuse you 
services, saying ‘there isn’t this or that for you, you’re Italian, there isn’t anything for 
you, what are you doing here?’ Italians were never attacked, but they were pushed 
(spinti) to leave (andarsene), pushed to leave.24 
 
On this occasion, two of Longo’s neighbors—siblings who had left Egypt in 1962 and 1963 
respectively—had passed by for an afternoon coffee, unaware of my presence. After Longo said 
that Italians were “pushed” by the circumstances to depart, one of his neighbors added, “there 
was no longer a future (non c’era più avvenire), there wasn’t work, there were only more 
difficulties.” Longo quietly agreed—it had been the absence of a future and the inability to insert 
themselves in the present that “pushed” them out of Egypt.  
                                                            
24 “Ma sta di fatto che l’autorità, gli uffici di lavoro che ti rifiutavano... [dicendo] ‘non c’è questo 
per te, non c’è questo per te, tu sei italiano non c’è niente, cosa stai a fare qui?’ Gli italiani non 
sono mai stati attaccati, ma spinti di andarsene, spinti di andarsene...” 
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O. Civiletti invited me to the fur shop (pellicceria) his father had opened in Rome several years 
after arriving from Egypt in the early 1960s. Civiletti’s grandfather, Salvatore Civiletti, a noted 
sculptor and artist from Sicily, emigrated to Alexandria from Palermo in the late 1800s with his 
wife and six sons, fleeing intimidation as an atheist. Before the Second World War, Civiletti’s 
father had been employed in various forms of cinematographic work. After being released from 
Fayed, however, he was unable to find similar jobs. Through a friend he had met in the camp, he 
began to work as a furrier (pellicciao), eventually inheriting the shop when his friend departed 
Egypt for South America in the late 1940s. By the mid 1950s, Civiletti remembered, the trade 
had become impossible: with the departure of Europeans, his father lost clientele. Frequent 
complaints were sent to the Italian consular offices in Alexandria and Cairo about the 
Image 12: Civiletti's repatriation ticket (source O. Civiletti). 
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disappearance of clientele in the 1960s as companies were nationalized and the wealthy families 
who ran and controlled businesses departed—hinting at the distinct economies that separated 
European and elite communities from the majority of Alexandria’s Egyptian inhabitants.25  
 In 1957, Civiletti’s father requested a consular repatriation, citing “continued 
unemployment” as his motivation. Later that year, not having received a response, he implored 
that the consulate cover the expenses of his repatriation so that he could submit the necessary 
paperwork for emigration to Brazil.26 Civiletti recalled that his father was “in love with the idea 
of going to Brazil, he didn’t want to come to Italy.”27 During the same period, Civiletti’s paternal 
uncle also wrote several pleas to the consulate. In 1958, observing that 21 years of continual 
employment had been interrupted only by four years of internment in Fayed, he wrote,  
given the crisis and the impossibility to continue my work, having lost almost all of my 
clients [to departure]... and given the impossibility to build a future for my family [in 
Egypt], I would like to emigrate to Argentina... if that isn’t possible, I am also willing to 
be repatriated... it’s an urgent matter.28 
 
Like the vast majority of these requests, they initially went unanswered. The queue for departure 
was long and the Italian offices in Egypt were instructed to confer consular repatriation only to 
the most destitute, leaving final judgment to the discretion of consular authorities. The remainder 
were encouraged to repatriate at their own expense. This was all part of the broader policy to 
avoid dependency on state resources. Repatriation was more readily facilitated by the consulates 
only after the Suez Conflict. These circumstances narrowed Civiletti’s sense of choice. Feeling 
obliged to depart, he no longer expressed a preference for his destination. He wrote to the Italian 
                                                            
25 Tignor, “The Economic Activities of Foreigners in Egypt.” 
26 ACGA, “Civiletti Claudio di Salvatore 1909.” 
27 O Civiletti interview, 23 May 2012. 
28 “concretare per la mia famiglia un avvenire... la questione ha carattere di urgenza.” ACGA, 
“Civiletti Oscar di Salvatore 1913.” 
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Consul in Alexandria, “I would like to go to Genoa in order to perform my [trade]... or Rome, or 
Milan.”  
In 1961 the family was granted a consular repatriation. O. Civiletti was 16 years old. His 
uncle took his family to Milan, where he was able to procure work with a friend from 
Alexandria, and Civiletti’s family went to Naples, where they were given the option either to 
stay in the Canzanella camp—by then infamous among Italian repatriates for its crowded and 
destitute conditions—or the less known CRP in Gaeta. Of the 15 families that arrived aboard the 
Esperia, only the Civilettis and one other family chose the Gaeta camp. Gaeta was populated 
mostly by repatriated Italians from Tunisia, who, Civiletti recalled, were “a bit... a bit more crude 
(rozzi), they were almost all farmers (agricoltori)... [they were] a bit rude, and quite angry with 
us because they said we were favored.” When I asked about the difference between the two 
communities, he recounted a story from their arrival in the camp: 
The guard looked at us, he knew that we were from Egypt, and said ‘ah, but you’re 
Fascists, right!?’ [My father responded, saying] ‘we were Fascists when the [Italian] 
government was Fascist, but we aren’t anymore.’ Anyways, the guards laughed and said 
‘some of your friends are here,’ referring to two German soldiers still imprisoned in the 
camp.  
 
As in other cases, Civiletti described the perception of the Italians of Egypt upon arrival as being 
politically anachronistic or out of sync with other communities. The refugee camps provided the 
perfect backdrop upon which such dynamics came into relief, confronting the Italians of Egypt 
with the institutions of the Italian state, with other Italian repatriates, and with the Italians of 
Italy. These encounters reified distinction. Here, many expressed a violent rupture in their 
experience of historical belonging. It was not only with longing for the past community that so 
many Italians arrived in Italy, but also it was in search of a future community. Yet, the present 
challenged this continuity. One of Civiletti’s few material reminders from his childhood in Egypt 
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is the ticket from the Esperia, dated 11 November 1961 (image 12). On the ticket, a small, 
otherwise innocuous stamp reads: “consular repatriation.” Looking at this ticket, and thinking 
about his father’s resignation to leave Egypt, Civiletti stated, “my father wouldn’t have gone if it 
wasn’t for my sister and me... he was thinking of us, our future... he didn’t see a future there.” 
 
I met with O. Civiletti’s cousin in Milan—a meeting that had been arranged through a mutual 
contact unrelated to the family. She lives in a quiet neighborhood on the edge of the city. Her 
most vivid memory from childhood, she said, was the family’s arrival aboard the Esperia in 
1961:  
 we took a train [from Venice] to Milan, which we found black, dark, and I don’t know 
what my father did… but we found a small room (pensione) on via Buenos Aires… after 
six months, my father found a job with an Italian Jew from Alexandria, an antique dealer, 
who died six months later and my father helped to keep the business going.”  
 
Her husband added, “one brother [of her father] went to Australia, one to Rome, her father to 
Milan, another to Genoa.” Civiletti left the room for a moment to check on the coffee she was 
preparing. As soon as she was gone, her husband turned to me and said, “you know, they don’t 
say it, but life changed for them [the Italians of Egypt]... adjusting to Italy was not easy.”  
The Civiletti cousins narrated their departures in a similar way. Each family had told the 
Egyptian Authorities that they were going away for three months’ vacation, but they had all of 
their belongings with them. O. Civletti remembered preparing the three large trunks—containing 
mostly kitchen and housewares—into which his family packed away their lives. He recalled that 
they were forbidden to take anything other than essentials. “We weren’t escaping, at least we 
didn’t want it to seem that way.” Both Civiletti and his cousin recalled departing officially as 
“tourists,” without the exit visa required in the case of permanent departure. Perhaps their parents 
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had hoped to return or to keep the possibility of return open, or perhaps they did so out of 
unwillingness to acknowledge the realities of the departure, for it was indeed a definitive one.29  
They [the Egyptian customs officers] knew we were leaving... they looked at our money 
and pointed to all our belongings and said ‘all this for a vacation?!’ It was just to make it 
clear to us that they weren’t stupid, they knew we were escaping (sapevano che noi 
stavamo scappando). 
 
 In order to conform to new regulations on the belongings taken outside of the Egypt in 
the late 1940s, repatriates were required by the Egyptian Authorities to present lists of their 
possessions upon departure. These lists were then approved by the consulates, and printed in 
Italian and either French or Arabic, for administrative purposes.30 Departees were permitted to 
carry with them only “used” possessions. The lists were titled “used personal belongings” and 
often included a statement that the Italian resident intended to depart with his/her family. They 
always included the qualification that the departure was “definitive.”31  
 While reading the personal registry files of the Italian consulates in Alexandria and Cairo, 
I found these documents useful for understanding what departure meant in material terms for 
many of the families, particularly for individuals and families who had few connections in Italy. 
In one case, Beniamino Paonessa, a carpenter born in Port Said who then worked in Alexandria 
                                                            
29 In his work on the departure of Greeks from Egypt during the same period, Angelos 
Dalachanis found that individuals often left without obtaining the exit visa in case circumstances 
in Greece did not prove adequate to their needs. For the Italians it seems like this may also have 
been a possibility. However, it is also possible that, because many of the elderly or retired 
remained in Egypt, departing without an exit visa was also a means to remain connected to the 
members of the community who stayed in Egypt during the years of departure. See Dalachanis, 
“Leaving Egypt.” 
30 It remains unclear to what extent these lists were regulated. They may have been prepared 
simply in order to facilitate departure (for packing purposes on the ships, for example). They are 
included amongst the documents of the personal files (registri nazionali) of the Italian consulates 
in Alexandria and Cairo (following the 1956 conflict, the consulate in Port Said, remained closed 
and the Alexandrian consulate instead handled Italian residents from the Canal Zone) and 
often—but not always—have official stamps from municipal offices in Egypt. 
31 In Arabic they were titled, “khashafa bi-bayan al-milabis al-mosta’mila li-l-mudhkor…” and 
in Italian “Oggetti Personali Usati.” 
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during much of the interwar period (whom we met when he filed a complaint about his work 
tools lost due to the sequester in Chapter Three), went unemployed for long periods after the war. 
By the mid 1950s, his son was in Rome where he had been hired by Italcable. Beniamino 
completed the form for his departure (foglia di via) in 1953, accompanied by his list of 
belongings, which described the possessions “belonging to the family [of] Beniamino Paonessa 
departing Egypt definitively for Italy.”32 The short list included: housewares, a bicycle, two 
house-clocks, a camera, a tapestry, carpentry tools, one radio, a set of books on “radio 
technology,” elementary-school textbooks, and the classic works of Cicerone, Apuleius, and 
Quintilian. He boarded the Enotria on 3 August 1953.33 Carlo Grasso, a mechanic born in 1907 
in Alexandria, repatriated in late 1956 with his wife and children. On his request for consular 
repatriation he wrote that he left no family in Egypt and arrived in Italy where he had no family 
waiting for him. His departure, he wrote, was “due to unemployment and the difficulty to find 
new housing given the current situation.”34 Grasso’s family brought with them four trunks. 
Inside the trunks were tools for mechanical work, a sewing machine, housewares (covers/sheets 
for bed, towels), and kitchenware (plates, cups, mugs, pots and pans). From 4 December 1956 
until, at least, May 1958, the family (four children aged 9, 17, 19, and 21) lived in the Cibali 
CRP in Catania (Sicily). The Caccioppo family (whom we met intermittently in Chapters One 
and Two) departed Egypt with two small trunks of housewares on 24 November 1962. Aboard 
the ship were 12 other families destined for the crowded Canzanella camp.35  
                                                            
32 “appartenenti alla famiglia Beniamino Paonessa che lascia l’Egitto definitivamente per recarsi 
in Italia.” 
33 ACGA, “Paonessa Beniamo - 1883” 
34 “per disoccupazione e per la difficoltà trovare una nuova sistemazione data l’attuale 
situazione.” 
35 ACGA, “Caccioppo Salvatore.” 
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 L. Mieli remembered the customs control upon exiting Egypt as a terrifying encounter. 
Her family sent a package of photographs to the censure. After the events of the 1956-57, 
Egyptian authorities feared the leakage of strategic information through photographs taken out of 
the country. People had hidden money and valuables in every way imaginable. More than once, I 
was told of the woman (or women) whose doctor covered a leg (or arm) in a cast, between the 
layers of which were hidden bills. Or, the story of the man who nonchalantly slipped paper bills 
between the pages of the newspaper that he casually—and innocently—carried in his arms as he 
walked through customs. Or, the family who had their clothes specially tailored so that money 
was inside two layers of fabric. “They [the customs guards] would root through everything,” 
recalled Mieli, 
 ... they put their fingers everywhere… but with me they didn’t do anything because I had 
this idea… I was 19 years old and I had never done anything like this, but I jumped on 
top of the counter [where they were opening suitcases and trunks] and I told them I 
would help them sort through our belongings. They were all shocked to see a young 
woman do that, I was flirting with them saying ‘look, nothing here, mafish haga’ [she 
winks] and they were all cheering me on… they were distracted by the mazmazelle. 
That’s how I helped get our 11 packages through…  
 
She added, as an afterthought, “it’s not that we were sent away (mandati via), but, in the end, it 
wasn’t our time to live there anymore… we boarded the [ship] Nefertiti… we left everything 
there, money, the apartment, we left with 100 EGP and our bags…”  
On our second meeting, R. Berni recalled:  
We had to sell (our belongings and property), but no one was buying, we had to close out 
(svendere)... we were going to Venezuela, but when we finally managed to sell 
everything off (svendere), I took the little money (quattro soldi) I had to buy tickets... 
[and then] Venezuela closed the door to immigration. 
 
Berni described a situation in which the circumstances of his departure were determined solely 
by external factors. To him departure was like being caught in a labyrinth. Emigration from 
Egypt was only possible under a strictly regulated regime by the 1960s. Due to restrictions 
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placed on the exportation of money and material goods out of Egypt, many had to sell their 
belongings at low prices. Others, knowing the market was overflowing with used goods, left 
their belongings with family members or friends who stayed in Egypt and they, in turn, used the 
goods as a form of supplementary income, slowly selling them off. Berni talked of the shame 
that marked his arrival in Italy. He recalled: 
I was 34 years old when I arrived [in Italy] with my wife and two children, 22 dollars in 
my pocket, thankfully my mother [and sister’s family] were already in Milan and hosted 
us. It was my first experience of great shame (vergogna), total humiliation... when the 
children went to school in the morning, I was ashamed, and I would pretend to sleep... I 
didn’t want my daughter to see me at home without work, it was the greatest shame on 
earth... we had become a breed (razza) of workers (lavoratori) because we had no one to 
protect us since 1945, not even the consulates, we had no unions and no institutions, one 
lived without protection. We learned we couldn’t count on the Italian State, only on 
ourselves, we needed to know how to protect ourselves (saper difendersi da soli).  
 
Berni’s case was similar to others who did not stay in a CRP and instead were housed for a 
period with family or friends who had previously arrived and stabilized themselves in Italy. 
Some houses became “points of encounter,” like the Paoletti home in Pisa, where Italians 
arriving from Egypt would come and go between the late 1950s to the 1960s.  
 
The departure~arrival relation—signifying the definitive spatial displacement from Egypt to 
Italy—compelled the Italians of Egypt to confront a variety of realities in Italy. After describing 
himself as “a strong Italian (un italiano forte),” G. Augeri, who had driven from the Veneto 
region in Northern Italy to attend the AIDE meeting in Rome, remembered his initial 
impressions of Italy. He said,  
the Italians [of Italy] had another input… other ideologies… after the war they took that 
other one… and… they said to us, ‘but you Italians colonized,’ to which I responded, ‘go 
read your history!’ and you see that’s what we’re doing here with AIDE… yeah, it’s true, 
someone (qualcuno) among us brought over a relative [to Egypt], but we went there 
invited (noi siamo andati lí chiamati).  
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To Augeri, the Italians of Egypt, when they were in Egypt, did not represent a community of 
Italian immigrants. They did not arrive “with a suitcase in hand,” he continued, but instead were 
“invited” to assist in Egypt’s development since the mid-nineteenth century. This exceptionality, 
he claimed, went unrecognized upon arrival in Italy—and was interpreted in “other” ways, as 
Augeri alluded to the anticolonialist sentiments of the Italian left during the postwar years. 
Italians of Egypt, he recalled, were received as colonizers. “[Italians of Italy] did not understand 
our history,” he argued. Due to similar encounters, many years passed before Augeri made 
friends among Italians (of Italy). Today, he admitted, almost apologetically, “we’re a little more 
Italianized (siamo un po’ più italianizzati).”  
Once in Italy, the Italians of Egypt reconfigured new lives (and new futures). Repatriates 
often sought to distinguish their own experiences from those of the other migrants—internal 
migrants from the Italian South, Italian emigrants elsewhere, and immigrants in today’s Italy. 
Regarding a political speech in which the current Prime Minister Matteo Renzi reminded his 
audience of the country’s history of emigration--in light of xenophobic responses to the ongoing 
influx of migrants and refugees in Italy--one Italian of Egypt denounced,  
What permits him to assimilate today’s immigrants to our emigrant descendants?... They 
worked hard, some earned more than others, sure, but they all contributed to the growth 
(hanno contributo a far crescere) of the countries to which they arrived...shame on him! 
 
She condemned the comparison, arguing that the “arrogance of clandestine migrants” was unlike 
the work ethic of Italian emigrants, especially those who had lived in Egypt.  
As another interview began to wind down, Santoro searched for a way to conclude his 
story. He compared his experience and that of other Italians of Egypt to an Italian (of Italy) of his 
own generation. He noted that—notwithstanding the technical education he and his peers 
received at the Don Bosco Institute—the Italians of Italy were “three levels lower” (tre livelli più 
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giù) than them. On Italian emigrants elsewhere, he thought aloud, “in Canada? in Brazil? what 
did the Italians do? in America… there they did more damage than good… while we… we did 
(mentre noi… abbiamo fatto)!” As a final punctuation, Santoro added, “I’m proud to be Italian, 
but I’m prouder to be an Italian of Egypt.”36  
Narrating departure from Egypt concurrently sketched a story of arrival in a country that 
had long been imagined as the Patria, the same Patria that had extended legally (through its 
protection under the Capitulations) until the late 1930s and socially until decades later (through 
the large-scale institutional restructuring of the community as part of the Fascist regime’s 
propaganda among Italians abroad and even into the late 1950s as the Italian administration used 
the idea of the community to frame a political “friendship” with Nasser). Yet, these ideas were 
dissonant with the initial impressions of the repatriated Italians. The relation of arrival~departure 
as a final page in the history of the Italians of Egypt conjures up networks that conjoin the 
Italians of Egypt, an abstracted Egyptian populace (and political body), the Italians of Italy, and 
the Italian State. The threads connecting each of these social and political bodies were 
interpreted on the basis of assumptions about the “historic” role played by the Italians of Egypt 
as a community of national subjects and political agents abroad. With unmet expectations upon 
their arrival and reception in Italy, a wrinkle in the narrative that defines the community of 
Italians of Egypt further articulated their sense of collective identity. In turn, the 
arrival~departure relation is central to understanding how legal, political, and social categories 
were shaped through the experiences of leaving Egypt over the course of the 1950s and 1960s.  
The arrival~departure relation can be understood in terms of its markedness. What is 
marked, argues linguist Linda Waugh, is less articulated in speech and is characterized by a 
minus-interpretation. The minus-interpretation at play here could be read as “not remaining 
                                                            
36 “sono fiero di essere italiano, ma sono più fiero di essere italiano d’Egitto!” 
 308 
Italians of Egypt” or, in other words, losing coherency as a national community. “Departure,” 
then, is used as the “carrier of the whole category” of being of Egypt and of being of the history 
of Italian imperialism in the Mediterranean, which structured the conditions of possibility that 
permitted the emergence of this community. “Arrival,” on the other hand, is specialized or, as 
Waugh would have it, it is “included” in the generalized structure of “departure” and therefore 
suggests a break from the broader meaning of departure. This relation, then, signifies a necessary 
node in the historical consciousness of the Italians of Egypt.37 For this reason, arrival is always 
characterized by distinction, by separation from other communities. If the arrival~departure 
relation did not exist in such terms, the community itself would cease to be present in history. 
But the arrival~departure relation also encapsulates a period of historical time that expands 
beyond the temporal boundaries of the spatial displacement from Egypt to Italy. It includes the 
entire “ending” of the community as a condition for its existence. The changes implied by arrival 
(the marked term) represent a semiotic hierarchy in which values are attributed to the specific 
qualities and conditions of departure. Thus, when the Italians of Egypt talk of arrival~departure 
in terms of their exceptionality and their unmet expectations upon arrival, they narrate their 
shared historical experience. All of this, in turn, structures the value of the community itself, 
endowing it with meaning. As Victor Turner reminds us,  
meaning always involves retrospection and reflexivity, a past, a history. Meaning is the 
only category which grasps the full relation of the part to the whole in life, for value, 
being dominantly affective, belongs essentially to an experience in a conscious present.38  
 
The stories that constitute these values are multiple. At the end of one of our meetings, just 
before walking away, O. Civiletti stepped forward and exclaimed, “you know, the history of the 
                                                            
37 Linda R. Waugh “Marked and unmarked: A choice between unequals in semiotic structure,” 
Semiotics, 38 3/4 (1982): 299-318, 305, 313. 
38 Victor Turner, “Social Dramas and Stories We Tell About Them,” Critical Inquiry, 7 1 (1980): 
141-168, 152. 
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Italians of Egypt is before the Second World War, that’s where the decline (scesa) begins!” As I 
have attempted to show throughout this dissertation, however, it is this decline that renders the 
Italians of Egypt present in history.  
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CONCLUSION 
 This dissertation began with the cry, “leave us our memories as they are!” in response to 
the man’s intervention at the AIDE conference regarding the deteriorating conditions of the 
Italian community in today’s Alexandria. While he recounted the slow degradation of the 
symbols of the past, the woman--and the audience that echoed her cry--wished to keep this 
present silent. Both participants, however, made the past present; one by relegating it to the 
domain of memory, the other by attempting to reconcile the breakage in historical time. The 
former generated two distinct temporalities, that of historical past and that of the detached 
present, which utilizes the past as memory. The latter, in trying to raise concern about the 
conditions of the present, wedded past and present into one continuous trajectory, 
notwithstanding its many disjunctures. This dissertation has attempted to move through the 
mechanisms conjoining the multiple and layered stories that make a community present in 
history. It has been concerned with the tensions articulated in the space between these two 
characterizations of the past. In this case, the stories—and their histories of departure—that fill 
this space constitute a community. To conclude, I revisit that call to return to the conditions of 
the Italian community in today’s Alexandria. It is in his concern for the present that the challenge 
underlying the narrative of this dissertation lay: the vulnerability of history.  
 
 311 
   
Image 13: The Casa di Riposo in the 1930s and in 2013. 
 
 Today, only around 250 members of the “historic” Italian community remain.1 Of the 
Italian institutions, little remains.2 When I read in the archives of the Italian consulate in 
Alexandria from 2012 to 2013, I stopped to visit the inhabitants of the Casa di Riposo several 
times each week, where I shared tea and conversation on the past, present, and future. I was 
asked to recount stories from the archives and the elderly residents narrated intimate details of 
the political landscapes of twentieth-century Italy and Egypt. In this space, I came to understand 
many of the complexities of this project. Their home, the Casa di Riposo, was designed and built 
                                                            
1 This number is unofficial and comes from estimates of members of the community itself and 
from the staff of the former consulate in Alexandria and the consular offices in Cairo. The total 
population of Italians living in Egypt is much higher (roughly 5,550 according to pre-2015 data), 
but this number includes a variety of recent arrivals and now a significant population of Egyptian 
immigrants who have also acquired Italian nationality. 
2 Remo Brenna, “La Casa di riposo ‘Vittorio Emanuele,’” Bollettino degli Italiani d’Egitto, July 
1981. 
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on a piece of land gifted to the Italian community for 99 years by King Fuad in 1928.3 It once 
stood at the center of a vast and growing Italian community. Its location in Mazarita marked the 
divide between the crowded working-class quarters inhabited by earlier émigrés and the 
emerging districts on Alexandria’s eastern coastline. Its architect, Ernesto Verrucci Bey, was an 
acquaintance of the Egyptian Royal Family. He was part of the small, elite population within the 
Italian community, upon which rested the myth of the abstracted community and its role in 
building Egypt’s modernity—his circle included the historian Angelo Sammarco and the noted 
Pulli Bey. Verrucci Bey was part of a generation that bridged the gap between the decentralized 
Italian subjects that resided in Egypt since the English occupation in 1882, and the tightly 
organized community that emerged through the “fascistization” of Italian schools, institutions, 
and daily life from late 1920s into the 1930s.  
 
                                                            
3 The land was conceded by the former king on 19 July 1928, given legal officiality through Law 
57 of 1929. Its construction was funded by members of the SIB. MAE, AP Egitto 1955 B1006, 
“rapporto consolare 1954 - Alessandria” 30 June 1955. 
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Image 14: The entryway to the Casa di Riposo and the bust of Vittorio Emanuele III. 
 
 The Casa di Riposo was constructed just at the moment the PNF enacted a major reform 
on the curriculum of Italians schools in Egypt which sought to bring Italian emigrants into the 
folds of the fascist nationalist and imperialist project. In 1932, it was dedicated to the Italian 
king, Vittorio Emanuele III, whose bust greeted visitors in the main lobby.4 A celebration of 
Mussolini and the leaders of the PNF in Egypt is carved into marble plaques that hang on the 
wall adjacent to the entryway. But this entryway is not in use and the bust of Vittorio Emanuele 
III stands facing a closed door.  
 On the ground floor, where the current entryway is situated, there is a small office for the 
nurses that care for the residents. From its opening until 1999, care at the Casa di Riposo was 
                                                            
4 Text of the dedication: “Anno X Dell’Era Fascista / Capo del Governo / Benito Mussolini / La 
colonia di Alessandria d’Egitto / Istituiva nel nome augusto del suo re / Vittorio Emanuele III / 
Questa casa di riposo …” 
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administered by the Suore missionarie pie madri della Nigrizia (a Combonian missionary 
congregation). Yet, with the waning presence of Italians in Egypt, the Italian nuns also thinned, 
eventually withdrawing from their role as caretakers and leaving the home without supervision 
for over one year. During that period, nearly one person passed away each week as its inhabitants 
struggled to find the attention they needed. Several members of the Casa di Riposo took 
authority at this moment and brought the Italian Charity Organization (Società italiana di 
beneficenza, SIB) into a more prominent role than it had previously played in the institution (its 
earlier function, part of its larger project since its founding in 1850, had been to provide financial 
support and assistance to the elderly). The SIB assumed full control of the Casa di Riposo, and 
found a group of Egyptian nurses to care for its residents.  
 This moment was one in which many thought the Casa di Riposo had fallen into 
complete indigence. It was just one episode among many through which the SIB has taken a 
greater role in the Italian community. While in the years before and immediately after the Second 
World War, the SIB had served solely as a charity organization to provide pecuniary support for 
impoverished Italians of Egypt, after the 1960s it took on responsibility for managing the Italian 
community.5 For example, the SIB attempted to convince the consulate to protect the Italian 
tombs in the freemason cemetery (also known as the “civil cementery”) in the 1970s, where the 
faded stone of one of A. and O. Civiletti’s uncles erodes among the others. Leadership within the 
organization figured the small monetary request would be fulfilled, but rather the consulate 
                                                            
5 Among its main tasks after its reconstitution in 1947, the SIB listed: 
1) to procure work for the unemployed; 
2) to foresee the institutionalization of impoverished children and the recovery of the elderly; 
3) to grant subventions—in money or material—to those who merit;  
4) to propose to consular authorities necessary [cases for repatriation]; 
5) to assist the sick at home or in hospitals. 
ACGA, Belleli Alberto fu Vittorio cl. 1883, “notizia sulla Società Italiana di Beneficenza di 
Alessandria- La casa di Riposo Vittorio Emanuele III,” 8 March 1952. 
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refused to provide any assistance. O. Laterza, then treasurer of the SIB, insisted that this was due 
to disinterest and fear of intervening in a matter that was not of political nature. Today, the 
cemetery is slowly being taken over by the Coptic church.6 Many worry—as did the recent 
visitor to Alexandria—that the Latin Cemetery will share the same fate.  
 One office on the ground floor belongs to A. Rollo, who is in charge of the quotidian 
activities of the Casa di Riposo. Another small room houses the office of the SIB, currently 
managed by F. Monaco, who carries the name of his paternal grandfather, founder in Alexandria 
of a pork production industry that lasted for three generations. Once a household name in the 
Italian community, Monaco closed its 100-year-old stores in 2012, after being required to import 
pork following the massive slaughter of pigs, ordered by then president Hosni Mubarak, during 
the swine flu scare of 2009. Over the years of research for this dissertation, I met numerous times 
with Monaco in Rome and Alexandria. We discussed my archival findings and the conversations 
with repatriated Italians of Egypt. Frequently, however, the dialogue meandered into the politics 
of the contemporary Mediterranean. Monaco drew my attention to what he considered an 
interesting dilemma. He said, “look at Italy today, Egyptian migrants number in the tens of 
thousands… they say that Italy doesn’t treat them well, doesn’t give them their institutions and 
allow for their cultural differences…” Then, he paused and said, “but look at our history, look at 
the Casa di Riposo.” What I came to learn was that Monaco perceived a great disjuncture in the 
fact that, in Egypt, the Italian community has increasingly undergone restrictions on its 
autonomy, being ever more constrained to live according to Egyptian national norms, while in 
the broader Mediterranean claims to pluralism beg the preservation—and not assimilation—of 
migrant identities. Absent from his comparison is the political economy of colonialism and 
decolonization. His goal, he confessed, is to maintain the Casa di Riposo as an island of 
                                                            
6 Interview with Osvaldo Laterza, 22 February 2013. 
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italianità within this changing sea. But, he acknowledges, the institution likely shares the same 
fate as the Italian state schools and the hospital in Alexandria, and will either be sold or ceded to 
the Egyptian state.  
 Across the hall from Monaco’s office is the small library of F. Greco, who has 
accumulated a collection of documents, books and narratives that tell the story of Alexandria’s 
past.7 Greco himself departed from Egypt in the late 1950s, in his youth, only to return after his 
retirement. In 1970, along with several members of the disbanded CoNIE, he helped to constitute 
the Associazione Nazionale Profughi Italiani d’Egitto (National Association for Refugee Italians 
of Egypt, ANPIE). The organization published a small bulletin, which he had hoped would unite 
dispersed members of the community. It was distributed amongst repatriated Italians of Egypt.8 
ANPIE also worked to attain legal rights and representation for them, specifically due to their 
internment during the Second World War and experiences as repatriates and refugees after the 
war.9 Once, on the corner of the old Fuad Street—as it is still called by Italians in Egypt, despite 
                                                            
7 Greco often claims that his name itself encompasses Alexandria’s past. Francesco Greco—he is 
French (Francesco), Greek (Greco), but an Italian, born in Alexandria, Egypt. Dalia ‘Essam, 
“Francesco Greco… al-itali al-akher fi al-iskandiriyyah,” Al-sharq al-awsat, 6 December 2010. 
8 Mario Ranno, “Perché gli italiani d’Egitto trovano difficoltà ad incontrarsi?” Bolletino degli 
Italiani d’Egitto, June 1972. 
9 He wrote prolifically about the regulations regarding the status of Italians of Egypt in the 
Bolletino degli Italiani d’Egitto. He was also responsible for drafting several forms through 
which Italians of Egypt were able to apply for benefits from the state:  
 
ANPIE, Greco requests ‘certificato contestuale’ Legge 40.4.1969 nº153 
 Certificato Contestuale  
 (art. 11 legge 4/1 1968, nº15) 
Il Consolato Generale d’Italia in Alessandria d’Egitto certifica dall’esame dei 
propri registri di stato civile e dalla documentazione in suo possesso risulta quanto 
segue:  
a) che il _____ è nato in ____ ed ha il proprio domicilio di origine in ____ atto di 
nascita n. ____ (con le generalità complete ai sensi art. 3 D.P.  2/5  1957, n.432). 
b) che la suddetta persona, già iscritta in questi registri dei nazionali sub n. ____ 
ha resieduto ininterrottamente in Egitto dall’anno ____ all’anno ____ 
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that it was renamed shari’a horriyya during Nasser’s reign—Greco turned to me and said, “you 
know, it’s not right… as an Italian in Egypt, I shouldn’t be subject to the same laws as 
Egyptians, but to Italian ones!” Greco invoked the Capitulations as though that kind of legal 
extraterritoriality offered a horizon for the present. He commonly remarked on how the Italians 
that remained in Egypt—like Monaco—were too resigned to the present. A member of the SIB’s 
directing committee told me that Greco interrupts when its members discuss the protocols of the 
Egyptian legal system. He insists that the SIB should only concern itself with Italian laws, as 
Italians should be living in the shadow of the consulate’s authority and protection. Greco 
maintains that the Italians of Egypt that remained in Egypt are destined to recede from the 
“historic” community because they do not resolutely defend their pasts. He claims, instead, that 
they have capitulated to the Egyptian legal and political system. They will be forever lost to de-
historicization.  
 On the second floor of the Casa di Riposo are rooms for Italians too impoverished to pay 
for their own housing in Alexandria. There are also several inhabitants whose health does not 
permit them to live alone. Since the late 1960s, the community has grown increasingly elderly 
with the departure of its younger members.10 The SIB provides for these inhabitants. Around the 
corner are several large abandoned rooms, which once housed residents in dormitory style. In the 
1990s, one of these rooms was converted into a museum by two French architects. The museum 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
c) che il sopracitato connazionale è stato internato, perché cittadino  italiano e per 
causa di guerra, nei campi di concentramento per internati civili italiani in Egitto 
dal ____ al ____ 
d) che alla data del suo rimpatrio definitivo, avvenuto ____ il Sig. ____ era 
cittadino italiano 
Si rilascia il presente certificato a richiesta dell’interessato i benefici previsti dalla 
legge 30/4/1969, n.153 e per gli usi consentiti dalle altre norme legislative..... 
10 Archives of the Società Italiana di Beneficenza, Alexandria, Egypt. See also Francesco 
Piccione, “Appunti sulla collettività italiana in Egitto” Affari sociali internazionali, 3 (1989): 
133-135. 
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is aptly named "the Time Machine (La Macchina del Tempo)” and is full of items of departed 
Italians of Egypt. I walked into the vast, dusty room. On the right is a stack of old, cardboard 
suitcases that reaches the ceiling. Their tags recount the names of Italians who traveled back and 
forth on the Esperia, between Italy and Egypt, others who left occasionally for Cairo, and still 
others who arrived from Italy and never had the opportunity--or desire--to return. A long table is 
covered with household items. There are antique cameras, photographs, a blender, kitchenware, 
glasses and plates, bathroom toiletries, a late-nineteenth century end table, two small chairs from 
the 1930s. The walls are covered with photographs and pages torn from photo albums. Some 
from after the war, others much older, from the late 1800s, taken in Italy of hopeful emigrants 
prior to their departure. An empty frame is stocked with old keys rather than photos. The keys 
opened doors in neighborhoods around Alexandria. In the corner is the last “exhibit” of the 
museum. A small dark room created out of the obsolete oven, which was once used to prepare 
meals for the population of Italians housed at the Casa di Riposo. It has been gutted. I entered the 
small chamber, eerily opened the oven doors, peeked through, and found an old hospital bed with 
photos strewn on top of it. A rack of canes, some old jackets and ties. It is dark, dusty and faded. 
Leaving this room, and leaving the museum, I returned to the empty, silent hallway of the second 
floor. There is nothing to narrate one’s visit of the museum aside from a photocopy of the 
designer’s original proposal, taped to the outside wall. The museum has gone unvisited for at 
least one decade. It is locked with one key, kept with the secretary of the SIB. 
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Image 15: Inside the Time Machine. 
 
 The third floor was added shortly after the Casa di Riposo’s initial construction in the 
early 1930s. It has small rooms for paying inhabitants. On this floor, there is Osvaldo Laterza, 
the “memory” of the Italian community, as he is called by others, whose small fishing-net 
industry (which employed mainly Egyptians) kept him active in Egypt until late in his life. There 
is also his cousin, Liliane, whose loud staccato Sicilian accent echoes throughout the floor. There 
is the quiet Rosa, who sits with her softened paperbacks, and Maurice, who says no more than a 
few words (in French) only when he plays backgammon with Rollo. They have tea together each 
day around a small table. Only two have relatives younger than 50 still living in Egypt.  
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 Each corner of the Casa di Riposo contains multiple and layered histories, immense 
narratives of the lives that crossed the sea, settled abroad, and departed once again. They mark 
the passage of time through fascism and the construction of institutions in which the Italians 
could congregate and through which regime propaganda conveyed an image of itself as the 
harbinger of change, as the revolutionary political movement that would restore “prestige” to 
Italian emigrants. But the walls of the Casa di Riposo also enclose the failure of fascism and the 
end of colonialism. They demonstrate, as historian Todd Shepard notes, how colonialism and 
decolonization “still inform world history.” They are shadows of a past. Yet, in order to be 
shadows, the object blocking light must stand, must cast upon the present the weight of 
something still vital. When the Casa di Riposo was dedicated to Vittorio Emanuele III in 1932, 
little did the community anticipate that the dethroned king would depart Italy in 1946 to spend 
his last days in Alexandria and remain entombed in St. Catherine’s Church until today (each 
year, a small group of loyalists to the monarchy visit the tomb and place a wreath at its foot). Nor 
did they imagine that Fuad’s son would abdicate to Italy in 1953. These multiple and layered 
histories--their experiences and expectations--are present in this way and, as Michel Rolph 
Trouillot reminds us, they are the traces that help us to comprehend why not any “fiction can 
pass for history.”  
 Walls close tightly around the Casa di Riposo. Since the uprisings against Hosni Mubarak 
in 2011, the walls around the grounds have grown several meters in height, sheltering this small 
island from the changing world outside. But it is not enclosed from time. It is not excluded from 
the present. The Casa di Riposo is not a time capsule, demarcating temporal boundaries between 
that which has passed and which continues to become. This is why this dissertation is not about 
memory. I have not told the story of pasts and presents separately arranged in a temporal 
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hierarchy, but rather in this dissertation I have attempted to recount the jointed paths of time 
through which histories are generated. The community inside the Casa di Riposo is living its end 
across the shores from the repatriated Italians of Egypt; living out the non-synchronic rhythms of 
the Mediterranean’s decolonization.  
 While the community of repatriated Italians of Egypt is dispersed and fragmented 
throughout contemporary Italy, the social and material architecture of the Casa di Riposo 
embodies the indissolubility of space and time, as in Bakhtin’s chronotope. The spatial 
configurations implied by terms like “metropole” and “colony,” “immigrant” and “emigrant” are 
blurred in the temporalities of the Casa di Riposo.11 It was in these halls—in their echoes and 
silences, their absences and presence—that I understood the confluence of the past and present 
worlds which I have compiled into this dissertation. Here, in the Casa di Riposo, the past 
becomes identity through its disappearance, through its absence, as much as its presence. In 
drawing out this project, I have argued that the work of colonialist and imperialist politics of 
earlier epochs lives within the historical consciousness of a community in contemporary Italy. 
On a much broader scale, however, I have argued that the process of departure has created this 
community out of time--it is a community whose semantic marking as “historic” has rendered it 
Other. These processes, I contend, help us to see how most communities are constituted of 
layered and non-synchronic histories. Rarely are communities formed through isolated events. 
Rather, the slow yet persistent waves of historical time generate meaning and assign values to 
community. In this case, departure from Egypt extends into the present of the Italians of Egypt. 
Overlapping scales of lived experience in the political gyrations of the twentieth-century 
Mediterranean coalesce into this community. The Casa di Riposo is densely permeated by these 
histories. The presence of affective remembering in conjunction with rigorous archival 
                                                            
11 Stoler, “Imperial Debris,” 200. 
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exploration permits us to reveal the networks, assemblages, and accumulations that enable being-
in-history (esserci nella storia). De Martino’s “crisis of presence” is a struggle against historical 
time. And thus, I return to my initial question: can a crisis of presence succumb to historical 
time? This is the vulnerability of history, the possibility that release from the “crisis of presence” 
does not happen and a community becomes incommensurable with the present and, slowly, 
erodes the sand away from its own shore.  
 As I narrate this story, the Italian consulate in Alexandria closed in 2013, less than one 
year after I finished archival work there, because it was deemed an inefficient use of funds by 
Italy’s Foreign Ministry. The community that once justified its presence is no longer present. 
Some of the documents were transferred to Cairo, others vanished into Alexandria’s waste, and 
still others were sold onto Egypt’s black market of documents. In 2014, Antonio, who managed 
the daily activities of the Casa di Riposo, suddenly passed away from a cancer that thrust itself 
into the future faster than his own will to life. Osvaldo, on the third floor, and Lilian, on the 
second, both passed away within months of Antonio. The SIB struggles to maintain the 
community with its limited funds, while Monaco and Greco conflict over competing visions of 
the future for a community of the past. The museum remains locked and unvisited.
 323 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX A 
Interviews 
 
IN ITALY 
Renato Berni – October 7 2011 [Milano]  
Loredana and Claudio – December 1 2011 [Olgiate] 
Patrizia and Anna Paoletti and Loredana – January 28 2012 [Pisa] 
Patrizia and Anna Paoletti – February 10 2012 [Pisa] 
Convegno di AIDE – March 3 2012 [Roma] 
Presentazione del libro di Carolina Delburgo – March 6 2012 [Milano] 
Alfredo Sinagaglia – March 13 2012 [Milano] 
Roland Cohen – March 15 2012 [Milano] 
Renato Berni – March 16 2012 [Milano] 
Agatone family – March 18 2012 [Paderno Dugnano] 
Alberto Ades - March 21 2012 [Milano] 
Bruno Buccetti - March 23 2012 [Milano]  
Renato Toscano - March 28 2012 [Bologna] 
Carolina Delburgo - March 29 2012 [Bologna] 
Guido Migliorini & Francesco Pizzi - April 3 2012 [Milano] 
Egizia Agatone & Alessandro (suo marito) – April 4 2012 [Milano] 
Mimi (moglie di Alfredo) & Alfredo Sinigaglia – April 5 2012 [Milano] 
Sandro Manzoni – April 9-10 2012 [Ginevra (Switzerland)] 
Giovanna Penino – April 16 2012 [Milano] 
Ada Civiletti – April 18 2012 (Giuseppe de Gobbi il suo marito) [Cusano Milanino] 
Nino Liciardello April 19-20 2012 [Pordenone] 
Lydia Mieli Pressel Aprile 21 2012 [Pavia] 
Deborah Cotich – April 23 2012 (la nipote di Giovanna Penino) [Bergamo] 
Francesco Monaco – April 27 2012 [Roma] 
AIDE assemblea a Roma – april 28 2012 [Roma] 
Giulio Augerio – april 28 2012 [Roma] 
Graziela Callery – May 9 2012 [Roma] 
Giuseppe Longo, Jacqueline & Carlo Gerasimo – May 10 2012 [Ostia] 
Giuseppe Longo e Loredana Farina – May 15 2012 [Ostia] 
Giuseppe De Stefano, Michele Vitulli, e il dottore – May 17 2012 [Ostia] 
Oscar Civiletti – May 23 2012 [Montesacro] 
Anna Moscatelli – May 25 2012 [Ostia] 
Michele Vitulli – May 30 2012 [Ostia] 
Giuseppe Longo, Loredana Farina, and Michele Ardizzone – 1 June 2012 [Ostia] 
Bruno Cristodoro (& Ivano, il figlio) – 3 June 2012 [Bracciano] 
Amalia Romanelli – 4 June 2012 [Roma, Eur] 
Leda Diodovich – 5 June 2012 [Roma, Eur] 
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Loredana Farina & Giuseppe Longo – 6 June 2012 [Ostia]  
Gaetano Santoro – 7 June 2012 [Roma] 
Silvio Calabria – 12 June 2012 [Roma] 
Bruno d’Alba & Marcello Paolini – 27 June 2012 [Casal Palocco] 
Francesco Monaco – 1 July 2012 [Parco Leonardo] 
Gaetano Santoro – 5 July 2012 [Roma] 
Alessandro Paraschevas – 8 July 2012 [Roma]  
Fernando Salvatori – 10 September 2012 [Roma] 
Adriana Piperno and Giuseppe Salerno (Giuseppe Longo) - 10 Ottobre 2012 [Roma] 
Edmondo Massone – 20 October 2012 [Bel poggio Tennis Club, Roma]  
Arnaldo Torrisi, Gaetano Santoro, Roberto Ruberti, & unknown – 25 October 2012 [Roma] 
Federico Salvatori – 26 October 2012 [Roma, but from Milano] 
Roberto Ruberti – 29 October 2012 [Roma] 
 
IN EGYPT 
Ladi Skakal (Cioni) – 9 November 2012 [Cairo/Heliopolis] 
Edda Tedeschi – 13 November 2012 [Cairo/Zamalek] 
Elide Dello Strologo (Sherif, Ladi, il maestro) – 13 November 2012 [Cairo/Helio] 
Ladi Skakal (Cioni) – 13 November 2012 [Cairo, going through boxes] 
Annie and Patrizia Bercovitch – 15 November 2012 [Cairo/Zamalek] 
Luciano Petro Paraskevas (Patrick) – 23 November 2012 [Alexandria] 
Marisa Abdelmessih (Cristafulli) & Sig.a Amadeo – 25 November 2012 [Alex.-Sprt.] 
Maria Giovanna Nadali – 26 November 2012 [Alex-Casa di Riposo] 
Carmelo Bottaro – 26 November 2012 [Alex-Casa di Risposo] 
Mario Schragher (mother Graziella di Novi) – 9 December 2012 [Casa di Riposa] 
Franco Monaco – 9 December 2012 [CR- Italians, class and neighborhoods] 
Anita Russo – 10 December 2012 [Alex] 
Mirella Morsi – 12 December 2012 [Alex] 
Giovanna Vennucci – 16 December 2012 [Alex-Roushdy] 
Osvaldo and Massimo Laterza – 20 December 2012 [Casa di Riposo] 
Mirella Morsi – 8 January 2013 [Alex] 
Liliana Lenzi and Maria Nadali – 16 January 2013 [Alex-Casa di Riposo] 
Antonio Rollo – 24 January 2013 [Alex - Casa di Riposo] 
Biagio Azzarelli – 9 February 2013 [Alex – negozio Manshieh] 
Lanzi e Nadali - 13 February 2013 [Casa] 
Osvaldo and Massimo Laterza - 20 February 2013 [Casa] 
Osvaldo Laterza – 3 April 2013 [Casa] 
Antonio De Ferrari – 7 April 2013 [Alex – Cleopatra] 
Osvaldo Laterza and Yolanda – 13 April 2013 [Casa] 
Osvaldo and Massimo Laterza - 19 April 2013 [Casa] 
Gildio Sampieri - 20 April 2013 [Alex - v. farahda] 
Alexandre Buccianti – 13 June 2013 [Cairo] 
Astorino – 19 June 2013 [Cairo] 
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APPENDIX B 
Archives and Sources 
 
IN ITALY 
Archivio Centrale dello Stato (ACS) 
 Ministero dell’Interno  
a) Gabinetto (1953-74)1 
b) Dir. Gen. Demografia e razza, affari diversi (1938-1945)  
c) Dir. Gen. Pubblica Siccurezza 
 Ministero di Lavoro e Providenza Sociale (MLPS) 
a) D.G. collocamento della manodopera 
i) Div. VIII accordi di emigrazione verso paesi comunitari  
ii) Div. Emigrazione verso paesi extracomunitari 
  b) ufficio lavoro e della massima occupazione 
 Croce Rossa Italiana  
  a) Ufficio Madrinato 
  b) Servizio Affari Internazionali 
 Presidenza del consiglio dei Ministri (PCM)  
  a) Ufficio del consigliere diplomatico 
 Casellario Politico Centrale 
 Segretaria Particolare del Duce 
 Ministero della Cultura Popolare  
  a) Gabinetto 
  b) Reports 
  c) Propaganda 
 Real Casa – Viaggi (1931-1933)  
Archivio Storico del Ministero degli Affari Esteri (MAE) 
 Direzione Generale Affari Politici (AP)  
a) Egitto (1931-1956) 
b) Israel (1951) 
 Ambasciata al Cairo (1923-1940) 
 Gabinetto del Ministro e della Segretaria Generale (II) 
 Direzione Generale Affari Politici Ufficio III (1948-1961) 
 Direzione Generale Italiani all’estero Ufficio I (1924-1946) 
 Serie “Z” Contenzioso 
Archivio Storico dell’unione delle comunità ebraiche italiane (UCEI)  
 Fondo Moisè Pontremoli 
 AUCII 1965-1968  
Archivio della Società Dante Alighieri (SDA) 
                                                            
1 All dates in parantheses are the dates of documents consulted, in cases where the archives are 
further divided by years.  
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 Cairo [1896-1960]  
 Alessandria [1933-1952] 
Archivio dello Stato Napoli (ASN) 
 Questure – Gabinetto  
  a) disposizioni di massima 
  b) seconda serie (1902-1971), massime 
 Centro di Emigrazione 
a) I versamento (prospetti di lavoratori espatriati e rimpatriati e relazione al 
ministero)  
 Prefettura di Napoli – Gabinetto III versamento  
Archivio Storico di Comune di Livorno 
 Ente Comunale di Assistenza  
Archivio dei Luoghi Pii Elemosinieri (Azienda di Servizi alla Persona “Golgi-Redaelli”), Milano 
(ALPE) 
 archivio assistenziale, atti 
 archivio assistenziale, profughi egitto  
Archivio dello Stato Brindisi  
Istituto Nazionale per la Storia del Movimento di Liberazione in Italia “Ferruccio Parri” 
(INSMLI) – fondo “Joe Battino” and fondo Guido Valabrega  
Archivio Sonoro “Franco Coggiola” del Circolo Gianni Bosio, Roma, Fondo Pantera 039, int. 
Alessandro Portelli 
Fondazione Antonio Gramsci 
 Fronte Unito (1943-1945) 
 
IN EGYPT 
Archivio/Registri del Consolato Generale d’Italia in Alessandria d’Egitto (ACGA) 
Archivio/Registri del Cancelleria Consolare/Ambasciata d’Italia al Cairo (CCAC) 
Biblioteca/Archivio di Santa Caterina in Alessandria d'Egitto 
Archives of the Società italiana di Beneficenza 
Centre d'Études Alexandrines (CEA)  
 Il Giornale d’Oriente 
 Cronaca 
 Oriente 
Centro Archeologico Italiano al Cairo, Champollion (CAI) 
 Il Giornale d’Oriente 
L’imparziale 
Francis Amin Collections  
Ladi Skakal Personal/Family Documents  
 
IN SWITZERLAND 
Swiss Federal Archives (SFA) 
 
IN ENGLAND 
British National Archives (BNA) 
Foreign Office (FO) 
War Office (WO) 
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